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Foreword
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the United States and its
NATO partners to confront the impact of hybrid warfare far beyond the
battlefield. Targeting Europe’s energy security, Russia’s malign inf luence
campaigns and malicious cyber intrusions are affecting global gas prices,
driving up food costs, disrupting supply chains and grids, and testing
US and Allied military mobility. This study examines how NATO’s adversaries
are using hybrid warfare, highlights the vulnerabilities in critical energy
infrastructure and energy dependencies that exist across the Alliance,
and provides mitigation strategies available to the member states.
Cyberattacks targeting the renewable energy landscape during Europe’s
green transition are increasing, making it urgent that new cybersecurity tools
are developed to protect these emerging technologies. No less significant are
the cyber and information operations targeting energy security in Eastern
Europe as it seeks to become energy independent from Russia and the economic
coercion used against Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland,
and Bulgaria to stop gas from f lowing to parts or all of these countries.
China’s malign investments in Southern and Mediterranean Europe are
enabling Beijing to control the critical energy infrastructure of some
NATO member states at a critical moment in the global balance of power.
What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare will be an important
reference for NATO officials and EUCOM and US installations operating
in the European theater. With US military and NATO troop mobility often
dependent on host critical infrastructure for their energy needs, it is more
crucial than ever for the United States to increase its supply of technologies
to foster energy independence for US military installations in Europe,
which have seen a 30 percent increase in troop presence since the beginning
of the war.
The technologies highlighted in section t wo analyze tools
for enhancing cybersecurity and energy independence. It is equally important
that resilience planning occurs as Europe faces energy shortages that are
predicted to lead to grid blackouts, gas shortages, heating challenges,
and communications interruptions starting this year and continuing
through 2025. The handbook’s country-by-country analysis will be helpful
for personnel charged with providing cyber support and security, mobility,
and communications to the United States and its allies.
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The study team of cyber policy analysts—including US military
officers, University of Washington students, and researchers from NATO
partner nations—led by Dr. Sarah Lohmann offers important mitigation
strategies for addressing energy security challenges in today’s gray warfare
environment. The Strategic Studies Institute is proud to publish this
important contribution to the understanding of how to strengthen energy
security in an era of hybrid warfare.

Dr. Carol V. Evans
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
and US Army War College Press
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Executive Summary
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the long-term energy
dependencies on Moscow that Europe will neither be able to resolve quickly,
nor without great sacrifice. Russia’s hybrid warfare—a combination of kinetic
strikes against key infrastructure, information manipulation, malign finance,
economic coercion, and cyber operations—has used Ukraine to target the heart
of Europe’s energy security. This war has forced the Continent to consider
how to realize its economic, environmental, and geostrategic energy goals
on its own.
This study found systemic dependencies and cyber vulnerabilities
in critical energy infrastructure throughout the European continent could
impact the Alliance’s political stability and threaten military effectiveness.
Forward mobility and troop readiness is affected directly by energy shortfalls
and increasing cyber vulnerabilities across NATO. The following main
f indings related to cyber and malign inf luence provide a sobering view
of the challenges of hybrid warfare on energy security in NATO nations.

Increased Cyber Threats Threaten Energy Critical Infrastructure
Russia and its agents have successfully penetrated energy networks
in Europe and North America and deployed malware to undermine
critical systems and infrastructure in the target country. Since the invasion
of Ukraine, significant cyberattacks have impacted NATO member states.
Advanced critical energy infrastructure warning and cyber threat
mitigation systems currently in place are not adequate to ensure safety and
resilience when emerging technologies being integrated into energy systems
are not cyber secured. There are large differences between NATO member
states in cyber mitigation capabilities and standards.
This book identifies potential solutions to mitigate cyberattacks and
increase energy independence for the militaries of NATO member states
and to prevent cyber vulnerabilities to energy critical infrastructure.
These options include a new generation of cyber early warning systems
(CEWS) and microgridding.

Energy Sector Supply-Chain Vulnerabilities Impact Military Operations
Moody’s Analytics has reported the greatest risk to the global supply chain
is now caused by the Russia-Ukraine military conf lict, not the pandemic.
xi
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With Russia supplying 43 percent of Europe’s natural gas and 40 percent
of the world ’s palladium (used for semiconductors) and Ukraine
supplying 70 percent of the world’s neon (used to create computer chips),
the prolonged uncertainty of the conf lict could continue to affect the global
supply chain severely.
Going for ward, supply-chain components will continue to be
subject to major threats from different subchains that interact directly
with low-security scrutiny. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the gas, power,
and nuclear industries are pervasive, increasing the threats due to the
interactions within each subchain.
Strategies for higher supply-chain resilience could include: (1) supply-chain
mapping and modeling to better predict supply and demand, (2) diversifying
suppliers, (3) shortening supply chains, and (4) automation with a careful
evaluation of cyber risks.

Malign Influence Is Directly Impacting Critical Energy Infrastructure
Russia views cyberattacks, hacking, and the spread of disinformation
as instruments of foreign policy and national securit y interests.
Through compromised websites (such as news sources and official government
sites), Russian operatives published fabricated articles, stories, quotes,
and other documents criticizing the United States and NATO’s presence
in Eastern Europe. Information operations and malign inf luence
specif ically target the energy sector in countries like Poland, Romania,
and Germany, with operational and economic impact.
Early detection of disinformation campaigns is crucial to prevent
malicious actors from escalating and exploiting this activity. To solve this
problem, a task force could be established within NATO’s Joint Intelligence
and Security Division to establish a network for detecting and countering
disinformation in its nascent stages. The information would then be classified
according to its impact (including threat level in terms of timeline) and its
possibility of spreading to a local, state, national or international level.
These f indings and recommendations are not exhaustive. By using
emerging tools to foster energ y independence and cybersecurit y
while countering malign inf luence, NATO can navigate from a position
of strength and resilience in the conf lict-laden days ahead.
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Introduction
Sarah J. Lohmann
©2022 Sarah J. Lohmann

The week before Russia invaded Uk raine in Februar y 2022,
the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) attacked the websites
of Ukraine’s defense ministry, army, and two largest banks in a distributed
denial-of -service attack called “the largest assault of its kind in the country’s
history.” 1 Of even greater concern was a data-wiping malware found
on computers across Ukrainian critical infrastructure organizations
(from financial to aviation and IT) on February 23, the same day Putin
announced military action against the Donbas. 2 Was this a coincidence?
According to NATO: “Hybrid threats combine military and nonmilitary
as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyberattacks,
economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular
forces.” 3 This book examines how hybrid warfare (including disinformation,
cyberattacks, and economic investment and pressure aimed at the energy sector)
is shaping the battlefield and rattling energy security across NATO states and
beyond. In this era of hybrid warfare, cyberattacks or disinformation campaigns
and kinetic attacks happen in coordination in the same limited time frame.
Alternatively, cyber and information operations can cause the destruction
or disablement of critical energy infrastructure even more potently, and
at a lesser cost, than kinetic attacks. Indeed, on the day Ukraine was supposed
to start “isolation mode” tests for its new power network to begin the process
of decoupling from the Russian grid, Russia started a full-scale invasion
of the country.4

1. Valerie Hopkins, “A Hack of the Defence Ministry, Army and State Banks Was the Largest of Its Kind
in Ukraine’s History,” New York Times (website), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/world/europe/ukraine
-cyberattack.html; and Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office of the Government of the
United Kingdom, “Government Response: UK Assess Russian Involvement in Cyberattacks on Ukraine,”
February 18, 2022.
2. Sean Lyngaas, “Key Ukrainian Websites Hit by Series of Cyberattacks,” CNN (website),
February 24, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/23/europe/ukraine-government-commercial-organizations
-data-wiping-hack/index.html.
3. “NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats,” NATO (website), June 7, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en
/natohq/topics_156338.htm.
4. Andrew Lee, “War in Ukraine: Russia Attacks Nation Looking to Renewables and EU Grid for Energy
Freedom,” Recharge (website), February 24, 2022, https://www.rechargenews.com/energy-transition/war-in
-ukraine-russia-attacks-nation-looking-to-renewables-and-eu-grid-for-energy-freedom/2-1-1173808.
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While this ground war serves as a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty
and international norms, Moscow’s hybrid warfare has actively targeted
Ukraine’s energy security since 2014. It has used cyberattacks on the grid and
disinformation campaigns, and it has sought to divide NATO Allies around
issues such as the certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which was
supposed to deliver gas from Russia to Germany without transiting Ukraine.
Using the pipeline as a bargaining chip to escalate conf lict with Ukraine,
European natural gas prices increased by 62 percent the day of the invasion. 5
While Russia’s methods and targets are not new, Europe can no longer
look away. The costs are too high. It is clear the Ukraine conf lict is providing
NATO members with daily basic lessons in hybrid warfare. Following a major
Russian cyberattack on Ukraine’s grid repelled by the Ukrainian government
on April 8, the cyber agencies of the Five Eyes warned on April 20 that
Russia was preparing to target the critical infrastructure of countries that
sanctioned Russia. 6
Perhaps the most clear-cut example of critical infrastructure targeting
is Germany, which remained Russia’s largest importer of Russian gas,
paying $9.5 billion for the product in the f irst two months of the war
alone.7 At the same time, Germany is a major distributor of Russian gas
to other NATO countries and is the economic powerhouse of Europe.
Any attacks on Germany’s critical infrastructure and economy are felt deeply
across the Alliance.
Germany’s renewable energy sector has been especially vulnerable
to cyberattacks since the invasion of Ukraine. A February 24, 2022, cyberattack
on a satellite providing services to Ukraine knocked 5,800 wind turbines
in Germany and Central Europe off line, affecting 11 gigawatts of power. 8
5. Kate Duffy, “Russian Gas Flows to Europe via Ukraine Reportedly Jumped Nearly 40% on Thursday,
Underscoring the Continent’s Dependence on Putin’s Energy,” Business Insider (website), February 25, 2022,
https://www.businessinsider.in/politics/world/news/russian-gas-flows-to-europe-via-ukraine-reportedly-jumped
-nearly-40-on-thursday-underscoring-the-continents-dependence-on-putins-energy/articleshow/89831410.cms.
6. AJ Vicens, “Russian Hackers Thwarted in Attempt to Take Out Electrical Grid, Ukrainians Say,”
Cyber Scoop (website), April 12, 2022, https://www.cyberscoop.com/ukrainian-electrical-grid-industroyer2
-russia-sandworm/; and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Alert AA22-110A,
“Russian State Sponsored and Criminal Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure,” CISA (website),
April 20, 2022, https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-110a.
7. Dipaneeta Das, “Germany the Top Buyer of Russian Gas at $9.5 Billion since War Began in Ukraine,”
April 28, 2022, https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/europe/germany-the-top-buyer-of-russian-gas
-worth-9-dot-5bn-since-war-began-in-ukraine-report-articleshow.html.
8. Joseph Henry, “Europe Cyberattack Results to ‘Massive’ Internet Outage; about 5,800 Wind Turbines
Went Offline,” Tech Times (website), March 5, 2022, https://www-techtimes-com.cdn.ampproject.org
/c/s/www.techtimes.com/amp/articles/272624/20220305/europe-cyberattack-results-massive-internet-outage
-5-800-wind-turbines.htm.
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On April 12, another cyberattack against the German wind-energy
company Deutsche Windtechnik caused the company to shut down the
remote-control systems of 2,000 wind turbines for a day. Conti, the pro-Russian
government ransomware group, launched a cyberattack against another turbine
maker, Nordex SE, and forced the company to shut down its IT systems.9
Interrupting Europe’s energy supply through a cyberattack can be much
cheaper than kinetic attacks because the current microgrids and wind turbines
often do not yet have comprehensive cybersecurity protection.10
Step by step, Russia has used hybrid warfare to challenge energy
security in Ukraine and across NATO member states as Moscow seeks
to beat back NATO inf luence and expand its power on the world stage.
Now an armed conf lict, the Ukraine crisis is a case study in how Russia’s
hybrid warfare has challenged energy security with an impact across NATO,
far beyond Ukraine’s borders.
For this study, the International Energy Agency (IEA) def inition
of energy security will be used. The IEA def ines energy security
as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable
price.” 11 Energy sources can include electricity, nuclear, oil, gas, coal,
and renewables. In this context, NATO has stated that “attacks on complex
energy infrastructure by hostile states, terrorists or hacktivists can have
repercussions across regions. Since electricity is key to the global energy
transition, power infrastructure security is becoming the cornerstone of energy
security.” 12 This book includes a focus on cyberattacks on the electric grid
and on energy critical infrastructure—to include systems operating pipelines,
grids, and nuclear energy. It examines how hybrid warfare is being used
by NATO’s adversaries, what vulnerabilities in critical energy infrastructure
and energy dependencies exist across the Alliance, and what mitigation
strategies are available to the member states.
9. Catherine Stupp, “European Wind Energy Sector Hit in Wave of Attacks,” Wall Street Journal
(website), April 25, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/european-wind-energy-sector-hit-in-wave
-of-hacks-11650879000#:~:text=European%20Wind-Energy%20Sector%20Hit%20in%20Wave%20
of % 2 0Hac k s, gover n ments% 2 0 move% 2 0 to% 2 0 t ra nsit ion% 2 0 aw ay % 2 0 f rom% 2 0Russia n% 2 0
fuel?msclkid=7f9116ddc7cd11ec9178cad5c4c63099.
10. Vytautas Butrimas, “Assessment Study of Cybersecurity of Smart-grid Technologies Employed
in Operational Camps,” Energy Security Centre of Excellence (website), August 11, 2021,
https://enseccoe.org/data/public/uploads/2021/11/vb-cyber-asses-study-v1dot2dot3-oct-1-2021-cyber-sg
-for-mil-camps.pdf.
11. “Energy Security: Ensuring the Uninterrupted Availability of Energy Sources at an Affordable Price,”
International Energy Agency (website), December 2, 2019, https://www.iea.org/areas-of-work/ensuring
-energy-security.
12. “NATO’s Role in Energy Security,” NATO (website), June 23, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps
/en/natohq/topics_49208.htm.
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How to Use This Handbook
Written as a handbook of mitigation policies for energy security,
the first two sections on vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies and the
new technologies being built to address hybrid attacks on energy security can
be used in the classroom, whether in a professional military education (PME)
context or in a public university context. They are also meant to inform
NATO and military officials of the policies and tools available to them in the
current gray energy battleground context.
Specifically, the first section assesses key vulnerabilities in critical energy
infrastructure in a hybrid warfare context. It starts with an examination
of the main gray warfare threats to critical energy infrastructure, including
to information technolog y, operational technolog y, and industrial
control systems. It then looks at vulnerabilities in an Internet of Things
environment that are especially prevalent in the critical energ y
infrastructure sector.Finally, it looks at malign inf luence and the impact
of disinformation on energy security. Each “vulnerabilities” chapter ends
with recommendations for successful defense.
The second section provides new research on key hybrid warfare mitigation
technologies, including a new generation of early warning systems and
independent, non-hackable energy sources such as microgrids.
For commanders and officers ensuring military mobility, communications,
and logistics where host critical infrastructure could challenge the mission,
section three contains useful briefs and maps on cyber and disinformation
targets. This section provides case studies on cyber and disinformation
vulnerabilities across NATO member states, mitigation strategies currently
in place to deal with those weaknesses, and what members should do to build
robust defenses. The NATO countries analyzed were chosen based on their
strategic and military relevance for NATO’s energy security.
The Baltics, currently geolocated on the front line to Russia’s hybrid
war, are in the process of separating from Russia’s power network.
The southeastern member states, with key military hubs for air and sea,
have other challenges. Romania, rich in renewables, must ensure it is cyber
secured in the Internet of Things environment. Countries like Italy, Türkiye,
and Greece have critical infrastructure strongly tied to China and Russia.
This dependence is already causing energy insecurity. Plus, Western and
Central Europe, with their up-till-now reliance on Russian oil and gas, are now
involved in a cyber, information, and economic war that has rattled markets
and caused gas and oil prices to soar to historic levels not seen since the 1970s.
xvi
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The case studies section also provides a cyber and disinformation attack
vortex map for each country. The threat information and estimates included
in these maps were based on open-source information identifying where major
critical energy infrastructure and military assets were located. These data
were paired with unclassified information on threat timelines and analysis
from country, military, and topic experts and sources. The first rendition
of the maps was created in summer and fall 2021. Many of the areas identified
in red as highly likely to be attacked in the next six months did indeed see
malicious cyberattacks and intrusions or malign information operations.
The maps were updated after receiving input from US Army commands
and after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
It is our hope this study will guide the US Army, NATO off icials,
energy-sector owners and operators, and engaged citizens to understand
the disinformation and cyber operations impacting critical energy
infrastructure in NATO states. This handbook presents new research on ways
to strengthen energy independence and cyber best practices to mitigate the
negative impacts of hybrid war.
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ABSTRACT: In the context of a decade of a record number of cyberattacks
in the public and private sectors, this chapter discusses the cyber
vulnerabilities of NATO’s critical energy infrastructure. Smart technology,
information and data storage, and attacker anonymity provide significant
vulnerabilities for state and non-state actors seeking to target energy
infrastructure in order to intimidate adversaries, economize offensive assets,
or disrupt energy f lows to vital military and civilian sectors. Cyberattacks
on energy infrastructure can target informational technologies, operational
technologies, or industrial control systems. Major attacks on energy
infrastructure between 2000 and 2021 demonstrate evolving attacker
capabilities and the need for more advanced security methods.
Key words: energ y securit y, smar t technologies, cybersecurit y,
St u xnet, ISOC, I ACS, cr itica l energ y inf rastr uct ure, c yber
t h r e at s , c r it ic a l i n f r a s t r uc t u r e , i n for m at ion te c h nolog y,
operational technology, SolarWinds, Colonial Pipeline, NotPetya, ICS,
APT, norms, industrial cybersecurity

The methods of hybrid war described in this study represent a new and
more sinister trend in conf lict characterized by secrecy, cynicism, and the
convenience of denial and a significant challenge to democratic societies
based on trust, transparency, and respect for the rights of others. While
cybersecurity in the information technology (IT) or office IT realm has
witnessed the development and implementation of measures to address
3
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threats from cyberspace for decades, industrial cybersecurity practitioners are
in catch-up mode. As a milestone, we can compare Bill Gates’ famous e-mail
sent to Microsoft employees about emphasizing security in its products
in 2002.1 On the other hand, efforts by industrial control system (ICS)
practitioners to implement secure coding practices for configuring program
logic controllers (PLCs) that are the backbone of industrial automation and
control systems (IACS) only began in summer 2020. 2 This change came despite
a decade of recorded cyberattacks on PLCs and industrial control systems
found in nuclear facilities, petrochemical plants, and steel mills. 3
In the military sphere where energy is used, the situation is similar.
For example, the application of “smart” technologies such as the “smart
grid” for military camps of the future creates an additional new task besides
protecting the information system.4 This application will bring together a mass
of sensitive and confidential data as it will provide information on the camp’s
operational activity, its energy supply, and its organization. Thus, adversaries
could leverage these data to neutralize the operation of the camp.
On the other hand, in addition to the information or data, the technologies
used to operate the smart grid can also be targeted, resulting in service
degradation, equipment damage, loss of life, or harm to the environment. 5
Thus, adversaries could disrupt the physical processes involved with the
generation, storage, and distribution of power along the smart grid and also
degrade or neutralize camp operations. 6 Therefore, it is necessary to apply
industry best practices and industrial standards to ensure the cybersecurity,
safety, reliability, and performance of the technologies used.

1. Bill Gates, “Trustworthy Computing,” Wired (website), January 25, 2002, https://www.wired.com
/2002/01/bill-gates-trustworthy-computing/.
2. “Version 1.0 of the PLC 20 Is Due for Release in November 2020,” ISA (website), 2020,
https://top20.isa.org/top/yearly.
3. Vytautas Butrimas, “Targeting Control and Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS): New Escalation of
Cyber Threats to Critical [Energy] Infrastructure,” https://www.enseccoe.org/data/public/uploads/2018/10
/v.butrimas-new-escalation-of-cyber-threats-to-critical-energy-infrastructure.pdf.
4. Gail Reitenbach, “The U.S. Military Gets Smart Grid,” Power (website), January 1, 2012,
https://www.powermag.com/the-u-s-military-gets-smart-grid/.
5. Jeff St. John, “The Military Microgrid as Smart Grid Asset,” Green Tech Media (website), May 17, 2013,
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-military-microgrid-as-smart-grid-asset.
6. Lily Hay Newman, “The Hail Mary Plan to Restart a Hacked US Electric Grid,” Wired (website),
November 14, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/black-start-power-grid-darpa-plum-island/.
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Why would a motivated advanced persistent threat (APT) actor consider
using cyber means to attack the critical energy infrastructure (CEI) of NATO
or a member nation? Here are potential reasons:


To disrupt the fuel (energy) supply just when their military
does something they know will draw NATO’s response.



To contribute to service disruptions in dependent civilian
infrastructures (transport, telecom, water).



To intimidate.



To economize on offensive assets, cyber weapons are
reusable while physical weapons (bombs and humans)
are not.



It is effective, cheap (for a state or state-supported actor), and
deniable.

There are several challenges in developing, and, most importantly,
in implementing cybersecurit y policies in the industrial sector.
Successful efforts will be judged by the way the following three important
questions are answered.


What are we protecting?



From which cyber threats?



How do we protect identified assets from identified threats
in the most cost-effective way?

In terms of deciding what to protect, if one is in government, one tends
to say government information systems and data need to be protected.
Recognition of the dependency on the electric grid that supplies electricity to
those chosen assets, however, is missed. If the electricity goes out because of a
cyberattack or unintentional incident, then government information systems
that need electricity to operate will also fail. This failure impacts the economy
and well-being of society through a prolonged failure in the power supply.
Resources needed to protect everything are limited, so time and consideration
are required in determining what is truly critical and deserves funding.
In answering the second question, it is a mistake to focus only on the
threats from hackers, socially motivated hacktivists, and cybercriminals.
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States and the “cyber samurai” working for them cannot be safely ignored
as sources of APT threats, especially to critical infrastructure. Stuxnet was
a targeted cyber weapon developed by a state to attack equipment belonging to
the critical infrastructure (CI) of another state. It was a highly sophisticated
cyberattack on the systems used to monitor and control a critical industrial
process. The apparent success of this attack, which brought no punishment
to the attacker and was executed at little cost, has attracted a lot of attention.
In recent years, targeted cyberattacks on critical infrastructure have increased.
Many of the attacks reveal signs of state involvement, ranging from the
UK’s cyber intrusion of Belgian telecommunications company Belgacom to the
Russian Chief Intelligence Office’s “Sandworm” team, whose activities have
targeted critical infrastructures of the energy sector and other sectors.7
In seeking to protect critical energy infrastructure, one must keep in mind
that this operating environment is different from the traditional information
system or website management systems. This environment is characterized
by real-time control and safety systems designed to provide some product
or service (such as electricity, fuel, or gas) safely and reliably. These systems
were designed with a distinct set of assumptions. One of them was that they
would not be connected to the Internet, and the other was that no one would
be trying to attack them intentionally.
The answer to the third question focuses on the development of cyber
capacity. This area concerns passing laws, developing risk assessments
and policies, imposing regulations and standards, and creating units
(such as an industrial security operations center) to participate in the
implementation of cybersecurity policies for improving resilience of critical
systems and effective response to cyberattacks and incidents. Without trained staff
who are knowledgeable about plant operations and cyber forensic investigations,
no solutions, tools, or early warning instruments will have an effect on reducing
the risk to safety, reliability, performance, and improving resilience.
What can be done to lower cyber risks in the energy sector?
The f irst thing that can be done is to be more aware of the importance
of answering the three questions discussed above. A process must
determine what critical assets and processes need to be protected
in the energy and supporting sectors (such as electricity and transportation).
To achieve these goals successfully, cybersecurity capacity needs to be
7. Louk Faesen et al., The Cyber Arms Watch: Uncovering the Stated & Perceived
Offensive Cyber Capabilities of States (Hague: Hague Centre for Strategic Studies,
July 2022), 170, https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Cyber-Arms-Watch-HCSS-2022
-V.2.pdf; and Andy Greenberg, Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s
Most Dangerous Hackers (New York: Doubleday, 2019).
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developed. Nations and operators of critical infrastructure need to become
more aware of the best practices and standards for securing available industrial
control systems. Extra time and effort will be required to convince management
and stockholders that spending money on security is justified. The results
of answering the first two questions will provide rational, evidence-based
answers to questions raised by management.
The next challenge is related to the first one mentioned above, namely,
lack of awareness of the complexity of dealing with threats emanating
from cyberspace. In terms of ensuring the cybersecurity of critical
infrastructure, IT thinking dominates. It is too frequently assumed the IT
equipment sitting on a desk is the same as the IT equipment used to monitor
and control critical real-time industrial process taking place in gas pipelines,
electric grids, transportation (seaports, shipping, trains, aircraft, and highway
tunnels), and manufacturing systems. They are not the same and are designed
according to different security and engineering criteria. IT-imposed solutions
by IT professionals who poorly understand industrial controls systems can
have surprising and potentially dangerous results.
In 2008, for example, the Hatch nuclear reactor in the United States
experienced an emergency shutdown for two days because of a problem that
occurred from executing a software upgrade on a single computer. 8 A bridge
of understanding and collaboration is needed between IT cybersecurity
professionals and ICS professionals who work with engineering systems.
In order to address vulnerabilities, develop strategies, and propose effective
solutions for the protection of critical infrastructure from threats emanating
from cyberspace, we need to understand the role played by the technologies
employed in the energy and other CI sectors—information technology (IT),
operational technology (OT), and industrial control systems (ICS).9
To determine the best ways to respond to cyberattacks on critical
energy infrastructure, it is necessary to define the cyber technologies used to
run them and examine the differences between them. All these technologies
may be used together, as is often seen in CI-sector industries. They are further
described on the next page.

8. Brian Krebs, “Cyber Incident Blamed for Nuclear Power Plant Shutdown,” Washington Post (website),
June 5, 2008, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/05/AR2008060501958.html.
9. Global Cybersecurity Alliance, “Industrial Automation and Control System Taxonomy,” https://gca.isa
.org/hubfs/21-29%20-%20ISAGCA/ISAGCA-IACS%20Taxonomy%20Definitions%20of%20Terms.pdf.

7

Butrimas



Information technologies are very data or information centric
and are applied in the administrative or office part of a business
or commercial enterprise. In a utility providing electricity
to customers, for example, IT supports the administration
of an enterprise and the interactions outside the company
by providing web services, e-mail to employees, and inprocessing customer accounts in the billing and accounting
department. Its security priority is to protect the data or
information processed.10 The selected cybersecurity measures
ensure the conf identiality (granting access to only the
authorized user), integrity (protection of the data), and
availability (on-demand access to the information).



Operational technologies are characteristic of the operations
center or control room of an electric power, water, or gas
utility. These technologies use special hardware and
software to monitor and control a physical process such as
the generation and distribution of electricity to customers
connected to a power grid or the f low of fuel or water
down a pipeline. The operators in the control room view
information from f ield devices closest to the physical
process through a Human Machine Interface (HMI).11
In many cases, this equipment would be a Windows PC at a
workstation running special monitoring and control software.
Operational technologies should remain separate from the IT
network, however, this is not always done in practice.



Industrial control systems are mostly computer based and are
used by infrastructures and industries to monitor and control
sensitive processes and physical functions. They collect sensor
measurements and operational data from the field, process and
display this information, and relay control commands to local
or remote equipment. They are the hardware and software
closest to the actual physical process: remote terminal units
(RTUs), PLCs, actuators, drives, sensors, safety instrumented
systems (SIS), and field devices.12 For example, a PLC on a
fuel pipeline monitors and reacts to information about the

10. “Debate over IT, OT and Control Systems,” Infracritical (website), November, 22, 2019,
http://icsmodel.infracritical.com/.
11.

“Debate over IT, OT and Control Systems.”

12. “Debate over IT, OT and Control Systems.”
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f low of fuel provided by a sensor physically placed on the
pipe. It acts according to a program entered by the engineer
according to changes in preprogrammed set points. The PLC
may react by starting a pump or closing a valve depending
on a change in the f low in the pipeline or as a response to
a command from the control room operator in the OT side.
While having much in common in terms of being computers, IT, OT,
and ICS have different security and safety requirements stemming from their
functions. Industrial cybersecurity is about enterprise-wide security polices
and capabilities employed to ensure safety, reliability, and desired performance
of the physical processes being monitored and controlled. The goal of this
effort is not just to protect information (IT and OT), but to protect the
physical process (ICS).

Figure 1-1. IT, OT, and ICS in critical infrastructure
Source: “Debate over IT, OT and Control Systems.”

If the IT and OT fail, the operation in the off ice and control room
stops. Even without the IT and OT, however, the physical process will still
do something. That is why imposing an office IT cybersecurity measure
may not be applicable in an industrial environment. A best cybersecurity
practice found in an office IT environment, such as preserving confidentiality
with a robust password policy (long alphanumeric and changed often),
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may not be useful in an industrial environment where failure to enter a correct
password in time of emergency may result in damage to property, loss of life,
and damage to the environment.
In figure 1-2, cyberattacks on all three parts of a utility/industrial operation
are illustrated. If a policymaker thinks protecting “SCADA” will be enough
to address cyber threats to critical infrastructure then placing emphasis on
employing industry-standard office IT security policies will fail to address
the most dangerous attacks (namely, on the ICS monitoring and controlling
a physical process, not to mention the physical process itself ). Figure 1-2
demonstrates which aspects of CEI were targeted during attacks that occurred
between 2010 and 2021.

Figure 1-2. Targeted aspects in cybersecurity attacks
Graphic used with permission of Robert Radvanofsky

Case Studies of Incidents Relevant
to Industrial Cybersecurity of Critical Infrastructure
The following cases studies present unsettling but continuing trends
in industrial cybersecurity.

Maroochy Water Services 2000
This attack is different from the subsequent instances on this list in that
it was not the action of a state or criminal organization. There continues to be
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a trend of substantial weakness existing from intentional, internal destruction
by knowledgeable employees.13
This event was an intentional, targeted attack by a knowledgeable
person on an industrial control system. A disgruntled former subcontractor
showed his displeasure at a municipality that refused to hire him permanently
by using his insider knowledge of the control systems used in the treatment
and distribution of drinking water. His actions caused the control system
to experience a series of faults—pumps were not running when they should
have been, alarms were not reporting to the central computer, and there
was a loss of communication between the central computer and various
pumping stations.14
The threat of a knowledgeable insider causing havoc in an industrial
operation is the most potentially dangerous of threats to the safety, reliability,
and performance of industrial operations.

Stuxnet 2010
Stuxnet, the first state-developed cyber weapon, was a computer code
capable of producing physical/kinetic effects on the target device or system
to attack the critical infrastructure (nuclear enrichment process) of another
state. The United States and Israel developed a code that targeted the PLCs
of Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, causing centrifuges to fail. It sought a specific
network configuration and remained innocuous to other machines.15
This at tack was a t urning point in c yberspace securit y.
Cybersecurity professionals began to understand that the most sophisticated
cyberattacks now extended to the engineering behind the technologies used
to support the operations of critical infrastructure. The methods employed
in this attack appeared repeatedly in cyberattacks on critical infrastructure
(such as disabling safety systems, providing false data to operators
about the physical process, and manipulating and causing physical destruction
of equipment to the surprise of control room personnel). In short, attacks
like Stuxnet take away operator view and control of a physical process.16
13. Marshall Abrams, “Malicious Control System Cybersecurity Attack Case Study–Maroochy Water
Services, Australia,” July 3, 2008, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1107275.pdf.
14. Abrams, “Malicious Control System.”
15. Kim Zetter, “An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon,” Wired (website),
November 3, 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/.
16. Ralph Langner, “To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators Tried
to Achieve” (Arlington, VA: Langner Group, 2013), https://www.langner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017
/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf.
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Saudi Aramco 2012
One of the world’s largest oil companies was the victim of the largest
denial-of-computer cyberattack to date as passwords were stolen and computers
prevented from rebooting. Approximately 30,000 off ice IT hard drives
were erased in the company offices by a hacker group calling themselves
the “Cutting Sword of Justice” while ships waited at port without ordering
or invoice information.17 The cyberattack did not reach into the CI operations,
and no equipment or processes were affected. For the Saudis, however,
this cyberattack threatened not just its CEI but its economy.18

Havex 2014 Malware Attack
According to reports from the Department of Homeland Security
Industrial Control Systems Computer Emergency Response Team (DHS
ICS-CERT), this reported malware (also known as Dragonf ly, Energetic Bear)
targeted software/firmware download websites of manufacturers of industrial
control systems.19 Compromised vendor software that customers download
from vendor sites allows attackers to access customer networks (including
those that operate critical infrastructure). 20 Commentators compared this
malware to Stuxnet, since the sophistication and choice of target pointed
to nation-state involvement. 21 According to a Symantec analysis, this malware
provided a platform for conducting cyber-espionage activities that gave the
“attackers the ability to mount sabotage operations against their victims,”
and, if the attackers had used the sabotage capabilities available, they “could

17. Jose Pagliery, “The Inside Story of the Biggest Hack in History,” CNN Business (website),
August 25, 2015, https://money.cnn.com/2015/08/05/technology/aramco-hack/; US Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), “Shamoon,” ICS-CERT Monthly Monitor, September 2012, https://www.cisa.gov/uscert
/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT_Monitor_Sep2012.pdf; and Lucian Constantin, “Kill Timer Found
in Shamoon Malware Suggests Possible Connection to Saudi Aramco Attack,” Computer World (website),
August 23, 2012, https://www.computerworld.com/article/2491501/kill-timer-found-in-shamoon-malware
-suggests-possible-connection-to-saudi-ar.html.
18. Al Arabiya News with AFP, “Saudi Aramco Says Cyber Attack Targeted Kingdom’s Economy,”
Regulatory Cyber Security: The FISMA Focus IPD (website), December 9, 2012, https://www.thecre
.com/fisma/?p=4177.
19. “ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-176-02A): ICS Focused Malware (Update A),” US Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) (website), June 27, 2014, https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/alerts
/ICS-ALERT-14-176-02A.
20. “ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-176-02A).”
21. Nicole Perlroth, “Russian Hackers Targeting Oil and Gas Companies,” New York Times (website),
June 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/technology/energy-sector-faces-attacks-from
-hackers-in-russia.html?_r=2.
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have damaged or disrupted the energy supply in the affected countries.” 22
This event should cause anyone who accepts cyber espionage as being part
of traditional spying to pause and consider its ramif ications.

German Steel Mill 2014
According to an off icial government report, advanced, persistent
threat actors were able to jump across office IT networks to the control
networks and eventually access the physical process. 23 Operators were unable
to shut down the operation after losing view and control, resulting in physical
damage. 24 To quote from the report: “The breakdowns led to the uncontrolled
shutdown of a blast furnace, leaving it in an undefined state and resulting
in massive damage.”

Ukraine December 2015 Cyberattack on Regional Power Grid
Advanced, persistent threat actors succeeded in penetrating the office
IT of a utility providing electricity to customers in a region of Ukraine.
After conducting reconnaissance, mapping, and acquiring access privileges,
they succeeded in acquiring operator view and control at the OT level and
proceeded to open breakers at over 30 substations. Over 250,000 customers
lost power in the winter just before Christmas. The attackers planted malicious
firmware on the serial port servers used to communicate between SCADA
control and the remotely located affected substations, causing them to become
disabled permanently. The perpetrator ran a previously planted disk-wiper
malware (as seen in Saudi Arabia in 2012) attack on the workstations in the
control room. With the loss of the hardware and software (SCADA) used
for the view and control of the power grid, the operator had to reestablish
power and operations manually by sending engineers out to the substations
to close the breakers manually and restore power. 25
22. Symantec, “Dragonfly: Cyber Espionage Attacks against Energy Suppliers” (Mountain View, CA:
Symantec Corporation, July 2014), 3, https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/dragonfly_threat_against_western
_energy_suppliers.
23. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, “German Steel Mill Cyber Attack, ICS Defense
Use Case (DUC),” December 30, 2014, SANS Industrial Control Systems, https://assets.contentstack.io
/v3/assets/blt36c2e63521272fdc/bltc79a41dbf7d1441e/607f235775873e466bcc539c/ICS-CPPE-case-Study
-2-German-Steelworks_Facility.pdf.
24. Federal Office for Information Security, The State of IT Security in Germany 2014 (Bonn, DE:
Federal Office for Information Security, November 2014), 31, https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs
/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securit ysituation/ IT-Securit y-Situation-in-Germany-2014
.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3.
25. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power
Grid (Washington, DC: SANS ICS/E-ISAC, March 2016), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files
/documents/3891751/SANS-and-Electricity-Information-Sharing-and.pdf.
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Ukraine December 2016
While this cyberattack on ICS (resulting in a partial blackout of Kyiv) was
more limited in duration and scope than the previous year’s attack, subsequent
analysis showed it to be more sophisticated and potentially far more damaging.
It attacked the relays of the electrical grid used to protect bulk power and other
critical equipment that distribute electricity on the grid. The attempt implied
one of the attacker’s goals was to make the operators’ option of restoring
power through manual control a dangerous one. When restarting power
after a blackout any f luctuations in power would have caused damage to very
expensive and hard-to-replace bulk power equipment (such as a transformer)
if the relays were not there to perform their function. 26
Since the second attack was more developed than the first and focused
on a similar target, it could be argued this advanced, persistent threat actor
was using Ukraine as a cyber weapons laboratory for developing attacks
on the industrial control equipment used to monitor and manage the power
grid in Ukraine. This observation is significant since Ukraine uses equipment
of Western manufacture. NATO member states and other industrialized
countries using similar equipment should seriously consider that these
cyberattacks developed against Ukraine could also be used in their countries.

NotPetya 2017
This incident, as with the two previously covered cyberattacks in Ukraine,
took place in the context of a war between Ukraine and Russia-supported
separatists in the Ukrainian province of Crimea. Ransomware placed
on accounting software used by companies dealing with the Ukrainian
ta x inspectorate proceeded to spread rapidly throughout the world,
stopping Maersk Shipping worldwide operations and affecting
other CI sectors.
One of the ransom malware variants, called NotPetya, seems to have
been planted in and later spread from Ukraine. 27 Victims experiencing
serious disr uptions to their operations were found worldwide,
ranging from unlikely places, including a candy factory in Australia,

26. Joe Slowik, CR ASHOVERR IDE: Reassessing the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Event
as a Protection-Focused Attack (Hanover, MD: Dragos Inc., 2019), https://www.dragos.com/wp-content
/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE.pdf.
27. Matthew J. Schwartz, “Ukraine Power Supplier Hit by WannaCry Lookalike,” Inforisk Today (website),
June 30, 2017, http://www.inforisktoday.com/ukraine-power-supplier-hit-by-wannacry-lookalike-a-10071.
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Russia’s biggest oil producer, Rosneft, and Danish shipping company Maersk. 28
Maersk ’s CEO claimed the NotPetya infection cost Maersk $300 million
in damages. 29 This is the f irst example of the “collateral damage” that
can occur in today’s targeted cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.
Later analysis of NotPetya indicated the creators of this malware were
not cybercriminals motivated by f inancial gain. It seems the function
for encrypting or erasing data on hard drives worked perfectly while the
ransomware function did not work. 30 In other words, the attackers did not
seem to care if the ransom payment module worked or not. The creators
focused on making sure this computer-killing malware would spread quickly
and as widely as possible. The motive for this attack seems far more sinister
and fits the interests of a state rather than a cybercrime gang. A state in
conf lict with Ukraine was using cyberattacks as policy achievement tools.
As one security analyst explained, “This was a piece of malware designed
to send a political message: If you do business in Ukraine, bad things are
going to happen to you.” 31 Western companies, like Maersk and FedEx/TNT,
with offices in Ukraine received “notice” to watch out.

Triton/Trisis/Hatman 2017
In June and again in August 2017, a cyberattack targeted the safety systems
of an important petrochemical plant in the Middle East. This is the fifth
publicly known ICS-tailored malware, however, it is the first ever to target
safety-instrumented systems (SIS). 32
The intentional attempt to compromise a safety system represents
a serious escalation of the cyber threat to critical infrastructure.
Control and safety systems are used in an industrial process to protect property,
the environment, and, most importantly, people from serious harm resulting
28. “Global Ransomware Attack Causes Turmoil,” BBC (website), June 28, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news
/technology-40416611.
29. Ry Crozier, “Maersk Had to Reinstall All IT Systems after NotPetya Infection,” iTNews (website),
January 25, 2018, https://www.itnews.com.au/news/maersk-had-to-reinstall-all-it-systems-after-notpetya
-infection-481815?eid=3&edate=20180125&utm_source=20180125_PM&utm_medium=newsletter&utm
_campaign=daily_newsletter.
30. Jeremy Kirk, “Latest Ransomware Wave Never Intended to Make Money,” Data Breach Today
(website), June 29, 2017, https://www.databreachtoday.com/latest-ransomware-wave-never-intended-to
-make-money-a-10069.
31. Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History,”
Wired (website), August 22, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code
-crashed-the-world/.
32. Davide Franzetti, “Oil & Gas Cybersecurity and Process Safety Converge Thanks to TRITON,”
Security Boulevard (website), February 26, 2019, https://securityboulevard.com/2019/02/oil-gas-cybersecurity
-and-process-safety-converge-thanks-to-triton/.
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from an industrial process that has gone outside the set parameters used
to program an automatic response in the SIS to bring a system back
to a safe state when changes in temperature, f low rates, pressure, frequency,
or other system state indicators exceed safe levels. These systems automatically
respond to open or closed valves on a gas pipeline when pressures or f low
rates go beyond preset parameters. 33 If something is done intentionally to
neutralize the functions of these systems, serious harm can result if a system
state exceeds the set parameters. It is like disabling the breaks and seat belts
of an automobile traveling down a highway without the knowledge of the
driver. In other words, safety systems are the last lines of defense provided
by automated technologies.
Of most concern is that this attack almost succeeded in fully compromising
safety-instrumented systems made by Schneider Electric. These systems and
similar SIS devices are used in many industrial plants around the world.
If the perpetrators have developed a technique against the equipment of
Schneider Electric, they can apply the same technique in any of the plants
that use this or similar equipment. While the cyberattack only worked
on a specific version of the device and software, the potential escalation for
disruption of Trisis is unsettling. 34
One important point to mention is that the victim was unaware of the
compromised state of the control systems. Even the manufacturer, after the
first shutdown in June, found no fault with the equipment and returned
it to the victim, where it resumed its place in the plant’s operations. The victim
had no cyber forensics capability on-site to investigate the incident but had
to pay top dollar to bring in specialists from the outside. In short, the industrial
site had little or no cybersecurity capability available to monitor and react
to the first cyber intrusions, which took place months earlier.

Norsk Hydro 2019
A particularly disruptive variant of the “LockerGoga” ransomware
caused an aluminum manufacturing and power company operating
in 40 countries and with 3,500 employees to stop its automated operations and
switch to manual operations. 35 Investigations later determined the ransomware
33.

Krebs, “Cyber Incident Blamed.”

34. Nicole Perlroth and Clifford Krauss, “A Cyberattack in Saudi Arabia Had a Deadly Goal. Experts
Fear Another Try,” New York Times (website), March 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15
/technology/saudi-arabia-hacks-cyberattacks.html.
35. Jeff Stone, “Norsk Hydro’s Cyber Insurance Has Paid Just a Fraction of Its Breach-related Losses
So Far,” Cyberscoop (website), October 28, 2019, https://www.cyberscoop.com/cyber-insurance-norsk-hydro
-lockergoga-attack/.
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entered the company’s operations through the supply chain. To the credit
of the company’s robust cybersecurity policy, good documentation on the
operation was available to reestablish automated operations. The company
still incurred heavy costs in dealing with the disruptions that amounted
to more than 30 million euros in the three months of 2019. 36 The fact that
this particular ransomware variant was encountered just once leads one
to consider this cyberattack also had an experimental purpose behind it. 37

US-Russian Intrusions in Each Other’s Critical Infrastructure
from 2018 to Present
The US government issued alerts on state-sponsored espionage activities
directed at acquiring access to power grid control systems. 38 There were also
reports of US government-sponsored efforts to do the same in the Russian
energy sector. 39 While it is probable the adversaries achieved the objective
of accessing the targeted control systems, it is not known if any successful
attempts were made to leverage that access in order to compromise systems
or cause physical damage.

Interception of Chinese Manufactured Transformer
by US Government in 2020
In late spring 2020, the Wall Street Journal reported on the US government
seizure of a Chinese-manufactured bulk-power transformer bound
for a power utility in the southwest United States and diverted to Sandia
National Laboratories.40 Other than speculation, no official report has been
issued about this event.41 This incident occurred, however, about the time
of a US presidential “Executive Order on Securing the United States

36. A Hotter, “How the Norsk Hydro Cyberattack Unfolded,” Fastmarket AMM (website), 2019,
https://www.amm.com/Article/3890250/How-the-Norsk-Hydro-cyberattack-unfolded.html.
37. Joe Slowik, Spyware Stealer Locker Wiper: Lockergoga Revisited (Hanover, MD: Dragos Inc., 2020),
https://pylos.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Spyware_Stealer_Locker_Wiper-_LockerGoga_Revisited.pdf.
38. “Alert (TA18-074A), Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical
Infrastructure Sectors,” CISA (website), March 16, 2018, https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A.
39. David Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “U.S. Escalates Online Attacks on Russia’s Power Grid,”
New York Times (website), June 15, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/us/politics/trump-cyber-russia
-grid.html?auth=login-google.
40. Rebecca Smith, “U.S. Seizure of Chinese-Built Transformer Raises Specter of Closer Scrutiny,”
Wall Street Journal (website), May 27, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-seizure-of-chinese
-built-transformer-raises-specter-of-closer-scrutiny-11590598710.
41. Cynthia Brumfield, “The Mysterious Case of the Missing 250-Ton Chinese Power Transformer,”
Vice (website), September 22, 2020, https://www.vice.com/en/article/v7gaqb/the-mysterious-case-of
-the-missing-250-ton-chinese-power-transformer.
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Bulk-Power System.” This order placed heavy prohibitions on the purchase
of bulk-power equipment from foreign sources.42
Bulk-power equipment is costly to replace, as it requires special design and
manufacture before being shipped, transported, and installed at its location.
Lloyd’s of London, a specialist insurance agency, and Cambridge University,
estimated the loss of 50 generators can cascade to an extensive long-term
regional blackout which, according to the severity of the scenario, could
cost the US economy from $243 billion to more than $1 trillion.43 It should
be noted that the Lloyd’s study scenario was relatively mild, for it did not
include actual damage to bulk-power equipment. It assumed that after the
event the grid would slowly energize with compromised protective relays
continuing to protect the bulk-power equipment as they return online.

SolarWinds Orion 2020/2021
SolarWinds software is used by many governments, businesses,
and industrial enterprises around the world for network monitoring and
management. Reminiscent of the Havex cyberattack six years earlier,
this incident was a more widespread, successful, and highly sophisticated
supply-chain compromise, affecting 18,000 organizations.44 Many of these
organizations work in industrial operations, including the energy sector.
What is concerning in this incident is that major original equipment
manufacturers (OEM’s) that supply online services to infected customers
were also infected, raising the potential number of compromised businesses
and industrial operations.45 What made this incident particularly insidious
was that the vendor’s legitimate software update to the targeted Orion product
was tainted with a malware that provided the attacker with a backdoor.46
42. White House, “Executive Order on Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” May 1, 2020,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-united-states-bulk
-power-system/.
43. Lloyd’s and University of Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies, Business Blackout: The Insurance
Implications of a Cyber Attack on the US Power Grid, Emerging Risk Report Innovation Series (London:
Lloyd’s, 2015), https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/crs-lloyds-business-blackout
-scenario.pdf.
44. Sergio Caltagirone, Ben Miller, and Kai Thomsen, “The SolarWinds Compromise and ICS/OT
Networks” (webinar, Dragos Inc., December 22, 2020), https://f.hubspotusercontent10.net/hubfs/5943619
/Webinar-Assets/Dragos%20webinar%20-%20SolarWinds%20Compromise%20-%20v10_KT%20%20-%20
%20Read-Only.pdf.
45. Kim Zetter, “SolarWinds Hack Infected Critical Infrastructure, Including Power Industry,” Intercept
(website), December 24, 2020, https://theintercept.com/2020/12/24/solarwinds-hack-power-infrastructure/.
46. Bruce Schneier, “The US Has Suffered a Massive Cyberbreach. It’s Hard to Overstate How Bad It Is,”
Guardian (website), December 23, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/dec/23/cyber
-attack-us-security-protocols.
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The customers’ efforts to apply industry cybersecurity best practice
(keep software patched and up-to-date) ironically only made matters worse.
Analysis indicates the initial infection of the vendor’s Orion software occurred
in spring 2020, months before its year-end discovery.
This incident highlighted the lack of cyber capability in industrial
operations. If an industrial operator became suspicious of a cybersecurity
breach, there were no means immediately available on-site to determine
the extent of the compromise. The operator had to embark on a massive
replacement of suspected IT equipment or hire a security firm from the outside
to come in and do the diagnostic and clean-up work.

Colonial Pipeline Shutdown 2021
Ransomware was planted in the IT part of the company, which resulted
in denial of the necessary data and other information required to process
and keep track of fuel orders. While the ICS of the pipeline that monitored
and controlled the physical processes inside the pipeline was not affected
by this ransomware, the loss of billing and accounting information left the
operator no choice but to shut down pipeline operations of over 5,000 miles
servicing the East Coast of the United States. This failure was due in part
to the company not adhering to industry cybersecurity standards. It lacked
a comprehensive corporate cybersecurity program that included standards
for industrial automation and control system security (IACS). In particular,
the International Society of Automation ISA 95 standard addresses enterprise
integration including transfer of information between plant instrumentation
and corporate information systems.47

Conclusion and Recommendations
In summarizing the unsettling and reoccurring trends in cyberspace,
the following characteristics and actions are evident. In the attempts
to disable industrial safety systems, little or no industrial cyber forensics are
available due to a lack of trained investigators familiar with the operations, and
IT-centric cybersecurity approaches fall short of protecting CEI and other
infrastructure. Further, the increased connectivity and integration of IT,
OT, and ICS, while offering advantages, have also introduced new fragilities
and exploitable vulnerabilities that did not exist before they were separate.
Cyberattacks for the advanced, persistent threat actor are effective, cheap, and
47. “ISA95, Enterprise-Control System Integration,” International Society of Automation (website),
https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-standards/isa-standards-committees/isa95.
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deniable. Asset owners and even cybersecurity solution providers are surprised
when cyberattacks happen, as the threat actor often achieves compromise
of the targeted asset long before discovery by the victim. In fact, in most
cases, victims are compliant with industry standards and best practices
(such as segmentation, updates, and f irewalls). Finally, there has been
a failure to establish concrete measures at the international security policy
level (such as agreements on norms or conventions) that could manage the
problem of malicious cyber activities of states in cyberspace.
There are ways to address vulnerabilities and reduce the danger
of compromise by improving cyber defense capacities.


One of them is to establish an industrial cybersecurity
operations center (ISOC). Responsibilities tasked to the
ISOC include, first, monitoring and checking on anomalous
process f lows, equipment performance, and data f lows with
a goal of detecting a cybersecurity breach within 24 hours.



Second, responsibilities include identifying and recording all
component pieces and versions in a control system.



Third, the ISOC must review available patches and updates
of OT devices found closer to the industrial process, such
as PLCs and other intelligent industrial electronic devices
(IIED).



Fourth, according to configuration, change management,
and safety procedure, it must test and apply selected
patches and updates. The ISOC would be responsible
for monitoring control and safety system cybersecurity
vulnerabilities (such as current patch levels, malware
notif ications, and newly discovered v ulnerabilities)
as announced by cybersecurity institutions and vendors.



Fifth, the ISOC should take part in regular training and
education on ICS cybersecurity, including sending at least one
staff member per year to organized ICS security conferences
and trainings (such as S4, the largest ICS professionals
conference, DEFCON hackers conference, and Black Hat)
as well as participate in NATO, EU, and other tabletop
and “Live Fire” exercises (such as “Locked Shields),” where
cyberattacks on control systems are included in the scenarios.
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Sixth, the ISOC should implement the recommendations
in this chapter that are beyond the means of current staff
capabilities and resources.



Seventh, it must oversee the operation of network management
systems, intrusion detection, or security information and event
management (SIEM) systems and internal operating system
health tools that can be used in both an investigative and
forensic capacity to identify the source of a problem.



Finally, it must organize and control use of A/V scanning-based
solutions according to established policies and procedures.
This solution involves conducting or organizing full off line
black-box and white-box penetration testing against the
switches, routers, f irewalls, controllers, and instruments
that the operator uses with help of vendors with certified
ethical hackers. It is also recommended to use available tools
(such as Metasploit), where one can use benign attack scripts
to prove the existence of a device vulnerability in an automated
fashion. This way, one can demonstrate a conceptual attack
on a test bench without damaging anything. Also vital is the
operation of a security test lab used to validate patches before
deployment, test security exploits on existing equipment
and firmware, and find and diagnose other bugs and test
code before downloading it to the field and ensuring that
user logons to the system and IED configuration changes
are documented, updated, and made available on-site
for operator personnel.

The next recommendation addresses the spiraling cyber arms
race and associated fragile security environment stemming from the
uninhibited malicious activities of states in cyberspace through the creation
of international norms.
Since 2010, an increasing number of analysts have expressed concern over
a spiraling cyber arms race fueled by states directing malicious cyber activities
at the critical infrastructure of other states.48 The attempts by the international
security policy community to manage this dangerous behavior have been
characterized by one commentator as “[causing] mostly confusion, indecision,
48. Jason Healey and Robert Jervis, “The Escalation Inversion and Other Oddities of Situational
Cyber Stability,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 4 (Fall 2020): 30–53, https://tnsr.org/2020/09
/the-escalation-inversion-and-other-oddities-of-situational-cyber-stability/.
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and paralysis. This lack of management has encouraged their use with impunity,
despite their potential for causing mass destruction.”49 Because cyberspace allows
for offensive and defensive technology to be nearly indistinguishable, there
is a chance it could increase the possibility for a major conf lict escalating
from a cyber incident.
Current defensive measures for protecting the technologies that support
operations of CEI may be inadequate in a dynamically changing cyberspace
environment where the attacker seems always ahead in discovering new
attack vectors and is especially true for states choosing to make malicious
use of cyberspace a means to achieve policy objectives unobtainable through
peaceful means such as diplomacy. The international security policy-making
community needs to create norms for managing malicious behavior of states
in cyberspace as well. These norms will lighten the load of defenders and
senior engineers already committed to monitoring OT. This latter group is not
an equal match against the advanced skills, patience, and resources available
to the state-based threat actor. Norms that seek to promote transparency and
cooperation among states based on common interests can reduce international
tensions from more frequent and increasingly disruptive cyberattacks
on critical infrastructure.
There are three basic cyberspace norms NATO can promote to reduce
the risk of igniting a spiraling conf lict among states. First, states should
restrain from directing malicious cyber activity at another state’s critical
infrastructure. 50 The restraint should come from a common recognition of
the important role technology plays for all states in the critical infrastructures
that support modern economic activity, national security, and the well-being
of society. Today critical infrastructure has an international dimension
because of its cross-border character (for example, power grids and pipelines)
and interdependency on cyberspace for its safe and reliable operation.
The attacker may find that their own critical infrastructure may feel the
effects together with the target. In other words, acting with restraint
is in everyone’s interest.
The second is for states to take responsibility for keeping their
cyberspace jurisdictions in order, including responding to malicious
cyber activities emanating from or transiting through their cyberspace
49. Jonathan Terra, “NATO Cannot Cede the New Art of Modern Warfare to Russia and China,”
Reporting Democracy (website), August 4, 2021, https://balkaninsight.com/2021/08/04/nato-cannot-cede
-the-new-art-of-modern-warfare-to-russia-and-china/.
50. Adam Segal, “The Development of Cyber Norms at the United Nations Ends in Deadlock. Now
What?” Council on Foreign Relations (website), June 29, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/development
-cyber-norms-united-nations-ends-deadlock-now-what.
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jurisdictions. 51 States cannot stand idly by when these activities are reported.
This is of special concern for the targeted state, which could interpret this
behavior as preparation of the battlef ield activity leading to dangerous
escalation. States must act responsibly in order to preserve the stability
in cyberspace that all modern nations depend on.
The third norm is to create an organization to monitor and report
on the violation of the above norms. This should not be considered
a fruitless effort; there are similar examples, such as the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which was created
as part of a signed international convention. 52 Another example is the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), created to address issues
of nuclear weapons proliferation. 53 These norms will not cause these
APT attacks to cease, but they should reduce the number of incidents
by making the potential perpetrator think twice and weigh the consequences
of being discovered before acting.
Several initiatives on norms have been proposed by various international
organizations and other entities in the past decade. The Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2012 Permanent Council
Decision No. 1039 on the development of confidence-building measures
to reduce the risks of conf lict stemming from the use of information and
communication technologies created an internal working group to develop
and present norms proposals.54 One of the proposed norms (number 3) in 2013
is similar to the first norm proposed above. 55
Even the private sector has joined in taking leadership on international
norms. In 2017, Microsoft proposed a digital Geneva Convention
51. Chris C. Demchak and Peter Dombrowski, “Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age,” Strategic Studies
Quarterly 5, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 32–61, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents
/Volume-05_Issue-1/Demchak-Dombrowski.pdf.
52. Vytautas Butrimas, “National Security and International Policy Challenges in a Post
Stuxnet World,” Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 12, no. 1 (2013–14): 11–32, https://www
.researchgate.net/publication/271726264_National_Security_and_International_Policy_Challenges_in_a
_Post_Stuxnet_World.
53. “History,” International Atomic Energy Organization (website), n.d., https://www.iaea.org/about
/overview/history.
54. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Permanent Council,
“Decision No. 1039, Development of Confidence-building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict
Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies,” April 26, 2012,
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/7/90169.pdf.
55. OSCE Permanent Council, “Decision No. 1106, Initial Set of OSCE Confidence-Building
Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication
Technologies,” December 3, 2013, N.3, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/1/109168.pdf.
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for cyberspace. 56 Out of concern for the protection of citizens from the
aftereffects of a state-sponsored attack a series of norms were proposed.
They resonate with the norm proposals mentioned above: “The world needs
an independent organization that can investigate and share publicly the evidence
that attributes nation-state attacks to specific countries.”57 To end this short list
of examples, the United Nations Group of Government Experts on Advancing
Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace, in the context of international
security (GGE), issued a report in May 2021 that highlights the first two norms
mentioned above.58
While norms cannot fully solve the problem of state-sponsored cyberattacks
on critical infrastructure, they do offer the possibility of managing this
destabilizing behavior in peacetime. For this reason, it is recommended that
NATO support such initiatives.

56. Brad Smith, “The Need for a Digital Geneva Convention,” Microsoft on the Issues (blog), February 14, 2017,
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/02/14/need-digital-geneva-convention/.
57.

Smith, “Digital Geneva Convention.”

58. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace
in the Context of International Security, May 2021, 13(c), 13 (f ), https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content
/uploads/2021/06/final-report-2019-2021-gge-1-advance-copy.pdf.

24

Vulnerabilities: Chapter 1

Defending against Cyber Threats to Critical Energy Infrastructure

Select Bibliography
Butrimas, Vytautas. “National Security and International Policy Challenges
in a Post Stuxnet World.” Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 12, no. 1
(2013–14). https://w w w.researchgate.net/publication/271726264
_National_Security_and_International_Policy_Challenges_in_a_Post
_Stuxnet_World.
Demchak, Chris C., and Peter Dombrowski. “Rise of a Cybered Westphalian
Age.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 1 (Spring 2011). https://www.airuniversity
.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-05_Issue-1/Demchak
-Dombrowski.pdf.
Federal Office for Information Security. The State of IT Security in Germany
2014. Bonn, DE: Federal Office for Information Security, November 2014.
https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications
/Securit ysituation/ IT-Securit y-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf ?
__blob=publicationFile&v=3.
“ICS Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-176-02A): ICS Focused Malware (Update A).”
US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). June 27, 2014.
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-14-176-02A.
Lloyd’s and Cambridge University Centre for Risk Studies. Business Blackout:
The Insurance Implications of a Cyber Attack on the US Power Grid,
Emerging Risk Report Innovation Series. London: Lloyd’s, 2015. https://
www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/crs-lloyds-business
-blackout-scenario.pdf.
Slowik, Joe. CRASHOVERRIDE: Reassessing the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power
Event as a Protection-Focused Attack. Hanover, MD: Dragos Inc., 2019
https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE.pdf.
Symantec. “Dragonfly: Cyber Espionage Attacks against Energy Suppliers.”
Mountain View, CA: Symantec Corporation, July 2014. https://docs
.broadcom.com/doc/dragonfly_threat_against_western_energy_suppliers.
Terra, Jonathan. “NATO Cannot Cede the New Art of Modern Warfare
to Russia and China.” Reporting Democracy (website). August 4, 2021.
https://balkaninsight.com/2021/08/04/nato-cannot-cede-the-new-art-of
-modern-warfare-to-russia-and-china/.
White House. “Executive Order on Securing the United States
Bulk-Power System.” May 1, 2020. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov
/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-united-states-bulk
-power-system/.

25

—2—
The Internet of Things Challenge
Chuck Benson

©2022 Chuck Benson

ABSTRACT: The interconnectedness created by the Internet of Things
(IoT) poses great value to critical infrastructure (CI), but has also
created deep cybersecurity vulnerabilities to CI systems. Attacks on data
management systems or supply chains could impact entire systems in ways
that were previously unheard of. Threat actor manipulation of CI IoT could
undermine NATO actions across Europe. To account for these weaknesses,
organizations must increase IT/OT competencies internally and review
vendor security protocols prior to implementation.
Keywords: Internet of Things, network, interdependence, data aggregation,
data chain, OT skills, risk mitigation, vendor security, retrofit

The Internet of Things, or IoT, is changing the world in substantial ways,
and that rate of change is accelerating. The spectrum of IoT device and IoT
system applications only continues to grow to include consumer devices and
systems such as Amazon’s Alexa, smartphone-controlled colorful light bulbs,
and home-security devices and systems such as the Ring camera/doorbell.1
There are medical devices and supporting IT systems such as infusion
pumps and pacemakers that monitor heart rate, blood temperature

1. Nicole Wetsman, “Amazon Announces Alexa Program for Hospitals and Senior Care,”
Verge (website), October 25, 2021, https://www.theverge.com/2021/10/25/22740181/amazon-alexa-hospitals
-senior-living; and “Video Doorbells,” Ring (website), n.d., accessed October 26, 2021, https://ring.com
/doorbell-cameras.
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and respiration, and alter the patient’s heart rate as needed. 2
Internet of Things systems are found in, and will increasingly be found
in, public-safety systems, city-planning and management systems, amateur
and professional athletics and sports, research systems, and transportation
systems. 3 While all these areas are important for various reasons,
one of the most critical is the association with IoT devices and systems
in local, national, and international physical critical infrastructure.
One of the most important of these is energy infrastructure.
While there are a number of definitions and descriptions of IoT, a useful
and succinct pair of definitions are: an IoT device is a networked computing
device that interacts with its environment in some way, and an IoT system
is comprised of many IoT devices (tens, hundreds, thousands, or more), as well
as a supporting infrastructure for connectivity, data aggregation, sometimes
command and control, data management, data analytics, and data publishing.4
Internet of Things systems in support of critical infrastructure have the
potential to bring profound value, increased performance, and sustainability for
many types of critical infrastructure. This arrangement, however, also brings
new dependencies of that infrastructure on these new IoT systems while adding
additional value. Exacerbating this problem is that many, and likely most, IoT
systems are poorly implemented, partially implemented, under- or unmanaged,
or all of the above in addition to other potential issues. At this point in time,
few institutions, corporations, governments, or nation-states are very good
at broad and deep implementation and ongoing operation of IoT systems.
This lack of ability creates signif icant issues for cybersecurity and risk
mitigation. In the realm of hybrid warfare, it provides a lucrative target
with potential for large damage and disruptions for possibly relatively little
investment and exposure for an adversary.

2. Inga Shugalo, “ Security Crisis of Cardiac Pacemakers Paves the Way for IoT Security Evolution
in Cardiology,” Health Care Blog, July 29, 2019, https://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2019/07/29/security
-crisis-of-cardiac-pacemakers-paves-the-way-for-iot-security-evolution-in-cardiology/; and Gavin O’Brien
et al., Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps in Healthcare Delivery Organizations, NIST Special Publication
1800-8 (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology/National Cybersecurity
Center of Excellence, August 2018), https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-8.
3. “Perspectives: Internet of Things in Sports,” Deloitte (website), n.d., accessed October 26, 2021,
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/consumer-business/articles/internet-of-things-sports-bringing-iot
-to-sports-analytics.html; and Sarah Way, “Public Transport Emerges as the Top Use of IoT in Cities,”
Cities Today (blog), September 9, 2020, https://cities-today.com/public-transport-emerges-as-the-top-use
-of-iot-in-cities/.
4. Chuck Benson, Managing IoT Systems for Institutions and Cities (New York: Auerbach Publications, 2019),
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9780429490996.
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Differences between “Traditional” IT versus IoT
Although they share some attributes, IoT differs from traditional
IT in several ways. The lack of awareness or understanding of their differences
contributes to or facilitates unexpected exposure stemming from the deployment
of IoT systems in support of critical infrastructure.
Scale. The number of IoT devices is estimated to be in the low tens
of billions and appears to be growing exponentially. 5
Variety and variation. There are a rapidly growing number of new and
differing types of IoT systems, and each IoT device has multiple components,
each potentially from a different source provider. Currently, the provenance
of any software component can be difficult, if not impossible, to determine.
Lack of language. This term refers to a lack of common, familiar language
to discuss, plan for, and manage risk for the deployment and operation
of these systems within institutional, corporate, governmental organizations,
and partner organizations.
Organizational interdependency. Within an institution, corporation,
government, international alliance, or other entity, IoT systems span
many departments and supporting organizations—traditional central IT,
traditional distributed and local IT, facilities operations, capital development,
security office, risk office, multiple vendors, contractors, and subcontractors—
many of which need some level of communication and coordination,
ranging from occasional to fully immersed. This creates substantial
organizational interdependency and a network of potential gaps in coordination
and communication.
Out of sight, out of mind. These networked computing devices of IoT
systems are usually embedded in the working environment, such as building,
campus, production facility, resource delivery facility (for example, pipeline),
or other. As such, they can be out of sight, out of mind. Often, planners,
operators, and users do not see sensors and actuators (sometimes in the
thousands or more) as actual networked computers exposed to the same
cyber risks and cyber adversaries as traditional computing devices (such as
workstations, laptops, tablets, and phones).
Lack of precedent. Across multiple industries and sectors—not least
of which energy and energy resource delivery—institutions, governments,
5. Bojan Jovanovic, “Internet of Things Statistics for 2022 – Taking Things Apart,” DataProt (website),
May 13, 2022, https://dataprot.net/statistics/iot-statistics/.
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and corporations are not good at these implementations from a cyber-risk
and cybersecurity perspective. This is particularly true in an increasingly
complex networked environment and network of competitors, adversaries,
near-adversaries, and others. Repeated, well-conf igured, risk managed,
cyber secure, IoT system delivery and operation is an immature space.
This is not at all to say that so-called traditional IT is not important.
It is critical for business operations and data management and analysis.
Caring for and supporting traditional IT, however, are different from doing
these things for IoT, and it is essential to recognize that having IT planning
and support capacity does not mean there is also IoT systems planning and
support capacity.

Infrastructure and IoT
Increasingly, where there is infrastr uct ure, there is IoT.
Energy infrastructure is no exception. Internet of Things systems are virtually
guaranteed to be included with, and a critical part of, any new infrastructure.
Similarly, there is strong motivation to retrofit existing infrastructure with
IoT systems because—if the systems are well-chosen, well-deployed, and
well-operated/managed—the network of IoT sensors can provide valuable
frequent environmental and operational information in support of system
performance, operational prediction, and safety. For example, there are
IoT-enabled roads and traffic-monitoring systems for monitoring and reporting
road conditions, weather, traff ic, and wildlife movement around roads.
There is also monitoring of the structural health of concrete across many
industries to include remote continuous monitoring of temperature, humidity,
corrosion rate, pH, strains/stress, and cracks. 6 The fatal condominium
collapse in June 2021 is an unfortunate recent reminder of the importance
of infrastructure health. Similarly, IoT systems are important to monitor,
regulate, and improve performance of offshore wind turbines for electricity
generation and for “supporting pipeline operations with environmental
monitoring, infrastructure management, enhancing operations controllers,
and energy management.” 7
6. Kathy Pretz, “Internet of Things Technology Will Connect Highways, Street Lights, and Vehicles,”
IEEE Spectrum (website), June 20, 2019, https://spectrum.ieee.org/internet-of-things-technology-will
-connect-highways-street-lights-and-vehicles; and Alex Jablokow, “How IoT Uses Sensors to Add Intelligence
to Concrete Infrastructure,” IoT for All (blog), November 11, 2020, https://www.iotforall.com/how-iot-adds
-intelligence-to-concrete-infrastructure.
7. Jeremy Kivi, “How the Internet of Things Has Influenced Midstream Pipeline Operations,”
Schneider Electric Blog, October 3, 2017, https://blog.se.com/oil-and-gas/2017/10/03/iiot-midstream
-pipeline-operations/.
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This additional capability, however, depends on complex subsystems,
partner systems requiring technical and human management, complex technical
and human organizational networks, and concomitant interdependencies
between them that create real points of exposure and risk in an increasingly
adversarial environment. An important critical subset of that infrastructure
is that of energy production, delivery, and consumption.
To the degree that NATO forces depend on energy for operational
requirements and force protection, keeping energy resources intact, operational,
deliverable, and resilient is critical. 8 Transitively, then, the IoT systems that
support these capabilities must also be kept intact, operational, deliverable,
and resilient.
This chapter will focus primarily on risk analysis and mitigation steps
in the interest of defending and protecting IoT systems in support of energy
infrastructure. That said, considerations for defense of this infrastructure
can be f lipped and used in consideration of offensive operations for energy
infrastructure that the adversary is motivated to protect or defend. For example,
it is possible NATO forces might desire to interrupt temporarily the energy
supply to an adversary. This chapter will primarily focus on protecting the
IoT aspect of the energy supply and resources in which NATO is interested.

A Framework for Analysis

Figure 2-1. Chapter scope
8. NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Projection, Allied Joint Publication 3.14 (Brussels: NATO
Standardization Office, November 2007).
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To accomplish this, one framework for ref lecting upon IoT systems and
deployments will be chosen, though this is not the only approach. For this
example, the IoT data pipeline will be used. In turn, this will be analyzed
within a 2 x 2 matrix with NATO and the adversary on one axis and offensive
and defensive operations on the other.
Regardless of physical manifestation, IoT systems will have an array
of sensors, actuators, or a combination at one end of the data pipeline.
These sensors or actuators can number in the 10s, 100s, 1,000s, or more.
An example of a sensor might be a temperature sensor, pressure sensor,
or air particulate sensor. An example of an actuator might be a remotely
controlled valve in an oil or energy source pipeline. These sensors will feed data
into an often-specialized or proprietary data aggregator where a server that
speaks the language of the sensors collects data from each sensor and converts
them into a more standard data format or protocol for subsequent processing
in aggregate. Alternatively, the server may also be a command-and-control
server that sends command-and-control data/signals to an actuator to change,
for example, the rate of f low of a liquid in a pipeline.
The path from the sensors to the aggregator could be over a tightly
controlled and managed network, public network, or something in between.
The path could be fairly simple, such as through one or two router hops on
the way to the aggregator, or through very complex multiple hops and complex
network switching.
From the data aggregator, data will be processed in more traditional,
though still nontrivial, ways. These data will still require extensive data
management. An inexhaustive list of data management tasks and processes
includes extensible data storage, data cleaning and curating, data backup and
recovery, data encryption, and data compression.
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Figure 2-2. Multiple links in the IoT data pipeline (also known as “jazz hands”)
Source: Chuck Benson

Subsequently, that data will go through one or many analytical processes
either through specially conf igured off-the-shelf analytical tools (such
as SPSS, Matlab, and others) or proprietary tools. Further, data-visualization
tools and programming languages, such as Tableau and R, can be
considered part of the analysis process (as well as the publication process).9
Ever-evolving artif icial intelligence approaches can also be applied
to the analysis. Proprietary visualization tools are also possibilities.
Finally, the processed and analyzed data are made available for human
use in the form of reports, spreadsheets, exports, dashboards, visualizations,
and combinations of these. Further, this information could be for operational
use, monitoring, troubleshooting, regulatory/compliance, public information,
or even marketing.
Breaking any point in this chain can render the entire data pipeline
ineffective at least temporarily and possibly permanently. This means
9. “IBM SPSS Software,” IBM (website), n.d., accessed October 26, 2021, https://www.ibm.com/analytics
/spss-statistics-software; “MATLAB,” MathWorks (website), n.d., accessed October 26, 2021,
https://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab.html; and “Business Intelligence and Analytics Software,”
Tableau (website), n.d., accessed January 23, 2019, https://www.tableau.com/.
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the physical infrastructure of energy f low and transport can be impacted
with suff icient disruption to be a useful strategic, operational, and/or
tactical target by an adversary. It is also important to remember, as the
Colonial Pipeline example has shown, that it can be enough to attack business
information systems only to motivate an operator to shut down the physical
portion of the infrastructure because of lost revenue (for example, due to the
inability to measure or invoice in a timely fashion).10
Examples of IoT in energy infrastructure include the following:


A pipeline might have acoustic sensors for crack-initiation
detection, magnetic sensors for corrosion detection, and
remote operation of valves and other actuators.11



A fuel depot will have storage tanks with inventory (level)
sensors, stored oil/fuel composition detectors, f low-rate
monitoring, seismic detection, and more.



Fuel transport vehicles, land or maritime, will likely have
IoT-based f leet asset-management systems, vehicle safety
systems, cargo (oil/fuel) operational and safety systems, and
other systems.12



A wind turbine farm will have sensors and actuators
to enhance reliability, add additional control capabilities,
and increase security.13



Other examples include battery farms, pumping stations,
remotely controlled circuit breakers, photovoltaic array
management (solar cells), hydrogen fuel farms, and others.14

10. Stephanie Kelly and Jessica Resnick-ault, “One Password Allowed Hackers to Disrupt Colonial
Pipeline, CEO Tells Senators,” Reuters (website), June 8, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/colonial
-pipeline-ceo-tells-senate-cyber-defenses-were-compromised-ahead-hack-2021-06-08/.
11. “4 Ways IoT Reimagines Pipeline Monitoring in Oil & Gas,” BehrTech (blog), July 3, 2019,
https://behrtech.com/blog/4-ways-iot-reimagines-pipeline-monitoring-in-oil-gas/.
12. “Internet of Things in Oil & Gas,” Deloitte (website), n.d., accessed December 15, 2021,
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/consulting/articles/iot-digital-oil-and-gas.html.
13. Lina Alhmoud and Hussein Al-Zoubi, “IoT Applications in Wind Energy Conversion Systems,”
Open Engineering 9, no. 1 (January 2019): 490–99, https://doi.org/10.1515/eng-2019-0061.
14. “After Many False Starts, Hydrogen Power Might Now Bear Fruit,” Economist (website), July 4, 2020,
https://econ.st/3DW1XEB.
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Supply-chain Considerations
Supply-chain exposure and challenges are prevalent across the entire
IoT data pipeline. At the device level, on the far left of the data pipeline
diagram, the devices—sensors and actuators—have many software components
from many different providers.15 There may be a real-time operating system
(RTOS) in the device, which could be sourced from several different providers.
There can be diverse sources for web services software, encryption software,
business logic software, TCP/IP networking software, wireless protocol
software, and others.16 These sources can have other sources, suppliers,
or subcontractors. Many vulnerabilities, some existing, deployed, and
“in the wild” for several years, have been found in software libraries
supporting the networking “TCP/IP stack.” Every packet of network
communication goes through this portion of the software on the device,
so if it is compromised, a malicious actor could exploit this vulnerability and
eavesdrop on the communication, disrupt device operation, or control the
device operation.17 Similarly, networking hardware and software can be sourced
from a variety of places, to include potentially adversarial countries such
as China (Huawei).18 The device data aggregator and/or command-and-control
hardware and software (server, cloud-based service/application) will also likely
have complex software assembled with software from many suppliers.
Applications in the IoT data pipeline used for data management, processing,
and analysis, as well as software applications used in publishing data (such as
reports, dashboards, and download portals) can also have software components
from multiple different providers—who can also source from many different
providers, and so on.

15. Hearing on China, the United States, and Next Generation Connectivity before the US-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, 115th Cong. (2018), 132.
16. Craig Hunt, “Chapter 1. Overview of TCP/IP,” in TCP/IP Network Administration,” 3rd ed.,
O’Reilly (website), n.d., accessed May 7, 2021, https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/tcpip-network
-administration/0596002971/ch01.html.
17. “Project Memoria,” Forescout (website), n.d., accessed December 15, 2021, https://www.forescout.com
/research-labs/project-memoria/.
18. Kevin Baron, “NATO Has ‘Growing Realization’ about Risks of Using Huawei Gear, Top General
Says,” Defense One (website), February 25, 2020, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/02/nato-has
-growing-realization-about-risks-using-huawei-gear-top-general-says/163318/.

35

Benson

IoT Considerations in Risk Analysis
and Defensive Operations for Energy Security
Because breaking the IoT data pipeline, which directly supports energy
infrastructure anywhere, can cause disruption of energy f low and delivery,
each point in the chain should be studied as well as the corresponding
interfaces between each point. Time and resources, particularly staffing
resources, will provide a limit to the level of detail and granularity of analysis
for any fixed time period, but that does not prevent a structured, consistent,
and repeatable approach.
For each point in the chain, the data pipeline, it is important to ask what
the likelihood and impact of a successful attack would be. For example,
the respective likelihoods and impacts of sensor or actuator damage,
degradation, destruction (in part or in whole), net work problems
between sensors and aggregator/command-and-control servers, hardware and
software supplied by potential adversaries with backdoors, and other control
and disruption mechanisms and network equipment and software of unknown
or questionable provenance should be considered. Furthermore, f lawed
or compromised data management software and/or analysis software and the
likelihood of an insider threat anywhere, or in multiple places, in the IoT data
pipeline should be examined.
Other considerations and potential for analyses include IoT life-cycle
stages and supply-chain issues at the device level all the way up the data
pipeline. Further, these different frameworks can be integrated and crossmatrixed. That integration with three different frameworks with multiple
components, however, begins to become unwieldy in application, particularly
for constrained resources.

Using IoT Systems to Disrupt Neighbor IoT Systems
Notably, it is possible an IoT system can be hacked to get into another IoT
system on the network. For example, in the 2008 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Turkish
pipeline explosion, the attackers hacked the networked video-surveillance
system and then used that as a stepping off point for a subsequent attack
on the industrial controls of the pipeline itself.19
19. Ariel Bogle, “A Cyber Attack May Have Caused a Turkish Oil Pipeline to Catch Fire in 2008,”
Slate Future Tense (blog), December 14, 2014, http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/12/11/bloomberg
_reports_a_cyber_attack_may_have_made_a_turkish_oil_pipeline_catch.html.
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Figure 2-3. 2008 Turkish pipeline hack and explosion
Source: Reuters (used with permission)

The idea and approach of this type of vulnerability and attack is that
different networks within an organization, enterprise, and nation-state have
many different subnetworks that are connected and often interdependent.
The issue is that, often, these different subnetworks can have distinct levels
of security, risk, and operational oversight. This heterogeneity of risk and
exposure level can occur because of the different external providers/vendors of
network services and devices used to implement and operate different network
services and equipment. Similarly, several aspects of the overall network may
be treated and supported quite differently because of substantial organizational
and cultural differences within separate divisions of the same organizational
entity, nation-state, or alliance, the central IT division, and the operational
technology/facilities operations divisions. 20
Exacerbating the varying security/risk posture challenge is that the
operator of the comprehensive network comprised of the smaller networks,
not uncommonly, implicitly assumes the whole network has the same level
of risk exposure and allows “trust” between interconnected subnetworks that
have distinct levels of risk and security. This assumption creates vulnerability.
An attacker can attack and garner access to a more exposed, less secure,
subnetwork. Then, because implicit trust may exist between subnetworks,
20. “IoT and Cybersecurity Risk: Core Issues for the Building Industry,” Cyber-BE Lab (website),
February 24, 2021, https://cyber.be.uw.edu/2021/02/24/part-i-iot-and-cybersecurity-risk/; and “IoT Policy
Landscape: Implications for Managing Security in the Built Environment,” Cyber-BE Lab (website),
February 24, 2021, https://cyber.be.uw.edu/2021/02/24/part-ii-iot-policy-landscape/.
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the attacker can use that foothold in the more exposed subnetwork to traverse
into other, often more sensitive, and critical, subnetworks.
While this weak-link-network approach has since been disputed in the 2008
pipeline case, it is a known attack vector. Another example is the Target cyberattack
in 2013 where the attacker gained access because of Target’s relationship
and network connection with a heating, ventilation, and cooling (HVAC)
vendor. 21 HVAC systems, some of the earliest IoT systems, remain a prolific
sector. Another example is alleged access to Boston-area hospitals through
an HVAC vendor. 22

Operational Technology Skill Set Shortages
A short supply of staffing and skill sets in operational technology (OT)
is needed to implement, operate, and manage IoT systems. There is also
a short supply of skill sets that can work well across organizational, historical,
and work-culture boundaries. “Resolving an issue often takes both data analysis
and a wrench . . . .” 23
This shortage of needed skill sets also contributes to improper
and/or incomplete and risk-laden IoT systems deployments and operation.
While this OT skill set capacity shortage will likely shrink in the future, it
will take time. In the meantime, there is a good probability that marginally
installed, operated, and exposed IoT systems, not the least of which are energy
infrastructure systems, will continue in the near term.

Mitigating Risk
With the rapid growth in the number, size, and complexity of IoT
systems and their respective interdependencies, there is growth in the number
of motivated, nation-state, and criminal malicious actors. Due to their
deepening and broadening capabilities, the shortage of IoT system deployment
and operational capacity for organizations, corporations, institutions, and
21. Robert M. Lee, “Closing the Case on the Reported 2008 Russian Cyber Attack on
the BTC Pipeline,” SANS Institute (blog), June 15, 2015, https://www.sans.org/blog/closing
-the-case-on-the-reported-2008-russian-cyber-attack-on-the-btc-pipeline/; and Brian Krebs,
“Inside Target Corp., Days after 2013 Breach,” Krebs on Security (blog), September 21, 2015,
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/09/inside-target-corp-days-after-2013-breach/.
22. Steve Alder, “HVAC Vendor Allegedly Hacked: Access Gained to Hospital Systems,”
HIPAA Journal (website), August 23, 2021, https://www.hipaajournal.com/hvac-vendor-allegedly-hacked
-access-gained-to-hospital-systems/.
23.

Benson, Managing IoT Systems.
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alliances mitigating risk in this environment is challenging. There are,
however, things that can be done. A short list of potential mitigation steps
includes:


Do not assume similar levels of risk exposure and security
across a large, multicomponent network.



Ascertain, as much as possible, the source of the provided
software in devices and other aspects of the IoT data pipeline.



Demand, review, and ask for evidence of vendor/provider
security and risk mitigation and practices.



Begin immediately to build communication channels and
shared language and interests across divisions/departments in
an organization, particularly traditional IT and OT divisions,
departments, and units.



Begin internal development of IT and IT/operational
technology competencies. Outsourcing is also possible, but
these skill sets are in short supply and high demand.



Begin to develop budgets around these needs and capabilities.
These needs are not going away and will continue to grow.

The University of Washington has implemented and continues to develop
a “Four Pillar” program to provide a framework for addressing these IoT
systems issues as an organization/institution:


Policy review, modification, and development



Outreach, education, awareness, and assistance across the
enterprise



Self-awareness and threat awareness



Interorganizational coordination

While each of these components, relationships, and the dependencies
between them requires substantial work, this framework does provide
a mechanism with which to orient to a very complex problem set. 24
24.
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Conclusion
Internet of Things systems directly enable and facilitate energy
infrastructure strategy and operations. A core and critical component
of these systems is the IoT data pipeline. There is a high likelihood that
damaging, destroying, or disrupting this IoT system data pipeline will have
immediate and potentially catastrophic effects on the physical infrastructure
for making energy available to NATO forces and partners. Because of its
importance and its natural logical f low, this data pipeline provides a traceable
path to serve as a basis for risk analysis, intelligence, and the operational
and strategic needs for NATO forces in Europe.
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ABSTRACT: This chapter outlines hybrid activity and the tools available
to actors to conduct hybrid warfare, vulnerabilities brought about
by cyber-integration and the concept of information warfare as a “gray zone”
in conflict. Current efforts by the Russian Federation and its proxies to destabilize
the information landscape surrounding its invasion of Ukraine are detailed,
and recommendations are made to counter disinformation, including media
regulation reform, the establishment of disinformation task forces, cultivating
populations that are resilient to information warfare, and diversifying supply
chains and the information landscape.
Keywords: hybrid threats, information diffusion, disinformation, energy
security, Russia-Ukraine War, supply chains

Introduction
The energy sector is one of the main pillars of a state’s operation
and sustainabilit y. Protecting and ensuring the smooth operation
of critical energy infrastructure is a primary goal of democratic societies.
Increasingly, advanced systems for parametric surveillance and control
of facilities are being introduced into the operation of critical infrastructure
and the broader energy sector. This integration offers better oversight and
remote accessibility but introduces potential vulnerabilities to malicious
activities such as hybrid threats.
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Defining Hybrid Activity
According to The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model,
“Hybrid threat can be characterized as coordinated and synchronized
action that deliberately targets democratic states’ and institutions’ systemic
vulnerabilities through a wide range of means. Activities exploit the thresholds
of detection and attribution as well as the border between war and peace.” 1
Hybrid actors seek strategic objectives by challenging the security
environment of democratic states and institutions. Their objectives
are to undermine decision-making processes, raise unhealthy polarization
in the society, and challenge democratic values by introducing new attack
vectors in an unprecedented manner.

Figure 3-1. Diagram of the conceptual model
Source: The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model (used with permission)

From the above diagram, it becomes evident that a hybrid actor, who
may be a state or non-state actor, has a variety of weapons (tools) applicable
to different domains that can be used to address the systemic vulnerabilities
of a democratic state. Hybrid actions can be employed in many ways,
from low intensity (such as inf luence) to the escalated version of hybrid warfare.
In a hybrid actor’s operational plan, objectives are not clearly def ined
in terms of time, hence, there are no deadlines or due dates for actions.
Unlike traditional operational plans, the attacker is relieved of the stress and
1. Georgios Giannopoulos, Hanna Smith, and Marianthi Theocharidou, The Landscape of Hybrid
Threats: A Conceptual Model (Luxembourg: European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid
Threats, February 5, 2021), 13, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/conceptual_framework
-reference-version-shortened-good_cover_-_publication_office.pdf.

44

Vulnerabilities: Chapter 3

Malign Influence and Disinformation

cost of gathering and consuming resources at a specific time and place, as
the targeted center of gravity, “the source of power that provides moral or
physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act,” can be shifted in time. 2
This modular and agile attack scheme available to hybrid actors
gives them the f lexibility to move for ward or backward, escalate
or de-escalate, and synchronize in parallel or in a series of independent actions
at their will and according to the circumstances. In that way, hybrid actors
ensure the viability and continuity of their plans, have the chance to test possible
reactions or response plans, and confuse the situational awareness of the target
state. At the same time, they are able to stay undetected and unattributed
at the gray zone between legal and illegal, acceptable and unacceptable, and
peace and war.

The Cyber Domain and Information Diffusion
One of the most critical domains in hybrid conf licts is the cyber
domain because it constitutes the main channel of information diffusion
(information circulated in isolated, mostly interdependent networks around
the globe). The Internet, Internet of Things (IoT) systems, telecommunication
networks, and many other systems and networks can carry large amounts
of data from encrypted and critical information to less signif icant,
publicly accessed networks. Cyberspace offers fertile ground for state
actors, non-state actors, or proxies of states to act effectively, rapidly,
and anonymously under the threshold of detection. Hybrid actors are trying
to gain access to any available information that can be processed
individually or studied in correlation with similar samples taken in different
time periods as a way of revealing and learning multilevel behavioral
patterns of the target state and gaining intelligence while reducing the chance
of detection.

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: JCS, August 2021).
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Cascading Effect of Hybridity
In multidimensional spaces of action, hybrid actors set up their
operational plans driven by systemic vulnerabilities and exposures of
the targets. This vulnerable domain may not be the prime target of the
hostile actor, but domain interdependence can allow for further action
toward the desired domain. Such an activity may trigger cascading effects,
offering opportunities for hybrid actors to exploit more domains by engaging
diverse tools in synchronized and coordinated actions that can be used
as force multipliers in the field.

Influence and Disinformation
According to figure 3-1, inf luence is a low-intensity activity in which
a hybrid actor has the chance to act in a gray zone and remain under the
threshold of detection and attribution. Inf luence is usually a prolonged and
effective process as it gains access through political, societal, and ideological
gaps in liberal democratic societies. Activities in the cyber domain are effective
in infrastructure like the energy sector, while information congestion and
disinformation are part of the toolkit hybrid actors use to build inf luence.
According to the definition established by the European Union:
“Disinformation is verifiably false or misleading information
created, presented and disseminated for economic gain
or to intentionally deceive the public and can have a range
of consequences, such as threatening our democracies,
polarizing debates, and putting the health, security and
environment at risk.”3
In the energy era, we have experienced how coordinated disinformation
campaigns target energ y diversif ication and securit y development
projects—mostly across Eastern European countries. Especially for the
development of nuclear power plants, the manipulation of public opinion
to oppose against such an investment is evident. In Poland, for example,
disinformation related to a possible radiation exposure like the Chernobyl

3. “Tackling Online Disinformation,” European Commission (website), n.d., https://digital-strategy.ec
.europa.eu/en/policies/online-disinformation.
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nuclear accident has impacted conversations about energy diversification.4
In addition, instrumentalizing ideological active organizations who fight
for environmental protection against hazardous materials and the proliferation
of nuclear power installations could be considered coordinated information
activity toward the same goal. 5
Principle aspects of democratic societies (such as freedom of speech,
freedom of expression, and freedom of media) can be weaponized
by malicious actors to manipulate or polarize the society. These core values
of democracy can be converted into systemic v ulnerabilities and
constitute potential targets in the hybrid context. While democracies
follow transparent and fair procedures in every means of information
dissemination, they also leave room for internal and external hostile
interference. On the other hand, news media are obliged to provide
reliable information and support the democratic processes by adhering
to journalistic principals and ethical codes.
Due to global digitalization and the proliferation of computers and
smart devices, the media news sector has been transformed. Social media
platforms today have taken over the majority of the information load,
leaving less room for traditional journalistic news. The modern method
of dissemination of information is performed without sufficient transparency,
usually anonymously, with no adequate fact-checking or relevant accountability,
providing fertile ground for disinformation. 6
Through the broader market strategy of social media that use segmentation
of people in groups according to their interests, disinformation campaigns
have become more sophisticated and effective by tailoring informative content
to each group. In that way, the detection of malicious information becomes
more difficult.7

4. Karolina Baca-Pogorzelska, “How Chernobyl Fake News Poisons Nuclear Energy Debate in Poland,”
Notes from Poland (website), April 25, 2020, https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/04/25/how-chernobyl
-fake-news-poisons-nuclear-energy-debate-in-poland/.
5. Aleksander Król, “Warsaw Institute Review: Information Warfare against Strategic Investments
in the Baltic States and Poland,” Warsaw Institute (website), July 19, 2017, https://warsawinstitute.org
/information-warfare-strategic-investments-baltic-states-poland/.
6. European Centre of Excellence (CoE) for Countering Hybrid Threats, Countering Disinformation:
News Media and Legal Resilience, Hybrid CoE Paper 1 (Luxembourg: European CoE for Countering
Hybrid Threats, November 2019), https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/News-Media-and
-Legal-Resilience_2019_HCPaper-ISSN.pdf.
7. Carme Colomina, Héctor Sánchez Margalef, and Richard Young, The Impact of Disinformation
on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World (Strasbourg, FR: European Parliament, April 2021),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653635/EXPO_STU(2021)653635_EN.pdf.
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The amount of information circulated through the Internet is enormous.
Every minute, Facebook users share 150,000 messages, WhatsApp users
share 40,000,000 messages, and Instagram users post 350,000 stories
and upload 500 hours of video. 8 In addition to traditional paper and
broadcasting media, phone calls and messages can illuminate how congested the
information environment is and how challenging it is to track disinformation.

Counter Disinformation
It is important to highlight the behavioral attitude cultivated
through social media. Unfortunately, users have become passive receivers
of messages rather than critical thinkers of what they read and listen
to due to insuff icient time to process the f low of information.
This shortcoming constitutes a serious vulnerability where disinformation can
become more digestible. The conditions for the f lourishing of disinformation
are enhanced when social unrest, caused by an economic crisis or pandemic,
prevails at the same time in society. Through such a situation, humans seek
to reinforce the feeling that something is wrong and someone is responsible,
either for causing or not preventing the problem. In this way, the trust
in states and institutions is shaken, and a gap is created that can be exploited
by hybrid actors to undermine decision-making capabilities.
Several attempts have been made and several measures have been taken
at the national and multinational level, such as the European Union (EU),
but there is no consensus on counter-disinformation best practices. In addition,
though several legal tools exist, they cannot be applied to the same extent
by all member states, due to cases of insufficient resources to support the
measures or the absence of law enforcement authorities to implement such laws.
Nevertheless, disinformation can still be an international problem, extending
beyond national borders, that can only be countered by a collective approach
(such as EU-level action) or an even broader approach.

Russian Malign Influence
during the 2022 Ukrainian Invasion
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the breadth of impact
possible when malign inf luence and disinformation combine with military
action. Russia has capitalized on its vast economic and informational
8. Domo Inc., “Data Never Sleeps 8.0,” 2020, https://web-assets.domo.com/blog/wp-content
/uploads/2020/08/20-data-never-sleeps-8-final-01-Resize.jpg.
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networks to further its invasion while attempting to divide Western powers.
While the invasion has had a unifying effect on most of NATO and the EU,
it has also identified areas of fundamental weakness. The allied response,
which has focused mainly on cutting economic and energy ties with the
Russian Federation, has deprived Moscow of important economic and political
capital, warranting a higher risk of Russian hybrid attacks in the NATO bloc.

Disinformation
The role of Russian disinformation in conjunction with the war has played
out differently than it has in the past and can be linked to the fact that
Russian state television networks are banned across the European Union,
and social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter have reduced the reach
of Russian propaganda dramatically. Instead, the Kremlin’s disinformation
has been focused toward Russian nationals and the Russian-speaking diaspora
in neighboring countries and farther abroad.
The use of the term special operation in the early days of the war was
innately deceptive, and the press releases from Russian embassies and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been sharing blatant falsehoods.
The main objective of this disinformation campaign was to lead Russians
to believe their military was conducting defensive operations, as opposed
to an offensive invasion of its neighbor. Some of these lies include claims that the
United States is operating a biochemical laboratory in Ukraine and that Ukraine
was attempting to build a nuclear bomb at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.
Both claims have been dismissed by Western governments and independent
fact-checkers.9 More recently, Russian propaganda has focused on efforts
to misrepresent Ukrainian refugees as “victims of [the Kyiv regime’s] Nazism”
to misconstrue Russian looting in Ukraine as internationally sanctioned trade
and mislabel NATO as an aggressor toward Russia and Ukraine.10
Cohesive efforts by governments and corporations in the United States
and Europe have highlighted a key strategy in future information wars.
By controlling the reach of Russian propagandists and openly discussing
the falsehoods in a unified fashion, these efforts have made it much more
diff icult for the Russian regime to narrate international events falsely.
9. Mark Scott, “As War in Ukraine Evolves, So Do Disinformation Tactics,” Politico (website),
March 10, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-russia-disinformation-propaganda/.
10. “Time Stopped for Russia in 1945: A Digest of Russia Propaganda for May 31,” Ukrinform (website),
June 1, 2022, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3504015-time-stopped-for-russia-in-1945-a-digest
-of-russian-propaganda-for-may-31.html.
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Furthermore, this information warfare has not done what the Russians usually
do best—capitalizing on preexisting divisions within nations and organizations.
This failure has proven to be a Western advantage. This victory should not
be considered a conclusive success over all Russian disinformation though.
For example, because of difficulties in algorithmic recognition of languages
beyond English, TikTok and YouTube have had Russian-language users and
accounts parrot otherwise banned Kremlin propaganda. Telegram has also
provided a substantial platform for the spread of misattributed war videos,
often reaching multiple countries and tens of thousands of readers nearly
simultaneously.11
Russia’s disinformation at home has been robust. First, the Kremlin has
severely limited unsanctioned reporting. Independent reporters have been
chased out of positions, and protesters have been arrested. In early March,
draft legislation proposed that anti-war protesters could be conscripted
into military service.12 Moreover, Russia’s considerable disinformation
net works have turned almost 90 percent of their efforts inward.13
There is no viable way to measure the efficacy of these efforts accurately
while so little information is coming into and out of Russia, but when the war
ends, the West must find ways to infiltrate the Russian-language information
spaces successfully to provide the necessary context to Russian nationals.
Without this effort, there is a significant risk of a generation of Russians
unaware of the truth and hostile toward Western states because of hardships
their government caused. Moreover, a population of misled citizens could
provide Russia with more vectors for disinformation in the same way
it incentivizes hackers—without necessarily employing them.
The success of the Western world, in light of the changing disinformation
landscape, demands a collaborative effort to continue to discover, describe,
and destroy disinformation before it can be widely disseminated. It is also vital
to remember that inf luence does not only occur in information spaces. The
invasion of Ukraine has highlighted that hostile actors can leverage economic
and infrastructural investment to further their needs. Diverse supply chains
will diminish this effect.

11.

Scott, “Disinformation Tactics.”

12. Reuters in Moscow and Gareth Jones, “Fearing Martial Law or Conscription, Some Russians Try
to Flee Abroad,” Reuters (website), March 3, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/fearing
-martial-law-or-conscription-some-russians-try-flee-abroad-2022-03-03/.
13. Scott, “Disinformation Tactics.”
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Recommendations
Some of the following measures could safeguard the credibility of the
information against malicious inf luential activities.

Shaping the Legal and Regulatory Framework of Media Platforms
Although many countries have established rules and norms to govern
information f low through journalistic media, especially during campaigns and
elections, they still need to fill the associated gap with global social media
companies. Institutions like the EU need to define the legal status, relevant
regulation, and accountability of social media platforms to bolster transparency
and fair competition with the corresponding journalistic media. At the same
time, democratic principles (such as freedom of expression, freedom of speech,
and equity) should be safeguarded.14

Creation of a Disinformation Rapid Response Force
A task force should be established within NATO’s Joint Intelligence
and Security Division to establish a network for detecting and countering
disinformation in the nascent stages. This task force should be staffed
by local, credible actors with a strong presence at the community level.
Their focus would be on building a network to ensure every state is able
to evaluate disinformation from multinational and multicultural perspectives
to determine the identity and motives of perpetrators more accurately
through data analysis. This information would then be classified according
to its impact, including a threat-level timeline, and its possibility of spreading
to local, state, national, or international levels.

Diversification of Supply Chains
Because malign inf luence is not exclusively disinformation,
NATO’s logistics committee should identify necessary goods produced
outside the Alliance. Wherever possible, it should work to stockpile
or d iversif y supply cha ins to create minima l d ist u rbances,
should non-Allied nations use their economic inf luence to interrupt
supply. This action would give NATO nations a full scope of responses
to aggression.

14. European CoE for Countering Hybrid Threats, Countering Disinformation.
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Education on Disinformation Efforts
Many resources, including funding efforts to enhance news literacy,
should be a high priority for governments. The development of critical
thinking and the cultivation of the ability to draw real facts through
an information storm cannot be obtained easily, especially today when the
majority of information is provided through social media. This ability must
be acquired from the early stages of education so it can be assimilated more
easily in the future. Hence, due to the digitalization of learning methods,
it would be advisable to teach children the methodology and value of analyzing
and exploiting the content of information through the Web.
Since 2019, the Council of Europe, through its European Media Literacy
Week, has advocated for the promotion of media literacy, and it has had
an expert research group since 2011. These efforts should be leveraged
to help member states create and implement national media-literacy programs
for children and adults. The most convenient and easiest way to protect
from disinformation is to follow a diversity of people or groups and perspectives
on websites and in traditional media. Relying upon limited, biased news and
resources increases the odds of falling victim to false rumors.15
In conclusion, many practices for countering malign information
exist. It is questionable, however, whether and to what extent they can be
applied. Surveillance and censorship (of journalists, in particular) oppose
the fundamental principles of democracy (such as freedom of speech,
expression, and the press). Additionally, constraints may lead to a conf lict
with private-interest and free-market competition, where social media
companies design and constantly improve their algorithms to dominate
the global market. Instead, NATO nations must candidly analyze areas
of inf luence dominated by hostile actors and build contingency plans to address
areas of weakness.

15 Darrell M. West, “How to Combat Fake News and Disinformation,” Brookings (website),
December 18, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/.
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ABSTRACT: Cybersecurity is pivotal to ensuring the collective security
of NATO, especially due to the Alliance’s dependence on the availability
and safety of energy resources. Cyber early warning systems in the field
of energy security can make a major contribution to preventing cyberattacks
and providing countermeasures capable of securing energy resources and
enabling unrestricted military mobility at the Alliance level. This chapter
presents the principles of the development of early warning systems and
analyzes the advantages and limitations of the current systems. It then
proposes a new generation of early warning systems that uses virtualization
and artif icial intelligence to identify and neutralize attacks before they
destroy energy critical infrastructure.
Keywords: early warning, energy security, cybersecurity, resilience

Introduction
Early warning systems (EWS) for cyber defense in energy security are
vital to ensuring NATO’s medium- and long-term goals. Accurate discovery
of threats in their early stages has the advantage of correctly identifying and
ensuring the effectiveness of the countermeasures needed to prevent the
disruption of the energy, logistical, and operational capabilities of Alliance
forces. A defining element of NATO’s effectiveness is safeguarding military
mobility using modern technologies that provide capabilities for protection
and preemptive action against kinetic or cyberattacks. Most current EWS
are not adequate to repel cyberattacks on critical energy infrastructure in the
emerging technology environment.
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This chapter f irst identif ies the challenges with predicting today’s
cyberattacks. It then analyzes the limitations of current cyber early warning
systems (CEWS). Finally, it proposes a new generation of EWS that is
having success at defeating malicious cyber intrusions due to its virtualization
of critical energy infrastructure and effective use of artificial intelligence.
The design and implementation of CEWS include many research
challenges, starting with the correct identif ication of the generic set
of indicators, intelligence gathering, forecasting, and fusing multiple data
sources together. With NATO pushing for greater interoperability and mobility
than ever before, the need for strategic coherence, operational cooperation
and information exchange has never been greater. Energy dependencies will
continue to create asymmetries. Hostile actors conduct aggressive energy
operations that blur the lines of traditional conf lict. Energy infrastructure
and the intrinsic access to energy resources can be turned into weapons
of trust—breaking against the Allied states in the region through cyberattacks.
Potential attacks to the energy supply-chain components could fundamentally
disrupt the joint military capabilities and cohesion of the Alliance at a time
when NATO’s eastern f lank and the Black Sea region are under threat.1
The adaptability of cyberattackers is enhanced by the process
of continuously discovering new vulnerabilities and by unlimited access
to information and research resources from malicious actors. Therefore,
cybersecurity, viewed from a defender’s perspective, must demonstrate a
constant ability to adapt and be proactive.
To prevent unforeseeable future effects in energy networks, EWS are
required to minimize the security impact by detecting potentially harmful,
usually unclassified, system behavior based on an existing knowledge base.
Early warning systems must often process fuzzy and low quality
(often uncertain) data. 2 The need to process ambiguous data increases due
to the volume of threats, increased complexity, and the dynamic
of communication and privacy concerns. 3 The problem of learning where the
1. A. Dupuy, “Energy Security Is Critical to NATO’s Black Sea Future,” Atlantic Council (website),
May 12, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/energy-security-is-critical-to-natos
-black-sea-future.
2. Joachim Biskup et al., “08102 Working Group Early Warning Systems,” in Perspectives Workshop:
Network Attack Detection and Defense, ser. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, ed. G. Carle et al. (Dagstuhl,
DE: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Germany, 2008), http://drops.dagstuhl.de
/opus/volltexte/2008/1493.
3. David K. Arrowsmith, R. J. Mondrag, and M. Woolf, “Data Traffic, Topology and Congestion,”
in Complex Dynamics in Communication Networks, ed. Ljupco Kocarev and Gábor Vattay (Berlin/Heidelberg:
Springer, 2005), 127–57.
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next attack will come from using uncertain or ambiguous data is a relatively
new challenge. Classical intrusion detection approaches based on traditional
algorithms cannot cope with such threats. In order to best understand how an
EWS using AI and virtualization improves on the current outdated systems,
an assessment of the drawbacks to older generation early warning systems
will first be analyzed.

Problem with Older Generation EWS
The growing importance of EWS has manifested itself in the growth
of research initiatives in the beginning of the last decade around the world.4
The major difficulties are to process the petabytes of information provided
by trillions of devices interconnected to networks with huge transfer
capabilities and to interpret the useful content of encrypted packets, as well
as the hypervisor-based services and platforms, proactive for cybersecurity
and oriented to future Internet needs. In addition, much of this big data
is stored in the complex Cloud environment, where security, confidentiality,
and data validity must be secured under conditions that foster maximum trust.5

Existing EWS Concepts, Systems, and Sustainable
Approaches Overview
Over the past decade, two key techniques have been used to detect
network-based intrusions: detecting resources misuse and detecting anomalies.
The first comprises the group of signature-based systems where detection
is performed by defining malicious behavior, using a set of pre-saved models
stored in a database. Traffic is checked in practice for a previously known
attack pattern either by testing the entire batch of data, including payload,
or by checking the header. Conventional and widely used intrusion
detection (IDS) systems cannot work satisfactorily in very high bandwidth

4. Mario Golling and Björn Stelte, “Requirements for a Future EWS – Cyber Defence in the Internet
of the Future,” in 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict Proceedings, ed. Christian Czosseck
and Enn Tyugu (Tallinn, EE: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, 2011),
https://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/en/download/107746.
5. Kai Hwang, Sameer Kulkareni, and Yue Hu, “Cloud Security with Virtualized Defense and
Reputation-based Trust Management,” in Eighth IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers)
International Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing Proceedings (Chengdu, CN: IEEE
Computer Society Technical Committee on Scalable Computing/National Natural Science Foundation
of China, 2009), 717–22, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5380613.
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environments. 6 It is not feasible to inspect the entire payload due to the great
amount of processing power required. There are, however, different ways
to overcome these restrictions by using machine-learning techniques to perform
a full payload inspection with a bandwidth of more than 1 gigabyte per second.7
In the case of systems based on anomaly detection, a behavioral model
is built that contains data such as types, quantities, and daily traffic allocation
of the monitored network. Detection is done by measuring the current state
of the system and comparing it with the values obtained from the model.
The approach is effective when machine-learning techniques are used,
such as data extraction and evolutionary algorithms, expert systems, and
neural networks. One method that can be used to increase eff iciency
is to combine methods, such as applying evolutionary algorithms
to data-mining systems. Due to its characteristics, this type of IDS is often
known as Network Behavioral Analysis (NBA). 8 There is an evolutionary step
beyond NBA under the framework of Network Situation Awareness (NSA),
where the network monitoring process includes high-level visualization and
data management.9 Technical approaches use distributed denial-of-service
detection with honeypots, which are set to detect, def lect, or counteract
attempts by unauthorized users. Other helpful approaches include diversion
of traffic to capture systems, use of the control advantages offered by dedicated
protocols, and use of human experience to detect anomalies. The complexity
of the analysis and the increasing bandwidth and the large number of services
limit the efficient applicability of the listed methods in the long run.
Early warning systems depend heavily on the efficiency of the technologies
used that have had several generational developments. Combinations
of methods have been proposed to overcome some of the limitations inherent
in IDS, such as those based on combined AI methods, event monitoring,
data exchange and automated analysis of captured payloads, malicious
behavior, and rehearsals. In the last decade, the following examples
of technical approaches have been used.

6. Alex Shenfield, David Day, and Aladdin Ayesh, “Intelligent Intrusion Detection Systems Using
Artificial Neural Networks,” ICT Express 4, no. 2 (June 2018): 95–99, https://www.sciencedirect.com
/science/article/pii/S2405959518300493/pdfft?md5=e59991f5920a04dc95674cddb9c67e42&pid=1-s2.0
-S2405959518300493-main.pdf.
7. “ReMIND – Real-time Machine Learning Intrusion Detection,” http://www.first.fraunhofer.de/owx 1
4079 2 2 0 4be4ae1a1c59c1.html.
8. “Network Behavior Analysis (NBA),” Sun Valley Networks (website), n.d., https://www.sunnyvalley
.io/docs/network-security-tutorials/what-is-nba.
9.

Golling and Stelte, “Requirements for a Future EWS.”
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EWS and IDS Based on Combined AI Methods
Early warning and intrusion detection systems based on combined
AI methods (FIDeS) aim to develop an advanced, intelligent system
for detecting Internet attacks on both local area networks and wide area
networks as early as possible.10 The system took into account the classic
File Transfer Protocol, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, and Hyper Text
Transfer Protocol, but not the newer protocols, such as Simple Object Access
Protocol, which enables distributed elements of an application to communicate
as well.11 The system seeks to reduce the number of false positives
resulting from the classical approach to using an anomaly-based IDS in an early
warning system based on the use of various AI methods such as declarative
knowledge representation, explanation generation, and cognitive assistance,
with FIDeS providing assistance and practical instructions, not just simple
intrusion detection.

Systems Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances
The event monitoring enabling responses to anomalous live
disturbances (EMERALD) environment is dedicated to tracking malicious
behavior on large networks and consists of a suite of scalable distributed
tools for network surveillance, attack isolation, and automated response.12
The system uses models developed from over a decade of research experience
based on the correlation of large volumes of data in distributed systems,
offering the advantage of f lexibility and abstraction layers given the use of
highly distributed, configurable surveillance and response monitors.

Worldwide Observatory of Malicious Behaviors and Attack Threats
Worldwide observatory of malicious behaviors and attack threats
(WOMBAT) was developed as a European project (STREP).13 The project
was structured on three levels to achieve its objectives: “(i) real time gathering
of a diverse set of security related raw data, (ii) enrichment of this input
by means of various analysis techniques, and (iii) root cause identification

10. “FIDeS,” Universität Bremen (website), n.d., https://www.informatik.uni-bremen.de/~sohr/FIDeS
/index_e.htm.
11. Ensar Şeker, “Use of Artificial intelligence Techniques/Applications in Cyber Defense” (Tallinn, EE:
NATO CCD-COE, 2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.12556.
12. “Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMERALD),”
SRI International (website), n.d., http://www.csl.sri.com/projects/emerald/.
13. “Worldwide Observatory of Malicious Behaviors and Attack Threats,” European Commission
CORDIS (website), n.d., https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/216026.

61

Raicu and Lohmann

and understanding of the phenomena under scrutiny.” 14 It has benef ited
from information resources such as Symantec-managed Deepsight, which
is a Cloud-hosted web portal providing technical intelligence. It has also
used the worldwide distributed honeypot system operated by Eurocom—
a decoy computer system intended to attract cyberattacks to gain information
about cybercriminals’ identities and methods. Other data have been gleaned
from the nationwide EWS used by CERT Polska or Hispasec’s largest
collection of malwares.15

Classical EWS Architectures Limitations, Challenges, and Solutions
Systems that try to monitor network status and detect new network
threats and anomalies have the following drawbacks:
 Global monitoring systems like net work telescopes,
an Internet system that allows the observation of largescale network attacks, are based on dark address space
with high detection rate of worms and network intrusions.
Focused attacks, however, are diff icult to recognize
and attribute.16
 Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) can detect many threats
and anomalies; however, it cannot be scaled at the level
of a large-scale network or Internet backbone.17
 Data f lows, or reactive programming, are some of the
most important sources for information based on the
evaluation of sampled f low technology, unable to provide
100 percent accurate results.18
 Most IDS systems are limited to evaluating only logs, f lows,
or packet counts.
14. Hervé Debar, “Sticky: March 2008 Archives,” WOMBAT Project (website), March 19, 2008,
https://wombat-project.eu/sticky/2008/03/.
15. “Worldwide Observatory of Malicious Behaviors and Threats,” European Commission CORDIS
(website), July 15, 2019, https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/216026.
16. Konstantinos Demertzis et al., “Darknet Traffic Big-Data Analysis and Network Management
to Real-Time Automating the Malicious Intent Detection Process by a Weight Agnostic Neural Networks
Framework,” Electronics 10, no. 7 (2021), https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/10/7/781/pdf.
17. Wenguang Song et al., “A Software Deep Packet Inspection System for Network Traﬃc Analysis
and Anomaly Detection,” Sensors 20, no. 6 (2020), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340013171_A
_Software_Deep_Packet_Inspection_System_for_Network_Traffic_Analysis_and_Anomaly_Detection.
18. Vijay Mann, Anilkumar Vishnoi, and Sarvesh Bidkar, “Living on the Edge: Monitoring Network
Flows at the Edge in Cloud Data Centers,” in 2013 Fifth International Conference on Communication
Systems and Networks Proceedings (Bangalore, IN: IEEE, 2013), https://www.inf.ufpr.br/aldri/disc/artigos
/2014/patrick_art2.pdf.
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 There is a weakness in the inherent division between
network- and host-based indicators. It is almost impossible
to correlate these disparate data streams efficiently.
 Anomaly detection is only performed on a segmented piece
of a larger network, is hard to profile as a “normal” operation,
and does not provide any level of attribution.19
 The operation of heterogeneous infrastructures that cannot
be interconnected, regardless of their technological level,
is also an obstacle to the efficiency of EWS.
To resolve these issues, the use of a system of artificial neural networks,
a computational model with processing elements with inputs and outputs based
on predefined functions, provides the average false positive rate percentage
of 0.03. 20 The system is particularly useful in detecting and classification
of botnet attacks, as well as analysis of standard cyber traffic, cyber-physical
systems traffic, and real-time traffic analysis.
A modern IDS is also good at detecting regular intrusions but has low
efficiency against AI-powered adversaries in which attackers inject malicious
inputs—false positives and negatives. The opponent’s malicious AI can use
a special alternation of false positive and negative elements to trick IDS
into infiltrating the network.
A development to counter adverse AI is currently underway, consisting
of several honeypots collecting information needed to train EWS’s
AI to strengthen machine learning against deception technolog y.
This technolog y relies on strategically placed decoy systems and
cyber-traps around the network. The system is designed to have a confusing
and nonlinear response capable of disorienting attackers by preventing them
from identifying real targets and allowing observers to track attackers’
tactics in real time. 21 Although the deception system is essentially effective,
the defense is generally static, making it easier for the opponent to distinguish

19. Eric Gyamfi and Anca Jurcut, “Intrusion Detection in Internet of Things Systems: A Review
on Design Approaches Leveraging Multi-access Edge Computing, Machine Learning, and Datasets,”
Sensors 22, no. 10 (2022), https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/22/10/3744/pdf?version=1652517852.
20. Maciej A. Mazurowski et al., “Training Neural Network Classifiers for Medical Decision Making:
The Effects of Imbalanced Datasets on Classification Performance,” Neural Networks 21, nos. 2-3 (2008): 427–36,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neunet.2007.12.031.
21. Daniel William, “How AI Can Help Improve Intrusion Detection Systems,” GCN (website),
April 15, 2020, https://gcn.com/cybersecurity/2020/04/how-ai-can-help-improve-intrusion-detection
-systems/291266/.
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over time, using his own AI, a honeypot from a real asset, and defeating the
decoy defense.
A few applications provide solutions to the problem of the static defense,
such as DeepDig, or DEcEPtion DIGging, developed at the University
of Texas at Dallas that “plant traps and decoys onto real systems
before applying machine learning techniques in order to gain a deeper
understanding of attackers’ behavior.” 22 DeepDig uses the behavior of real
systems it mimics by transforming each cyberattack into a training session
for IDS system AI capabilities. 23

EWS Using Emergent Technologies Addresses Hybrid Threats
Classical cybersecurity models and practices are not conducive
to application in emerging or heterogeneous environments such as OT or IoT.
Over the last decade, virtualization technologies have drastically changed
cybersecurity methods. To meet new security demands in the changing
hostile environment, advanced machine-learning techniques promoting new
architectures and innovative models for network behavior analysis and learning
algorithms need to be developed to build the new generation of EWS systems.
To address this challenge, the principles of virtualization could drastically
change the way cybersecurity is applied, forcing mechanisms and rules
of application to be reconstrued. The virtual environment is ubiquitous
with an accelerated evolution of Cloud computing concepts that will lead
to the adaptation of large-scale machine-learning techniques to meet new
security challenges. 24 New architectures, sophisticated network behavioral
analysis models—which conduct network monitoring to ensure security—
and learning algorithms can be used to build next-generation EWS.
The goal of this system is also to develop approaches and models for detecting
anomalies and behaviors considered within normal limits for systems,
22. Gbadebo Ayoade et al., “Improving Intrusion Detectors by Crook-sourcing,” December 9, 2019,
in Proceedings of the 35th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (San Juan, PR: Association
for Computing Machinery, December 2019), https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Improving
-intrusion-detectors-by-crook-sourcing-Ayoade-Al-Naami/fef9e447174994c10b359bb1934d19c7c6e4fe9b?p2df;
and “Computer Scientists’ New Tool Fools Hackers into Sharing Keys for Better Cybersecurity,”
Department of Computer Science/University of Texas Dallas (website), February 27, 2020,
https://cs.utdallas.edu/cs-new-tool-fools-hackers-cybersecurity/.
23. Gbadebo Ayoade et al., “Automating Cyberdeception Evaluation with Deep Learning,”
in 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences Proceedings (Maui: Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences, January 2020), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337287036
_Automating_Cyberdeception_Evaluation_with_Deep_Learning.
24. Kaushik Pal, “10 Ways Virtualization Can Improve Security,” Techopedia (website), October 22, 2021,
https://www.techopedia.com/2/31007/trends/virtualization/10-ways-virtualization-can-improve-security.
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sharing information between multiple EWS depending on threat levels.
The approach must be holistic and consider the latest general security
management initiatives.
This is done by developing new methods for malware detection and
behavioral analysis. Temporal and spatial f low characteristics must then be
integrated into the model. Low structured patterns are created by searching
for enhanced malware detection at various levels in the network. Sensor data
are then interpreted by enhancing distributed analyzing capabilities. 25
Early warning cybersecurity systems are dependent on the efficiency of
the technology and the accuracy of the logic of recognizing a cyber threat.

Figure 4-1. EWS extended research directions and development areas
explored by the SAS-163 scientific team
Source: Gabriel Raicu and Sarah Lohmann, “Energy Security in the Era of Hybrid
Warfare,” SAS-163 Research Project Annual Workshop, Project EWS Concepts
(Oberammergau, DE: December 2021).

25. M. Golling and B. Stelte, “Requirements for a Future EWS – Cyber Defence in the Internet
of the Future,” in 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict Proceedings, ed. Christian Czosseck
and Enn Tyugu (Tallinn, EE: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, 2011),
https://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/en/download/107746.
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To overcome the barrier of eff iciency of conventional systems,
a series of paradigm shifts can be used. In the following descriptions, a series
of principles and methods will be reviewed to open up new areas of constructive
approach to EWS.
As an important and general step in increasing the eff iciency of the
systems, the data-sharing capability will have to be extended to obtain a model
of early warning systems with active cybersecurity shared intelligence.
An EWS with included cybersecurity intelligence sharing will provide
the framework to exchange information in real time and provide updated
information to all subsequent modules involved in the system. The main
development will be focused on a comprehensive review of knowledge
exchange and cyber trust models as well as alternative models from other
industrial domains. It will consist of research development by iterative
reviews of requirements and features established to support a cyber
model that promotes information sharing among partners in coordination
with regulatory requirements.
When it comes to EWS to address smart-grid risks, one must consider
that smart-grid networks tend to replace traditional networks due to the
inherent advantages of efficient management and adaptability to transient
regimes, reduced backup requirements, increased resilience and efficiency and
self-healing capacity, elasticity in the integration of renewable energy resources,
and innovative distribution systems to final consumers. 26 There are, however,
a number of elements that need to be considered from a technical point of
view. They combine the classical energy network with the ICT network,
resulting in a system with multiple advantages because it includes smart
devices, monitoring devices, renewable resources, meters, and automatic
decision systems.
In addition to the advantages and possibilities of development,
smart grids also have a number of disadvantages due to their nature.
These disadvantages include the large number of access points,
lower physical security, frequent updating of network devices, the difficulty
of ensuring trust and the risk of spoofing, communication inefficiency and
different level of training between the teams serving the network, the use
of protocols and commercial hardware, and software with a high-attack
envelope on IP networks and adjacent infrastructure. Attacks can be brief ly
listed as using dedicated or conventional malware such as ransomware,
26. Suman Advesh Yadav et al., “A Review of Possibilities and Solutions of Cyber Attacks in Smart
Grids,” in 1st International Conference on Innovation and Challenges in Cyber Security Proceedings (Greater Noida,
IN: IEEE, February 2016), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=7542359.
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unauthorized access by stealing or leaking credentials, false alerts, distorted
messages, denial of service, and traff ic analysis and network mapping
for future exploitation. 27
Detection measures must be approached holistically due to their complexity
since attackers can range from non-malicious users, who may harm the system
out of sheer curiosity, to dissatisfied consumers, untrained or unhappy internal
employees, rivals, terrorists, or hostile state actors. It is also difficult to have
accurate attack attribution, due to the risk of plausible deniability or the use
of pressure groups made up of disinformed users.
When the issue of long-term sustainability involves the use of renewable
energy, blockchain and AI technologies must be considered as a base
for cybersecurity of next generation energy grids. Renewable energy sources
and the increasing interest in green energy has been the driving force behind
many innovations in the energy sector, such as how utility companies interact
with their customers and vice versa.
Even though this new combination brings a plethora of advantages,
it also increases the cyberattack surface of the energy grid. These vulnerabilities
can be aggravated by cybersecurity challenges but alleviated by the advancements
in AI and blockchain technologies. In the following section, a series
of technologies that approach the problem of threat detection and ensuring
resilience are reviewed.

27. Rossella Mattioli and Konstantinos Moulinos, Communication Network Interdependencies
in Smart Grids (Athens: European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, 2015),
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/communication-network-interdependencies-in-smart-grids
/@@download/fullReport.
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Figure 4-2. Advanced monitoring in microgrids
Source: Tuyen V. Vu et al., “Cyber-Physical Microgrids: Toward Future Resilient
Communities,” IEEE Industrial Electronics Magazine, September 24, 2020,
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9205672.

Forecasting Abnormalities: EWS for Industrial Control Systems
A new feature-based framework of abnormalities forecasting is proposed
for early warning for cyber-physical control systems where detection
of ICS anomalies must recognize intelligent cyberattacks and differentiate
them from naturally occurring errors and failures. 28 The system can have
a dual role preventing cyberattacks and providing early signaling
of defects. The signals captured from the monitoring nodes are translated
into behaviors using feature discovery techniques. Each characteristic has its
own behavior and well-defined decision limits between normal and abnormal
behavior. A virtual model of the monitored installation such as a power plant
is used. 29
28. Masoud Abbaszadeh and Lalit Keshav Mestha, “Situation Awareness and Dynamic Ensemble
Forecasting of Abnormal Behavior in Cyber-Physical System/US Patent Application 20200067969,”
FreePatentsOnline (website), https://www.freepatentsonline.com/y2020/0067969.html.
29. Masoud Abbaszadeh, Lalit K. Mestha, and Weizhong Yan, “Forecasting and Early Warning
for Adversarial Targeting in Industrial Control Systems,” in 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control (CDC) Proceedings (Miami: IEEE, December 2018), https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2018.8619332.
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The problem of characteristic variation over time is addressed using state
models selected by a cluster Gaussian mixture model (GMM). This means
that not all subpopulation data points are assigned, but the subpopulations
can be learned by the model automatically through a probability distribution.
As such, it is the fastest algorithm for learning mixture models. 30 The predicted
results over time represent the anticipated evolution of the characteristics,
calculated by applying a Kalman predictor adaptive to each overall model.
The general forecast of the characteristics is then obtained through the
process dynamic mediation based on the future characteristic vector evolution
designing process in a retractable horizon mode. The forecast is compared
to the decision limit to estimate whether and when the characteristic vectors
will cross the border. 31
One example of the successful use of EWS for industrial control systems
is General Electric’s (GE) Digital Ghost, which can protect from malicious
cyberattacks. It was developed at GE’s Research Lab. Digital Ghost provides
an additional layer of protection by combining artificial intelligence and
machine-learning technologies with sensing and controls to locate and
neutralize cyberattacks. The GE engineers used the physics of a natural-gas
pipeline, created a Digital Twin, and combined it with machine learning
to protect critical infrastructure. In the testing phase, Digital Ghost found
and neutralized a cyberattack in the virtualized operating gas turbine
at GE Power’s manufacturing facility in Greenville, South Carolina.
In validation studies, it has located over 98 percent of cyberattacks. It has,
however, only been able to neutralize them when over 50 percent of the assets’
sensors have already been compromised. 32

EWS with Fully Distributed Cyber Defense using DIAMoND
Another approach allows the use of local information available on nodes
and distributed decision-making algorithms to detect and exploit critical
system resources. The main feature of this method is the unusual ability
to detect anomalies quickly, using little memory and only local information.
The efficiency of the system allows an increase of about 20 percent in the
detection capacity over parallel isolated anomaly detectors. The algorithms
30. “Gaussian Mixture Models,” Scikit-learn (website), https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules
/mixture.html.
31. Lindsay Kleeman, “Understanding and Applying Kalman Filtering” (PowerPoint presentation,
Monash University Clayton Campus, Melbourne), https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~motionplanning/papers/sbp
_papers/kalman/kleeman_understanding_kalman.pdf.
32. General Electric (GE) Research, “Digital Ghost: Real-time, Active Cyber Defense,” GE (website),
https://www.ge.com/research/offering/digital-ghost-real-time-active-cyber-defense.
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used have a nonparametric, fully distributed coordination framework that
translates the biological success of these methods into similar operations
useful in cyber defense. 33

EWS Approaches Using Bayesian Inference
The Internet is the area most exposed to cyber risks due to reduced data
structuring and a strong increase in various threats. It requires a combination
of classical and innovative approaches using Bayesian inference to analyze
network scenarios to detect early threats. Theoretical bases and experimental
verifications on real attack scenarios improve the predictive capacity. 34

EWS Based on Entangled Cyber Space
The major challenge of cyber defense is the inefficiency of counteracting
the sophisticated attacks of opponents given the interconnection of modern
societies at the level of physical and cyber events. To counteract the effects
of this situation, it is necessary to build proactive cyber-defense models that
consider the interconnection and relations between events and activities in the
physical, social, media and economic realities of cyberspace. 35 The concept
of proactive cyber-defense models can use entanglement principles to overcome
loosely connected events. Entangled cyberspace is an integrated approach
for predicting cyberattacks. It can provide a solid foundation for building
proactive cyber-defense models in a seemingly tangled space where there are
always major correlations between the physical and the cyber environment. 36
To generate an efficient early warning system component, continuously
adaptable to multidimensional realities and with advanced prediction
capabilities, an analytical framework of cyber analysis must be introduced.

33. Maciej Korczyński et al., “DIAMoND: Distributed Intrusion/Anomaly Monitoring for Nonparametric
Detection,” in 2015 24th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN) Proceedings,
(Las Vegas: ICCCN, August 2015), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278018275_DIAMoND
_Distributed_IntrusionAnomaly_Monitoring_for_Nonparametric_Detection.
34. Harsha Kumara Kalutarage, Sira Ahmed Shaikh, and Francis Lee Bu Sung, “Towards an
Early Warning System for Network Attacks Using Bayesian Inference,” in 2015 IEEE 2nd International
Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing Proceedings (New York: IEEE, November 2015),
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7371513.
35. Ruth Ikwu, “Multi-dimensional Structural Data Integration for Proactive Cyber-Defense,”
in 2017 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and Assessment
Proceedings (London: IEEE, June 2017).
36. Ruth Eneyi Ikwu, “The Entangled Cyberspace: An Integrated Approach for Predicting Cyber-attacks,”
(PhD thesis, Brunel University London, 2018).
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This framework achieves the intersection and correlation of events
from multiple physical, social, economic, and virtual layers. 37

EWS Capabilities Using Heterogeneous Information Networks
The approach addresses the general issue of open exchange
of cyber-threat information (ITC) to get a complete real-time picture of the
cyber-threat situation. One mandatory step is to design a metaschema of threat
information to describe the semantic relationship of the infrastructure nodes,
and, in a second step, to model information about cyber threats
on a heterogeneous information network (HIN). 38 To do the modeling,
different types of infrastructure nodes and rich relationships between them
are integrated. Next, it is necessary to define a meta-path and meta-graph
infrastructure threat similarity measure (MIIS) and present a heterogeneous
graph convolution network (GCN) approach based on MIIS measurements
to identify the types of infrastructure node threats involved.

37. Alex Barnett, Simon Smith, and Dick Whittington, “Paper 081: Using Causal Models to Manage
the Cyber Threat to C2 Agility: Working with the Benefit of Hindsight” (conference presentation,
18th International Command & Control Research & Technology Symposium, Alexandria, VA, June 2014),
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA607000.pdf.
38. Yali Gao et al., “HinCTI: A Cyber Threat Intelligence Modeling and Identification System Based
on Heterogeneous Information Network,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 34,
no. 2 (February 2022), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9072563.
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Figure 4-3. EWS emergent technology research directions in the medium term
by the SAS-163 scientific team
Source: Gabriel Raicu and Sarah Lohmann, “Energy Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare,”
SAS-163 Research Project, April 2022, Project EWS Concepts in the medium term.

Conclusion
The effectiveness of EWS and their degree of relevance vary greatly depending
on the approach used. Early warning systems can usually be considered 100
percent effective on a large scale only if the attackers and their attack techniques
do not evolve, and the attack patterns are only those already stored in the
event history. The major challenge is the lack of adaptability of EWS due
to the lack or inconsistency of predictive capabilities, even in classical
AI approaches. The authors propose a combination of technologies and
methods that, if understood holistically, can provide solutions with significant
long-term predictive capabilities to NATO commanders in protecting the
new energy environment, which includes renewables, pipeline sensors,
smart grids, and IoT integration at every level.
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This protection of the energy sector is critical to the Alliance’s security,
as any disruption affects the continuity of the supply chain and the effectiveness
of the defense. It is extremely important that cyber threats in the field of energy
security are properly and fully addressed. The Russo-Ukrainian War reiterated
the importance of security in the energy sector and logistical capabilities at the
Alliance level for the full preservation of NATO’s military mobility potential.
Increasing military presence in the Black Sea region requires a strong NATO
deterrence and defense posture, especially at the cyber and energy nexus.
It ranges from strategic coherence and strengthening partnerships across the
region to national and common capabilities deployment in the area.
The contribution of new generation EWS automatic response can make
the difference between preemptive efficiency and merely reactive measures
if old generation EWS continue to be used. These new generation EWS
should be used in Allied exercises to improve logistical support and integrated
infrastructures. Dual-use critical infrastructures for energy; transport
on land, in the air, and on water; and cyber can be modeled and simulated
using virtualization and artificial intelligence that employs machine learning
for increasingly accurate results. These measures ought to increase
significantly the accessibility of energy supplies and the timely and effective
military mobility to all contributing NATO nations in a broad spectrum
of operational contexts.
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ABSTR ACT: Energy insecurity and Russian-backed malicious cyber
activity has impacted the European Continent in the lead-up to and the
aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine. It is more crucial than ever that
US military installations in Europe are able to produce their own energy,
even if local grids fail. Malicious cyber intrusions for both the purpose
of espionage and destruction of critical infrastructure are being used
directly against Ukraine and its allies within NATO. This chapter examines
possible solutions to that hybrid warfare through the use of microgrids
for military installations.
Keywords: cyber threats, microgrid, energy independence, NATO, military
installations, renewables

The severity of cyber threats to the power grid and electricitydependent infrastructure has far-reaching implications for
Mission Assurance policies and programs. Indeed, given the
dependence of DOD force projection on civilian-operated
ports, transportation assets, and other infrastructure,
accelerating the restoration of grid-provided power will be
of prime importance for mission assurance. . . . However,
adversaries are increasingly threatening this infrastructure as
a means to disrupt and degrade US warfighting capabilities. 1
1. Paul N. Stockton, “Strengthening Mission Assurance against Emerging Threats: Critical Gaps
and Opportunities,” Joint Force Quarterly 95, no. 4 (2019): 24, https://paulnstockton.com/wp-content
/uploads/2021/04/strengthening-mission-assurance-against-emerging-threats-critical-gaps-and-opportunities
-for-progress.pdf.
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What if mission-critical assets on a military installation were not able
to function beyond a two-day timespan during a blackout caused by a local
grid failure? What if bases using state-of-the-art equipment necessary
for protecting the Alliance do not have the backup energy storage and
production capability necessary for ensuring basic operations and mission
readiness, should grid access be interrupted due to a cyber or kinetic attack?
This chapter discusses the immediate threat to energy security on military
installations in Europe posed both by shortages and cyberattacks on host
nation grids. It proposes that new technologies (such as microgrids) can
start creating urgently needed energy independence, even if a host grid fails,
and recommends increasing backup capability in the interim.

The Problem
The introductory questions about critical infrastructure resilience are
intended as a starting point for addressing mission readiness in the face
of the current energy crisis. Cyberattacks on a host nation’s grid have
wide-ranging impacts on NATO and US militar y installations—
from interrupting aviation and communications to stopping electricity
and heat needed to keep operations going.
That is because the US military and NATO allied forces rely
on host-country grids and electricity to power operations. In fact, MIT did
an assessment for the Department of Defense on the use of foreign grids
for US bases operating OCONUS which “strongly recommended that every
US military base consider using host nation power” because “in every case,
it was found that bases connected properly to host nation power grids would
reduce the cost of energy for those bases, reduce fuel usage, and increase the
base endurance.” 2 While the MIT assessment explains how it has come to the
current OCONUS practice, this reliance has the high potential to compromise
the US mission.
The problem is, while relying on foreign grids saves money in the short
term, it puts our national security at risk during a time when an adversary like
Russia is actively attempting to compromise the industrial control systems of
grids in the United States and Europe and partnering with China in targeted

2. Guidance for DoD Utilization of Host Nation Power (Lexington, MA: MIT Lincoln Laboratory/Sandia
National Laboratories, October 2015), www.dtic.Mil/get-tr-doc/pd-f?AD=AD1034495.
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hacking campaigns in Europe. 3 This study found that advanced critical energy
infrastructure warning and cyber threat mitigation systems currently in place
in most NATO member states are not adequate to ensure safety and resilience
when emerging technologies are being integrated into energy systems.
This problem is largely because cybersecurity applications have not yet been
created for the new emerging technology systems being integrated with critical
energy infrastructure. As is shown in the case studies of NATO member
states to follow in the next section, there are large differences between NATO
member states in cyber-mitigation capabilities and standards as pertains
to critical energy infrastructure.
Russia and its agents have successfully penetrated energy networks
in Europe and North America and deployed malware to undermine critical
systems and infrastructure in the target country.4 It is worth mentioning
Germany here as a case study in Russia’s penetration tactics, as Germany
hosts more US troops than any other European country in NATO. According
to the most recent statistics available, 35,221 US active-duty military are
based in Germany, as compared to over 12,000 US troops in Italy and 9,000
in the United Kingdom. 5 In addition, there are 173,741 German Bundeswehr
soldiers, with all but around 3,000 of those serving in Germany. 6
With Germany serving as a hub for NATO member troops, it has been
and continues to be a hybrid target.
Germany has been a testing ground for the Russian-based hackers Berserk
Bear’s malicious cyber activities, from attacking a number of energy companies
and attempting to intrude on Germany’s grid in 2017 to its long-term efforts
to compromise the supply chain of critical infrastructure such as the energy,
3. “Alert (AA22-110A) Russian State-Sponsored and Criminal Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure,”
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (website), April 20, 2022, https://www.cisa.gov
/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-110a; Nicole Lindsey, “Russia and China Can Cripple Critical Infrastructure
in the United States,” CPO Magazine (website), February 12, 2019, https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security
/russia-and-china-can-cripple-critical-infrastructure-in-united-states/; and Maxim Tucker, “China Accused
of Hacking Ukraine Days before Russian Invasion,” Times (website), April 1, 2022, https://www.thetimes
.co.uk/article/china-cyberattack-ukraine-z9gfkbmgf.
4. Associated Press, “Russian Officials Charged in Years-Old Energy Sector Hacks,” U.S. News & World
Report (website), March 25, 2022, https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2022-03-24/russian-officials
-charged-in-years-old-energy-sector-hacks?msclkid=5f bb7759b8ee11ecb9487d9555eadb7f.
5. “Number of Active-duty United States Military Personnel in Europe in 2022, by Country,” Statista (website),
February 4, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1294271/us-troops-europe-country/.
6. “Anzahl der Soldaten und Soldatinnen bei der Bundeswehr von 2000 bis 2022,” Statista (website),
June 2022, https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/38401/umfrage/personalbestand-der-bundeswehr
-seit-2000/; and “Anzahl der an internationalen Einsätzen beteiligten deutschen Soldaten der Bundeswehr,”
Statista (website), May 30, 2022, https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/72703/umfrage/anzahl-der
-soldaten-der-bundeswehr-im-ausland/.
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water, and power sectors up to the present time.7 Germany’s intelligence
services have warned that the group’s intention was to imbed malware
permanently in IT networks and gain access to OT networks. The same hackers
conducted an intelligence-gathering campaign on US energy companies and
targets industrial networks. 8
The problem is compounded when a grid is aging or has lack of
energy supply, as is the case in a number of NATO countries, including
Germany. Germany’s Interior Ministry’s federal audit found in 2021 that
it is at heightened risk of grid blackouts through 2025.9 This is due
to an aging grid and the energy shortfall as renewables are not able to fill
an energy supply gap. Renewables are defined by the Oxford English Dictionary
as “a natural resource or source of energy that is not depleted by use, such
as water, wind, or solar power.” 10 The gap in energy was predicted by the
Interior Ministry’s audit in 2021 long before Russia invaded Ukraine,
highlighting the fact that renewable technology was not yet advanced enough
or producing enough supply to make up for nuclear plants being taken off line
and coal needing to be phased out in line with Germany’s goals to reduce
carbon emissions by 65 percent by 2030 compared to 1990 emission levels.11
Hybrid warfare directed at an already unstable grid in the current
environment could have devastating effects on Europe’s economic powerhouse.
As mentioned in the introduction, in the months since the Ukraine war
started, Russia has also conducted cyberattacks against Germany’s wind
energy companies. These cyberattacks have caused one company to shut
down its remote-control systems for wind turbines, another to shut down
its IT systems, and another’s wind turbines to be knocked completely off line.12
7. Reuters Staff, “German Intelligence Sees Russia behind Hack of Energy Firms,” Reuters (website),
June 20, 2018, https://w w w.reuters.com/article/us-germany-cyber-russia-idUSKBN1JG2X 2;
and Sean Lyngaas, “German Intelligence Agencies Warn of Russian Hacking Threats to Critical
Infrastructure,” CYBERSCOOP (website), May 26, 2020, https://www.cyberscoop.com/german-intelligence
-memo-berserk-bear-critical-infrastructure/.
8. Lyngaas, “German Intelligence Agencies.”
9. Marcus Wacket, “Germany’s Energy Drive Criticized over Expense, Risk,” Reuters (website),
March 30, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/germany-energy-audit-idUSL8N2LS2RC.
10.

Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (2022), s.v. “renewables.”

11. “Indicator: Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” Umwelt Bundesamt (website), March 15, 2022,
https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/en/data/environmental-indicators/indicator-greenhouse-gas-emissions.
12. Joseph Henry, “Europe Cyberattack Results to ‘Massive’ Internet Outage; about 5,800 Wind
Turbines Went Off line,” Tech Times (website), March 5, 2022, https://www.techtimes.com
/articles/272624/20220305/europe-cyberattack-results-massive-internet-outage-5-800-wind-turbines
.htm; and Catherine Stupp, “European Wind-Energy Sector Hit in Wave of Hacks,” Wall Street Journal
(website), April 25, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/european-wind-energy-sector-hit-in-wave
-of-hacks-11650879000.
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For US military installations, which depend on Germany’s unreliable
grid, and which have seen a 30 percent increase in force presence since the
beginning of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the question is not if bases will see grid
failure, but when, how often, and for how long.13 Backup systems and energy
independence will be vital to mission success in this setting.
Germany is not the only NATO country facing such issues, nor is it
the only country hosting US or NATO installation in Europe that should
be prepared for grid blackouts to affect operations in the next six months
to two years. A recent report by Microsoft’s Digital Security unit
shows that Russia-aligned cyber-threat groups were preparing to target
organizations allied with Ukraine as early as March 2021. In fact, 93 percent
of Russia-backed malicious activity seen on Microsoft’s online services
in 2021 was aimed at NATO member states—specifically the United States,
the United Kingdom, Norway, Germany, and Turkey. These included cyberespionage activities which could provide Russia with information on how the
West would respond to the coming Russian invasion on both the military and
humanitarian front, as well as targeted attacks on Ukraine’s supply chain vendors.14
More than 40 percent of the Russian-backed destructive cyberattacks were
on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure sector, including nuclear and transportation.15
Knowing Russia is targeting the supply chain and critical infrastructure
of Ukraine and its partners in NATO, independent energy resilience must
be a top priority for military installations immediately.

Potential Solutions:
Renewables-powered Microgrids and Mobile Microgrids
This section will examine the benef its and drawbacks to microgrids
being used to provide installations with independent, non-hackable energy
sources. A discussion of microgrids’ usage and challenges will be followed
by an assessment of lessons learned and recommendations.

13. Ryan Morgan, “US Troops Surpass 100,000 in Europe,” American Military News (website),
June 27, 2022, https://americanmilitarynews.com/2022/06/us-troops-surpass-100000-in-europe/;
and Jim Garamone, “News: US to Deploy 3,000 Troops to Romania, Poland, Germany,” Joint Base
San Antonio (website), February 2, 2022, https://www.jbsa.mil/News/News/Article/2921087/us-to
-deploy-3000-troops-to-romania-poland-germany/.
14. Digital Security Unit, “Special Report: Ukraine – An Overview of Russia’s Cyberattack Activity
in Ukraine” (Redmond, WA: Microsoft, April 27, 2022), https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms
/api/am/binary/RE4Vwwd.
15. Digital Security Unit, “Special Report: Ukraine.”
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Microgrids are an alternative source of energy for military installations
as they can island—or separate—if the main grid is attacked. A microgrid
is a self-contained power system conf ined to a small geographic area.
Microgrids have been increasingly implemented on US military installations
due to their provision of independent energy and cost-saving and environmental
advantages. In fact, while the US Navy plans for all its major installations
to operate off the grid for two weeks by 2025 due to its microgrid
implementation, the US Army announced a plan in February 2022 for each of
its 130 bases worldwide to have a microgrid by 2035.16 Likewise, in the NATO
Secretary General’s 2022 Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment,
NATO listed microgrids as a climate-change mitigation tactic to be used
by militaries to reduce military CO2 emissions.17
However, for the purpose of this study, our main research question
is not focused on whether grid implementation saves money or improves
environmental protection, but on whether it improves cybersecurity and
energy independence. Specifically, this chapter examines whether microgrids
can provide the resilience military installations need when they island off
foreign host grids, and if so, under which conditions they remain powered and
cybersecure. To answer this question, several case studies will be examined.
At the Miramar Marine Corps Air Station Miramar in San Diego,
California, the microgrid uses methane gas from a nearby landfill, photovoltaic
and solar thermal energy, natural gas and diesel, and battery storage to stay
powered. In the event of a blackout, the microgrid is expected to stay powered
for 21 days, allowing f light line operations to continue. During its first Energy
Resilience Readiness Exercise, all mission-critical operations were supported
completely by the islanded grid on a workday—through on-site fuel sources.18
Miramar’s renewables have been shown to provide energy to the host grid,
but not yet to the microgrid.
In what was touted as the 2019 Project of the Year for the DoD’s
Environmental Securit y Technolog y Certif ication Program, the
Otis Air National Guard tested its microgrid islanding, relying on renewable
16. Elisa Wood, “Army to Equip All Bases with Microgrids by 2035 as Part of Carbon-free Electricity
Goal,” Microgrid Knowledge (website), February 9, 2002, https://microgridknowledge.com/army-microgrid
-climate/.
17. Jens Stoltenberg, The Secretary General ’s Report: Climate Change & Security Impact Assessment
(Brussels: NATO HQ , 2022), 9, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_f l2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf
/280622-climate-impact-assessment.pdf.
18. “Microgrid at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar,” Marine Corps Installations Command,
Marines (website), June 30, 2021, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2677033/microgrid
-at-marine-corps-air-station-miramar/.
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energy sources, such as wind turbines.19 It was also supposed to test cybersecure
protection and operation of the grid while islanding. While the Otis Air
National Guard Base microgrid was able to establish a cybersecure interface
operation, it was only able to do so while tied to the main grid. Its microgrid
was unable to island due to regulations around only one backup generator
being allowed to be used per building or mission, and the single generators
experienced power surges beyond what they could handle. 20 If renewables
are unable to be utilized while islanded with its microgrid, and cybersecure
operation of the grid is only a given while connected to the main grid,
it cannot serve as a model in the current grid insecure environment in Europe
during active hybrid warfare without compromising national security.
Two other projects are worth brief ly mentioning due to their high
potential, though their islanding claims have not yet been tested by a natural
disaster or cyberattack. The Parris Island, South Carolina, microgrid at the
US Marine Corps Recruit Depot has 5.5 megawatts of solar photovoltaic
power and a 4 megawatts battery-based energy storage system. The grid
has its own integrated control system and can conduct islanding and fast
load-shedding capabilities. The load shedding and islanding are an
improvement over the Otis microgrid. While the Parris Island microgrid’s
islanding capabilities are regularly tested, the Department of Energy comments
in its “lessons learned” that: “Cybersecurity is also increasingly important
and should be considered and implemented at the start of the project.” 21 If
cybersecurity is not implemented from the first day of a microgrid’s active
life, security has already been compromised.
Finally, in what could be considered a model for future projects,
a microgrid built for Fort Belvoir, Virginia, Army installation, both included
cybersecurity on the front end and successfully islanded. The cybersecurity standards
of the microgrid met the Risk Management Framework, the National Institute
of Standards and Technology Special Projects 800-53 and 800-82 and the
North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure
Protection. The Fort Belvoir successful tests demonstrated something
the others had not. Not only was it able to island during normal workday
19. Paul Roege, “4 Lessons Learned from the Otis Microgrid Project,” Typhoon HIL (blog), June 8, 2021,
https://info.typhoon-hil.com/blog/4-lessons-learned-from-the-raytheon-technologies-otis-microgrid-project.
20. David H. Altman, “Hybrid Micro-grid with High Penetration Wind for Islanding and High Value Grid
Services,” ESTCP Project EW-201606, Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, vii.
21. Elisa Wood, “Military Microgrids: Four Examples of Innovation,” Microgrid Knowledge (website),
December 3, 2019, https://microgridknowledge.com/military-microgrids-four-examples/; and “Project
Profile: Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island – 3.5-MW CHP + Microgrid” (US Department
of Energy Southeast CHP TAP, July 2021), https://chptap.ornl.gov/profile/121/MCRDParrisIsland-Project
_Profile.pdf.
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conditions but also during an unforeseen contingency event when a generator
stopped working because of a large load. The microgrid was able to keep
working without loss of power and is now considered to be a model for
US Army standards, which call for bases to be able to provide for their
mission-critical operations for 14 days. One thing to note, though,
is that unlike the previous case studies mentioned, the energy sources were
fuel-based and did not include renewables. The Fort Belvoir microgrid
included three fixed natural-gas generators and four 400-kilowatt mobile
diesel generators. 22
In recently published modeling research, the authors used the successes
and lessons learned from bases such as Fort Belvoir, Parris Island, and Japan’s
Showa Research Base, which isolated a microgrid in Antarctica, to simulate
operation scenarios to optimize the conception and design of mission-critical
microgrids used for military installations. Its test case was the Alcântara
Space Center. There, the off-grid simulation showed that it would be possible
to island the microgrid and still guarantee the power supply and operational
security of the space center, using algorithms to address the energy
generation and demand balance and to deal with unexpected contingencies.
Launch campaigns were not possible, however, without the use of dispatchable
sources, such as a source of electricity like a power plant. 23

22. “Mission-Critical Military Base Enhances Resiliency with S&C’s Microgrid Control System,”
S&C Electric Company, November 9, 2020, https://www.sandc.com/globalassets/sac-electric/documents
/sharepoint/documents---all-documents/case-study-2000-1002.pdf?dt=637843708562560430.
23. César Augusto Santana Castelo Branco et al., “Mission Critical Microgrids: The Case of the Alcântara
Space Center,” Energies 15 (2022): 3–4, 22–24, 3226, https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/15/9/3226/htm.

82

Mitigation: Chapter 5

Microgrids: The Future of Cyber Secure Energy Independence?

Lessons Learned and a Way Forward
These results underscore the research cited thus far, which is that
each facility has unique energy generation and storage needs which must
be considered when optimizing islanding and cybersecurity. In addition, other
lessons learned from the case studies include the need to ensure regulations
around backup generators and battery storage fit with national security needs,
that renewable technology can contribute power to the microgrid once islanded,
and cybersecurity is included for microgrids even in the test phase.
One proposal to address the challenges of the unique energy generation
and storage needs of diverse bases is with a mobile microgrid, which could
be stored and used for backup purposes. While Fort Belvoir has served
as a success story for the use of mobile microgrids, it did not incorporate
renewables into its microgrid project. A study was done for DoD installations
testing a standard mobile microgrid that can carry an average 10-kilowatt
load and that could be transported in an International Standards Organization
triple container that is 8 feet by 6 feet, 5 inches by 8 feet and is not more than
10,000 pounds. The design was modeled and simulated over the US Army’s
14-day resilience standard to see if the battery storage provided, together
with photovoltaic and generator power, can bring mission-critical assets back
online during an emergency. 24
The purpose was to see if a mobile microgrid could reduce fuel consumption
associated with diesel generators, especially in situations such as large-scale
combat operations, to reduce a footprint on the battlefield and so that there
is a lower logistics demand. This simulation was examined to see if such
a mobile microgrid could provide an immediate independent energy solution
for combat forces with little access to fuel. The scenario provides power
to supply formations, and the mobile microgrid is located with the division
operations center. When the operations center needs to relocate, the mobile
microgrid is disconnected, and the solar photovaltaics (PV)—the microgrid
control unit—and the emergency diesel generator are loaded back into a f latbed
truck and staged for movement. 25

24. Daniel W. Varley, Douglas L. Van Bossuyt, and Anthony Pollman, “Feasibility Analysis of a Mobile
Microgrid Design to Support DoD Energy Resilience Goals.” Systems 10, no. 3 (74), https://doi.org/10.3390
/systems10030074.
25.

Varley, Van Bossuyt, and Anthony Pollman, “Feasibility Analysis.”
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Figure 5-1. Concept of operations for installation of critical load backup power
from a mobile microgrid
Used with permission of Douglas Van Bossuyt, Naval Postgraduate School. Originally
published in: Varley, Van Bossuyt, and Pollman, “Feasibility Analysis.”

The purpose was to see if a mobile microgrid could reduce fuel consumption
associated with diesel generators, especially in situations such as large-scale
combat operations to reduce a footprint on the battlefield and so that there
is a lower logistics demand. This simulation was examined to see if such a
mobile microgrid could provide an immediate independent energy solution for
combat forces with little access to fuel. The scenario provides power to supply
formations, and the mobile microgrid is located with the division operations
center. When the operations center needs to relocate, the mobile microgrid
is disconnected, and the PV, the microgrid control unit and the emergency
diesel generator is loaded back into a f latbed truck and staged for movement. 26
While the system modeled did reduce reliance on the generator
by 37 percent, and the study concluded that a standardized mobile microgrid has
advantages that a customized single-load microgrid does not, the assumptions
made in the study call for field testing before the mobile microgrids are used
in combat.
26.

Varley, Van Bossuyt, and Pollman, “Feasibility Analysis.”
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First, while both winter and summer data were used for the PV in the
modeling over a 14-day period, it “did not conduct a detailed accounting of
temperature, wind, and other environmental considerations” that could affect
PV and the microgrid control system. In addition, the 10-kilowatt load that
the microgrid can handle is on the low end for what DoD installations need
to carry. 27 However, the modeling of both the mobile microgrid, the Alcântara
Space Center, and the very real successes of Fort Belvoir provide promise for
the increased use of microgrids on military installations in Europe in the
near future.

Figure 5-2. Mobile microgrid is airlifted to contingency operations location
and can be powered there.
Used with permission of Douglas Van Bossuyt, Naval Postgraduate School. Originally
published in: Varley, Van Bossuyt, and Pollman, “Feasibility Analysis.”

Before these lessons learned can be transferred to other US military
installations in Europe, however, there are three factors that must be considered
no matter where the microgrids are being implemented: 1) the regulative
process, 2) ensuring microgrids have the power supply they need to be able
to island from the host nation grid completely, and 3) ensuring cybersecurity
is built into the process from the beginning.
27.

Varley, Van Bossuyt, and Pollman, “Feasibility Analysis.”
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First, the regulative process must be addressed. Part of the challenge with
microgrids is their cumbersome approval process. The average amount of time
for approval for a US microgrid project is 407 days. That is because each entity
that wants to install a microgrid is considered the same as a utility, which falls
under the distributed generation facility regulations, with the same amount
of paperwork as a massive coal plant. 28 This period is short in comparison
to the regulative approval process for some US installations overseas.
Foreign regulation of the grid installation and maintenance of the microgrids
and the high cost of doing so makes their funding and construction
cumbersome, often delaying much-needed projects with red tape
before they can ever get started. Microgrid code, power purchase agreements,
and unbundling regulations can all stand in the way of a quick implementation
of a microgrid.
Recent recognition of the regulation challenge, however, is leading
to a new legal framework. For example, within the European Union,
nation states are not subjected to unbundling regulations separating the
supply from the operation of transmission and distribution as long as they are
serving less than 100,000 connected customers. France, Finland, Austria, the
Czech Republic, and Flanders also have streamlined processes for gaining
approval of closed distribution networks. 29 While additional NATO countries
are considering creating streamlined regulative processes due to the current
energy process, the US Army and others planning to use microgrids as their
energy generator in the near future must calculate the long wait times for the
multilevel approval process into their implementation schedule.
Second, power supply must be addressed. As the case studies have shown,
while fuel was a reliable power source for the microgrids, renewables such as
PV had mixed results and require more field study. While there have been
gains in mixed use, such as wind and solar supplemented with diesel and
natural-gas generators, renewable technology alone is not yet at a point where
it can provide the amount of power needed by installations. 30

28. Renee Cho, “Microgrids: Taking Steps toward the 21st Century Smart Grid,” Columbia Climate
School (website), April 18, 2017, https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2017/04/18/microgrids-taking-stepstoward-the-21st-century-smart-grid/.
29. World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), Microgrids for Commercial and Industrial
Companies (Geneva: WSCSD, November 2017), 22–23, https://docs.wbcsd.org/2017/11/WBCSD_microgrid
_INTERACTIVE.pdf.
30. Timothy Renahan, “Realizing Energy Independence on U.S. Military Bases,” Joint Force Quarterly 103,
no. 4 (2021): 62–65, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-103/jfq-103_62-65_Renahan
.pdf?ver=sQI3ZQ2RqerA6g8Aqkwbdg%3d%3d.
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Beyond ensuring energy independence in the future, backup generators
are needed urgently at US and NATO bases now—and sometimes more than
currently allotted. According to a Pew Trust study on energy on US bases,
over the 20 years of a generator’s life, the average base has a 50/50 chance of
experiencing a week-long outage, and it is very likely that a base will have
an outage of one to three days. Current policy, however, only allows the
backup of “critical loads,” which often do not include R & D laboratories and
industrial facilities, which would give the military exponential costs if they
were not backed up. 31 Preparedness will mean assessing whether each base has
enough backup generators on hand to provide secure protection for the coming
blackout seasons for the next four winters and that they also have provided
for the diesel and natural gas they will need in the interim until renewable
technology can be developed to power the microgrids.
Third, cybersecurity needs to be built in on the front end of the
microgrid process, or the microgrid, which is an independent power generator
in and of itself, could become a target. A recent Naval Postgraduate School
study warned: “microgrids can be a more attractive and likely target due
to the importance of their mission and national security value.” 32 As shown
in several of the US-based case studies, cybersecurity was not included,
for example, in the design in Parris Island or able to be sustained while
islanded at Otis Air Base. This is a challenge in the microgrid models being
produced by NATO allies and European militaries as well. While many
of these add an extra layer of vulnerabilities, as their microgrids are connected
to smart grids, a study by the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence
found that European militaries’ prototype systems for mobile military camps
often lacked cybersecurity considerations. 33
The study found that cybersecurity was completely missing from the
design process in prototype smart-grid systems connecting to microgrids
in the prototypes assessed. Various military installation smart grids connecting
to microgrid prototypes were examined which were being tested by Canada,
NATO, the NATO Science for Peace and Security Organization, the European
31. Jeffrey Marqusee, Craig Schultz, and Dorothy Robyn, Power Begins at Home: Assured Energy
for U.S. Military Bases, commissioned by the Pew Charitable Trusts (Reston, VA: Noblis, January 12, 2017),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2017/01/ce_power_begins_at_home_assured_energy_for_us
_military_bases.pdf.
32. Christopher J. Peterson et al., “Analyzing Mission Impact of Military Installations Microgrid
for Resilience,” Systems 9, no. 3 (69), https://doi.org/10.3390/systems9030069.
33. Vytautas Butrimas, Assessment Study of Cybersecurity of Smart-grid Technologies Employed
in Operational Camps (Vilnius, LT: NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, August 11, 2021),
https://enseccoe.org/data/public/uploads/2021/11/vb-cyber-asses-study-v1dot2dot3-oct-1-2021-cyber-sg
-for-mil-camps.pdf.
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Defense Agency, and the Dutch military. They all had varying degrees
of success at combining energy sources between fuel and solar and wind
power. In these cases, they connected to a microgrid with a smart grid,
which is a two-way communication system between intelligent electric
devices to monitor and control the generation and distribution of electricity. 34
Without cybersecurity built in on the front end, a cyberattack on a grid sensor
could be “a single source of failure that can severely affect the safe, reliable
and efficient application of renewable energy and smart-grid technologies.” 35

Areas for Further Research
As the energy crisis continues to intensify across NATO countries
in the wake of the Ukraine war, military installations, especially in Europe,
are preparing for increased energy independence of fuel supply and grid
stability. Civilian populations, however, are expected to be equally impacted
by fuel supply shortages and grid blackouts for the next three years.
In the wake of this energy crisis, further research is needed on how military
installations can be prepared for how energy independence on installations
could impact the civilian population when there are shortages and should
develop a resilience plan that would take into account both national security
concerns and local shortages.
In the case studies examined in this chapter, two bases with microgrids
were designed for providing for both military and civilian needs during
blackouts. The microgrid installation at the Miramar Marine Corps Air
Station was able to provide the electricity needed for both the base and
for local communities in the San Diego area during the heat wave in summer
2021, reducing the total number of blackouts in the area. 36 Otis Air National
Guard Base’s microgrid was likewise designed to meet all of the base’s needs
while islanded because of the wind power and battery storage it is connected
to, and also to provide service to a regional grid operator, providing for energy
needs across the region in eastern Massachusetts. 37 As mentioned earlier,
in practice, the microgrid has not yet been able to island apart from the
grid, so sufficient storage will continue to be an area for research for future
resilience design.

34.

Butrimas, Smart-grid Technologies Employed in Operational Camps, 3, 12–16.

35.

Butrimas, Smart-grid Technologies Employed in Operational Camps, 18.

36.

“Microgrid at Miramar.”

37.

Wood, “Military Microgrids.”
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While Miramar and Otis have state-of-the-art grids, most military
installations, whether in the United States or abroad, do not have the same
level of technology. That means that while US bases continue to strive toward
energy independence through microgrids going forward, few are at a point
of development where they can provide the energy needed for military bases
apart from local grids. For the few that are able to provide energy independence
to military installations when local communities do not have access to power,
national security concerns will need to be addressed in any further research
about providing energy to surrounding civilian communities that could
be desperate to access that power.
Unlike the examples of Miramar and Otis grids, which were designed
to provide electricity to local civilian communities in the United States, any
supply of power from US military installations abroad to foreign civilian
populations brings with it questions of access, legal concerns, cost, and
security impact. These topics would need to be researched and policy decisions
made ahead of considering any provision to the broader foreign community.
Nevertheless, the main question for most bases through at least 2025 will
remain how to ensure that military installations come to a point of resilience in
securing the most mission vital assets independently through energy provision
and storage without relying on local grids.

Conclusion
Tests and modeling of microgrids on and for military installations
in the United States and Europe show that, if constructed correctly,
they can provide soldiers with an independent energy source that can
island from host nations grids—and thus limit exposure to cyberattacks.
Microgrids themselves, however, can become targets and put entire mobile
military units at risk if cybersecurity is not built into the design of the
microgrid. Renewables have shown some success at decreasing fuel dependency,
but further field testing is required to ensure this can be done safely and
reliably. Finally, the main inhibitor to the use of microgrids on military
installations in Europe is overregulation. If European countries are able
to work toward decreasing this regulatory inhibitor, microgrids can be in place
sooner to power NATO’s missions going forward.
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Western and Central Europe
The case studies presented in this chapter include five NATO
nations: France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Poland.
Of the five countries listed in this section, France is the only one considered
to be energy independent, relying mostly on its many nuclear facilities
for power. Renewable energy infrastructures have been implemented
across Europe with varying degrees of success. They now account
for approximately 30 percent of power produced across this region,
but many nations are still dependent on imported energy via Russia.
Questions have been raised, however, regarding whether the development
of new technology is outpacing the ability to secure these new technologies
from infrastructure cyber threats.
The nations in the Western and Central Europe regions are the most
cyber hardened of the European nations. Cyber threats are developing
as rapidly as the technologies created to guard against them. France and
the Netherlands, especially, have made great strides in advancing network
security systems, with well-connected Internet of Things capabilities
secured by reliable, modern network systems. Since the start of the
Ukraine invasion, Western and Central European countries have
nevertheless suffered cyberattacks by Russian hacker groups on emerging
technology such as wind farms.
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ABSTRACT: France has cemented its status as a leader in international
cybersecurity by creating some of the most comprehensive cybersecurity
policies in Europe and by being a net exporter of energy, having gained
full energy independence. This independence gives France autonomy
over most of its power usage and distribution, making its electrical grid
secure, but its rapid transition to a smart-grid system connected via Internet
of Things (IoT) technologies has raised questions of whether development
is occurring so rapidly that security is being left behind. The French
infrastructure suffers thousands of cyberattacks annually from sources
across the globe, including state and non-state actors, and compliance
with updated security regulations is not universally enforced.
Keywords: Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, cyber defense
pledge, cyber norm initiative, Black Hat Europe, French electricity
transmission network, Energetic Bear, Enedis, cert.fr

Introduction and Energy Landscape
France has established itself as a leader in both global and national
cybersecurit y practices, rank ing in the top 10 for both metrics
according to the National Cybersecurity Index.1 In 2018, France initiated
the “Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace” based around nine
principles for cybersecurity. This initiative has been widely supported in
the public and private sectors, including in the European Union (EU),
1. Paola Velasco, “France,” National Cyber Security Index (website), March 3, 2021, https://ncsi.ega.ee
/country/fr/.
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Canada, the United States, and more than 700 private-sector organizations. 2
Because of this expertise, France has taken an active role in supporting
and promoting other cybersecurity initiatives in organizations, including
NATO, the UN, and the G7. 3 Most notably, it is a member of the UN’s Group
of Governmental Experts (GGE) on international cybersecurity issues,
hosted NATO’s f irst Cyber Defense Pledge Conference in May 2018,
and hosted the G7 meeting that established the Cyber Norm Initiative,
which has been central to the international cyber stability framework.
Until the Russian invasion of Ukraine, France regularly communicated
with the Kremlin on issues of strategic security, including in cyberspace,
particularly following Russian interference in the 2017 presidential elections.4

Figure 6-1. France’s role in international cybersecurity
Source: Shuo Zhang

According to the World Energy Trilemma Index 2020, France ranked
fifth with its combined scores in energy security, equity, and sustainability,
but it is outside the top 10 when measuring energy security alone. 5
2. “Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace,” Paris Call (website), November 11, 2021,
https://pariscall.international/en/supporters.
3. “France Diplomacy: France and Cyber Security,” Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (website),
May 2019, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/digital-diplomacy/france-and-cyber
-security/.
4. Juliette Faure, “Macron’s Dialogue with Russia: A French Attempt to Fix the European
Security Architecture,” Russia Matters (website), May 21, 2021, https://russiamatters.org/analysis/macrons
-dialogue-russia-french-attempt-fix-european-security-architecture.
5. Oliver Wyman, “World Energy Trilemma Index 2020,” World Energy Council (website),
https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/v2/media/World-Energy-Trilemma-Index
-2020-Report.pdf.
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While France is less dependent than its neighbors on gas imports from
Russia, these imports still make up 17 percent of its gas consumption.
In addition, France has recently faced limited electricity generation due
to maintenance issues with its nuclear reactors. 6 To deal with its energy
shortage, France is calling for reducing consumption by 10 percent
over the next two years. France remains, however, a net exporter of electricity,
Europe’s second-largest energy consumer, and the second-largest nuclear
energy generator in the world.7 As France has limited supply of fossil energy
resources, it imports most of its natural gas and oil and all of its coal.
France has developed its nuclear energy industry to decrease its reliance
on fossil fuels. As of January 2021, about 70 percent of French electricity
comes from nuclear energy (with about 17 percent being from recycled
nuclear fuel). The government hopes to reduce this to 50 percent by 2035. 8
Moreover, following its energy transition law of 2015, France is attempting
to draw 40 percent of its energy production from renewable sources by 2030.9
Most renewable energy in France is drawn from hydropower though
it is increasing usage of wind (onshore and offshore) and solar photovoltaic
systems.10 Smaller-scale areas of production of renewable energ y
include biomass combustion and geothermal. Oil imported from Russia
($2.92 billion), the Netherlands ($1.68 billion), Belgium ($1.52 billion), Saudi Arabia
($1.38 billion), and Spain ($1.2 billion) accounts for about 50 percent
of French oil usage.11 As of March 2022, France has announced plans to end
oil and gas imports from Russia completely by 2027.12
The transition toward renewable energy will inevitably lead to changes
in electricity metering, transmission, and distribution. With the increased
6. Dominique Vidalon and Leigh Thomas, “France Working on Contingency Plans as Energy Crisis
Looms,” Reuters (website), June 27, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/france-is-working-energy
-contingency-plans-says-finance-minister-2022-06-27/.
7. “France,” US Energy Information Administration (EIA) (website), August 2016, https://www.eia.gov
/international/analysis/country/FRA.
8. “Nuclear Power in France,” World Nuclear Association (website), January 2021, https://www.world-nuclear
.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france.aspx.
9. Clara Bauer-Babef, “It’s Crunch Time for France’s Tumultuous Renewable Energy Debate,” Euractiv
(website), August 26, 2021, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/its-crunch-time-for-frances
-tumultuous-renewable-energy-debate/.
10. “Renewable Energy in France; What You Should Know,” Hive Power (website), June 7, 2021,
https://hivepower.tech/renewable-energy-in-france-what-you-should-know/.
11. “Refined Petroleum in France, 2020,” Observatory of Economic Complexity (website), https://oec.world
/en/profile/bilateral-product/refined-petroleum/reporter/fra.
12. Reuters Staff, “France Wants to End Russia Gas and Oil Imports by 2027 – PM Castex,” Reuters (website),
March 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-wants-end-russia-gas-oil-imports-by-2027
-pm-castex-2022-03-16/.
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usage of independent power producers, decentralized production, and
renewable energies, the power system will change from highly centralized
to a more decentralized, and smart grids and energy storage will play
crucial roles.13
While the majority of French electricity usage is internally controlled
and is transitioning toward decentralized renewable sources, these transitions
increase French reliance on smart grids, IoT technologies, 5G connectivity,
and artificial intelligence mapping through digital twin technologies and will
create more vulnerabilities from cyber threats.

Emerging Technologies:
Expansion of Smart-grid Infrastructure, IoT, and 5G
Since 2016, France has focused on drastically expanding its use
of smart grids for low- and medium-voltage delivery points. By the end
of 2021, the largest distribution network in France hopes to have
35 million low-voltage delivery points equipped with smart meters.14
These Linky smart meters are estimated to cost 1–2 euros per household
monthly over the course of 10 years but are expected to save about 50 euros
annually. About 10 percent of the 4.5 billion euros project cost will be used
to develop an IT system for the grids.15 It should be noted that France houses
and provides significant funding to the SuperGrid Institute, which does
research and design to move offshore renewable energy efficiently to wide
areas of use, often far from generation, to promote large-scale optimization.
In September 2020, Schneider Electric partnered with the
telecommunications company Orange France to equip its Le Vaudreuil factory
outside of Paris with a 5G network, which is believed to be the first use
of a private 5G network in an industrial environment. The increased speed
from 5G networks is anticipated to improve production eff iciencies and
augmented reality used for system maintenance activities. The 5G network
will connect a robot plant guide and a remote user to complete plant visits
to minimize travel time and costs of in-person inspections and reduce the
13. Deloitte Conseil, European Energy Market Reform Country Profile: France (Zurich: Deloitte
Conseil, 2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Energy-and-Resources
/gx-er-merket-reform-france.pdf.
14. Claire Volkwyn, “Fast Forwarding the Energy Transition in France,” Smart Energy International (website),
October 29, 2019, https://www.smart-energy.com/regional-news/europe-uk/fast-forwarding-the-energy-transition
-in-france/.
15. Volkwyn, “Fast Forwarding.”
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carbon footprint of plant upkeep.16 Furthermore, a digital map of the plant
will be available for inspection, ref lecting real-time data.
In addition to 5G, IoT plays a signif icant role in digitalization.
The IoT applications enable all components of the smart grids with IP addresses
and two-way communication. A smart grid involves power generation,
power transmission, power distribution, and power utilization, and IoT can
be applied to these four subsystems. In France, the long-range IoT station
is a smart-grid solution developed by Kerlink for machine-to-machine and
IoT service operators aiming to run on an independent network.17
Furthermore, IoT technology will play a role in the development
of microgrids (small-scale smart grids that are semiautonomous,
fully islanded, or autonomous), allowing small energy networks to be involved in
local production via photovoltaic panels, miniature wind turbines, and fuel cells.
The IoT will be an essential factor toward realizing diversity in the energy
mix, and it will contribute toward decentralization, allowing supply to regions
with poor network coverage (for example, isolated rural zones).18

Energy Cyber-related Vulnerabilities
As France’s energy transition to renewable energy is expected to accelerate,
smart grids will play a major role in realizing France’s renewable energy
goals. Despite their benefits, the use of smart grids entails cyber challenges.
During the Black Hat Europe 2014 conference, two cybersecurity professionals
demonstrated that it was possible to hack some smart meters despite
the encryption of ingoing and outgoing communications.19 France has
reduced many of these concerns, however, with its smart-meter expansion
by transferring smart-meter data through electric and telephone networks
rather than the Internet.
16. “Press Release: Orange and Schneider Electric Run Industrial 5G Trials in French Factory,”
Orange (website), September 28, 2020, https://www.orange.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2020/orange
-and-schneider-electric-run-industrial-5g-trials-french-factory.
17. “Semtech LoRa Platform Selected by KERLINK for First Internet of Things Long-Range
Gateway,” Device Management Forum (website), https://www.devicemanagement.org/imported-news
/semtech-lora-platform-selected-by-kerlink-for-first-Internet-of-things-long-range-gateway/.
18. Laurent Felix and Xavier Metz, Liberty, Equality, . . . Responsibility? IoT for People, a Driver of Value
Creation in France (Paris: Wavestone/Group Caisse des Dépôts/La Poste, 2018), https://www.wavestone.com
/app/uploads/2018/05/IoT-for-people.pdf.
19. Gabrielle Desarnaud, Cyber Attacks and Energy Infrastructures: Anticipating Risks (Paris: Études
de l’Ifri, January 2017), https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/desarnaud_cyber_attacks_energy_
infrastructures_2017_2.pdf.

99

Zhang and Hodges

In 2018, there were more than 4,300 cyberattacks on the French Electricity
Transmission Network (RTE). 20 With digitalization, the incorporation
of IoT and 5G with smart grids is inevitable. According to the European
Parliament, “development of smart energy has also led to exponential growth
of networked intelligence throughout the energy grids and also consumer
premises.” 21 Together with decentralization and diversification of energy
technologies, the growth of digital technologies like IoT and 5G can expand
the potential surface for cyberattacks in energy systems. Hence, cyberattacks
can now target people, products (physical and data infrastructures),
and processes (system information f low). 22

Energetic Bear
In 2014, approximately 250 energy companies in the United States and
Western Europe were infected by a malware known as Energetic Bear. 23
The industrial control systems (ICS) were affected, and the malware,
similar to that used in the Stuxnet attack, allowed the attackers to monitor
energy consumption in real time or attack physical systems like power plants,
wind turbines, and gas pipelines. 24 Since the group behind Energetic Bear
is suspected to have ties to Russia, it is important to be aware of potential
vulnerabilities relating to ICS, especially since Energetic Bear has an active
presence in France. 25
As smart grids are considered a form of ICS, it is important to understand
the vulnerabilities of smart grids. Smart grids enable transitions to an open,
largely decentralized, and digital infrastructure. They are now more exposed
to cyberattacks, however, from communication networks and computer
applications, resulting in severe destructions to the electricity network. 26
There are three main cyber challenges for smart grids. First, a high complexity
20. Patrice Mallet and Hicham Kadiri, “Risk of Cyber Security Attacks on Smart Grid,” BearingPoint
(website), February 27, 2019, https://www.bearingpoint.com/fr-fr/blogs/energie/risk-of-cyber-security-attacks
-on-smart-grid/.
21. International Energy Agency (IEA), Digitalization & Energy (Paris: IEA, 2017), https://iea.blob.core
.windows.net/assets/b1e6600c-4e40-4d9c-809d-1d1724c763d5/DigitalizationandEnergy3.pdf.
22.

IEA, Digitalization and Energy.

23.

Desarnaud, Cyber Attacks and Energy Infrastructures.

24. Sam Jones, “Energy Companies Hit by Cyber Attack from Russia-Linked Group,” Financial Times (website),
June 30, 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/606b97b4-0057-11e4-8aaf-00144feab7de.
25.

Sam Jones, “Energy Companies Hit by Cyber Attack from Russia-Linked Group.”

26. European Cybersecurity Organisation (ECSO), Energy Networks and Smart Grids: Cybersecurity for the
Energy Sector (Brussels: ESCO, November 2018), https://ecs-org.eu/documents/publications/5fdb2673903c6.pdf.
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level and volume of interconnected components require security solutions
that prevent domino effects, particularly when a large number of components
are compromised. Second, resource-constrained legacy energy systems
with very long lifetimes may be unable to integrate with new components
and new security requirements. Finally, an increase in attack surfaces because
of new data interfaces, for example, new and connection-oriented meters,
collectors, and other smart applications (like IoT) creates additional potential
entry points for attackers. 27 Thus, smart grids’ components—from smart meters
to power-plant relays, including software components and supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that monitor these components—
can be vulnerable targets for cyberattacks.
Since smart grids are the digitalization of energy infrastructure,
it is important to understand that the connection of any physical device
to the Internet will involve some digital security risks. The digital
security risks posed by IoT are similar to those related with ICS. 28
In the case of smart grids, the attackers could exploit IoT devices’ vulnerabilities
to move into smart grids remotely. The vulnerabilities embedded in the smart
grid can be easily exploited to cause malfunctions in the electric-power system.

Intrusion Campaign on Centreon
In 2021, France identif ied an intrusion campaign with aff iliation
to the Russian military intelligence agency GRU that targeted Centreon,
a French software company. The campaign began in late 2017 and continued
until 2020. 29 The campaign had numerous similarities with previous
cyberattacks attributed to Sandworm, which is notorious for conducting
consequent intrusion campaigns before aiming at specif ic targets that
suit its strategic interests inside the victims’ pool. The attack was a result
of Internet-exposed systems via the use of a P.A.S. web shell and an Exaramel
backdoor to gain control of the Centreon system and its nearby network. 30
Although only users of an outdated open-source version were affected,
the campaign served as a crucial warning since Centreon’s major customers
27.

ESCO, Energy Networks and Smart Grids.

28. Pooja Anand et al., “IoVT: Internet of Vulnerable Things? Threat Architecture, Attack Surfaces,
and Vulnerabilities in Internet of Things and Its Applications towards Smart Grids,” Energies 13, no. 18
(2020): 4813, https://doi.org/10.3390/en13184813.
29. Laurens Cerulus, “France Identifies Russia-linked Hackers in Large Cyberattack,” Politico (website),
February 15, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/france-cyber-agency-russia-attack-security-anssi/.
30. Maria Henriquez, “French Cybersecurity Agency Warns of Intrusion Campaign Targeting
Centreon,” Security (website), February 18, 2021, https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/94629
-french-cybersecurity-agency-warns-of-intrusion-campaign-targeting-centreon.
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include Électricité de France (EDF) and Total. The campaign could possibly
result in a detrimental cyberattack to France’s energy sector, which would
impact several French energy companies. Moreover, the attack type has also
shown the vulnerability of attacks on suppliers whose software needs regular
updates and patching.
Since the use of 5G networks will increasingly revolve around software,
risks from security f laws can increase because of suppliers’ poor software
development processes, allowing malicious actors to insert backdoors
to the products. The mobile network operators’ dependencies on suppliers
can also increase exposure to risks, increasing the number of attack paths
that can be manipulated by malicious actors and thereby increasing the
possible severity of the attacks’ impacts. 31 Additionally, the 5G risk landscape
merges traditional IP-based threats with the all-5G network and insecure
legacy (2/3/4G) threats. 32 The most sensitive information is conveyed
via core network functions, and impacts to the core networks could
potentially compromise the integrity, availability, and conf identiality
of the entire 5G network services. 33 Amongst the possible malicious actors,
non-EU states or state-backed actors are most likely to target 5G networks,
and their attacks are deemed the most serious.

Other Notable Cyberattacks
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of cyberattacks in France
increased fourfold, with 200 large-scale cyberattacks across 12 areas of critical
infrastructure, including health, defense, and banking. 34 In 2021, two French
hospital groups were affected by ransomware attacks in less than a week. 35
Energy as a critical sector could be targeted in France as it has been in other
parts of the world.

31. NIS Cooperation Group, Cybersecurity of 5G Networks: EU Toolbox of Risk Mitigating Measures
(Brussels: European Commission, January 29, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection
/document/64468.
32. European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), ENISA Threat Landscape for 5G Networks,
ed. Marco Lourenço and Louis Marinos (Athens: ENISA, November 2019), https://doi.org/10.2824/49299.
33.

NIS Cooperation Group, Cybersecurity of 5G Networks.

34. David Keohane and Peggy Hollinger, “Pandemic Brought Surge in French Cyber Attacks, Warns
Thales CEO,” Financial Times (website), April 5, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/70e1c40d-acc8-4e8e-8ce3
-3e0d9901358a.
35. France 24, “Cyber Attacks Hit Two French Hospitals in One Week,” France 24 (website),
February 16, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20210216-cyber-attacks-hit-two-french-hospitals
-in-one-week.
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It is imperative to understand that the ease of connectivity by digitalization
using 5G and IoT could also further intensify the effects of cyberattacks
on smart-energy applications by making it easier to infiltrate the systems
for cascading effects.

Mitigation
Since 2008, France has identified cyber threats as a significant concern
for its national security, and in 2009 it established the National Cybersecurity
Agency (ANSSI) to handle cybersecurity incidents of significant state concern. 36
In 2013, the Military Programming Law (MPL) was passed, marking the
first legal milestone for cybersecurity requirements. The legislation called
on 200 operators of vital importance (OVI), whose function is necessary
for the security and resilience of France, and drew from an existing list
established in 1998. 37 Energy sectors were included as OVIs. These companies
must provide ANSSI with a list of critical-information systems, implement
a security policy using an accredited information system, create a detailed map
of both physical equipment and network configurations, and notify ANSSI
in case of any cybersecurity incident. In return, the Operational Center
for the Security of Information Systems (COSSI), a branch of ANSSI,
will attempt to support the aff licted OVI technically and run cyber forensics
to prevent similar attacks to other companies. 38 COSSI specializes
in identifying vulnerabilities in current systems, defining response strategies,
and analyzing, monitoring, and responding to cyber threats 24 hours a day
as the government’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-FR). 39
The emergency response team works as the main international point of contact
for all cyber incidents affecting France.40
Beyond informational technologies, ANSSI has been certifying the
security of industrial control systems like program logic controllers,
36. French National Digital Security Strategy (Paris: France Republic, October 16, 2015), https://www.enisa
.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map/France_Cyber_Security_Strategy.pdf.
37. “The French CIIP Framework,” ANSSI (website), https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/cybersecurity-in-france
/ciip-in-france/.
38. Desarnaud, Cyber Attacks and Energy Infrastructures.
39. Robert S. Dewar, ed., National Cybersecurity and Cyberdefense Policy Snapshots (Zurich: Center
for Security Studies, September 2018, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center
-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports_National_Cybersecurity_and_Cyberdefense_Policy_Snapshots
_Collection_1.pdf.
40. Melissa Hathaway et al., France: Cyber Readiness at a Glance (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute
for Policy Studies, September 2016), https://potomacinstitute.org/images/CRI/CRI_France_Profile_PIPS
.pdf#page=9.
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which change system dynamics based on input received from the system
itself. Finding (or creating) products that are secure by design will take
significant time, so IT cybersecurity remains paramount to cybersecurity.
As mentioned above, Enedis, France’s primary energy supplier, has
also avoided some cyber vulnerability through ensuring consumer data sent
from smart meters is encrypted and sent to an Enedis data center via
non-Internet channels. These data are then isolated. Return communication
from data centers are sent from tamper-proof hardware known as security
modules, which are regulated under ANSSI.41 While these means are more
secure than others, all connected objects with digital functions are still
vulnerable to cyberattacks.

Strengths and Weaknesses
Based on France’s cybersecurity blueprint, France has a relatively
strong system established for ensuring security of its critical infrastructures.
The French method features heavy involvement of energy companies
during the establishment of ministerial policies and regulations,
offering tailored responses catered to specific needs. Overall, this method
has helped establish trust between the French authorities and the OVIs.
The EBIOS method recommended by ANSSI will be able to forge interactions
between different functions within an organization, encompassing the entire
life cycle. By having appropriate risk analyses, this method can potentially
lead to adequate security measures, adjusting to local needs and corresponding
challenges.42 Risk mitigations will allow identification of sensitive components
within the system. Mitigation strategies (such as a defense-in-depth strategy)
that delay the cyber threat are able to enhance protection against unknown
threats, decreasing the scope and alleviating the impact.43
W hile the methods are relatively useful in risk mitigations,
the traditional risk-assessment process centered on impact and likelihood
of threats may have some weaknesses. The usual method of evaluating
a system’s security is to identify the attack tactics and understand which

41.

Desarnaud, Cyber Attacks and Energy Infrastructures.

42. French National Agency for the Security of Information Systems (ANSSI), Managing
Cybersecurity for Industrial Control Systems (Paris: ANSSI, 2012), https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2014/01
/Managing_Cybe_for_ICS_EN.pdf.
43.

ANSSI, Managing Cybersecurity.
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system components may be compromised.44 The increase of attacks on IoT,
however, together with the increase in availability of advanced attack tools,
means traditional risk assessment methods may have diff iculty keeping
up with emerging threats and utilizing automated and dynamic security
methods. Risk-assessment methods focused on attacks may incur high costs
for creating secure IoT systems during application and frequent updates on a final
system. It is also important to note that even though the CSPN is used widely
in France, it is only recognized in France.45

Recommendations
With the emergence of malign state and non-state actors, a further increase
in cyber-related attacks toward energy infrastructure is on the rise. As France
is a major player in economic, political, and military fields and has positioned
itself as a mediator in the Ukraine crisis, it will likely continue to be a target
for cyberattacks. The following are recommendations.

Security Classification Standards
France shou ld use a new securit y classif ication standa rd
focused on systems’ functionalities, such as exposure and protection
mechanisms. This approach is different from the traditional, risk-based
approach, with attacks being a major part of the security evaluation.
This approach will allow engineers and designers to have a more concrete
standard on security when building critical infrastructure. Unlike the
certification method, which is applied after the system is created, the new
approach can be applied during the design phase to build secure critical
infrastructure (such as advanced metering infrastructure). The classification
standards will have goals to be accomplished by engineers in their security
designs, and the evaluation will offer guidelines for system implementation
to meet required security requirements. The new classification can also be
used in addition to the traditional approach, especially when attacker models
have to be considered during value-driven evaluations.46

44. Manish Shrestha et al., “A Methodology for Security Classification Applied to Smart Grid
Infrastructures,” International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection 28 (March 2020), https://doi.org/10.1016
/j.ijcip.2020.100342.
45. Hans Baars et al., Smart Grid Security Certification in Europe: Challenges and Recommendations
(Athens: ENISA, December 2014), 67, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/smart-grid-security-certification
-in-europe.
46.

Manish et al., “Methodology for Security Classification.”
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The new security classification standards will aim to achieve the following:


Provide a set of usual traits, particularly for IoT systems
with common traits (communication, composition, attack
surfaces, interaction, and after-effects), so it will be easier
for securit y professionals and management off icials
to recognize risks and safety measures required for new
system security, and to have a fast synopsis of the criticality
of the systems they are handling.47



Categorize complex systems into predefined groups according
to security requirements to analyze the criticality of a system
or subsystem. This will also diagnose exposure in terms
of which functionality surface may be prone to attacks
and would combine the attacks’ aftereffects and exposure
to attackers.



Enhance security assurance and transparency on security,
building trust between stakeholders involved in the energy
sector.

For companies, this new approach will assist in decision making
during the system design phase when choosing the most suitable
technology and equipment from the vendors.
For end users, the new approach will allow a high-level overview
of the security system, enabling them to make better informed decisions
on secure system selection. Information regarding exposure and safeguard
mechanisms can assist end users, especially users with limited technical
skills, in understanding the security level of their product or system,
preventing them from using products with weak security features.48

Energy Sector Case Study Scenarios
France should consider creating specif ic case study scenarios
tailored to the energy sector. France has cybersecurity plans established.
The plans, however, feature general cybersecurity systems guidelines
instead of having different guidelines specifically tailored to each industry.
While the protocols for cyberattacks may be similar, the stakes in each industry
may be different, with different impacts and stakeholders. The growing
47. Manish et al., “Methodology for Security Classification.”
48.

Manish et al., “Methodology for Security Classification.”
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trend of new advanced technologies like 5G and IoT may increase the need
to have early warning systems or risk mitigations tailored to critical energy
infrastructure. Additionally, the presence of legacy energy systems may require
additional security requirements and more f lexibility during integration
with new technologies and components.
The specific case-study scenarios will aim to achieve the following:


Serve as a framework/guideline for agencies and companies
related to the energy sector and to set up tailored early
warnings or risk mitigations for applications, such as smart
grids, that have incorporated advanced technologies.



Supplement the current risk scenarios for mitigation methods
by helping to understand the scenarios regarding the use
of resource constrained legacy systems and establish relevant
mitigations when incompatibilities occur, which may include
creating suitable patches for outdated systems.

Secure-by-Design ICS Components
Availability and cost are signif icant limiting factors in selecting
secure-by-design ICS components. To ensure the selection of truly designed
cybersafe products, purchasers must scrutinize suppliers and ensure secure
implementation, installation, and maintenance throughout the lifetime
of the system or product.49 ANSSI should continue to provide up-to-date
certifications for as many available products as possible.
Additionally, the certif ication process should include a series
of recommendations for updates to legacy systems that pose a significant
threat to a system’s cybersecurity. Many distributed control systems and PLCs
have been in service for decades and do not meet the security requirements
of modern ICS technologies. These updates should focus on migration
or modernization projects. 50

49. Larry O’Brien, “Secure-by-Design Industrial Products Are Increasingly Important,”
Control Engineering 2 (December 2020), https://www.controleng.com/articles/secure-by-design-industrial
-products-are-increasingly-important/.
50. O’Brien, “Secure-by-Design Industrial Products.”
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Conclusion
France is prominently positioned as a leader in cybersecurity and energy
security. Its national cybersecurity policies provide an excellent framework
for other nations, and its continued participation in global forums will
be instrumental in developing widespread industrial cybersecurity policies.
While it has not been immune to cyber intrusions, France continues to
develop impressive early warning and mitigation strategies that could be aided
by critical energy infrastructure mitigation methods and guidelines.
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Figure 6-2. Map of France’s threat timeline estimate (six months indicates likely
attack vector in 2022, one year by 2023, two+ years by 2024 or later)
Credit: Ryan Fisk and Samira Oakes

Location

Reason for Threat Priority and Timeline

Paris

Expect an ICS attack on the Paris sector of the RTE network in the
next six months due to technical vulnerabilities in smart grids and
elevated tensions with Russia.

Port de Brest

ICS or DDoS attack on both important port terminal and logistical
hubs used by the French military within six months due to recent
attacks by Russia in neighboring countries.

Chooz and
Blayais Nuclear Plants

Expect disinformation attacks and DDoS attacks in two+ years
due to Russia’s goal of undermining independent European
sources of energy as it reduces its import of Russian fossil fuels.
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A BSTR ACT: The majorit y of Belgium’s energ y is current ly
supplied by nuclear power, but this source is to be phased out by 2035,
and no feasible domestic replacement exists. With the EU voting
on July 6, 2022, to label nuclear power green energy, Belgium has more
possibilities. Right now, domestic renewable energy sources such as wind
farms only produce about 10 percent of Belgium’s energy, and Belgium
has become largely reliant on foreign energy sources—such as pipelines
from the UK and Germany, which are experiencing their own energy
crises—to bridge the gap in domestic energy needs. Additionally, divided
policy interests in the Belgian government have created roadblocks to the
creation and implementation of comprehensive security policies to govern
new, rapidly evolving technologies, such as the Belgian infrastructure’s
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), leading to outdated security measures
and making these technologies more vulnerable to cyberattacks.
Keywords: nuclear power, wind farms, Elia, SCADA, ALEGrO, Cyber
Security Coalition, industrial Internet of Things/IIoT, Brabo, energy
independence, renewable energy

Introduction and Energy Landscape
Belgium, as the home of the NATO and European Union (EU)
headquarters and one of the first NATO member states, holds a unique
position within the Alliance. The country has a federal government and
three administrative regions: Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels. The two
main languages spoken are Flemish (Dutch) and French. Belgium is bordered
by NATO allies: France to the southwest, the Netherlands to the northeast,
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Germany to the east, and Luxembourg to the southeast. The North Sea is on
its northeastern border.
Currently, the principal source of energ y, by far, is nuclear.1
Until recently, more than 50 percent of Belgium’s energy supply had been
produced among seven nuclear reactors distributed throughout the country.
A noticeable percentage of energy consumption is also currently provided
by natural-gas products, but it appears future policy intends to reduce that
share in favor of renewable energy sources.
In addition to nuclear power, a large offshore wind farm has been developed
in the North Sea within the Belgian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) bounds.
It currently provides roughly 10 percent of the total domestic energy
production. 2 Policy measures are in place to increase the share of energy
sourced from renewables in the market, but how those renewable sources will
materialize is unclear, aside from a second large wind farm in an area similar
to the first. The current North Sea wind farm is a conglomeration of individual
wind farms operated by various corporations: Mermaid, Northwester II,
Belwind, Nobelwind, Seastar, Northwind, Rentel, C-Power, and Norther.
These farms comprise one area of the territory designated for wind power.
The other large farm will be developed in the coming years in another Belgian
EEZ location. While some of the farms use a communal transmission system
to the coast, others have their own transmission lines. All, however, connect
to the national electrical grid.
Belgium has a single manager of the electrical grid, Elia, which manages
the entire country. Elia is responsible for the domestic grid, but it is also the
group that manages connections to the transmission lines of utility companies
for external countries. Elia is part of a larger organization, Elia Group,
which also manages a transmission system operator in Germany. As such,
Elia Group and its TSOs are actors with major roles in the increasing
interconnectivity of European electricity.
It is also important to note that the Central European Pipeline System
(CEPS), originally intended for use by NATO but later expanded to
include uses for civilians, transits Belgium. Jet fuel at the Brussels airport

1. “Country Nuclear Power Profiles 2019 Edition: Belgium (Updated 2018),” International Atomic Energy
Agency (website), 2018, https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2019/countryprofiles
/Belgium/Belgium.htm.
2. “Belgian Offshore Platform,” Belgian Offshore Platform (website), n.d., https://www.belgianoffshoreplatform
.be/en/.

112

Case Study: Chapter 7

Belgium

is supplied by CEPS. 3 In times of conf lict, the military use is guaranteed
priority; in a worst-case scenario, this could lead to an aircraft fuel shortage.
The largest immediate vulnerability in the Belgian energy landscape comes
from the projected domestic energy deficit and the increasing dependence
on external sources for energy. The deficit has become clear to the federal
government: the 10 percent of energy coming from renewables is not enough
to make up for the over 50 percent from nuclear power scheduled
to be phased out by 2025. In order to make up for the decreasing share
of domestic production, the Belgian federal government has completed,
and is in the process of agreeing to several import policies from external
countries (primarily Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands)
through a 10-year development plan from 2015–25.
The import infrastructure arrangement from Germany is designated
ALEGrO. A collaboration between Elia and a German grid operator,
Amprion, ALEGrO stands for Aachen Liège Electricity Grid Overlay.
A roughly 90-kilometer underground cable, it connects an Amprion-operated
station located in Oberzier, Germany, to an Elia-operated station in Lixhe,
Belgium.4 ALEGrO is significant because it is the first direct transmission
line from Germany to Belgium, and Germany will soon provide a major source
of electricity during the winter. Use of the line began in November 2020.
The import plan from the United Kingdom is designated NEMO.
Similar to ALEGrO, it is the first direct transmission line between the
United Kingdom and Belgium. NEMO’s line is both subsea and underground
and connects Richborough in the United Kingdom to Herdersbrug in Belgium.5
The Belgian station is again operated by Elia, and the British side is operated
by Siemens, which is headquartered in Germany. Operation of NEMO
began in 2019. It is also important to note that Siemens has planned
a transmission line between the United Kingdom and Denmark called the
Viking Link.
NEMO holds particular significance in the Belgian energy landscape.
In addition to the new interconnection between the United Kingdom and
Belgium, NEMO included the coordination of construction (by Elia)
of the Stevin Line, a main line for routing the energy produced by the wind
3. “Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS),” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2017.
4. Joëlle Bouillon, “ALEGrO,” Amprion (website), n.d., https://www.amprion.net/Grid-expansion/Our-Projects
/ALEGrO/.
5. “We Connect Europe: Nemo Link Supplies Electricity across Borders,” Siemens Energy (website), n.d.,
https://www.siemens-energy.com/global/en/news/magazine/2020/intereuropean-hvdc-link-nemolink.html.
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farm in the North Sea to the coast and then further inland. The Stevin Line
is connected in the North Sea to a modular offshore grid, which serves
as a junction for the energy produced by the individual wind farms. The line
then travels from its offshore origin to substations on the coast. Once the
electricity reaches the coast, it can be routed to the NEMO Line for electricity
exchange between the United Kingdom and Belgium.
Brabo is the import plan from the Netherlands. Brabo consists of three
subprojects, all taking place at the Port of Antwerp. 6 Brabo II increases
the capacity of the local grid and was intended to prepare for Brabo III:
two underground transmission lines and one overhead transmission line
that connect the Belgian grid to the Netherlands. Due to the proximity
of Antwerp to the border of the Netherlands, these lines are not long.
Commissioning of Brabo III is targeted for 2024.
This increase in projects shows a palpable shift from independent
domestic energy production to a reliance on external sources of energy
while the proportion of domestic renewable production increases in
volume. The dependence on external sources is a vulnerability. Should
circumstances outside Belgian political control reduce the incoming supply,
the country could be at risk of a signif icant energy shortage because
it will no longer have the capacity to produce enough energy on its own.
It would be advantageous for new connections to be made with NATO allies.
An increasing Alliance-wide interdependency lacks redundancy, however,
and, as such, may become a target.
In addition, as discussed below, this vulnerability is compounded by the
fact that Internet of Things–enabled critical infrastructure is being developed
across Belgium and the NATO alliance as a whole. If, for example, a hostile
actor discovered a zero-day exploit in the control software of an Internet
of Things–enabled electrical transmission line from the North Sea, it could
interrupt transmission at dangerous times, such as a moment of high reliance
on renewables due to low import capacity from other countries.

Emerging Technology: Internet of Things
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to the increasing interconnectivity
of devices to each other and to the Internet and often materializes
in the integration of “smart” devices into a domestic environment.
6. “Brabo III,” Elia Group (website), n.d., https://www.elia.be/en/infrastructure-and-projects/infrastructure
-projects/brabo-lll.
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The development of IoT, however, has been in parallel with the development
of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). The IIoT functions with the
same concept as IoT but as the name suggests, is integrated into industry,
utilities, and critical infrastructure. With increasing connectivity,
comes increasing vulnerability. What makes IIoT so consequential is that, when
it is integrated into critical infrastructure, it becomes a new avenue for hybrid
threats to threaten energy security. For example, an IIoT-integrated supervisory
control and data acquisition controller (SCADA), the industrial control system
(ICS) used to supervise and control large sets of critical infrastructure like power
plants and the electrical grid, can now be compromised through the Internet
or through malware uploaded to the host network. Penetrating SCADA
by cyberattack is not a new phenomenon; this method was the basis of the
2010 Stuxnet attack on the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran.7 There is a major
difference, however, between that attack and how an attack on an IIoT-enabled
SCADA controller would be executed. The Iranian SCADA was airgapped,
ran on only wired connections, and had to be penetrated through a physical
input. In an IIoT-integrated environment that may no longer be the case
if an actor is able to exploit a vulnerability in a part of the environment that
is connected to the SCADA controller.
Belgium has multiple IoT/IIoT initiatives that have developed
in recent years. The f irst is “Digital Wallonia,” a region-wide effort
to digitize Wallonia, with IoT/IIoT as a major focus. Managed by the
Digital Agency, in turn supervised by the vice president of Wallonia, it
focuses on digital and IoT integration into business and public service
as well as public technology education and IIoT integration into critical
infrastructure. Digital Wallonia has initiated a cybersecurity project intended
to improve the security of IoT integration, but the more vulnerable nature
of IoT will be a barrier to making critical infrastructure completely secure.
Flanders has a project of a similar nature referred to as the Smart
Energy Region initiative. 8 This project is more an alliance between companies
than a designated organization with paid employees such as Wallonia.
There is still an organizing body, however, the Flux 50, intended to facilitate
cooperation between the businesses and corporations that make up the Smart
Region initiative. The areas that Flux 50 has prioritized coordination efforts
on are 1) energy harbors, 2) microgrids, 3) multi-energy solutions at a district
level (an effort to diversify renewable energy sources and something that would
7. Kim Zetter, “How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History,”
Wired (website), July 2011, https://www.wired.com/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/.
8. “The Digital Industry in Flanders,” Flanders Investment and Trade (website), n.d., https://www
.flandersinvestmentandtrade.com/invest/en/sectors/digital-society.
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be extremely valuable in ensuring continuity of energy supply), 4) energy Cloud
platforms, and 5) intelligent renovation. Several IoT-focused research centers
are also located within Flanders.
In multiple cities in Flanders, an IIoT-connected water management
system is already in place. Water-Link, a utility company serving over 600,000
people and responsible for urban sewer systems in roughly 10 cities, contracted
a smart water management system to increase efficiency.9 The management
system is less of a control system and more of a monitoring system and involves
placing several thousand sensors and communication modules in underground
hydrants. Data from these sensors are evaluated for loss of water in order
to minimize waste and maximize efficiency. While this system does not have
the capability to manage water f low, a cyberattack could still cause damage
by spoofing incoming data and causing panic over a perceived water shortage,
for example. It also raises the question of the vulnerability of IIoT-systems that
are capable of control, instead of exclusively monitoring them. A cyberattack
that could cause a water (or electrical, gas, or oil) shortage could be exceptionally
damaging. Belgium does not yet appear to have integrated IIoT into enough
of its critical infrastructure to have that security problem, but it needs
to be aware of the potential risk as it continues IIOT integration.
The third region, the Brussels-capital region, does not appear to have
any region-wide initiatives to integrate IoT into business or industry. Its status
as a center of European politics, however, has led it to be the location for many
efforts and conferences regarding IoT adoption. It would be unsurprising
to see an initiative develop in the future. These initiatives would require
a greater degree of security due to the possibility that IIoT exploitation
could be used to disrupt NATO or EU operations, for example.
As Belgium undergoes its energy transition, it is very clear that
IIoT will be integrated into a greater share of Belgian infrastructure.
Several North Sea wind farms (such as Nobelwind and Belwind) have
already laid the groundwork for IIoT-connected infrastructure through
the implementation of LTE networks.10 Management sensors are already
operational, and it would be reasonable to expect that a larger suite
of data-collection oriented sensors and more control-oriented IIoT integration
will be in place in the future.

9. Bagaar, “Waterlink: Smart Water Management,” Bagaar (website), n.d., https://www.bagaar.be
/work/waterlink.
10. “Keeping Belgian North Sea Wind Farms Connected,” Power Technology (website), October 8, 2020,
https://www.power-technology.com/sponsored/keeping-belgian-north-sea-wind-farms-connected/.
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Industrial Internet of Things integration into current and future North Sea
wind farms need to be approached with caution. Already, actors have probed
Belgian ICS vulnerabilities, and IIoT integration would dramatically increase
the number of potential methods of attack. In 2013 and 2014, an APT titled
Dragonf ly (also known as Energetic Bear) launched malware attacks against
targets that were connected to ICS throughout Europe and the United States.11
One of the companies, Ewon, was a Belgian firm that develops remote-access
technology for ICS. In an even more relevant twist, Ewon also develops software
to manage IIoT.12 This includes IoT-enabled programmable logic
controllers integral to SCADA controllers in wind farms; it would
be reasonable to expect to see these in the North Sea, for example.
Dragonf ly is thought to be of Russian origin, and the techniques used
in its 2013 malware, Havex, are similar to the techniques used in the
2020 SolarWinds hack. The fact that ICS on renewables in Belgium have
probably already been explored by APTs should be considered when deciding
how much IIoT, and the number of vulnerabilities, should be integrated
into an increasingly important source of domestic energy production.
One critical aspect of Belgian IIoT is how Elia will attempt to integrate
it into its nationwide electrical grid. As the sole grid manager,
how it approaches the security aspect of its monitoring, management,
and control will have signif icant impact on the ability of hostile actors
to disrupt the consistent supply of energy regardless of whether it is imported
from an international source or if it is produced domestically. Elia has
already created “The Nest,” a digital laboratory open to all Elia employees
in which they can experiment with IoT and artif icial intelligence (AI)
on the condition that all prototyping be in the pursuit of a greater
digitalization of Elia systems. Development programs like this are where
increased innovation meets increased security risks.13
While the integration of IoT into domestic Belgian infrastructure has
the potential to impact the energy security of the country, the increasing
cross-border energy importation from Germany, in particular, will create new
vulnerabilities. Germany is the fourth-largest investor in IoT technologies
for both consumer and industrial purposes; should a hostile actor exploit
a vulnerability in the German energy supply, it could directly affect the energy
supply to Belgium as well.
11. Paul Roberts, “Industrial Control Vendors Identified in Dragonfly Attack,” Security Ledger (website),
July 4, 2014, https://securityledger.com/2014/07/industrial-control-vendors-identified-in-dragonfly-attack/.
12. “IoT Solutions,” Ewon (website), n.d., https://developer.ewon.biz/content/iot-solutions.
13. “The Nest, Our Digital Laboratory,” Elia Group (website), n.d., https://innovation.eliagroup.eu/projects
/the-nest-our-digital-laboratory/.
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Vulnerabilities and Potential Trajectories for Hostile Influence
As the headquarters of NATO and the EU, Belgium has the potential
to be targeted by criminal activity or an APT for a larger number of reasons
than its international stance or domestic policies. While it does not produce
major activity in the offensive cyber realm, Belgium’s status as a host and
participant in these organizations could create motivation for a more intense
Russian hybrid warfare campaign waged against Belgium or its geopolitical
neighbors regardless of the potential for retaliation. Crippling Belgium would
undermine the leadership and proper functioning of NATO and the EU,
a long-standing Russian policy objective.
Hybrid one-off attacks or a full campaign in Belgium could take
a number of forms and exploit a number of vulnerabilities. As mentioned
previously, the most conspicuous vulnerability is the significantly reduced
production of domestic energy and the dramatically increasing dependence on
external sources when nuclear power is phased out. Belgium would not need
to be involved in a direct conf lict to begin to see threats to its energy security
appear; it would only need to be in proximity to one. In a direct attack
on Belgium, the many new transmission lines entering the country could
become a target, which could be devastating if attacks on multiple lines were
to be executed in concert. The practice of stockpiling exploits is now
common, and Russia or another actor could spend a signif icant amount
of time finding f laws or zero-days in new renewable ICS or substations
and could deploy them all at the same time.
While a vulnerability is already inherent to the Belgian dependence
on external sources, this risk is compounded by some outside sources,
like Germany, that are already dependent on external sources for energy.
A domino effect is possible. If a source to a source of Belgium lost power,
it could affect Belgium and the NATO alliance as a whole.
A second major vulnerability is the near-future integration of IIoT
into critical infrastructure and a lack of a national, comprehensive
policy plan to address the inherent potential for exploitation. It appears
Flanders and Wallonia have a weighty effort to digitize their economy
and infrastructure but less of a plan to ensure their security. The IoT’s
reputation is one of increased convenience but also decreased cybersecurity.
The IoT vulnerabilities are widespread and common, as evidenced in the
2021 discovery of the Transmission Control Protocol/IP vulnerabilities that
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affected an estimated 100 million devices.14 As IIoT infrastructure grows
in popularity, Flanders, Wallonia, and the Belgian federal government will
need to conduct more thorough reviews of the critical infrastructure that IIoT
can be integrated into.
A holistic analysis of hybrid threat vectors should also address the
potential for social disruption and the exploitation of social divisions.
As evidenced by the 2016 Russian active-measures style campaign, it is a real
threat that has only been amplified by the increasing use of social media.
Again, the headquartering of NATO and the EU in Brussels increases the
likelihood of disruption.
The primar y social divides within Belgium are regional and
linguistic, which seed several other potentially exploitable divisions.15
Flanders, which speaks Dutch, has a large right-wing movement and two
right-wing separatist parties. Wallonia, on the other hand, speaks French
and tends to vote more on the left. This divide is significant: both regions
have a major degree of political autonomy, and social interaction is conducted
in separate spheres—with different languages and a regional, not national,
media focus. Brussels is the exception and has a more diverse population,
though the urban areas speak mostly French. An immediate effect of this
division is that it inf luences the dynamic of elections and the formation
of coalition governments. National elections often fail to form viable
parliamentary coalitions, and a caretaker government is often a reasonable
expectation as was the case from 2018 to 2020.
A second division involves immigration into the country. Mirroring the
language and regional split, the right-wing movement in Flanders employs
significant anti-immigrant rhetoric.16 A case in point was a September 2020
rally in Brussels of nearly 4,500 attendees. While the purpose of the rally
was to protest the incoming coalition government, much of the advertising
for it was centered around immigration to Flanders. In addition, a major
factor in the collapse of the 2018 parliamentary coalition was a reaction

14. Lily Hay Newman, “100 Million More IoT Devices Are Exposed—and They Won’t Be the Last,”
Wired (website), April 23, 2021, https://www.wired.com/story/namewreck-iot-vulnerabilities-tcpip
-millions-devices/.
15. Cecil Meeusen, Joris Boonen, and Ruth Dassonneville, “The Structure of Prejudice and Its Relation
to Party Preferences in Belgium: Flanders and Wallonia Compared,” Journal of the Belgian Association
for Psychological Science, November 2017, https://www.psychologicabelgica.com/article/10.5334/pb.335/.
16. Gabriela Galindo, “Outrage after Car Brandishing Nazi Symbols Joins Vlaams Belang Protest,”
Brussels Times (website), September 28, 2020, https://www.brusselstimes.com/133244/outrage-after-car
-brandishing-nazi-symbols-joins-vlaams-belang-protest.
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to a federal policy that agreed to a UN convention regarding European
migrant burden-sharing.17
To hybrid actors, these seams are exploitable. Through APT 28/
Fancy Bear, Russia has already demonstrated its disinformation campaigns are
based around domestic political circumstances, as in the 2016 US presidential
election and the suspected 2017 Macron document dump immediately
preceding French elections.
Exploiting social divisions is not the most likely path to reduce
the supply of energy, but a large-scale hybrid campaign could use the
two in concert. At the same time that a cyber intrusion compromises
the critical infrastructure importing electricity from outside countries,
a hack-and-dump of relevant, sensitive documents could inf lame tensions
between Dutch- and French-speaking groups. In addition, synthetic media
distribution (like deepfakes) and a disinformation campaign could be launched
to further the goal. Compounded with an already volatile situation due
to a sudden energy def icit, Belgium could experience signif icant unrest
if this situation were to become feasible.

Early Warning and Mitigation
The three bodies responsible for the management of cybersecurity
in Belgium are the Belgian Centre for Cyber Securit y (CCB),
the federal Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), and the Cyber
Directorate of the General Intelligence and Security Service (SGRS).
Belgium’s CERT is designated CERT.be and is administered by the CCB.
In addition to internal coordination between these three organizations,
they also interface with a significant number of other relevant stakeholders:
NATO, the federal police, and the State Security Service (the VSSE, a civilian
intelligence service, distinct from the SGRS). In a practical domestic response
scenario, the primary response bodies are CERT.be and the CCB, with support
provided by SGRS.
Brought under supervision of the CCB in 2014, CERT.be is responsible
for reactive measures to a cyber intrusion or disruption and is also responsible
for managing the development and administration of the country’s early

17. Matt Apuzzo and Monica Pronczuk, “After 2 Years of Paralysis, Belgium Forms a (Very Fragile)
Government,” New York Times (website), October 1, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/01/world
/europe/belgium-government-coalition.html.
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warning system (EWS).18 Its stated mission is to “detect, observe,
and analyze online security problems, and to inform various target groups
accordingly.” Services are provided to essential organizations and businesses:
critical infrastructure, utilities, and government. Nonessential businesses
and the general public have the ability to utilize a limited part of CERT.be’s
services, but the majority of information is reserved for organizations with the
largest impact on public functioning and safety. Of note, parts of the EWS
functioning do not appear publicly available and are unable to be included here.
The CERT.be EWS is a voluntary ser vice primarily intended
to be utilized by essential organizations and businesses. The CCB refers
to these organizations as Organizations of Vital or Special Interest (OSI),
and they are the intended users of the EWS. The EWS in its current form
has been in operation since roughly 2016. It is accessible through a portal
and contains a malware information-sharing platform, anti-phishing and
anti-spear-phishing resources, and a frequently updated list of bad
domains. In addition, CERT.be will distribute notifications in the event
of a significant development, like a recently discovered zero-day of consequence
or an emergency.
Of the information that can be obtained and based on the capabilities
discussed above, CERT.be appears designed to anticipate mostly routine
criminal activity. It is unclear whether it would be able to preempt a targeted,
APT-level attack successfully. It would be reasonable, however, to surmise
that the SGRS has the capability to handle the response, or potentially the
prevention of a potential attack, of a suspected nation-state actor.
The coordination between Belgian cyber threat-mitigation organizations
can be illustrated in the wake of a massive DDoS attack that occurred
on May 4, 2021, and continued into May 5. It targeted Belnet, a major
ISP that hosts the websites of the Belgian parliament and government
agencies, universities, and research institutes.19 The DDoS saturated
Belmont’s servers at roughly 11:00 a.m., downing the various websites
of roughly 200 customers, including multiple parliamentary and government
websites. A DDoS is a relatively uncomplicated attack to carry out,
so its origins could have come from any level, and no attribution has been
made as of this writing. Of note, the commencement of the attack coincided
18. “Service Definition Document,” CERT.be (website), January 2019, https://www.cert.be/en/service
-definition-document.
19. “Update: The Belnet Network Is Again Available, Our Teams Remain Vigilant,” Belnet (website),
May 5, 2021, https://belnet.be/fr/nouvelles-evenements/nouvelles/update-reseau-belnet-a-nouveau-disponible
-nos-equipes-restent.
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with the appearance of a witness to give testimony to the parliament regarding
alleged abuse of Uyghurs in the PRC. 20
As soon as Belmont detected its servers being f looded, it immediately
contacted the CCB. The CCB activated the response function of CERT.be
and began a dialogue with SGRS. Details of how the three collaborated
to stop the attack and what methods they used are not easily available,
but the majority of effects were eliminated within a day.
While CERT.be is the official operational cyber-response organization,
Belgium also has a forum, the Cyber Security Coalition, that brings
public agencies, private corporations, and academia together to pursue
a national-level culture of cybersecurity and best mitigation practices.
Judging by organizations that are a party to the forum, it appears the
Cyber Security Coalition has been relatively successful in creating
a national-level discourse; organizations like the SGRS, CERT.be, Belnet,
the armed forces, Digital Wallonia, and a large number of private
companies are all members. 21 It is also notable that Huawei is also a member
of the Cyber Security Coalition but Elia is not, and there is no explanation
immediately evident.
It is important to note that the coordination between and the proper
functioning of these organizations have not always been domestic priorities.
Belgium was delayed in adopting the provisions of the NIS directive and was
nearly brought to court by the European Commission for noncompliance. 22

Policy Recommendations
As renewable energy becomes the primary source of energy and
is increasingly connected to the Internet through IIoT, an increasing number
of exploitation options will open up to hostile actors. While EWS may
prevent the success of some attacks on critical infrastructure and renewables,
some of these will likely succeed. In order to ensure continuit y
of supply, domestic sources of energy production should be diversif ied
20. Sarah Coble, “Cyberattack on Belgian Parliament,” Info Security (website), n.d., https://www.infosecurity
-magazine.com/news/cyberattack-on-belgian-parliament/.
21. “Cyber Security Capability,” Cyber Security Coalition (website), n.d., https://www.cybersecuritycoalition
.be/about/focus-groups/.
22. “Shaping Europe’s Digital Future – Cybersecurity: Commission Urges Belgium, Hungary and Romania
to Comply with Their Obligations Regarding Operators of Essential Services,” European Commission
(website), October 30, 2021, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/cybersecurity-commission-urges
-belgium-hungary-and-romania-comply-their-obligations-regarding.
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as much as realistically feasible. A large and varying supply will complicate
an attack, and a redundant system is the best way to ensure continuous supply.

Expanding Renewable Energy
One of the ways Belgium could be successful in creating
redundancy in its energy supply chain is by expanding to other sources
of renewables outside the North Sea wind farm. Solar, hydro, and tidal
energy could all have a place in increasing the number of targets that
a cyberattack would have to target in order to do the most damage.
As European interdependence grows, diversification could be an advantage
for the Alliance as well. Just as other countries will export to Belgium,
Belgium will export to them. Should the primary source of generation
in Belgium be compromised, it could no longer provide that benefit to the
energy security of the Alliance as a whole.

Tailored EWS Capabilities
The EWS should be redesigned to include three new features.
The capabilities of the system in its current state are more suited to typical
criminal activity than a threat from an APT. As nation-state level hostile
activity increases in cyberspace, an EWS better tailored to politically
motivated, targeted intrusions is necessary to prevent severe damages
to Belgium’s critical infrastructure and energy security.
First, it should include a greater number of relevant stakeholders.
While the current system of selecting organizations based on their perceived
value to the functioning of society is an important step, the EWS should also
include a larger number of those charged with protecting critical infrastructure
and responding to cyber threats—the armed forces, the SGRS, and the VSSE
for example (if they are not already members). Providing real-time information
to those tasked with response will facilitate more informed, and thus more
effective, prevention and mitigation actions.
Second, it should be redesigned to incorporate more broad and
cross-cutting factors into its analysis of threats. Information gleaned
from cyberspace is not the sole way of determining the origin of potential
threats; activity in cyberspace often mirrors geopolitical activity, so the
analysis of political factors should be included in a next-generation EWS.
While, of course, no attribution has been made, an EWS with a political
analysis capability may have been more successful at anticipating and preventing
the DDoS of the parliament on the day testimony was given regarding abuse
of Uyghurs in China.
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Third, the EWS can serve as a facilitator to further solidarity
among NATO allies. Given increasing energy interconnectivity, the security
of one is a part of the security of all. A next-generation EWS should
be capable of sharing and receiving information from other systems
in NATO member states. An improved information f low will highlight trends
and threats that may only be discernible with a holistic view. Hybrid threats,
especially those that engage in deliberate threshold manipulation, may only
be visible at an Alliance-level unit of analysis as compared to a state-level
unit of analysis.
Fourth, an effort should be made to increase transparency in the
decision-making process and execution of cybersecurity policy. The most
effective functioning of any EWS system may be compromised by a corporate
fear to share sensitive information regarding technical specif ications
or breaches that occur on corporate systems. Finding a compromise by
giving corporations or utilities and policymakers a seat at the table, however,
as compared to dictating cybersecurity policy, may be the only way to find
a truly workable solution with the most potential to understand business
realities and succeed at the same time in creating more robust cyber defenses.
In addition, transparency helps build norms for best practices. If businesses
are able to observe other businesses operating with cybersecurity as a priority,
they are more likely to follow suit.

Increased Information Sharing
The Cyber Security Coalition, discussed previously, is an excellent step
in achieving a higher degree of information sharing. Bringing an increasing
number of stakeholders to national-level discussion has the potential
to make a real difference. The utmost effort should be made to bring the
corporations that supervise the increasing share of domestic renewable
production to the table, like those operating the current and future
North Sea wind farms. In addition, Elia, as one of the most critical
organizations to Belgian energy security on the forefront of national energy
innovation, should be party to the Coalition. The company most likely has
as much to teach as it does to learn and would serve as an incredibly valuable
resource to increasing cyber resilience as a whole.
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Comprehensive Technology Standards and Regulations
The last recommendation is that security be built into all aspects
of renewables development. In the near future, renewables will produce
an ever-increasing majority of the energy supply. Renewable technology
has not yet become a top-tier target, but that may change. In order
to ensure the future security of Belgium’s energy supply, now is the time
to create and enforce comprehensive standards and regulations for this
critical infrastructure.

Conclusion
Even prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Belgium has been
in a state of energy transition. Struggling to recuperate a domestic
energy def icit caused by the planned phaseout of nuclear power—
which provides over 50 percent of Belgium’s energy supply—Brussels
has partnered with Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
to integrate its electricity grid with its neighbors. This interconnectivity
provides vulnerabilities, especially considering Germany’s reliance on energy
imports from hostile actors (such as the Russian Federation). In addition,
the growing Industrial Internet of Things leaves increasingly large swaths
of critical infrastructure prone to attack from a single entry point.
To better address these vulnerabilities, Belgium can expand renewable energy,
redesign its early warning system to prioritize APT threats and broaden its
scope, increase information sharing with national stakeholders, and implement
comprehensive technology security standards.
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Figure 7-1. Map of Belgium’s threat timeline estimate (six months indicates likely
attack vector in 2022, one year by 2023, two+ years by 2024 or later)
Credit: Ryan Fisk and Lucas Cox

Location

Reason for Threat Priority and Timeline

North Sea Wind Farm and
the Stevin Line

Disinformation attacks and DDoS attacks on wind
farm within six months as it becomes a major source
of domestic energy production and as it reduces its
import of Russian fossil fuels.
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ABSTRACT: Germany has pledged to become energy independent by 2050
by supporting renewable energy sources. Despite this pledge, until now,
Germany has imported the majority of its energy from foreign sources,
especially Russia. As experts predicted, Germany has now made itself
dependent on an unreliable energy partner, driving up oil and gas prices
and creating energy insecurity in the country. In addition, the grid and new
energy sources such as wind farms have been exploited through cyberattacks.
Germany has produced multiple proactive policies governing cyber threat
mitigation to include research into early warning systems and the formation
of a new branch of the military directed specifically at securing cyberspace.
Its cybersecurity for critical energy infrastructure, however, has not been
significant enough to thwart significant cyberattacks by Russia.
Keywords: Nord Stream II, industrial control systems/ICS, cyberattacks,
Russian pipeline, energy independence, renewable energy, early warning,
Ukraine

Introduction
While the invasion of Ukraine has left most NATO nations unified in that
member states want to wean themselves off Russian oil and gas sooner rather
than later, the renewable technology that could serve as an energy substitute
in the nation paying the most for Russian energy is too underdeveloped
to solve the problem in the next two years. Instead, Germany has increased
its coal usage since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and it has increased the
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amount it has paid for Russian gas.1 While commitments to accelerate the
development of renewable technologies such as wind and solar are laudable,
malicious actors are already taking advantage of their cyber vulnerabilities
to create greater energy insecurities associated with the emerging technologies. 2
Germany is Europe’s economic powerhouse and the largest importer
of Russian gas in the first months of the war. 3 At the same time, Germany
is a major distributor of Russian gas to other NATO countries. But
attempts to divide Germany from its NATO allies around issues
such as the certif ication of the now-bankrupt Nord Stream 2 gas
pipeline, which planned to deliver gas from Russia to Germany without
transiting Ukraine were part of the broader Russian hybrid warfare. 4
Using the pipeline as a bargaining chip to escalate conf lict with Ukraine,
Moscow has manipulated Europe’s energy dependencies in its favor—
to silence dissent and to inf lict economic and political costs on those who
do not.
A German embargo on Russian energy imports or a Russian cessation
of delivery will have lasting impact on Germany and Europe, as Germany
is the European Union’s (EU) leading economic power. The Bundesbank
warned on April 22 that a gas embargo alone would thrust Germany
into a recession and cause the GDP to shrink by 2 percent. 5 Goldman Sachs
estimated that if Russia stopped all pipeline exports to Europe, the continent
would see a 2.2 percent decrease in GDP, and Germany a 3.4 percent decrease. 6

Note: Research from this chapter was published in altered form by the author in: Sarah Lohmann, “Russian Gas,
Green Technology, and the Great Sacrifice,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (website), June 23, 2022,
https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/06/23/russian-gas-green-technology-and-the-great-sacrifice%EF%BF%BC/.
1. Morgan Meaker, “Coal Threatens a Comeback as the EU Pulls Away from Russian Oil,” Wired (website),
March 17, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/green-transition-russia-ukraine/.
2. Catherine Stupp, ”European Wind-Energy Sector Hit in Wave of Hacks,” Wall Street Journal (website),
April 25, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/european-wind-energy-sector-hit-in-wave-of-hacks-11650879000/.
3. Dipaneeta Das, “Germany the Top Buyer of Russian Gas at $9.5 Billion Since War Began in Ukraine,”
Republic World (website), April 28, 2022, https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/europe/germany-the
-top-buyer-of-russian-gas-worth-9-dot-5bn-since-war-began-in-ukraine-report-articleshow.html.
4. Zoe Strozewski, “Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Owner Files for Bankruptcy, Releases Workforce,”
Newsweek (website), March 1, 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/nord-stream-2-pipeline-owner-files
-bankruptcy-releases-workforce-1683820.
5. Phillip Olterman, “Ban on Russian Gas Would Plunge Germany into Recession, Warns Bundesbank,”
Guardian (website), April 22, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/apr/22/russian-gas-ban
-germany-recession-bundesbank.
6. Elliot Smith, “Goldman Predicts What Will Happen to Europe’s Economy if Putin Shuts
off the Gas Taps,” CNBC (website), March 11, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/11/goldman-predicts
-what-will-happen-to-europes-economy-if-putin-shuts-off-gas.html.
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As of this writing, around half of Germany’s gas and hard coal imports
and one-third of its oil imports are from Russia, meaning Germany relies
on Russia for one-third of its total energy consumption.7 As part of its
green transition, Germany planned to close its last nuclear power plant this
year and shut down another 6.4 gigawatts of coal capacity by 2023. 8 The
green transition is part of the German government program Energiewende,
which provides specif ic, measurable energy benchmarks through 2050.9
Compared with a base year of 1990, German government emission targets
are 40 percent cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, 65 percent by 2030,
88 percent by 2040, and net neutrality by 2045.10 These goals, however,
mean that even before the Ukraine crisis, Germany was facing an energy
shortage as it worked toward the discontinuation of coal and nuclear usage.
Even before it vowed to wean itself off Russian imports, the nuclear
discontinuation alone meant Germany would face a shortage of 4.5 gigawatts
of energy between 2022 and 2025.11
Although renewables, that is, sources of energ y not depleted
by use, such as water, wind, or solar power, provide 16 percent of Germany’s
energy demand, they cannot quickly f ill the more than 30 percent gap
in energy supply left by turning off the nuclear reactors and suspending Russian
energy imports.12 In addition, Germany’s renewable energy sector has been
vulnerable to cyberattacks since the invasion of Ukraine. Any attacks
on Germany’s critical infrastructure and economy are thus being felt much
more deeply across the Alliance. Most recently, as mentioned in the
introduction to this book, 11 gigawatts of German wind power generation

7. Rüdiger Bachmann et al., “What If? The Economic Effects for Germany of a Stop of Energy Imports
from Russia,” EconTribute, Policy Brief no. 028, March 7, 2022, https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc
/ajk/ajkpbs/ECONtribute_PB_028_2022.pdf.
8. “Kraftwerksliste,” Bundesnetzgentur (website), May 31, 2022, https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE
/Fachthemen/ElektrizitaetundGas/Versorgungssicherheit/Erzeugungskapazitaeten/Kraftwerksliste/start.html.
9. Thomas Klaus et al., 2050: 100% – Energy Target 2050: 100% Renewable Electricity Supply
(Dessau-Roßlau, DE: Umweltbundesamt, July 2010), https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files
/medien/378/publikationen/energieziel_2050_kurz.pdf.
10. Zahi Badra, “Germany Announces 65% Emissions Reduction by 2030 and Climate Neutrality by 2050,”
Climate Scorecard (website), July 9, 2021, https://climatescorecard.org; and “German Position on the Fit
for 55 Package,” Bundesregierung (website), May 27, 2021, https://www.bundesregierung.de.
11. Markus Wacket, “Germany’s Energy Drive Criticized over Expense, Risk,” Reuters (website),
March 30, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/germany-energy-audit-idUSL8N2LS2RC.
12. Bachman et al. “What If?”
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was paralyzed by a failure in satellite communication systems in February
2022, which has been attributed to a Russian cyberattack.13

Figure 8-1. Defense-in-depth for ICS networks and the OT systems those networks
support, with the Siemens SNOK IDS solution providing an early warning system for
detecting attacks to strengthen system integrity14

In addition, on April 12, another cyberattack against German
wind-energy company Deutsche Windtechnik caused the company
to shut down the remote-control systems of 2,000 wind turbines for a day.15
The pro-Russian government ransomware group Conti launched a cyberattack
against another turbine maker, Nordex SE, and forced the company to shut
down its IT systems.16
Cyberattacks on Germany’s critical energy infrastructure are not new.
In the past, these have also included attacks on Germany’s industrial control
systems. From a cyber intrusion at a German steel mill in 2014 to cyber
surveillance gathering activities on German electric grid operators beginning

13. Marian Willhun, “Satellite Cyber Attack Paralyzes 11GW of German Wind Turbines,” PV Magazine
(website), March 1, 2022, https://www.pv-magazine.com/2022/03/01/satellite-cyberattack-paralyzes-11gw
-of-german-wind-turbines/; and Joseph Henry, “Europe Cyberattack Results to Massive Internet Outage;
About 5,800 Wind Turbines Went Offline,” Tech Times (website), March 5, 2022, https://www-techtimes
-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.techtimes.com/amp/articles/272624/20220305/europe-cyberattack-results
-massive-internet-outage-5-800-wind-turbines.htm.
14. Davinder Harcharan, Siv Hilde Houmb, and Erlend A. Engum, How to Safeguard Sophisticated
Operational Technology for Targeted, Highly Dangerous Cyber Threats, white paper (Norcross, GA:
Siemens, 2018), https://assets.new.siemens.com/siemens/assets/api/uuid:be9b0c7d-2afa-463a-bb31-fd53ba7525f9
/snok-white-paper.pdf.
15. Stupp, “European Wind Energy.”
16. Stupp, “European Wind Energy.”
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in 2017, malign actors continue to test Germany’s cybersecurity weaknesses
while evading detection.

What Solutions Are There?
Improve Cyber Early Warning
Early warning systems (EWS) of the future must protect sophisticated
next-generation networks, develop models for behavioral analysis and
learning algorithms, and define normal behavior patterns and anomalies.17
Siemens/Secure-NOK® SNOK® Network Anomaly Detection solution,
or simply SNOK, is a digital early warning system designed to detect
cyber intrusions. It uses software to identify anomalous behavior patterns
in the network to disrupt an attack before it occurs. The EWS targets
suspicious activity to detect threats from anomalies in parameters to unusual
CPU usage. SNOK then alerts a compromised ICS network’s operators to the
attack and provides data to inform a countermeasure decision. The program
analyzes attack patterns through machine learning and then provides a counter
before the interruption becomes a threat.18
The National Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence (NCCoE) Engineering
Laboratory, partnered in the “Capability Assessment for Securing ICS” assessed
SNOK capabilities.19 The NCCoE assessed that 15 different behavior anomaly
detection (BAD) categories and anomaly scenarios were successfully detected,
demonstrating that BAD techniques can serve as a critical element for securing
and sustaining ICS operations. NCCoE likewise assessed SilentDefense,
CyberX, and OSIsoft Early Warning Systems using up to 16 differing BAD
categories and anomaly scenarios that produced similarly successful results
to SNOK. 20 The increasing importance and challenges of EWS cannot
be understated, considering the billions of devices, vast amounts of data, and
virtualization of services. Cybercriminals conduct digital reconnaissance
to find and exploit network and infrastructure vulnerabilities and challenge
17. Mario Golling and Björn Stelte, “Requirements for a Future EWS-Cyber Defence in the Internet
of the Future,” Proceedings of 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict (ICCC) (Tallinn, EE: ICCC, 2017),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229034186_Requirements_for_a_future_EWS-Cyber_Defence
_in_the_internet_of_the_future.
18. Siv Hilde Houmb, “Secure-NOK: Unprecedented Industrial Cybersecurity Monitoring,” CioReview
(website), 2020, https://cybersecurity.cioreview.com/vendor/2017/secure-nok#.
19. Houmb, “Secure-NOK.”
20. James McCarthy et al., Securing Manufacturing Control Systems: Behavioral Anomaly Detection,
NISTIR Report 8219 (Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards
and Technology, July 2020), https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8219.
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traditional intrusion detection protocols. Further, the ability to correlate data
to a threat, find the intrusion source, and the computer forensic capabilities
of a government or corporation often limit cyber defense professionals’ ability
to protect or offer a response option. 21
The project Early Warning and Intrusion Detection System Based
on Combined AI Methods (FIDeS), Event Monitoring Enabling Responses
to Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMERALD), ARAKIS, and the Worldwide
Observatory of Malicious Behaviors and Attack Threats (WOMBAT) are
all early warning and intrusion detection software based on combined AI
methods used in Germany. 22 These methods are defined further in chapter 4.
Table 8-1 illustrates an overview of EWS requirements and how each system
is equally challenged to meet cyber defense requirements. The relationship
and dependency between formerly stand-alone systems and networks create
complexities not yet experienced, and therefore developing appropriate EWS
to counter each complexity has become increasingly difficult.
As stated in chapter 4, these challenges can be countered with a new
generation of infrastructure modeling and virtualization while combining
artificial intelligence and machine learning to ensure the cyber mitigation
method is specific to the type of energy infrastructure and that new types of
attacks are repelled before they do damage.

21.

Golling and Stelte, “Future EWS-Cyber Defence.”

22.

Golling and Stelte, “Future EWS-Cyber Defence.”
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Table 8-1. Capabilities of state-of-the-art EWS technologies
Source: Golling and Stelte, “Future EWS-Cyber Defence.”
Requirements

FIDeS

EMERALD

ARAKIS

WOMBAT

X

X

Traffic volume independency

X

X

X

X

End-system independency

X

X

X

X

Extended flow handling
Sophisticated correlation of data

X

Comprehensive reasoning model

Payload-independent analysis
Safeguarding mobile devices
Virtualized environment/clouds
Spontaneous network behavior

As cyber intrusions evolve, becoming more sophisticated, the
diff icult y in protecting digitized critical infrastructure increases.
Infrastructure must operate 24 hours a day, sevendays a week,
without disruption. Digital infrastructure protection will require agile and
responsive early warning systems embedded with defense-in-depth capabilities
to monitor and detect network intrusions adequately and react to threats in near
real time before the attack occurs. Effectively monitoring and detecting cyber
intrusions via layered, in-depth defenses provides cyber defense professionals
the requisite time and awareness to assess risk and develop potential
response options.

Improve Non-hackable Energy Independence
Germany’s state-of-the-art nuclear reactors, which provided 13 percent
of Germany’s electricity last year, already exist. 23 While no one has suggested
extending the controversial nuclear reactors’ operations to be a permanent
solution, Germany’s Free Democrats have proposed reactivating nuclear
for the short term. This is tricky as it will require a new legislative mandate,
and new fuel rods. 24 The Greens, who are part of the ruling coalition, are still
23. Kate Connolly, “Can Germany Function without Vladimir Putin’s Gas?” Guardian (website),
February 25, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/25/can-germany-function-without
-vladimir-putins-gas.
24. Claus Hecking et al., “Germany’s Alternatives to Putin’s Gas,” Spiegel International (website),
March 9, 2022, https://www.spiegel.de/international/business/lng-imports-and-nuclear-power-a-look-at
-germany-s-alternatives-to-putin-s-gas-a-4e10b1fd-0828-4a0a-9183-f2fd38d4dfe1.
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averse to the idea, though reviving nuclear would provide an emissions-free
domestic solution. Another immediate solution is to expand the use of biogas,
which today could immediately replace 5 percent of Russian gas imports. 25
While the German government aims to increase renewables, renewable
power companies, especially those responsible for wind and updating grids,
are skeptical that they can produce at the speed the government is asking
of them. 26 Licensing challenges, supply-chain issues, and a lack of workers
hinder an accelerated increase in renewables.
On April 7, the government rolled out the “biggest energy policy reform
in decades,” which plans for the country to move to a 100 percent renewable
power supply by 2035. 27 To make this utopian vision a reality, Germany will
need to provide incentives for the education of personnel in the renewables
field, cut down its famous bureaucracy around licensing, update its grid
networks, and ensure more domestic supply of renewable technology parts.
Today, the war in Ukraine rages as Germany continues to pump funds
into Moscow’s war chest, paying them $9.5 billion for gas since the start
of the war. 28 By comparison, Russia has earned $66.5 million in gas revenue
total since the war began with 71 percent coming from the European Union. 29
In the short term, it may be time to consider nuclear energy and biogas
as immediate options to bolster Germany’s energy independence. 30 This could
also allow the country time to develop renewables and the ability to defund
Moscow’s war efforts.

25. Benjamin Wehrmann, “Q&A: How Can Renewables Enable Germany’s Energy Independence Push?,”
Clean Energy Wire (website), April 12, 2022, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/qa-how-can-renewables
-enable-germanys-energy-independence-push.
26.

Wehrmann, “Q&A.”

27.

Wehrmann, “Q&A.”

28. Dipaneeta Das, “Germany the Top Buyer of Russian Gas Worth $9.5bn since War Began
in Ukraine: Report,” Republic World (website), April 28, 2022, https://www.republicworld.com/world
-news/europe/germany-the-top-buyer-of-russian-gas-worth-9-dot-5bn-since-war-began-in-ukraine-report
-articleshow.html.
29. Das, “Top Buyer of Russian Gas”; and Express Tribune staff, “Russia in Receipt of $63B for Fossil Fuels
since Start of War,” Coverpage (website), April 28, 2022, https://coverpage.org/russia-in-receipt-of-63b-for
-fossil-fuels-since-start-of-war/.
30. Wehrmann, “Q&A.”
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Conclusion
If the German government continues to import Russian energy,
it will need to be honest with its public about what protracted dependence
on Russia will mean not just for the Ukraine, but for Europe’s security
as an adversary moves its territorial boundaries closer to NATO’s Eastern
f lank. Cyberattacks on Germany’s critical energy infrastructure will continue
and will likely increase on its emerging technology in the near future
until a new generation of cyber early warning systems are developed.
Malign inf luence campaigns, now already affecting Germany’s gas market,
will affect Germany’s gas and oil until Germany becomes more energy
independent. In the meantime, Germany’s public should be informed
about what a more than 30 percent reduction in supply will mean
for private households, German industry, and the EU economy. This reduction
is likely to be felt in the homes and businesses of citizens from Berlin
to Riga for years to come.

Figure 8-2. Map of Germany’s threat timeline estimate (six months indicates likely
attack vector in 2022, one year by 2023, two+ years by 2024 or later)
Credit: Ryan Fisk and Lucas Cox
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Location

Reason for threat priority and timeline

North Sea Wind Farms

Germany’s wind farms have been a Russian target in the
first months of the war. Expect continued disinformation
campaigns and cyberattacks on the remote-control
systems of wind turbines for the next six months due
to Russia’s goal of undermining Germany’s sources
of energy as it reduces its import of Russian fossil fuels.

Southern Germany Grid Instability

During the energy transition, the power supply to the
southern part of Germany—in the Transnet BW region
and part of the TenneT region—is not reliable due
to unpredictable wind and solar, and an aging grid that
is vulnerable to cyberattack. Occasional blackouts are
to be expected to start in 2022.

Wind Farm Infrastructure

ICS attacks within one year, as manufacturer Enercon has
already had its KA-SAT communications system attacked
and as wind energy becomes increasingly important
for Germany’s energy independence.

Yamal-Europe Pipeline

Russia has repeatedly halted gas flows through the Polish
segment of the pipeline, which is partially owned and
operated by Gazprom, and the flow has been reversed
to deliver fuel to Poland. The eastbound gas flow also
stopped July 5, 2022. Should the gas flow be reactivated,
it will remain vulnerable to Russian retaliation via
disinformation and the supply chain due to its importance
and control by Gazprom.
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Figure 8-3. Germany’s energy sources
Image Source: GazProm, https://www.gazprom.com/projects/germany/;
original source: Colonel Chris Clyde
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ABSTRACT: Despite measures taken in recent years to adopt renewable
energy sources, the Netherlands remains a net energy importer, reliant
on foreign pipelines for the bulk of its power. This net energy def icit
is a major problem, coupled with a rising concern over the speed of green
energy infrastructure adoption, which is potentially outpacing the ability
to secure said infrastructure. The Netherlands has devoted resources
toward smart grid and Internet of Things adoption. Overall, the Netherlands
is cyber hardened, devoting resources to advancing and securing its cyber
systems and staying competitive in guarding against cyberattacks.
Key words: sea port security, renewable energy security, Amsterdam
Internet Exchange, Groningen gas field, smart grid, TenneT

Introduction
The Netherlands is well-positioned to be a leader at the energy-hybrid
warfare nexus. Since the turn of the decade, the Netherlands has increasingly
utilized innovative technologies within its critical infrastructure systems,
including smart grids, the Internet of Things (IoT), and renewable energy
power generation. In a model of asymmetric cyberwarfare, these new
technologies, brought on by a commitment to decarbonizing state and civil
operations, become vulnerabilities to critical energy infrastructure (CEI).
For this case study, CEI encompasses the processes of energy generation,
transmission, distribution, and consumption. Targeting critical infrastructures
with cyberattacks is a low-cost, high-yield effort for malign actors to disrupt
and destabilize civilian lives and entire nations.
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In a world of increasing interconnectedness, improving cybersecurity
of infrastructure is essential to ensuring national securit y and
avoiding possible cascading effects in critical sectors across the region,
including health care, water management, and military operations.
In this changing and interdependent world, the Netherlands is a gateway
between the international community and the European Union. Schiphol
Airport is one of the busiest airports for international passengers and cargo
in the European Union; outside Asia, the port of Rotterdam is the largest
seaport in the world, and the Amsterdam Internet Exchange (AMS-IX)
is the world’s largest Internet exchange in connected peers and third-largest
in daily traffic.1
With its neighbors, the Netherlands shares extensive crossborder and subsea oil and gas pipelines and electrical connections. 2
Fortunately, the Netherlands and its historic commitment to cybersecurity,
resilience, and crisis management has positioned it well to address the
heightened threats associated with an electrifying, digitizing, and connected
world. Geopolitically, the primary challenge to eff icient, secure, and
affordable energy in the Netherlands is the 2022 phaseout of the Groningen
gas field, the largest gas field in Europe and the 10th-largest in the world.
The 2018 decision to phaseout resulted in the Netherlands becoming a
net importer of natural gas for the first time in several decades. Beyond
this, the looming threat to Dutch energy security is one from cyberspace.
The Netherlands belongs to most countries in the international community,
which have a rate of embedding information and communication technology
(ICT) into CEI that far outpaces the adoption of risk mitigation safeguards
and adapted security protocols.
The operation of the electrical grid and the integration of smart-grid
technology are the emerging technologies that require the most attention
in order to fut ure-proof Dutch critica l energ y infrastr uct ure.
This case study provides context for the Dutch cyber and energy
landscapes and makes recommendations toward developing a NCSC toolkit
for critical energy infrastructure operators, relying on IT/OT engineers’
expertise, and gaining NCSC-sponsored awareness for certification.

1. Melissa Hathaway and Francesca Spidalieri, “The Netherlands: Cyber Readiness at a Glance,”
Potomac Institute (website), May 2017, https://potomacinstitute.org/images/CRI/FinalCRI20Netherlands
Web.pdf.
2. “The Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review,” International Energy Agency (website), September 2020,
https://www.iea.org/reports/the-netherlands-2020.
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Dutch Energy Mix
At present, the Dutch energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels.
As of 2019, natural gas held the largest share of the Dutch total primary
energy supply (TES) at 45 percent, followed by oil (36 percent) and coal
(9 percent). 3 Only minor shares (8 percent) of the Dutch total energy supply
come from renewable energy and carbon-neutral sources, including solar,
wind, and biowaste.
In December 2019, the Netherlands passed the 2019 Climate Act, which
reimagined the Dutch energy market, existing energy infrastructure, and
overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to be in line with international
objectives, of which it was falling behind.4 The act sets out an ambitious goal
of achieving a 49 percent reduction of GHG emissions (based on 1990 levels)
by 2030 and 95 percent by 2050.5 Using the collaborative Dutch polder model—
a consensus-based method of economic and social policy making—and drawing
together 100+ stakeholders, a coalition of Dutch policymakers and business
leaders created a framework for reaching Climate Act objectives titled the
2019 Climate Agreement. This intranational agreement contained emission
reduction targets and measures for five sectors: electricity, industry, the built
environment, mobility, and the natural environment. 6 The 2019 Climate Act
and Agreement are the most recent energy policies passed in the Netherlands.
Also in December 2019, the Netherlands passed a separate law phasing
out coal-fired power generation by January 1, 2029.7 Additional phaseout
projects are also occurring in nuclear and natural gas. A full phaseout
of the sole Dutch nuclear generator—the 485-megawatt Borselle plant
generating 3.5 percent of Dutch total energy supply (TES)—is expected
by 2033. 8 Furthermore, regional earthquakes in 2018 and 2019 caused
by excessive drilling inspired the Dutch government to strategize a phaseout
of the Groningen gas f ield by 2022. The Groningen gas f ield produces
a chemical variety, known as L-gas, which is different from most
commercially available gas in the international market (H-gas). As a result,
the Netherlands has two LNG pipeline systems throughout the country.
3. “Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review.”
4.

“Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review.”

5.

“Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review.”

6.

“Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review.”

7. “Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review.”
8. “Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review.”
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Despite this, until the low-carbon transition is complete, natural gas
is expected to remain the primary Dutch energy source because it remains
favorable over dirtier petroleum products and has existing infrastructure.
The 2019 Climate Act set an objective of 100 percent CO2-free electricity
generation by 2050. Accordingly, the Netherlands is transitioning to electricity
generation with wind, solar, and biomass projects, most of which are subsidized
by the government’s stimulation of sustainable energy production and climate
transition funding schemes.9 Under the Climate Agreement, intermittent
renewable energy sources (IRES), those that are stochastic and associated
with variable weather, are expected to increase from 12 percent in 2018
to nearly 70 percent by 2030. Beyond solar and wind, the use of biomass—
making up 61 percent of all renewable energy—and waste electrical power
generation is expected to increase in share as well .10

Geopolitical and Cyber Concerns
As a result of rapid investment in renewable energy production and
the phasing out of natural gas and other fossil fuels in the Dutch energy
mix, the Netherlands faces several distinct energy security vulnerabilities.
Now, as a net importer of natural gas because of the ongoing phaseout
of Groningen, the Netherlands was relying on Norway, Russia, Germany, and
the United Kingdom to meet its gas demands.11 This presents geopolitical
challenges and leaves the nation reliant on other countries for its energy
needs. This challenge has only escalated in the wake of the Ukraine invasion,
with Russia cutting off gas to the Netherlands because it refused to pay
in rubles.12 Furthermore, the transition to renewable energy production
as the dominant energy source brings additional vulnerabilities. The stochastic
nature of renewable energy sources can, in various weather conditions,
lead to scarcity and grid imbalances across the nation, impacting energy

9. Sophie Dingenen, “Electricity Regulation in the Netherlands,” Lexology (website), November 6, 2018,
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d3b6b42e-fd53-42d0-aba9-9727f6026093.
10. “Netherlands – Energy,” Privacy Shield Framework (website), n.d., https://www.privacyshield.gov
/article?id=Netherlands-Energy.
11. “Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review”; and Assia Elgouacem and Peter Journeay-Kaler,
The Netherlands’ Effort to Phase Out and Rationalise Its Fossil-Fuel Subsidies (Paris: Organisation for Economic
Co-operation/International Energy Agency, September 2020), 43, https://www.iea.org/reports/the-netherlands
-effort-to-phase-out-and-rationalise-its-fossil-fuel-subsidies.
12. Anna Cooban, “Russia Is about to Shut Off Some of Germany’s Gas,” CNN (website), May 31, 2022,
https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/31/energy/russia-shell-germany-gas-shut-off/index.html.
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security.13 These transitions also create cyber-specif ic vulnerabilities
within the nation’s energy infrastructure:
 Malicious intrusions. As demand for and reliance on
electricity increases, so too does the potential for malign actors
to infiltrate the Dutch electrical grid. Furthermore, as the
grid becomes increasingly digitized, adopts modern renewable
energy production facilities online, and manages the grid via
ICS/SCADA management software, additional vulnerabilities
arise for malign actors to exploit.
 Smart-grid and IoT vulnerabilities. A part of digitization
includes additional investments in end-user and monitoring
technology to enhance the nation’s smart grid. Relying
on IoT technology, new interconnected points of intrusion
are introduced into the electrical grid, allowing malign actors
to disrupt CEI nationwide from a single local access point.
For example, a recent cyber intrusion into the oil facilities
in the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (AR A) trading
hub has demonstrated the vulnerabilities of an integrated
cross-border IT network.14

Emerging Technology
The Netherlands’ electricity grid is divided into high-voltage (>110 kilovolt
[kV]) transmission, operated by TenneT, the sole transmission system operator
(TSO) in the Netherlands, and low-voltage transmission, operated by seven
regional distribution system operators (DSOs).15 While the high-voltage grid
connects energy producers to the grid and manages international grid-to-grid
transmission, low-voltage DSOs connect the grid to individual households
and businesses. “The [Dutch] transmission system has over 22,500 kilometers
of lines operated at 110 kV, 150kV, 220kV, and 380kV; more than
450 substations; nine cross-border interconnectors; and a rapidly expanding
offshore grid.” 16

13. Dingenen, “Electricity Regulation.”
14. “Belgium Investigates Cyberattack on Energy Companies,” DW (website), February 3, 2022,
https://www.dw.com/en/belgium-investigates-cyberattack-on-energy-companies/a-60651892.
15. Dingenen, “Electricity Regulation.”
16. “Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review.”
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Both TSOs and DSOs are under government regulation as a result of their
designation as Operators of Essential Services (OES).17 The Electricity Act
of 1998 establishes the duties of TSOs and DSOs while the Dutch Unbundling
Act prohibits both from owning subsidiaries that operate or sell electricity
to the grid.18 These ensure that TSOs and DSOs focus on protecting the
security of the physical electrical infrastructure while 25 electricity producers
and 35 electricity retailers in the Dutch electrical energy landscape focus
on meeting the nation’s electricity needs.19
The Netherlands shares land and/or sea electrical grid connections
with Belgian, British, Danish, German, and Norwegian transmission grids. 20
BritNED, NorNED, and COBRA electrical sea cables connect the Netherlands
to the United Kingdom, Norway, and Denmark, respectively. 21
Germany is the largest electricity trading partner of the Netherlands and
was planning on phasing out nuclear and coal production in favor of renewables.
From 2019 to 2025, cross-border interconnector capacity is expected to grow
from 7.05 gigawatts to 10.8 gigawatts through the construction of additional
cross-sea cables and overhead lines. 22
The Netherlands has renewable energy targets to meet in 2023, 2030,
and 2050. In 2018, amongst International Energy Agency (IEA) member
countries, the Netherlands was ranked as one of the countries with the
lowest share of total f inal energy consumption (TFEC) coming from
renewables. Looking at TFEC, renewable energy has historically addressed
demand in the electricity, heat, and transport sectors. The Dutch transport
sector remains dominated by fossil fuels, however, the nation is quickly
building its electric vehicle (EV) infrastructure. The current goal is to have
1.7 million charging points across the country by 2030. 23 A major
obstacle to renewable energy expansion in the Netherlands is that largescale solar and wind projects are hard to implement in a populous nation.
17. Irene Kamara et al., The Cybersecurity Certification Landscape in the Netherlands after the Union
Cybersecurity Act, Final Report (Tilburg, NL: National Cyber Security Centre of the Netherlands/
Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society, July 2020), https://www.ncsc.nl/binaries/ncsc/documenten
/rapporten/2020/oktober/2/the-cybersecurity-certification-landscape-in-the-netherlands-after-the-union
-cybersecurity-act/NCSC_CYBERCERT_FinalReport__20200730.pdf.
18.

Kamara et al., Cybersecurity Certification.

19. “Netherlands – Energy.”
20. Dingenen, “Electricity Regulation in the Netherlands.”
21.

Dingenen, “Electricity Regulation in the Netherlands.”

22.

“Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review.”

23. “Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review.”
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As a result, TenneT has projected an eight billion euro infrastructure
expenditure to provide subsidies to municipalities that initiate residential
photovoltaic (PV) projects and expand offshore grid connections in line
with the Dutch government’s Offshore Wind Roadmap. 24 By 2030,
it is expected that 70 percent of Dutch electricity generation will come
from renewables. 25
The International Energy Agency provides a breakdown of how
energy is currently utilized across the country: in 2018, total electricity
demand was 114.0 terawatt hours. The services/other sector was the largest
consumer (41 percent), followed by industry (32 percent), driven by chemical
and petrochemical demand. The remainder of demand came from the
residential (20 percent), energy (5 percent), and transport (2 percent) sectors.
Transport demand came from electrified rail (76 percent) and electric road
transport (24 percent). 26 Estimates from the Central Bureau of Statistics
show that electricity demand reached an all-time high of 121 terrawatt hours
in 2019. The Netherlands has an extensive rail network that is almost completely
electrified. The country is a global leader in electric vehicle (EV) deployment
and EV charging infrastructure, with around 200,000 registered EVs and
over 50,000 EV charging stations in 2019.

Smart-grid Technologies
The smart grid is often referred to as a cyber-physical system. Digitization
of the electrical grid garners increased attention as a promising method
to increase eff iciency. The Netherlands has become an incubator
for smart-grid technology innovation in the past decade, most notably
by creating the Intelligent Grids Innovation Programme, which has supported
the work of 94 pilot programs integrating smart-grid technology into residential
districts, city centers, and industrial estates across the country. 27 Many of the
pilot programs are focused on integrating smart technologies like IoT meters
and sensors into (micro)grids to evaluate their impact on efficient energy use,
often in conjunction with the implementation of electric vehicle charging
ports. Smart management systems and IoT devices make use of open networks
to coordinate electrical consumption with local DSOs to create projections
24.

“Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review.”

25.

“Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review.”

26.

“Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review.”

27. Cihan Gerceket et al., “A Comparison of Households’ Energy Balance in Residential Smart Grid Pilots
in the Netherlands,” Applied Sciences 9 (15): 2993, July 25, 2019, https://doi.org/10.3390/app9152993.
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more accurately, allowing producers to efficiently ramp up or down production
according to demand.

Vulnerabilities in the Cyber Landscape
The Netherlands is a technologically advanced nation; nearly 100 percent
of households have broadband connection. 28 Furthermore, the Netherlands
is a top-10 exporter of ICT, host to the Amsterdam Internet Exchange
(AMS-IX), and claims 6 percent of its GDP comes from the Internet
economy. 29 This reliance on Internet devices and the electricity that
powers them makes Dutch CEI a prime target for malign actors.
Furthermore, the rapid digitization of the Netherland’s CEI increases cyber
vulnerabilities by increasing points of entry and interconnectivity of systems.
A 2020 report commissioned by the Dutch government identified critical
processes as high-value assets increasingly targeted by malign state actors
and cybercriminals. 30
While this case study focuses on vulnerabilities present in the electrical
grid and associated IoT smart-grid technology, additional consideration
should also be given to other critical infrastructure in the Netherlands,
namely, that of LNG pipelines and Delta Works. Delta Works is a series
of water-related construction projects (for example, f lood defenses, sluice gates,
bridges, and tunnels) that prevent f looding in the Netherlands which has more
than 26 percent of its land mass below sea level. The unique situation makes
water management a national security concern. Many Delta Works projects
are digitally operated and employed during times of sea rise, ocean storms,
and f looding. Ensuring the successful operation of such mechanisms,
specif ically from cyber intrusion, is actively being investigated by the
Dutch state. 31
Natural gas and its associated infrastructure are other prime targets
for malign actors deserving of consideration. The Netherlands extensive gas
infrastructure consists of “over 200 onshore and offshore production sites,
28.

“Netherlands – Energy.”

29. Melissa Hataway and Francesca Spidalieri, “The Netherlands: Cyber Readiness at a Glance”;
and “Netherlands – Energy.”
30. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), NCSC Research Agenda 2019–2022 (Hague: NCSC,
October 2020), https://english.ncsc.nl/binaries/ncsc-en/documenten/publications/2020/oktober/29/ncsc
-research-agenda-2019-2022/200203_NCSC+Onderzoeksagenda+A4+EN+web.pdf.
31. “Digitale dijkverzwaring: cybersecurity en vitale waterwerken Rapport,” Algemene Rekenkamer,
March 28, 2019, https://www.rekenkamer.nl/publicaties/rapporten/2019/03/28/digitale-dijkverzwaring
-cybersecurity-en-vitale-waterwerken.
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136,632 kilometers of pipelines, and connections to 95 percent of households,
most commercial properties, numerous industrial sites, and gas-fired power
plants.” 32 Geopolitically, the Netherlands’ housing of the Title Transfer Facility
(TTF), Europe’s largest gas trading hub, ref lects its ongoing active participation
in LNG and international cooperation for security of supply. 33 Much like the
electrical grid, the transition to ICS in LNG systems opens vulnerabilities
to be exploited by sophisticated attackers. As seen with the US
Colonial Pipeline, defensive posturing measures must be taken at all levels
of CEI operation, including accounting systems. 34
Compromised cybersecurity can result in distributed denial of service
(DDoS), ransomware attacks, and theft of end-user information. 35
The 2015 attack on Ukraine’s power grid and the temporary shutdown
of the US Colonial Pipeline in 2021 ref lect the risk posed by grid digitization.
A report by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR)
asserts that the adoption of ICT technologies is outpacing the adoption of
protective measures in its systems. This same report claimed the Netherlands
was insufficiently prepared for cyber incidents, noting the government has
centered cyber resilience in their work and let crisis management and cyber
disruption preparedness fall to the wayside. This level of unpreparedness
was exploited in the ARA attack mentioned above and can be replicated
on a larger scale in the future. 36

Electricity Grid:
ICS/SCADA and International Cooperation
Functioning power grids underpin domestic livelihoods, industry, and
national operations, making them prime targets for malign foreign actors
and requiring state-directed investment in the security of those grids.
32. “Netherlands 2020 – Energy Policy Review.”
33. Lucia Van Geuns and Irina Patrahau, “Gas Supply Security in the Netherlands,” HCSS (blog),
March 2, 2021, https://hcss.nl/report/gas-supply-security-in-the-netherlands-geopolitical-and-environmental
-dilemmas/.
34. Mike Hoffman and Tom Winston, “Cyber Attack: Recommendations Following the Colonial Pipeline
Ransomware Attack,” Dragos (blog), May 11, 2021, https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/recommendations
-following-the-colonial-pipe line-cyberattack/.
35. Tucker Bailey, Adam Maruyama, and Daniel Wallance, “The Energy-Sector Threat: How to Address
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities,” McKinsey & Company (website), November 3, 2020, https://www.mckinsey
.com/capabilities/risk-and-resilience/our-insights/the-energy-sector-threat-how-to-address-cybersecurity
-vulnerabilities.
36.

NCSC, Research Agenda 2019–2022.
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In the Netherlands, distributed denial of service (DDoS) is the largest
cyberattack concern, with 919 attacks registered in 2019. 37
An important distinction in electrical infrastructure is the
difference between Information Technology (IT)—software like e-mail,
cloud computation, and document sharing—and Operational Technology
(OT)—physical infrastructure like monitors, sensors, and screens.
A growing concern is the inherent vulnerability associated with the
convergence of IT with OT, as most modern industrial power grids
(electrical, oil, and gas) are managed using industrial control systems (ICS)
and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA). 38 Together, they
improve the interoperability and control-of-f low capabilities of grid operators,
providing real-time data and remote-control functions. The interoperability
of ICT and electrical is an example of IT-OT convergence where improving
control-f low mechanisms and demand-management has the unintended
consequence of increasing the number of entry points for malign actors.
The growing concern over this topic comes from the increased accessibility
and controllability over previously analog industrial control systems used
in the movement of energy resources via the Internet and IP addresses.
The Cybersecurity Assessment of the Netherlands identified EKANS,
a ransomware raising red f lags in the cyber world, as a pressing concern
for which ICS/SCADA systems could be vulnerable, requiring mitigation
and security measures. 39 The concern with EKANS is that unlike previous
ransomwares, it has the ability to target ICS-essential software specifically,
halt vital functions, and encrypt underlying data.40 The emergence of EKANS
ref lects the technological savviness of cybercriminals and therefore the need
for OESs to develop protective measures.41
A 2020 report completed in collaboration with the Hague Security
Delta performed a system analysis of all ICS/SCADA in use within the
Netherlands—including non-grid uses—and identified several vulnerabilities:

37. NCSC, Research Agenda 2019–2022.
38. J. M. Ceron et al., Online Discoverability and Vulnerabilities of ICS/SCADA Devices
in the Netherlands (Enschede, NL: University of Twente, June 21, 2019), https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/portalfiles
/portal/124347608/wodc_report_scada_final.pdf.
39.

NCSC, Research Agenda 2019–2022.

40. Andy Greenberg, “Mysterious New Ransomware Targets Industrial Control Systems,” Wired (website),
February 3, 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/ekans-ransomware-industrial-control-systems/.
41. Dragos Inc., “EKANS Ransomware and ICS Operations,” Dragos (blog), February 3, 2020,
https://www.dragos.com/blog/industry-news/ekans-ransomware-and-ics-operations/.
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 Shodan [a search engine that prov ides metadata
about Internet-connected systems], make[s] it extremely
easy for potential attackers to find ICS/SCADA devices.
[Scanning tools, like Shodan, are increasingly used by cyber
criminals to identify vulnerable entry points.]
 [A]t least [1,000] ICS/SCADA devices in the Netherlands
are exposed on the Internet.
 Around [60] of these devices have multiple vulnerabilities
with a high security level.
 Severa l wel l-k now n and relatively easy-to-deploy
measures exist that help to improve the security of these ICS/
SCADA devices.42
Vulnerabilities in these systems also occur as a result of coordination
challenges between public and private entities as well as transnational system
operators. Despite cybersecurity centralization efforts, there still remains
a great deal of institutional overlap between several Dutch ministerial bodies
overseeing the implementation of cybersecurity measures. The court of audit
noted cybersecurity protocols vary amongst ministries and asserted that
information security throughout the Dutch central government is still not
to standard.

Smart-grid Technologies:
Points of Entry, Supply Chain, and Certification
As a cyber vulnerability, IoT devices (smart meters, smart thermostats,
energy monitors) are all points of access that increase the overall surface
vulnerability of energy systems by putting Internet-enabled, gridintegrated devices in the homes, businesses, and industry operations of endusers.43 Unmonitored and under-protected, the integration of IoT devices
into the energy grid at the producer and consumer present incredible risks
to Dutch energy security. Common vectors of attack on the smart grid include
advanced persistent threats (APTs), attack trees, phishing, DDoS, malware,
and data theft.44

42.

Ceron et al., Online Discoverability and Vulnerabilities.

43.

Kamara et al., Cybersecurity Certification.

44. Dharmesh Faquir et al., “Cybersecurity in Smart Grids, Challenges and Solutions,” AIMS Electronics and
Electrical Engineering 5, no. 1 (2021): 24–37.
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The Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (AIVD) and
Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) are particularly concerned
over the security and supply of new ICTs.45 A cyberattack on embedded
ICT-enabled technolog y within a grid—which can range in size
from end-user sites and DSO-operated substations—can have wideranging impacts. Performing security analysis on IoT devices, the Dutch
Radio Communications Agency determined that most devices were not at
an acceptable level. On their metric, “17 of the 22 devices studied scored
between ‘mediocre’ and ‘very poor’ when it came to basic security and privacy.”46
The installation of foreign-manufactured, unregulated, and uncertif ied
technologies in CEI presents clear national security risks, giving foreign
malign actors unrestrained access to extremely sensitive systems.
This draws into question the regulatory standards and certifications
required for grid-integrated technology. Increasingly complex global supply
chains force most ICT producers to integrate some type of third-party
technology and software, often from foreign companies. Work to mitigate
the risks associated with sourcing ICT products, services, and processes
is demonstrated in the 2019 Union Cybersecurity Act (CSA), which expands
the scope of ENISA and tasks the agency with bolstering an EU-wide
ICT certif ication framework. 47 At present, the Dutch adaptation bill
for national implementation remains in draft form. Without it,
standards like NTA 8130 for smart meters and ISA99 and IEC62443
for OT-security would be suggestions rather than mandatory for TSOs, DSOs,
and suppliers.48 When passed, the adaptation law is expected to delegate the
role of national cybersecurity certif ication authority to the Radio
Communications Agency and create a framework for national accreditation
and conformity assessment bodies.49

Mitigation and Early Warning Systems
Until recently, the Netherlands maintained a decentralized approach
on cybersecurity; individual ministries and organizations were responsible
for implementing their own policies and practices. With the adoption
45. Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, AIVD Annual Report 2019 (Hague: General Intelligence
and Security Service), September 3, 2020, https://english.aivd.nl/publications/annual-report/2020/09/03/
aivd-annual-report-2019.
46.

NCSC, Research Agenda 2019–2022.

47. Kamara et al., Cybersecurity Certification.
48.
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49.

Kamara et al., Cybersecurity Certification.
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of Net work and Information Systems (Securit y) Act ( W BNI),
the National Cybersecurity Centre (NCSC-NL) and Cybersecurity Incident
Response Team (CSIRT-DSP) are now given centralized responsibility
over cybersecurity and acting as the single point of contact for cyber
incidents and information-pooling in the Netherlands. In addition to its
operational roles, the NCSC is responsible for setting the government-funded
research agenda in the cyber realm. This has resulted in close partnerships
with research organizations. Research out of The Hague Security Delta
(HSD) and the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) cover
all topics including ICS/SCADA vulnerabilities, creation of national test
beds, and future certification schemes.
Information regarding a nation’s cyber defenses and early warning systems
are intentionally kept secure and limited. Given this restraint, little information
on early warning systems embedded in Dutch government infrastructure
is publicly accessible. Some traces of early warning system usership, however, can
be found for private energy companies embedded in the Dutch electrical grid.
The trend here is that cybersecurity measures and monitoring software programs
are increasingly created and managed by third-party entities like Dragos, IBM,
or Nozomi Networks and then paid for as a service by energy companies.
The reliance on private entities as the managers of critical infrastructure
security is worrisome and presents another vulnerability to be carefully
considered. In the year 2015, the Dutch had nationwide cyber-risk defenses
that included “Taranis” and “Beita,” but it is unclear now whether these
are still in operation. Taranis was “an open-source software used by several
other CERTs” that used to collect, analyze, and publish warnings about ICT
vulnerabilities, while the ‘Beita’ program consist[ed] of a number of honeypots
and a network of sensors installed at government organizations to monitor
automatic Internet attacks.” 50
Beginning in 2016 as a pilot program, and having since expanded,
the national detection network (NDN) seems to be the Dutch government’s
most recent development in early warning system installation. The NDN
serves Dutch institutions and CEI-operating companies by providing advance
warning of threats through 24/7 data analysis informed by sensors and probes
installed extensively throughout government networks. 51 The function
is to raise awareness before intrusion, detecting real-time indicators
of compromise (IoC) and advanced persistent threats (APTs). When threats are
50.

Hathaway and Spidalieri, “Netherlands: Cyber Readiness.”

51. Sergei Boeke, “National Cyber Crisis Management: Different European Approaches,” Governance 31,
no. 3 (July 2018): 449–64, https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12309.
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identified, NDN members are notified immediately and respond accordingly.
The NDN is still growing in scope; at full operation the NDN will connect
250 organizations. 52 The most recent national cybersecurity agenda indicated
increased funding for the effort to future-proof CI networks. 53
The Netherlands participates in various interagency partnerships and
exercises to foster information-sharing and crisis-response strategies.
Primary allies in the f ield of cyber defense have been EU and NATO
member states. Collaboration has been exhibited through multinational joint
exercises such as the EU Cyber Europe exercise, NATO Cyber Coalition and
Cyber Atlantic exercises, and the US Department of Homeland Security’s
Cyber Storm. 54 Ref lecting the increased interconnectedness of the European
power grid and the Netherlands as a hub for these energy transfers,
the nation has also agreed to participate in ongoing information-sharing
efforts and international networks in the cyber realm. These include NATO’s
malware information-sharing platform (MISP), the European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA), the energy-specific European Network
for Cybersecurity (ENCS), the EU CSIRT Network, Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams (FIRST), and the International Watch and
Warning Network (IWWN). 55
In line with recommendations made by The Dutch Advisory Council
on International Affairs (AIV) and the Advisory Committee on Issues
of Public International Law (CAVV), the Netherlands has developed
its offensive and defensive cyber capabilities side-by-side since 2011.
The Dutch Ministry of Defense houses the Joint Sigint Cyber Unit (JSCU) and
Dutch Defense Cyber Command, the operational unit and strategizing body,
respectively, for leveraging cyberwarfare tactics. In mid-2014 the maturity
of Dutch offensive cyber capabilities was ref lected when it was revealed that
the JSCU had infiltrated the computer networks of Russian hacker group
Cozy Bear. 56 In subsequent press statements, the Ministry of Defense
announced that Cyber Command could be deployed for offensive tasks
“such as disrupting or disabling enemy networks and systems such as phones
52.
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53. National Cybersecurity Agenda - A Cyber Secure Netherlands (Amsterdam: National Cyber Security Centre
Ministry of Justice and Security, April 20, 2018), https://english.ncsc.nl/publications/publications/2019
/juni/01/national-cyber-security-agenda.
54.
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and computers, but also weapon or fuel systems or aircraft altitude meters.” 57
Over the past five years, the Netherlands has demonstrated transparency
about its active offensive cyber capabilities and adopted a posture that
breaks from many of its European neighbors. The development of offensive
capabilities has made the Netherlands a unique player operating in the
cyberwarfare domain. These capabilities may act as a deterrent and allow
the Dutch Defense Ministry to prevent an escalation of conf lict with malign
actors before cyberattacks begin impacting the physical world.

Recommendations
This case study’s analysis of available open-source literature ref lects the
need for the Netherlands to direct attention toward cyber challenges in the
energy hybrid-warfare nexus. Because of digitization and electrification,
state-sponsored malign actors motivated to perform espionage and inf luence,
disrupt, or sabotage Dutch security now have more entry points to do so.
The 2021 Dark Side infiltration of the United States’ Colonial Pipeline draws
attention to how national security has historically been balanced with critical
infrastructure operators and the need to readdress the complex relationship
for the future. In the cyber world, the question is not if an attack will happen,
but when. Ensuring that resilience measures, mitigation methods, and avenues
of communication exist prior to a crisis is fundamental.
Much remains unknown for how the Dutch cyber landscape will take
shape in the years to come in response to the increased cyber threats and
attacks worldwide, implementation of new national certification standards and
policies, and the emergence of public-private information-sharing platforms.
Amidst these changes, there are three actionable recommendations to improve
overall cyber resilience in critical energy infrastructure. The recommendations
will be evaluated on the following criteria: (1) the degree of interagency and
transnational coordination required, (2) the degree to which CEI cybersecurity
threats are neutralized or minimized, and (3) associated implementation costs.

NCSC Toolkit for Critical Energy Infrastructure Operator
The NCSC should maintain a toolkit specif ic to CEI that consists
of all national and international cyber-related expectations and requirements,
information-sharing and dissemination platforms and organizations, and
a “cyber compass for energy.” This would be an energy sector-specif ic
57. Lilly Pijnenburg Muller, Military Offensive Cyber-capabilities: Small-state Perspectives, Policy Brief 1,
(Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, January 2019), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19882.
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version of the NCSC’s existing cyber compass toolkit, outlining trends
in cyberspace so preemptive action could be taken by relevant stakeholders.
More specifically, the toolkit should address topics of IT/OT convergence,
ICS/SCADA operations, vulnerabilities associated with renewable energy
technologies and the phaseout of fossil fuel infrastructure, and internal
safeguards (for example, VPNs, f irewalls, training to avoid e-mail
phishing). Paired with mandatory reporting and benchmark accountability
measures, Dutch energy system operators, producers, and suppliers provided
with this toolkit can implement cyber secure infrastructure and crisis
management protocols that meet government expectations. Currently, there
is no centralized and publicly recognized checklist or toolkit of this kind
provided by a Dutch ministry.
Developing a toolkit of this caliber would have low to moderate upfront
implementation costs, require only moderate coordination, and would have
the potential to be a low-effort but highly effective tool for improving the
cybersecurity of OES. A small team dedicated to the work of this project,
working in collaboration with the NCSC Energy-ISAC (for which many
OES are members), could assemble and disseminate this toolkit. The NCSC
taking the lead on this is beneficial because they have existing relationships
with all the OES in the energy sector.

Rely on IT/OT Engineers’ Expertise
The NCSC should create permanent positions for engineers working
in IT/OT convergence to join teams at NCSC headquarters focused on
cyber-physical resilience. Bringing trained computer and network engineers
into the policymaking realm could prove invaluable to future-proofing the
energy cybersecurity landscape. To ref lect the ongoing IT/OT convergence,
other members of the roundtable discussions could include cyber policymakers
and cyber-ICT experts. Such a group would address the knowledge-gap
that exists at NCSC on ICS/SCADA technology. 58 Permanent positions
in NCSC designated for senior engineers with experience bringing ICT
online would provide NCSC with a permanent repository of technical
expertise. As the Netherlands centralizes more of its cyber efforts and oversight
through the NCSC, more opportunities exist for the teams to grow in scope
and for publications on CEI to be better informed.
This recommendation would be moderate-to-high in implementation
costs and would require medium-to-high coordination. Implementation costs
associated with this recommendation would be tied to onboarding and salaries
58.
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of permanent employees. Because engineers hold critical technical knowledge
on how IT/OT convergence occurs and how networks, physical equipment,
and energy all connect, the payoff in potential effectiveness could be extremely
high. Permanent engineer positions could produce high effectiveness
as they would be on staff and could intervene in policy making with technical
expertise regularly.

NCSC-sponsored Awareness Raising and Training for ICT Certification
This recommendation is an echo of a recommendation presented
in “The Cybersecurity Certification Landscape in the Netherlands after the
Union Cybersecurity Act,” a report conducted by the Tilburg Law School
and funded by the NCSC. 59
The NCSC should leverage its position as a hub for cybersecurity and its
preexisting relationships with major stakeholders in CEI to raise awareness
of the benefit to getting ICT certified. Preexisting relationships and trust
with all energy-related TSOs, DSOs, suppliers, and producers positions
the NCSC as one of very few entities that can inf luence their operations.
The NCSC can use existing communication channels through the
Energy-ISAC to frame certif ication as a positive and necessary step
toward improving security and system resilience rather than it being solely
a legal obligation. Informational training could be organized and attended
by conformity assessment body (CAB) practitioners and auditors who can
explain the intricacies of the certification scheme. In this way, the NCSC acts
as a platform connecting its partner organizations to the resources they need
to ensure system resilience as they digitize more operations.
This recommendation is made with consideration given to the
Union Cybersecurity Act and upcoming Dutch policy implementing
national standards and certification schemes. Ensuring CEI operators are
knowledgeable on certification schemes for ICT will increase their overall
voluntary willingness to invest resources in meeting these standards.

Criteria
Having the NCSC assume an active role in guiding partner organizations,
specif ically those in CEI, through the certif ication process would pose
moderate implementation costs and high coordination requirement and have
immeasurable impacts on the degree to which it improves cyber resilience.
The NCSC would need to coordinate with experts from conformity
assessment bodies to ensure certif ications are standardized across use
59.
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cases, relevant stakeholders are contacted and involved, and information is
disseminated via appropriate channels. This cooperation would be resource
intensive requiring monetary and time investment from multiple agencies
as well as energy TSOs, DSOs, suppliers, and producers.

Conclusion
The Netherlands is a mature actor in the cyber domain that must not let
up its efforts to mitigate cyberattacks during a time of rapid electrification
and digitization. In a world of increasing interconnectedness, improving
cybersecurity of infrastructure is essential to ensuring national security
and avoiding possible cascading effects in critical sectors across the
region, including health care, water management, and military operations.
The operation of the electrical grid and the integration of smart-grid
technology are emerging technologies that require attention to future-proof
Dutch critical energy infrastructure. The growing use of scanning tools and
ransomware techniques by cyber actors is threatening industrial mechanisms
tied to energy infrastructure. Deterring malign actors’ ability to compromise
increasingly system-integrated ICS/SCADA is crucial in a high-tech,
interconnected country like the Netherlands. Beyond bolstering its offensive
cyber capabilities, the Netherlands has several actionable steps it can take
to improve the cyber defense mechanisms of its national security apparatus.
I recommend developing an energ y sector-specif ic NCSC toolkit
(relying on engineer expertise on IT/OT convergence) and raising awareness
for the benefits of certification.
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Figure 9-1. Map of the Netherlands threat timeline estimate (6 months indicates
likely attack vector in 2022, 1 year by 2023, 2+years by 2024 or later)
Credit: Ryan Fisk and Lucas Cox
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Location

Reason for Threat Priority and Timeline

The Hague: National
Cybersecurity Centre and
European Cybercrime Centre

These organizations are constantly targeted with cyberattacks
every day. As they investigate Russian activity—and because
the Netherlands has a notable offensive cyber capability—
DDoS, ICS, or disinformation attacks are expected to continue
during the Ukraine conflict for the next six months.

Port of Rotterdam

ICS or DDoS attacks on port infrastructure could be likely
within six months as the Port of Rotterdam is a significant
location for NATO troop and equipment mobility in the context
of elevated tensions with Russia.

Schiphol Airport

Schiphol Airport is supplied with jet fuel by CEPS, the
NATO-operated pipeline. Expect the airport to be vulnerable
for the next year due to the airport’s importance as a hub
and its role as a NATO pipeline terminal in the midst
of geopolitical tensions.

Groningen Gas Field

Expect disinformation operations within one year due
to current importance for European energy and contentious
debate over its health and environmental consequences
on which Russia can capitalize.

Offshore Wind Farms

Without adequate cybersecurity protection, the wind farms
could become a target in the next six months due to size
of impact on Europe. This is one of the world’s largest
wind farms and accounts for an increasing amount of
British energy sources. The few energy infrastructures that
have been attacked to date have been wind farms
in neighboring Germany.

Borssele Wind Farms

Not as prominent or important as German wind farms that
have experienced cyberattacks, but satellite usage and rising
importance of renewables could see targeting within the next
year as the Netherlands weans itself off of Russian energy.
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ABSTR ACT: Poland imports the bulk of its energy from Russia.
Russia exploits this dependence through cyberattacks on Polish
infrastructure. Poland recognizes the risks posed by Russian interference
and has responded by creating a branch of its government specif ically
to address cyber security. It has also created alliances with its neighbors
in the region to prevent and mitigate the Russian cyber threat. The country
has taken strong comprehensive steps in legislation, policy, and practice
to secure its infrastructure and aid its neighbors who suffer from a similar
political situation.
Key words: Baltic pipe, SCA DA, Gazprom, smart grid, Russian
cyberattacks, Network of Information Security Directive, Russian
disinformation, Poland Ministry of Digital Affairs, NASK, AR AKIS

Introduction
Poland occupies an essential position at the intersection of continental
Europe and the so-called near abroad of Russia. It is the bridge through which
the Baltic states are connected to the European Union. Since Russia first
annexed Crimea and invaded Ukraine in 2014, Poland has grown wary of Russia’s
coercive political behavior in the region. This wariness has grown exponentially
in response to Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Poland’s most striking recent trend before the Ukraine invasion was the
relative decrease in domestic energy production and relative increase
in reliance on energy imports, mainly from Russia.1 In response to the Russian
1. Rafał Macuk, “Energy Transition in Poland: Edition 2020,” Forum Energii (website), 2020,
https://forum-energii.eu/public/upload/files/Energy%20transition%20in%20Poland.%202020%20Edition.pdf.
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invasion of neighboring Ukraine, the Polish government has pledged to end
all imports of Russian energy by the end of 2022, calling Europe’s reliance
on Russian imports a “tool of blackmail.” Poland plans to replace Russian gas
with imports from Norway through the Baltic Pipeline, the expansion of
its LNG terminal on the Baltic Sea, and the signing new contracts with
exporters like Qatar and the United States. 2 Russia stopped gas f low to Poland
at the end of April and is now supplying gas to Italy, France, and Germany. 3
With the largest domestic coal sector in Europe, Poland is committed
to growing renewable energy sources and upgrading energy distribution
infrastructure to 5G networked smart grid. Poland’s energy sector nevertheless
remains vulnerable to geopolitical threats that can manifest as coercive behavior
and hybrid threats that include cyberattacks against Poland’s energy sector.
This case study first summarizes Poland’s energy sector by outlining
energy production and distribution, emphasizing renewable energy sources
(RES) and critical infrastructure, which encompasses energy sources of supply
and distribution infrastructure.4 The case study then assesses Poland’s energy
sector vulnerabilities and surveys the range of threats against Poland’s energy
sector from both state and non-state actors. A review of Poland’s early warning
systems follows. Finally, the case study concludes with recommendations
to address vulnerabilities and mitigate risks to energy security from technical
and geopolitical threats.

Energy Production and Distribution
Poland relies on a range of fuel sources for its domestic energy production
requirements, including coal, natural gas, petroleum, and a variety of RES.
While Poland generates most of its electricity using coal, renewable energy
sources are the fastest-growing segment in Poland’s energy production
landscape. Renewable energy sources accounted for over 20 percent
of installed generating capacity for the first time in 2019. That same year,
roughly 15 percent of Poland ’s domestic energ y production came
from RES, the most ever. 5 Poland’s RES and infrastructure include wind,
2. Zosia Wanat, “Poland to EU: Follow Our Lead on Scrapping Russian Energy,” Politico (website),
March 30, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/follow-my-lead-on-scrapping-russian-energy-poland-tells-the-eu/.
3. “Cut Off by Moscow, Poland Gets Russian Gas from Its Allies,” Bloomberg (website), May 4, 2022,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-04/cut-off-by-moscow-poland-gets-russian-gas-from
-its-allies?leadSource=uverify%20wall.
4. “Systemy infrastruktury krytycznej,” Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa, 2021, accessed May 12, 2021,
https://www.gov.pl/web/rcb/systemy-infrastruktury-krytycznej.
5.

Macuk, “Energy Transition in Poland: Edition 2020.”
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solar, hydro, and biofuels (biomass and biogas). Wind power is the largest segment
of Poland’s RES, accounting for 65 percent of installed generating capacity
as of 2019. 6 The second-largest RES segment is solar energy. Photovoltaic
sources for solar energy amount to nearly 16 percent of installed generating
capacity as of 2019, with a mix of government-subsidized solar farms and
private end-user installed equipment.7 Hydroelectric power and biofuels
round out Poland’s RES and account for 9 percent and 11 percent of installed
generating capacity, respectively. 8 Wind power is thus the largest and most
promising RES segment in terms of growth and generating capacity.
Despite Warsaw’s emphasis on RES, coal-fired power plants supplied
approximately 74 percent of Poland ’s electricity generation demand,
while natural gas and renewable sources accounted for 9 percent and 14 percent,
respectively, in 2019.9 In 2020, Poland became the largest coal producer in the
EU, after Germany reduced its domestic coal production to meet emissions
targets.10 Coal remains Poland’s largest domestic fuel source but is increasingly
diff icult and expensive to extract. As coal prices drop across the EU,
producing electricity from coal-fired plants is increasingly cost-prohibitive
under the EU’s carbon-swapping scheme and greenhouse gas emissions
targets.11 Despite ample deposits and a large coal industry, Poland had been
a net importer of coal, mainly from Russia. As of May 2022, Poland has
halted all imports of Russian coal, presenting a time-sensitive challenge
to domestic suppliers.12
Poland also imports over 80 percent of the natural gas it consumes,
most of which came from Russia and its state-owned energy company
Gazprom until April 2022.13 Russian natural gas had been delivered
to Poland via the Yamal-Europe pipeline, extending over 4,000 kilometers
6. “Poland – Country Commercial Guide: Energy Sector,” U.S. Department of Commerce
International Trade Administration, July 2020, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides
/poland-energy.
7. Macuk, “Energy Transition in Poland: Edition 2020.”
8. Macuk, “Energy Transition in Poland: Edition 2020.”
9. “POLAND,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, July 2020, https://www.eia.gov/international
/analysis/country/POL.
10. Statistical Review of World Energy 2020, 69th ed. (London: British Petroleum, 2020), 6, https://www
.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp
-stats-review-2020-full-report.pdf.
11. Paul Hockenos, “As Pressures Mount, Poland’s Once-mighty Coal Industry Is in Retreat,” Yale
Environment 360 (website), October 20, 2020, https://e360.yale.edu/features/as-pressures-mount-polands
-once-mighty-coal-industry-is-in-retreat.
12. Zosia Wanat, “Poland to EU: Follow Our Lead on Scrapping Russian Energy.”
13. “POLAND,” U.S. Energy Information Administration.
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from the Yamal Peninsula in northern Russia through Belarus, Ukraine, and
Poland toward Germany.14
Poland imports natural gas via its liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal
at Świnoujście, in operation on the Baltic Coast since 2015. Poland also
partnered with several European countries on the Baltic Pipe Project.
The Baltic Pipe will connect Norway with continental Europe, pass through
the North Sea, Denmark, and the Baltic Sea, and terminate in Poland.
In addition, the Polish segment will expand the onshore gas transmission
network with over 300 kilometers of new pipeline integrating Baltic Pipe
with Poland’s national gas transmission system. Construction began in the
Baltic Sea in May 2021, with initial deliveries of Scandinavian gas to Poland
slated for October 2022.15
The Polish government adopted a new energy policy in February 2021,
the Poland Energy Plan (PEP) 2040. The PEP policy sets ambitious goals
to reduce the country’s dependence on domestic coal and foreign hydrocarbon
imports for energy production and reduce the country’s carbon emissions
to better align with EU targets and improve air quality. According to the
PEP, Poland will accomplish these energy goals in the near term by expanding
generating capacity from RES through 2030 and in the long term by building
nuclear reactors to incorporate zero-emissions nuclear power into a diversified
energy portfolio by 2040.16 The policy aims to increase RES generation capacity
by 65 percent through 2025, primarily from building offshore wind farms
in the Baltic Sea and expanding onshore wind farms and photovoltaic sources.17
Warsaw plans to invest over 130 billion zloty (approximately $34.4 billion)
in offshore wind farms that will generate up to 11 gigawatts
by 2040, with the f irst projects coming online in 2025 and generating
5.9 gigawatts by 2030.18 With these projects and the attendant reduction
14. “The End of the Yamal Contract: Poland’s Gas Sector to Enter a New Era,” Warsaw Institute, December 6,
2019, https://warsawinstitute.org/end-yamal-contract-polands-gas-sector-enter-new-era/.
15. “GAZ SYSTEM Begins Laying the Baltic Pipe Offshore Gas Pipeline,” GAZ SYSTEM (website),
May 6, 2021, https://www.gaz-system.pl/en/for-media/press-releases/archives/gaz-system-begins-laying
-the-baltic-pipe-offshore-gas-pipeline.html.
16. “Poland Adopts 2040 Energy Policy, Plans to Cut Coal Share to 56% by 2030,” S&P
Global Market Intelligence, February 3, 2021, https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en
/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/poland-adopts-2040-energy-policy-plans-to-cut-coal-share-to-56
-by-2030-62459745.
17. Will Mathis and Maciej Martewicz, “Europe’s Coal Heartland Is the Hottest Market
for Green Power,” Bloomberg (website), June 24, 2020, https://w w w.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2020-06-24/coal-heartland-of-europe-is-the-hottest-market-for-green-power.
18. Adam Easton and Stuart Elliott, “Poland’s PGNiG Requests Talks with Gazprom on Contracted
Gas Price,” S&P Global Platts (website), November 2, 2020, https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market
-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/110220-polands-pgnig-requests-talks-with-gazprom-on-contracted-gas-price.
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in coal usage, Poland seeks to generate at least 23 percent of its domestic
power requirements from RES by 2030.19
In October 2020, Poland announced a strategic 30-year partnership
with the United States to develop Poland ’s civil nuclear program. 20
Poland plans to build up to six nuclear power plants through 2043
with investment and technical assistance from American nuclear f irms,
including Westinghouse Electric Corporation. 21 Through the civil nuclear
program, Poland aims to reduce its reliance on imported hydrocarbons and
increase energy security and clean energy targets.
To better integrate with EU transmission networks, Poland will invest
over $3 billion through 2027 to modernize and expand the transmission grid,
part of the country’s critical infrastructure. 22 The modernized grid will also
optimize the integration of Poland’s growing RES segment into transmission
infrastructure. The PEP directs smart meters to be installed at 80 percent
of end users in Poland by 2026. As of 2020, approximately 11 percent of end
users had smart meters installed. 23 Smart meters are part of Poland’s advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI), enabling remote digital communications and
data transfer to monitor energy demand and consumption by the country’s
distribution system operators (DSO). Eventually, AMI will be connected
over 5G networks and comprise a smart grid that can mitigate the inherently
variable nature of electricity generation from wind and solar sources. 24
In addition, to maximize the reliability of energy supply from RES,
smart grids integrate information technology (IT) and sensors with traditional
energy transmission infrastructure to actively manage energy supply and
demand. Energa, the leading Polish DSO in terms of AMI and smart-grid
implementation, is leading a pilot smart-grid project to install IT components
and sensors throughout the transmission infrastructure in the north
of the country. The suite of smart-grid technologies being installed includes
grid automation through switch disconnectors, radio supervisory systems,
19. Ministry of Energy, Draft Energy Policy of Poland until 2040 (Warsaw: Republic of Poland, 2018), 5,
http://seo.org.pl/en/zaktualizowany-projekt-polityki-energetycznej-polski-do-2040-r/.
20. “Nuclear Newswire: Westinghouse to Invest in Poland’s Nuclear Future,” Nuclear Newswire
(website), March 17, 2021, https://w w w.ans.org/news/article-2722/ Westinghouse-to-invest-in
-polands-nuclear-future/.
21.

“Westinghouse to Invest in Poland’s Nuclear Future.”

22. “Market Intelligence: Poland Power Transmission and Distribution,” US Department of Commerce
International Trade Administration, December 20, 2019, https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/poland
-power-transmission-and-distribution.
23. “Poland – Country Commercial Guide: Energy Sector,” US Department of Commerce.
24.

“Poland – Country Commercial Guide: Energy Sector,” US Department of Commerce.
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IT control systems networked over wired and wireless data communications,
and energy storage systems to stabilize energy distribution during variable
power generation scenarios. 25
Wireless data communications enable DSOs to monitor usage
and update f irmware, both of which increasingly occur over 5G
networks. Poland’s nascent smart-grid infrastructure includes a pilot
5G private digital network connecting smart meters at individual enduser locations with supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
control systems. In 2020, Polska Grupa Energetyczna, Poland’s largest
distribution system operator, partnered with Finnish telecommunications
giant Nokia to develop and install a pilot 5G network to connect
over 20,000 customers as a proof of concept. 26 Under PEP 2040, smart
grids will enable Poland to integrate future RES projects, including the
offshore wind farms in the Baltic Sea, into Poland’s modernized electricity
transmission networks and ultimately across the EU.

Vulnerabilities
Poland’s dependence on natural-gas imports to meet energy demands
will remain a persistent vulnerability to Poland’s energy security through the
mid- to long term. Pipelines, upon which Poland and other EU members rely
for natural-gas imports, are especially vulnerable to sabotage, cyberattacks,
and criminal hacking. While sabotage in the form of physical destruction
by a state or non-state actor is an extreme and unlikely scenario, cyberattacks
and criminal hacking that render a pipeline’s supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) control systems inoperable are far more likely and
common.
Gas transmission networks comprise SCADA control systems of software
automation, digital communications, f ield devices, and instrumentation
to manage the safe and consistent operation of pipelines. A variety of sensors
and instruments physically installed in the pipeline, known as field devices,
collect data passed to the control layer consisting of programmable logic
controllers (PLC), remote terminal units (RTU), and other control systems.
25. “Poland Rolling Out Smart Grid Infrastructure,” European Commission (website), May 29, 2019,
h t t p s : //e c . e u r o p a . e u / r e g i o n a l _ p o l i c y /e n / p r o j e c t s / P o l a n d / p o l a n d - r o l l i n g - o u t- s m a r t
-grid-infrastructure#:~:text=This%20is%20Poland’s%20largest%20project,to%20more%20sustainable%20
energy%20sources.
26. Nick Westerby, “National Grid Operator PGE Systemy and Nokia Create World’s First
5G Private Network,” First News (website), April 7, 2020, https://w w w.thef irstnews.com
/article/national-grid-operator-pge-systemy-and-nokia-create-worlds-first-5g-private-network-11807.
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The control layer then communicates with the SCADA host computer
via two-way digital communications, using wired and wireless Internet
protocols. 27 As a result, the physical instruments and field control devices,
and digital communications networks are vulnerable to cyberattacks and
hacking through multiple vectors.
Ransomware attacks ref lect a potential cyber vulnerability endemic
to SCADA-controlled gas transmission networks. Malicious actors can also
manipulate software to override sensors causing the sensors to send false data back
to control systems, resulting in critical failures in transmission infrastructure
when control systems attempt to compensate for inaccurate readings.
SCADA control systems are present throughout Poland ’s electricity
transmission grid, including Poland’s growing smart-grid infrastructure,
and thus ref lect a collective series of vulnerabilities across Poland’s critical
energy infrastructure.
Poland’s push to optimize the electricity transmission smart grid
for integration with broader EU standards also raises the prospect of cyber
penetration from a wider area network and vice versa. Malicious actors could
gain access to Poland’s critical infrastructure from within the standardized
EU network, or they could penetrate Poland’s smart grid and gain access
to the broader EU network. Supervisory control and data acquisition control
systems, such as those in Poland’s smart-grid infrastructure, are notorious
for weak security protocols because they rarely encrypt data transmitted
between f ield devices and host control computer systems. 28 As a result,
networked SCADA control systems are consistently vulnerable to penetration
over TCP/IP networks. In other words, the same vulnerabilities present
in Poland’s gas transmission networks also exist in Poland’s electricity grid.
Proprietary SCADA control systems used in energy transmission
networks are typically air-gapped from the wider Internet. Poland’s pilot
5G connected smart grid relies on Nokia private networks operating
at 450 megahertz, the European smart-grid standard, enabling rapid wireless
two-way communications between smart meters, field devices, and control
systems. 29 The 5G networks hold great promise for a digitally connected
27. Russell W. Treat, “SCADA and Telemetry in Gas Transmission Systems” (Technical Report, EnerSys
Corporation, 2016), 3, https://asgmt.com/wp-content/uploads/pdf-docs/2003/1/30.pdf.
28. Marcin Spychała, “Artificial Intelligence in the Service of Critical Infrastructure: Opportunities
and Threats,” in Cybersecurity of the Polish Industry: The Energy Sector (Kraków: Kosciuszko Institute, 2017),
15, https://ik.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/cybersecurity-of-the-polish-industry-en.pdf.
29. Agnieszka Konkel, “Standardisation of Cybersecurity Solutions in the Energy Sector: An Overview
of the EU Policy,” in Cybersecurity of the Polish Industry: The Energy Sector (Kosciuszko Institute, 2017), 30,
http://www.ik.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/sklad-en-online.pdf.
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future, especially smart-grid infrastructure, but their software-based
characteristics make them vulnerable to hacking and penetration.
Decentralized soft ware-based routing, artif icial intelligence (A I)
data management, and wide-area bandwidth coverage ref lect aspects
of 5G networks that make them more vulnerable to cyberattacks, despite their
inherent benefits and potential. 30
Poland’s emerging smart grid and its total electricity and gas transmission
infrastructure are vulnerable to cyberattack through countless vectors.
In addition, smart meters and pipeline pressure sensors, and other field devices
and control systems are susceptible to attacks. As emerging 5G networks
replace existing wired communications networks, the attendant risks to cyber
penetration will grow exponentially. Moreover, Poland’s goal to further
integrate its distribution networks with the EU’s will also increase its exposure
to cyberattacks and hacking from state and non-state actors alike.

Threats
Poland faces geopolitical threats from Russia and, to a lesser degree,
China. Threats can manifest as part of a broader sublethal hybrid campaign
to achieve political objectives below the threshold of war using cyberattacks
and other coercive measures. Poland ’s most signif icant geopolitical
threat stems from what the 2020 National Security Strategy of the Republic
of Poland calls “the neo-imperialist policy of the authorities of the Russian
Federation,” which includes the use of military force to coerce neighboring
states in Russia’s near abroad, as in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine
in 2014 and 2022. 31
While Russia continues to use overt military force in Ukraine,
it also pursues activities below the threshold of war, often through
proxies or unattributable actors, to coerce nearby states such as Poland.
Hybrid activities, including cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns,
are attractive tools for state and non-state actors to achieve political objectives
without military force. 32 Russia views cyberattacks, hacking, and the spread
of disinformation as instruments of foreign policy. Russia uses these instruments
30. Tom Wheeler and David Simpson, “Why 5G Requires New Approaches to Cybersecurity: Racing
to Protect the Most Important Network of the 21st Century,” Brookings Institution (website),
September 3, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-5g-requires-new-approaches-to-cybersecurity/.
31. National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (Warsaw: Biuro Bezpieczeństwa
Narodowego, 2020), https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/National_Security_Strategy_of_the
_Republic_of_Poland_2020.pdf.
32. National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 7.
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as part of broader hybrid campaigns to undermine NATO and the European
Union and provide Russia strategic advantage through the manipulation
of cyberspace. 33 Russian behavior poses a threat to Poland’s energy security due
to Poland’s dependence on natural-gas imports, which will continue
until the end of 2022. Russia has dominated the gas and oil markets
in Eastern Europe for decades and has used reliance on Russian gas and oil
to threaten supply manipulation as an instrument of political coercion. 34
Although Poland plans to cease gas imports from Russia in 2022,
Poland’s dependence on imported gas will remain a long-term vulnerability.
Russia also conducts information operations to spread disinformation
and promote narratives aligned with Russian securit y interests. 35
Such information operations, which include targeted hacking of public websites
and social media profiles of prominent officials, are part of broader inf luence
campaigns ref lective of hybrid threats. For example, a Russian inf luence
campaign has been targeting Eastern European NATO members, including
Poland and the Baltic states, since March 2017. Through compromised websites,
such as news sources and off icial government sites, Russian operatives
published fabricated articles, stories, quotes, and other documents criticizing
the United States and NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe. 36
Russia’s disinformation apparatus is active in Poland ’s energ y
sector. In March 2021, after Poland announced its strategic partnership
with the United States to develop Poland’s civil nuclear program, malicious
actors hacked into several Polish government websites. They posted
false information about leaking nuclear waste at a nearby Lithuanian
nuclear reactor that endangered Polish citizens living near the border. 37
The cyberattack and ensuing disinformation action to spread falsehoods,
ostensibly to sow fear and distrust toward Poland’s nuclear plans among its

33. Juha Kukkola, “The Russian National Segment of the Internet as a Source of Structural Cyber Asymmetry,”
Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis, 9, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/1-The
-Russian-National-Segment-of-the-Internet-as-a-Source-of-Structural-Cyber-Asymmetry_ebook.pdf.
34.

Duda, National Security Strategy, 8.

35. Lee Foster et al., “ ‘Ghost Writer’ Influence Campaign: Unknown Actors Leverage Website
Compromises and Fabricated Content to Push Narratives Aligned with Russian Security Interests,”
FireEye (website), July 29, 2020, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/07/ghostwriter-influence
-campaign.html.
36.

Foster et al., “ ‘Ghost Writer’ Influence Campaign.”

37. Givi Gigitashvili, “Cyber-enabled Information Operations Targets Poland with Radiological
Leak Hoax,” Atlantic Council Digital Forensic Lab (website), April 2, 2021, https://medium
.com/dfrlab/cyber-enabled-information-operation-targets-poland-with-radiological-leak-hoax-28a5b1f b6776.
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population, have not been officially attributed to Russia. The hack, however,
and spread of disinformation resembled a “typical Russian attempt.” 38

Figure 10-1. Cyber and disinformation threat overlay

Russian perceptions of the EU and NATO, and the greater international
order, must be considered in the context of Russia’s relationship with China.
Russia and China share a range of strategic interests, including diminishing
the standing and security role of the United States in global affairs. 39
Poland has sought to strengthen relations and military cooperation with the
United States ever since the Crimean crisis of 2014, and Beijing’s deepening
relationship with Russia, even during the Ukraine invasion, suggests
China tacitly accepts Russia’s revisionist behavior in Eastern Europe. 40
Moreover, a shared Russian and Chinese vision of a weakened American
military presence in the world would undermine the effectiveness and
credibility of the NATO alliance, which is the foundation of Poland’s security
policy.41 China is a notorious cyber actor that f launts international norms and
engages in malicious activity against government organizations and the private
sector. China’s continued rise, therefore, ref lects potential long-term threats
to Poland’s security environment.
38. “Polish State Websites Hacked and Used to Spread False Info,” AP News (website),
March 17, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/europe-poland-eastern-europe-lithuania-nuclear-waste
-424dd97778b3d2046bc1cb61a175f270.
39. “Natural Gas Weekly Update: Poland Natural Gas Grid,” US Energy Information Administration.
40. Paweł Paszak, “Poland-China Relations in 2021: Current State and Prospects,” Warsaw Institute (website),
January 29, 2021, https://warsawinstitute.org/poland-china-relations-2021-current-state-prospects/.
41. Paszak, “Poland-China Relations in 2021.”
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Early Warning Systems
Poland implemented the Network and Information Security (NIS)
directive, the first EU-wide cybersecurity legislation, in November 2017
through the National Framework of Cybersecurity Policy (NFCP) of the
Republic of Poland for 2017–2022. The NFCP seeks to increase Poland’s
capacity to achieve security of public and private sectors and citizens alike
from cyberattacks and disruption of critical infrastructure.42 As part of this
policy, information about increasing cyber threats and vulnerabilities and
potential cyberattacks is essential for providing early warning to Poland’s
Internet users. Therefore, the NFCP calls for national cybersecurity
management systems to aggregate information, analyze threat reports, and
issue warnings and risk-mitigation measures to relevant stakeholders.43
Poland’s Ministry of Digital Affairs thus created the department
of cybersecurity in 2015, which is responsible for implementing national
and EU guidelines for IT systems protection and risk assessment of IT systems
across Poland.44 The ministry supervises a semiautonomous organization
knows as the Research and Academic Computer Network (Naukowa
Akademicka Sieć Komputerowa, NASK), which focuses on Internet security
with operations ranging from providing responses to cyber threats to early
warning of cyberattacks against Polish industrial and economic sectors,
including Poland’s energy sectors.45 In addition, NASK manages Poland’s
National Cyberspace Protection System and operates Poland’s Computer
Emergency Response Team, CERT.pl. As part of the public-private
partnership, NASK leverages innovative technological solutions for practical
cybersecurity applications. The most extensive commercial collaboration
fostered by NASK is with AR AKIS Enterprise, which implemented
ARAKIS-GOV in conjunction with the Polish Internal Security Agency.46
AR AKIS Enterprise is a commercial cyber early warning system
for businesses. It does not replace typical cybersecurity measures but instead
42. “National Framework of Cybersecurity Policy of the Republic of Poland for 2017–2022,”
Ministry of Digital Affairs, 2017, 7, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies
/ncss-map/Cybersecuritystrategy_PL.pdf.
43.

“National Framework of Cybersecurity Policy of the Republic of Poland for 2017–2022,” 14.

44. Joanna Świątkowska, Izabela Albrycht, and Dominik Skokowksi, National Cyber Security Organisation:
POLAND (Tallinn, EE: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2017), 10.
45.

Świątkowska, Albrycht, and Skokowksi, National Cyber Security Organisation: POLAND, 11.

46. Piotr Kijewski and Adam Kozakiewicz, “Security Research at NASK: Supporting the Operational
Needs of a CERT Team and More,” in Proceedings of 2011 First SysSec Workshop (Amsterdam: IEEE, 2011), 97,
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6092775.

173

Kuzminski

works under the auspices of NASK to provide data on emerging cyber threats
and attacks, both localized and regional, to stakeholders and government
agencies. ARAKIS improves Poland’s situational awareness of cyber threats
and potential attacks across Poland’s Internet address space. AR AKIS
works by operating a network of sensors and data collection mechanisms
to obtain near real-time data from firewalls and antivirus systems for early
detection of malicious activity and discovering potentially new attack vectors
against zero-day vulnerabilities.47 As an early warning system, ARAKIS
detects cyber threats that propagate through active means, such as worms
and other malware.
In 2016, the NIS directive incorporated data- and information-sharing
protocols into regulatory requirements for incident reporting and threat
analysis across EU computer security incident response teams (CSIRT).
According to the NIS directive, transmission network and distribution
system operators in EU-member states must share sensitive information
regarding IT vulnerabilities, cyberattacks, and digital network penetrations
to facilitate crisis response and mitigate risks due to a lack of preparedness.48
Such an information-sharing mechanism enables interorganizational and
inter-state cyber threat assessments and risk analysis to define appropriate
mitigation measures.49 The NIS directive also created a CSIRT network
to “contribute to developing confidence and trust between member states
and to promote swift and effective operational cooperation.” 50 As of 2021,
25 CSIRTs operate in Poland, representing both government and private
organizations across various constituencies. In addition, each of the five major
DSOs operates a CSIRT as part of the critical information infrastructure
protection (CIIP). Only three of Poland’s CSIRTs, however, are members
of the NIS-directed network. 51

47. Piotr Kijewski, Mirosław Maj, and Krzysztof Silicki, Research and Development Projects
Launched in Response to the Dynamic Evolution of Internet Security Threats – A Perspective of a CERT
Team (Warsaw: NATO Science & Technology Organization, November 22, 2010), https://apps
.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA592007.
48. Smart Grid Task Force Expert Group 2, Recommendations for the European Commission on Implementation
of a Network Code on Cybersecurity, Interim 1st Report (Brussels: European Commission, 2017), 13.
49.

Smart Grid Task Force Expert Group 2, Network Code on Cybersecurity, 11.

50. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, “Article 12, Directive (EU) 2016/1148
of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 July 2016 Concerning Measures of High Common Level
Security of Network and Information Systems across the Union,” Official Journal of the European Union 194,
no. 19 (July 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016L1148&rid=1.
51.

CSIRTs Network (website), n.d., accessed May 15, 2021, https://csirtsnetwork.eu/.
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Recommendations
Poland’s ability to ensure energy security and support alliance efforts
to deter aggression relies on its critical infrastructure. This case study provides
the following recommendations to mitigate risks of cyberattack and ensure
Poland’s future energy security.

Transparency
Poland ’s long-term energ y securit y in the cyber era demands
transparency between companies, distribution system operators, government
cybersecurity organizations, and EU partners. Organizations at all
levels, including national and industry sector CSIRTs, must share cyber
threats and vulnerabilities using established NIS-directed networks and
channels. In addition, cyber professionals must share risk analysis, based
on geopolitical trends and events and best practices, and practical steps
to protect critical infrastructure.

5G Supply-chain Security
Poland’s 5G connected smart grid will introduce new risks and potential
attack vectors into Poland’s critical infrastructure. Therefore, Poland must
approach 5G risk mitigation holistically by partnering with trusted vendors,
such as Nokia, and setting 5G equipment supply-chain standards for the EU.

5G Network Security Protocols
Poland should integrate security protocols into 5G network layers
(such as firewalls or malware detectors). Operators should also implement
end-to-end encryption for all SCADA control systems as they roll out
5G networks near- to mid-term, especially at distributed cloud computing
nodes used in 5G network operations. 52 Additionally, Poland should isolate
5G network slices for dedicated critical infrastructure use, especially electricity
smart-grid transmission networks. 53

52. Gregg Knowles, “The Cybersecurity Risks Associated with 5G Networks and How to
Manage Them,” ITProPortal (website), March 2021, https://w w w.itproportal.com/features
/the-cybersecurity-risks-associated-with-5g-networks-and-how-to-manage-them/.
53. Ericsson, A Guide to 5G Network Security 2.0: Conceptualizing Security in Mobile Communications
Networks – How Does 5G Fit In? (Stockholm: Ericsson, 2018), 9, https://www.ericsson.com/en/security
/a-guide-to-5g-network-security.
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Natural-gas Transmission Network Resilience:
Poland must ensure the Baltic Pipe construction is complete ahead of
the Yamal contract termination in December 2022. Poland should continue
with its plans to fast-track LNG terminal capacity expansion at Świnoujście
and increase the number of market partners to diversify its sources of natural
gas. Additionally, Poland must develop redundancy in gas distribution capacity
to accommodate planned and unexpected disruptions to gas pipeline operations.
Distribution capacity must be f lexible enough to maintain consistent supply
within the country should a critical node or pipeline be disabled due
to a cyberattack.

Conclusion
Poland’s geostrategic position at NATO’s frontier and the nexus
between continental Europe and Russia’s near abroad makes it a lucrative
target for political coercion and hybrid threats, including cyberattacks
against critical infrastructure and the energy sector. Poland remains dependent
on energy imports, especially natural gas, even as it seeks to diversify
its sources of supply completely away from Russian imports and expand
domestic generating capacity from renewable energy sources. This dependence
exposes Poland to coercive energy supply manipulation and disruption
through cyberattacks, especially during potential hybrid threat scenarios.
Poland requires access to a stable supply of natural gas in the near term,
which means ensuring the Baltic Pipe and LNG capacity expansion proceed
as scheduled in 2022. Delays or disruption of the Baltic Pipe may force Poland
to restart gas imports from Russia.
Additionally, Poland must ensure the security of its smart-grid
infrastructure and 5G connected control systems through encryption and
data resilience while increasing transparency and information sharing
to thwart would-be attackers and disinformation campaigns. Poland must
develop a diverse energy portfolio consisting of redundant supply streams and
distribution infrastructure in the mid- to long term. Poland must integrate
domestic energy production from nuclear power and renewable energy sources
and coal, with stable natural-gas supply streams from within the European
Union. A secure and redundant distribution infrastructure, together with
stable energy production and supply, transforms Poland into a hard target
against cyber and hybrid threats from state and non-state actors and reduces
risks to Poland’s and NATO’s long-term energy security.
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Figure 10-2. Map of Poland’s threat timeline estimate (six months indicates likely
attack vector in 2022, one year by 2023, two+ years by 2024 or later)
Credit: Frank Kuzminski, Ryan Fisk, and Lucas Cox
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Location

Reason for Threat Priority and Timeline

Świnoujście LNG Terminal

Expect the terminal to remain vulnerable for the next
six months as it increases energy security in Poland
and serves to increase the independence of the Baltics
from Russia.

Baltic Pipe

The Baltic Pipe, to be operational October 1, 2022,
is the replacement project for the Yamal Pipeline,
which supplied LNG from Russia. Since this new
connection will be to Norway and is an intentional
shift away from Russia, it will remain vulnerable to ICS
or disinformation operations within the six months
following if tensions continue.

LitPol Link

This electricity link between Poland and Lithuania
could remain a target for the next six months because
it is an intentional effort to decouple from Russia.

Harmony Link

Harmony Link will increase the reliability of transition
from BRELL to the Continental European Synchronous
Area once completed in 2025. Intervention to
completion could be expected in the year before
completion should tensions with Russia increase.

Offshore Wind Farms

Offshore wind farms remain vulnerable for the next six
months of the conflict if they do not have adequate
cyber protection.

Nuclear Power Program

Nuclear facilities near Belarus and Ukraine likely
to be subject to disinformation or cyberattacks
within one year due to geostrategic importance
during the Ukraine conflict.

Renewable Info Ops and Smart Grids
in Coal-producing Region

Disinformation operations will likely occur within the
next year as Russia targets renewable energy such
as smart grids in its information warfare and cyber
operations, especially as Polish coal supplies increase
in importance amid the ban on Russian imports.
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Conclusion: West and Central Europe
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Poland have
benef ited from their energ y partnerships in the past. But energ y
dependencies and the introduction of renewable sources that cannot yet provide
sufficient independent energy on a national scale have left the countries
vulnerable to hybrid warfare. The transition of these countries to renewables
that are not yet cyber-hardened has left their energy landscapes vulnerable
to escalating cyberattacks, especially in the context of Russian hybrid warfare
during the Ukraine conf lict. These major NATO powers will need to focus on
ensuring that they diversify their energy sources and speed their development
of renewables with appropriate critical infrastructure cybersecurity and that
no non-emissions producing independent energy source, such as nuclear,
is left off the table.
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– Case Studies –
Baltics
The Baltics region consists of three nations: Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania. All three are former Soviet nations in a unique position
of being at high risk from Russian interference. The Baltics are small nations
with small populations, but they have a strategic position along the Baltic
Sea with several sizable ports allowing access to west Europe, which would
be extremely valuable to Russia. The Baltics wish to remain independent
from Russia, however, and have expressed no desire to join Russia to recreate
the former Soviet Union, instead aligning themselves with NATO and their
energy programs with those put forth by NATO member nations.
Of the Baltic states, Lithuania was a net energy exporter prior to
joining NATO, at which point it abandoned its nuclear power plant and
began to make the shift to renewable energy. The shift from nuclear to
renewables took time to implement, however, and the Baltic states became
net importers of energy, reliant on Russia for the majority of their energy
needs. This reliance on Russian energy has created increased security concerns
as Russian belligerence in the region has increased. Russia has taken
the stance that certain types of cyberattacks are tools of foreign policy;
hence, due to their strategic position and historical ties to the Soviet Union,
the Baltics are frequently subject to cyberattacks as a means of strongarming
a reliance on Russian energy.
The Russian cyber threat has spurred a great deal of innovation and
partnership in the Baltics. This region is generally united in the singular
mission of defense, and unlike the western regions, there are no disputes
of what policies to adopt. Following several large-scale successful cyberattacks
on Baltic infrastructure, the Baltics and Poland have formed their
own cyber defense alliances. This region has invested a lot into cyber innovation
and cyber-hardening of its energy infrastructures and has moved toward the
rapid adoption of smart grids to isolate itself from Russian interference
as much as possible.
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ABSTR ACT: The most signif icant threats to Estonia’s infrastructure
security center around Estonia’s relationship with Russia. Estonia
is in a unique position culturally as a former member nation of the Soviet
Union and Russia’s geographical neighbor. In addition, Estonia is one of
the most energy-dependent countries in Europe, relying on a select few
pipelines for its domestic energy supply. Russia exploits this dependency
frequently and utilizes cyberattacks on critical infrastructure as a tool to
exercise political control over Estonia, and Estonia attempts to mitigate this
by creating information- and resource-sharing networks with other nations
in the region to resist Russian inf luence and exploitation.
Keywords: Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence/CCDCOE,
Russian cyberattack, smart grid, Estlink, Elering, BRELL network,
critical infrastructure security, Baltics, cyber mitigation

Introduction
Due to its geopolitical location, cybersecurity infrastructure, and energy
systems, Estonia is a uniquely positioned NATO member country when
evaluating hybrid warfare threats to critical infrastructure. On a broad scale,
Estonia is one of NATO’s leading members on cybersecurity, with NATO’s
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) based in
Tallinn. The capital city is also the namesake of the CCDCOE’s Tallinn
Manual, which details international law applicable to cyberwarfare. In addition,
the government has adapted a horizontal integration of cybersecurity, including
a national cybersecurity strategy and the Cybersecurity Act. At all hours,
Estonian cyberspace and cyber incidents are monitored by the Estonian
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Information System Authority’s (RIA) branch CERT-EE.1 While Estonia
has a robust cybersecurity infrastructure, vulnerabilities to malicious actors
remain, especially in the energy sector.
Geopolitically, the threat of cyberwarfare from Russia is particularly
pertinent in Estonia. As a country of only 1.3 million positioned
on the Baltic Sea, with Russia currently invading Ukraine, hybrid warfare
is a reality in Estonia. 2 Furthermore, Estonia is no stranger to Russian
cyberattacks. In 2007, Estonia was the victim of a large-scale cyberattack
led by Russian hackers after the relocation of a Soviet-era bronze soldier
monument. Over 50 websites, including those of government entities, banks,
and newspapers, went off line simultaneously. This incident had global
repercussions, shedding light on the inevitability of cyber warfare and its
ability to create confusion, disruption, and agitation in a nation-state. 3
Following the 2007 attacks, Estonia bolstered its cybersecurity measures
to predict vulnerabilities and mitigate risk in the cyber realm. One predicted
target of hybrid warfare is the energy sector, due to the critical role energy
systems have in the functioning of the state.4
In Estonia, oil shale dominates the energy sector. As of 2018, oil shale
made up 73 percent of total primary energy supply and 72 percent of domestic
energy production. Primary energy supply was then followed by bioenergy
and waste at 19.3 percent and natural gas at 7.3 percent. The reliance on oil
shale demonstrated by these statistics makes Estonia one of the most energy
independent countries in the EU, but also one of the most carbon intensive. 5
Estonia has published goals for decarbonization efforts and is working toward
implementing increased renewable energy. Yet, it is not solely decarbonization
that marks recent changes in Estonian energy infrastructure; the electric grid
is also undergoing an important transition.
To lessen reliance on Russian energy sources, the Baltic States are currently
undergoing an electric grid reconfiguration in which Estonia will decouple
1. “CERT-EE,” Republic of Estonia Information Security Authority (website), n.d., https://www.ria.ee
/en/cyber-security/cert-ee.html.
2. “Estonia Population (2021),” Worldometer (website), n.d., accessed April 28, 2021,
https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/estonia-population/.
3. “How Estonia Became a Global Heavyweight in Cyber Security,” e-Estonia (website), June 14, 2017,
https://e-estonia.com/how-estonia-became-a-global-heavyweight-in-cyber-security/.
4. “Cyber Security in Estonia 2020,” Republic of Estonia Information System Authority (website),
October 5, 2020, https://www.ria.ee/en/news/cyber-security-estonia-2020.html.
5. “Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Estonia 2019 Review – Analysis,” International Energy
Agency
(IEA) (website), October 2019, https://w w w.iea.org/reports/energy-policies-of-iea
-countries-estonia-2019-review.
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from the Moscow-based IPS/UPS power grid and synchronize instead
with the EU. Although the synchronization of the Baltic power grid
with Europe will make future blackout attempts by Russia more difficult
to achieve, the transition phase is accompanied with increased cyber
vulnerability. 6 To combat the risks associated with the electric grid transition
and enhance the security of electricity supply, Estonia has adopted smart-grid
technology.7 Smart meters and data-sharing efforts are being implemented
to optimize energy eff iciency and ward off malign actors. Smart-grid
technology also is susceptible to vulnerabilities.
In this chapter, the electric grid and use of smart-grid technology in
relation to Estonia’s energy security will be discussed, including weaknesses
and risk mitigation methods. First, the energy landscape of Estonia will be
surveyed, with in-depth information on electric and smart grids. Then, the
chapter will identify cyber vulnerabilities and demonstrate possible weaknesses
in grid technologies. In the third section, risk mitigation methods and
early warning systems (by public and private actors) will be discussed
to contextualize how Estonia responds to cyber threats in critical
infrastructure. Finally, the chapter will conclude with recommendations
to enhance the energy security of Estonia and NATO as a whole.

Energy Landscape of Estonia
To provide a survey of the energy landscape of Estonia, this section will
brief ly overview oil shale and then discuss how the electric grid and smart grid
are being used. As previously mentioned, Estonia is highly energy independent
due to its domestically produced oil shale, which is the principal fuel input
to generate electricity. While energy independence has increased business
opportunities and security in Estonia, it has also hindered the diversification
of energy sources and created reliance on a few select pipelines. 8 As the
recent 2021 ransomware attack against the Colonial Pipeline in the United
States demonstrates, energy systems are at growing risks of cyber intrusions
in NATO member countries.9 Although the cyber vulnerabilities of oil and
6. Stephen Jewkes and Oleg Vukmanovic, “Suspected Russia-backed Hackers Target Baltic Energy
Networks, Reuters (website), May 11, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltics-cyber-insight
-idUSKBN1871W5.
7. “Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Estonia 2019 Review.”
8. “Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Estonia 2019 Review.”
9. Brad Plumer, “Pipeline Hack Points to Growing Cybersecurity Risk for Energy System,”
New York Times (website), May 13, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/climate/pipeline-ransomware
-hack-energy-grid.html.
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gas pipelines are beyond the scope of this report, it is important to note that
Estonia’s critical infrastructure is susceptible to threats outside the smart
grid and the electric grid, including the extraction and transportation of oil.
Pipelines (such as the Baltic Connector, which opened in 2020) should
be monitored closely to ensure ongoing energy security.10 At the same time,
Estonia must also monitor the energy grid for potential hybrid warfare attacks.
The Estonian electric grid is managed by Elering, the transmission
system operator (TSO). Approximately 5,500 kilometers of transmission
lines and 155 substations comprise the electricity transmission network.11
Currently, Estonia is a part of the BRELL network, which connects the nation
to Belarus, Russia, Latvia, and Lithuania via AC power lines. Of particular
interest to NATO are the three 330-kilovolt lines that run from Estonia
to Russia. The lines present a particular vulnerability, as Russia has physical
access to a NATO ally power line. Since 2006, Estonia has also been
connected to Scandinavian energy sources with the creation of Estlink 1,
which provides direct current interconnection from Estonia to Finland.
The creation of Estlink 1 marked a shift in Estonia’s electricity systems,
as the country diversified its electricity supply and moved away from reliance
on Russia. Following Estlink 1, Estonia has continued to move toward linking
with Europe’s electricity system. In 2014, Estlink 2 was finished and increased
the transmission capacity between Finland and Estonia to 1,000 megawatts.12
By shifting electricity supply toward European countries, Estonia has switched
its energy market from the Baltic States and Russia to the Baltic States
and Scandinavia.
The Baltic push toward aligning electricity systems with Europe continues
to be a key strategy for energy security. In 2018, former President of the
European Commission Jean Claude Juncker, and the heads of government
of the Baltic States conf irmed this energy transition by announcing the
full synchronization of the Baltic power grid with continental Europe
by 2025.13 The decision to couple with the European electric grid displays
Estonia’s allyship with NATO member countries and signals a shift
away from Russia. To obtain full integration of the electric grid with continental
10. “Balticconnector Gas Pipeline up and Running since 1 January 2020,” European Commission (website),
January 8, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/balticconnector-gas-pipeline-ready-use-1-january-2020
-2020-jan-08_en.
11. “Electricity System,” Elering (website), n.d., accessed May 20, 2021, https://elering.ee/en/electricity-system.
12. “Electricity System.”
13. “European Solidarity on Energy: Synchronisation of the Baltic States’ Electricity Network
with the European System Strengthens Security of Supply,” European Commission (website), n.d.,
accessed April 28, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4284.
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Europe, the Baltic States are in the process of desynchronizing from the
IPS/UPS network in Russia and connecting to the LitPol Link (Poland),
NordBalt (Sweden), and Estlink 1 and 2 (Finland).14
During this time of energy transition and modernization, Estonia has
adopted smart-grid technology (such as smart meters, smart city lights,
and smart city projects) to become more energy eff icient and secure.
As the electricity TSO, Elering administers and heads the majority
of smart-grid innovation. The main goal of smart-grid technology in Estonia
is to provide modern IT solutions in a time of immense change
in energy systems. Particularly important to Estonia is Europe’s energy retail
market integration by means of data sharing and access. To work toward data
accessibility, Elering has used X-Road technology to form Estfeed, a smart-grid
data-sharing platform. X-Road or X-tee technology is a software-based solution
that allows Estonia’s public- and private-sector parties to link up through
a multilayered data exchange. Utilizing X-Road technology, Estfeed enables
data access and sharing, consumer authorization of third-party actors to meter
data, and the centralization of electric meter data monitoring.15 Since 2014,
Estonia has provided 100 percent of smart-metering coverage of households
and offices, creating a wealth of data to inform energy usage, efficiency,
and security.16 Moreover, Elering, in cooperation with WePower, has tokenized
a year’s worth of energy grid data.17

Cyber Vulnerabilities
After being the target of the f irst cyberwarfare attack in 2007,
Estonia knows the threat of hybrid warfare. Due to a combination
of Estonia’s geopolitical position and energy systems in transition,
critical infrastructure is especially at risk of hybrid threats. With key roles
in stabilizing society and the state, the electric grid and smart grid will
be susceptible to cyberattacks. According to Baltic scholars Arūnas
Molis, Claudia Palazzo, and Kaja Ainsalu, the risk of a blackout scenario
“remains highly possible,” as “cybersecurity expertise and exercise are lacking
14. “European Solidarity on Energy.”
15. Federico Plantera, “Access to Electricity and Gas Smart Meter Data in Estonia, ” X-Road (website),
n.d., accessed April 15, 2021, https://x-road.global/access-to-electricity-and-gas-smart-meter-data-in-estonia.
16. Plantera, “Electricity and Gas Smart Meter Data.”
17. Jason Deign, “WePower Is the First Blockchain Firm to Tokenize an Entire Grid,” Greentech Media
(website), October 29, 2018, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/wepower-is-the-first-blockchain
-firm-to-tokenize-an-entire-grid.
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and integration into European natural gas and electricity systems has not been
completed.” 18 Furthermore, energy security has been established as a cyber
vulnerability in the EU’s “Joint Framework for Countering Hybrid Threats.” 19
More acutely, electricity has been deemed the Achilles’ heel of the Baltics
in regard to mitigating hybrid threats. 20 Thus, it is imperative to recognize
the cyber vulnerabilities posed by electric-grid and smart-grid technologies
in order to respond to the rising challenges of cyberattacks.
On a general level, electric and smart-grid operators struggle
with common information technology threats. For instance, Elering
noted their energy systems are targeted by “the most common risk factors
in the cyber room.” 21 These risk factors include incidents like botnet, phishing,
and service interruption, which are frequent threats identified by Estonia’s
annual cybersecurity agenda. 22 While these threats are common among all
sectors, they are incredibly dangerous when used against critical infrastructure.
An example of the urgency of curbing these threats occurred in 2020,
when an Estonian energy company notified the government of “memcached,”
a temporary information caching service that had been left public online
and could be misused in denial-of-service attacks. As a result, the cached
information of the energy company was leaked, forcing the company
to f ix its service. CERT-EE then helped check the company’s logs and
recommend cybersecurity protocols. 23 Although the damage in this situation
was minimal, common cyber risks can cause immense harm when leveraged
against companies that provide electrical and smart-grid services.
In terms of specif ic malign cyber actors, Russia remains the most
urgent threat to Estonian energy security. The impact of the Russian
power system on the Estonian power system is described by Elering as
the “most systemic risk” to critical infrastructure cybersecurity in the past
10 years. 24 Thus, the synchronization of the Estonian power grid to Europe
is imperative to energ y securit y. Yet, the electric grid, bolstered
18. Arūnas Molis, Claudia Palazzo, and Kaja Ainsalu, “Mitigating Risks of Hybrid War: Search
for an Effective Energy Strategy in the Baltic States,” Journal on Baltic Security 4, no. 2 (December 2018): 2,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330928695_Mitigating_Risks_of_Hybrid_War_Search_for_an
_Effective_Energy_Strategyin_The_Baltic_States.
19. “FAQ: Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats,” European Commission (website), https://ec.europa.eu
/commission/presscorner/detail/it/MEMO_16_1250.
20. Molis, Palazzo, and Ainsalu, “Mitigating Risks of Hybrid War.”
21.

“Electricity System.”

22.

“Cyber Security in Estonia 2021.”

23. “Cyber Security in Estonia 2021.”
24.

“Electricity System.”
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by smart-grid technology, is particularly vulnerable during systems
transitions. Synchronization of the electric grid creates vulnerabilities
because Russia has the power to disconnect Estonia from the IPS/UPS
framework before the country has fully joined the European electricity
system. On the threat of decoupling the grid, Molis, Palazzo, and Ainsalu
have noted that the “key question is not whether this weapon will be used,
but how successfully it can work,” with Estonia’s resilience capabilities being
the main determinant of the scenario. 25
Estonia’s preparedness scheme to confront this challenge focuses
specifically on decreasing bottlenecks and improving interconnectedness.
Thus, market security, regional cooperation, and data sharing are reinforced
to avoid a Baltic blackout scenario. 26 Not only did the Lithuanian TSO
predict a Baltic blackout would cost the region between 1.3 to 2.1 billion
euros, but a blackout would cause critical services to stop functioning,
fear in society to spread, and political ramif ications of hybrid war. 27
Disruptions of energy supply from Russia during the Ukraine crisis,
increased power demand, and the transition away from grid integration
with Russia and rising energy prices present signif icant political and
economic challenges for the future of Estonia’s energy sector. In 2021 alone,
the price of natural gas rose 400 percent. 28
To curb electrical grid vulnerabilities, Estonia has invested heavily
in smart metering and data sharing. These emerging technologies, however,
have implications for smart-grid vulnerabilities and are not immune
to threats; just “as any other device connected to a network, smart meters
become vulnerable to attacks.” 29 With 100 percent coverage of households and
offices by smart meters in Estonia, the sheer number of networked devices
in the electric grid provides increased entry points for cyberattacks.
As for data sharing in the smart grid, low involvement in public-private
partnerships (PPPs) limits the threat mitigation capabilities of X-Road
technology. Recent literature on X-Road technology reveals Estonia has high
25.

Molis, Palazzo, and Ainsalu, “Mitigating Risks of Hybrid War,” 4.

26. “Estonian National Energy and Climate Plan 2030 (NECP) – Policies,” IEA (website),
https://www.iea.org/policies/12146-estonian-national-energy-and-climate-plan-2030-necp.
27.

Molis, Palazzo, and Ainsalu, “Mitigating Risks of Hybrid War.”

28. Kaja Kallas, “Political Statement by Prime Minister Kaja Kallas on the Situation in the Electricity
Market, January 18, 2022,” Republic of Estonia Government (website), January 18, 2022, https://www.valitsus
.ee/en/news/political-statement-prime-minister-kaja-kallas-situation-electricity-market-18-january-2022.
29. Rebeca P. Díaz Redondo, Ana Fernández-Vilas, and Gabriel Fernández dos Reis, “Security
Aspects in Smart Meters: Analysis and Prevention,” Sensors 20, no. 14 ( July 17, 2020),
https://doi.org/10.3390/s20143977.
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PPP potential, yet it struggles to engage private actors due to low awareness
and understanding of profitability, among other factors. The data-sharing
imperative to X-Road technology is in turn hampered by barriers to PPPs. 30
Part of this barrier is the role of utilities, as the government “must set clear
limits in market power of distribution utilities while allowing competition
in the generation segment with the establishment of a market for energy.” 31

Current Cyber Mitigation Methods
or Early Warning Systems
While the Estonian energy sector is at risk of security vulnerabilities
such as the grid transition, energy operators and the Estonian government
have worked to ensure risk mitigation through training and early warning
systems. Under the scope of government, Estonia has robust pathways
to address cyber risks to critical infrastructure. Legislation, government
agencies, annual strategies, and national training programs inform
threat mitigation. In the private sector, companies have invested in early
warning technology, grid stabilization projects, and cybersecurity training.
As will be displayed by the overview of mitigation methods, Estonia is aware
of the threat posed by cyberattacks on energy systems and is actively trying
to counter its technology vulnerabilities.
To begin with, Estonia’s Information Systems Authority (RIA) manages
the nation’s cybersecurity and handles cyber incidents. More specifically
to energy security, critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP)
under RIA protects “public and private sector networks and information
systems that are essential for the functioning of the Estonian state.” 32
To ensure this protection, cyber vulnerability reporting and monitoring
are key aspects of RIA’s cyber mitigation methodology. This is apparent in
Estonian cybersecurity legislation, mainly the Cybersecurity Act of 2018.
Under the Cybersecurity Act, it is mandatory for critical infrastructure
cyber vulnerabilities to be reported to CERT-EE, which monitors Estonian
cyberspace 24 hours a day. CERT-EE also sends daily automated notifications
30. Karoline Paide et al., “On the Systematic Exploitation of the Estonian Data Exchange Layer X-Road
for Strengthening Public-Private Partnerships,” in Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Theory
and Practice of Electronic Governance (New York: Association for Computing Machinery, 2018), 34–41,
https://doi.org/10.1145/3209415.3209441.
31. “Power,” Public-Private Partnership Knowledge Lab (website), May 6, 2015, https://pppknowledgelab
.org/sectors/power.
32. “Critical Information Infrastructure Protection CIIP,” Republic of Estonia Information System Authority
(website), n.d., https://www.ria.ee/en/cyber-security/critical-information-infrastructure-protection-ciip.html.
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to companies about the misuse and vulnerability of their networks.
Yet, the information is not often forwarded to end users, shedding light
on a weakness of mitigation methods. Furthermore, actors that are part
of the energy sector must follow the regulation titled “Requirements for Risk
Analysis of Network and Information Systems and Description of Security
Measures,” which outlines the service provider’s obligation to assess and
secure cyber vulnerabilities. Moreover, Estonia utilizes Suricata-4-All (S4A),
a freeware-based network traffic analysis system to detect cyberattacks and
threats to critical infrastructure automatically. 33 With legislation such as the
Cybersecurity Act, agencies like RIA, the 24-hour monitoring of cyberspace
by CERT-EE, and the implementation of anomaly detection systems,
Estonia has rigorously worked to protect against hybrid threats.
Another crucial aspect to preventing cyber intrusions in Estonia
is an emphasis on cybersecurity training. Through cybersecurity events and
education, Estonia works to improve the cyber hygiene of individuals and
companies. In Tallinn, the CCDCOE hosts the annual Locked Shields
event, an international crisis exercise that tests the skills of cybersecurity
professionals to defend critical infrastructure and IT against real-time attacks. 34
After identifying the energy sector as vulnerable to cyberthreats in 2019,
Estonia practiced how to solve a ransomware attack on an energy company.
Earlier in 2016, under the Baltic Ghost training program, cybersecurity
training included how to ensure electricity supply in the case of cyberattacks. 35
Strengths of cybersecurity training practices include preparedness for crisis
scenarios and the development of management techniques. Yet, these scenarios
are solely helpful in a reactionary capacity and fail to provide preventative
measures. To predict threats instead of responding to them, early warning
systems are imperative.
To track anomalies in the electric grid and monitor grid stability,
Elering uses Guardtime’s Keyless Signature Infrastructure (KSI),
which uses blockchain technology to detect anomalies autonomously
in the electric grid. 36 Elering has also initiated other efforts to ensure
electric and smart-grid security. In 2020, the first grid stabilization project
33.

“Critical Information Infrastructure Protection CIIP.”

34. “Locked Shields,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (website),
n.d., accessed May 19, 2021, https://ccdcoe.org/exercises/locked-shields/.
35. “Cyber Security Training Baltic Ghost Practises Ensuring Electricity Supply in the Case
of Cyber-Attacks,” Elering (website), September 21, 2016, https://elering.ee/en/cyber-security-training-baltic
-ghost-practises-ensuring-electricity-supply-case-cyber-attacks.
36. KSI Blockchain,” e-Estonia (website), November 15, 2021, https://e-estonia.com/solutions/cyber-security
/ksi-blockchain/.
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in the Baltics was contracted. Elering partnered with Siemens Energy
to build three synchronous condenser plants to increase the resilience
of grid infrastructure. 37 Looking toward the future, Datel (an Estonian ICT
company) is developing a large infrastructure early warning system called
Sille. This system will rely on open satellite data from the European Space
Agency. 38 The private and public sector are both working to automate early
warning systems and protect electricity and smart grids.

Recommendations
Hybrid threats remain, and the constantly changing nature of cyberspace
requires nations to adapt to new challenges. By continuing to bolster its
security, Estonia will in turn aid the cybersecurity of NATO as a whole.
To do so, Estonia can proactively adapt tools, plans, and early warning systems
that mitigate the threats posed by malicious cyber actors. Recommendations
for Estonia and NATO include:
1. European grid adoption. Ensure the smooth transition
to the European synchronized electric grid by expanding
X-Road technology and Estfeed as a multi-stakeholder
information-sharing platform for the Baltic region. This action
would provide a space to report regional cyber threats to critical
infrastructure. It is important that both public and private
actors report risks to prevent attacks.
2. Increase regional cooperation and trust. The Baltic region
has been especially hard hit by hybrid threats from Russia
in the lead-up to, and during, the Ukraine invasion, and the
region would benefit from NATO cooperation to counter
Russian cyberattacks. To face the hybrid threats posed
by Russia, a “strong regional cooperation with regional
priorities” is needed. 39 Furthermore, the protection of critical
infrastructure is “not merely a national issue” because the
“disruption of energy supply and the destruction of a part
37. “Siemens Energy Wins Grid Stabilization Project in Baltic States,” T&D World (website),
December 16, 2020, https://www.tdworld.com/grid-innovations/article/21150570/siemens-energy-inc-siemens
-energy-wins-grid-stabilization-project-in-baltic-states.
38. “Estonian ICT Company Is Developing a New Early Warning System Based on European Satellite
Open Data,” PreventionWeb (website), March 9, 2018, https://www.preventionweb.net/news/estonian-ict
-company-developing-new-early-warning-system-based-european-satellite-open-data.
39. Molis, Palazzo, and Ainsalu, “Mitigating Risks of Hybrid War.”
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of energy infrastructure may affect not only the state where
they occur but also other states.”40
3. Public-private partnerships. Develop incentives for
Private-Public Partnerships to fully harness X-Road technology
and layered data sharing. As previously mentioned, the most
effective functioning of Elering’s data-sharing platform,
Estfeed, relies on public and private actors to share information.
By creating incentives for PPPs, Estonian companies will
contribute more to Estfeed and provide more data to build
security decisions. This is essential, as “PPPs are of utmost
importance in the protection of critical energy infrastructure
because they are mostly owned by the private sector.”41
4. Information sharing. Stakeholders in critical energy
infrastructure should share best practices on early warning
systems and anomaly detection services to ensure their
effective and efficient usage. This action would increase the
resilience of energy infrastructure.42
5. Integrated best practices. Share best practices
surrounding critical infrastructure within Estonia and
internationally. Estonia is at the forefront of cybersecurity and
ensures national cybersecurity through the implementation
of events, legislation, training, education, and more.
Estonia has already taken steps toward this recommendation
through cyber diplomacy efforts with the United States,
the Dominican Republic, and other nations around the globe.43
Best practices should continue to be shared, especially with
NATO member countries.

40. Tiziana Melchiorre, Recommendations on the Importance of Critical Energy Infrastructure (CEI)
Stakeholder Engagement, Coordination and Understanding of Responsibilities in Order to Improve Security
(Vilnius, LT: NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, 2018), https://enseccoe.org/data/public
/uploads/2018/04/d1_2018.04.23-recommendations-on-the-importance-of-critical-energy.pdf.
41.

Melchiorre, Recommendations.

42.

Melchiorre, Recommendations.

43.

“Cyber Security in Estonia 2021.”
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Figure 11-1. Map of Estonia’s threat timeline estimate (6 months indicates likely
attack vector in 2022, 1 year by 2023, 2+ years by 2024 or later)
Credit: Ryan Fisk and Lucas Cox
Location

Reason for Threat Priority and Timeline

Estlink 1 and 2 to Finland, and Baltic
Synchronization (EU Coupling) to Latvia

ICS of Estlink primary transmission lines to remain
vulnerable within six months due to Russia’s retaliation
to Estonia’s decoupling from Russian energy.

Tallinn Smart Grid

Smart Grid in the Estonian capital remains vulnerable
for next two years due to geostrategic importance
of the Baltic capital during NATO-Russia tensions.

Viru Substation

The Viru substation, located in Auvere, is a critical
juncture that helps to supply Tallinn, western Estonia,
and southern Estonia all at once. A cyberattack
on the associated SCADA, or a kinetic attack
on the physical station, could disrupt a major portion
of Estonia’s electricity supply.

CCD COE Smart Grid

The CCD COE Smart Grid and ICS could remain
a target for the next six months, though Estonia has
strong cyber defenses on the grid, and attacks are
unlikely to be successful.

BRELL

Russia will continue targeting the BRELL
interconnection for the next six months to three
years due to Russia’s last-ditch effort to maintain the
Baltics’ reliance on Russian energy before another
interconnection is complete in 2025.

Estonia-Latvia Interconnection Pipeline

The pipeline infrastructure may be vulnerable
to cyber intervention within two years because of its
increasing importance as the Baltics seek to diversify
away from Russian gas supplies.

196

Case Study: Chapter 11

Estonia

Select Bibliography
“Cyber Security Training Baltic Ghost Practises Ensuring Electricity
Supply in the Case of Cyber-Attacks.” Elering (website). September 21,
2016. https://elering.ee/en/cyber-security-training-baltic-ghost-practises
-ensuring-electricity-supply-case-cyber-attacks.
Díaz Redondo, Rebeca P., Ana Fernández-Vilas, and Gabriel Fernández dos
Reis. “Security Aspects in Smart Meters: Analysis and Prevention.” Sensors 20,
no. 14 (July 17, 2020). https://doi.org/10.3390/s20143977.
“Estonian ICT Company Is Developing a New Early Warning
System Based on European Satellite Open Data.” PreventionWeb (website).
March 9, 2018. https://www.preventionweb.net/news/estonian- ict-company
-developing-new-early-warning-system-based-european-satellite-open-data.
“European Solidarity on Energy: Synchronisation of the Baltic States’
Electricity Network with the European System Strengthens Security
of Supply.” European Commission (website). n.d. Accessed April 28, 2021.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4284.
Kallas, Kaja. “Political Statement by Prime Minister Kaja Kallas on the
Situation in the Electricity Market, 18 January 2022.” Republic of Estonia
Government (website). January 18, 2022. https://www.valitsus.ee/en/news
/political-statement-prime-minister-kaja-kallas-situation-electricity-market
-18-january-2022.
“Locked Shields.” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
(website). n.d. Accessed May 19, 2021. https://ccdcoe.org/exercises
/locked-shields/.
Melchiorre, Tiziana. Recommendations on the Importance of Critical Energy
Infrastructure (CEI) Stakeholder Engagement, Coordination and Understanding
of Responsibilities in Order to Improve Security. Vilnius, LT: NATO Energy
Security Centre of Excellence, 2018. https://enseccoe.org/data/public
/uploads/2018/04/d1_2018.04.23-recommendations-on-the-importance-of
-critical-energy.pdf.
Molis, Arūnas, Claudia Palazzo, and Kaja Ainsalu. “Mitigating Risks
of Hybrid War: Search for an Effective Energy Strategy in the Baltic States.”
Journal on Baltic Security 4, no. 2 (December 2018). https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/330928695_Mitigating_Risks_of_Hybrid_War_Search_for
_an_Effective_Energy_Strategyin_The_Baltic_States.

197

— 12 —
Latvia
Michael Bervell

©2022 Michael Bervell

ABSTRACT: Like the rest of its Baltic counterparts, Latvia is attempting
to move away from Russian power sources into renewable energ y
independence and has been plagued by Russian cyberattacks for more
than a decade which have only increased in the lead up to and during the
Ukraine crisis. Latvia is transitioning to a smart-grid energy infrastructure
connected through a 5G Internet of Things network, which has increased
opportunities for outside exploitation. It has prioritized public-privateinternational partnerships in combating Russian inf luence and developing
cyber defense strategies, bringing in specialists from different sectors
from across Europe to advise on infrastructure security. Furthermore,
Latvia has engaged in a unique large-scale education program in order
to inform all of its citizens on cyber security.
Key words: BR ELL Net work, ENTSO-E, Baltic Energ y Market
Interconnection Plan/BEMIP, CERT.LV, Russian cyberattacks, Baltic
energy security, National Information Technology Security Council
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“Let the devil into church and he will climb into the pulpit.” So goes one
the best-known Latvian proverbs. Originally coined to emphasize piety
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, today this quip can best be used
an analogy for the state of cybersecurity in Latvia. Located on the cusp
the Baltic Sea, Latvia is a small country the size of Nebraska
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with 1.9 million citizens.1 To its North and South are friendly neighbors
Estonia and Lithuania; to the East, however, is the devil in the pulpit, Russia.
Time and time again, Russia (a cybersecurity D’yavol or devil) has been
the culprit of “Easter Egg hacks” in the Baltic region, sowing chaos and
discontent in networks through malware hidden on computers that exploits
systems at the click of a button. Hiding in a digital pulpit, anti-Baltic actors
(often Russian actors) masquerade as natural parts of computer systems
before strategically unleashing digital unrest to destabilize countries
from within by crippling critical infrastructure. As described in a 2019
report by the Constitutional Protection Bureau of the Republic of Latvia,
“Russian cyber-attacks in Latvia have mostly been carried out for espionage
purposes and directed against government institutions, mainly in the fields of
defence, interior and foreign affairs. The number of cyber-attacks by foreign
special services detected in Latvia has not changed significantly over the last
4 to 5 years, reaching a few dozen cases each year.” 2
One of the first examples of the devil in the Baltics occurred in 2008.
The subject? Estonia. This attack revealed the power of coordinating physical
attacks and cyberattacks. 3 In the midst of one of Estonia’s largest public
protests about the movement of a historic Estonian statue, the Estonian
cyberspace was subject to a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack.
Online, thousands of computers around the world repeatedly accessed
Estonian websites at Russia’s command while planted Russian dissenters
sowed unrest in the physical crowds. The result? Internet-connected news
organizations, government services, and banking resources in Estonia lost
connectivity. While websites in Estonia were only down for a few hours,
those who attempted to access Estonian websites from outside the country
were unable to for several days.4 The timing was impeccable. In the midst
of riots, a poke of cyber penetration tested the core of Estonian security
through a uniquely twenty-first-century battlefield. This was a wakeup call
for the Baltic region.

1. “Quick Facts United States,” US Census Bureau (website), n.d., accessed May 19, 2021, https://www.census
.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045221.
2. Constitution Protection Bureau of the Republic of Latvia, 2019 Annual Report (Riga, LV: Constitution
Protection Bureau of the Republic of Latvia, 2019), 26, https://www.sab.gov.lv/files/Public_report_2019.pdf.
3. Luukas Kristjan Ilves, “Cyber Security Trends and Challenges: Latvian and Estonian Experience,”
February 29, 2012, YouTube video, 2:30, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg8IADVeNis&list=
PL194DD043B0884979.
4.

Ilves, “Cyber Security Trend.”
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Since then, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania have banded together
with other NATO countries to unify cybersecurity and combat the
Russian threat. For instance, the three countries have worked to relieve
themselves of Russia’s inf luence by investing in joint infrastructure projects
with Sweden, Poland, and Lithuania to reduce Russian dependence by 2025. 5
Latvia has arrested Russian spies and banned Russian TV and the Russian
language in schools in an effort to promote national pride on and off line. 6
Specifically in the cyber context, Latvia hopes to expel the devil from the
church by investing in public-private partnerships, international cooperation,
and state-wide education. While each Baltic nation has its vulnerability
challenges, weaknesses, and successes, this report will focus specifically
on Latvian 5G, IoT, and electrical grid challenges. Additionally, it will offer
tools and techniques for mitigating future intrusions in cyberspace given
the unique makeup of the Latvian cyber defense sector.

Latvia’s Cyber Vulnerabilities
Latvian Cyber Structure
The year 2018 was not the best for Latvian cybersecurity. The Republic
of Latvia discovered spyware within its Ministry of Interior, and the Latvian
social networking site Draugiem.lv was the target of hacktivist attacks.7
The former of the two attacks was a continuation of targeted 2016 campaigns
that threatened the Latvian Defense and Foreign ministries. 8 The latter,

5. Juris Kaža, “Baltics to Cut Electric Links to Russia, Disagree on Power Trading until Then,”
Medium (website), July 9, 2020, https://juriskaza.medium.com/baltics-to-cut-electric-links-to-russia-disagree
-on-power-trading-until-then-b7f7f546c983.
6. AFP, “Latvia Arrests Spy Working for Russia,” Moscow Times (website), March 2, 2020, https://www
.themoscowtimes.com/2020/03/02/latvia-arrests-spy-working-for-russia-a69489; Lauren Chadwick,
“Lithuania Follows Latvia in Banning Russian Broadcaster RT,” Euronews (website), September 7, 2020,
https://w w w.euronews.com/my-europe/2020/07/09/lithuania-follows-lat via-in-banning-russian
-broadcaster-rt; and Lucian Kim, “A New Law in Latvia Aims to Preserve National Language by Limiting
Russian in Schools,” NPR (website), October 28, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/10/28/654142363
/a-new-law-in-latvia-aims-to-preserve-national-language-by-limiting-russian-in-sc.
7. Inga Šņore, “Iekšlietu IT tīklā atrod spiegu vīrusu, izcelsme liecina par Krieviju,” Latvijas Sabiedriskie
mediji, November 25, 2018; and “Vēlēšanu dienā uzlauž draugiem.lv un lapā izvieto Krievijas simbolus,”
Latvijas Sabiedriskie mediji, October 6, 2018.
8. “SAB: Krievijas specdienests pēdējos gados uzbrucis Latvijas kibertelpai,” Latvijas Sabiedriskie mediji,
October 8, 2018.
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timed to take place on election day, posted pro-Russian messages to sway
election results.9
As described by Krista Viksnins, a Schuman trainee in the European
parliament, “hackers replaced the front page of the Facebook-like site
with a Russian f lag and message saying ‘Fellow Latvians, this concerns you.
The Russian border has no limits!’ The page also played the Russian national
anthem and included pictures of President Vladimir Putin and the Russian
military . . .”

Figure 12-1. Visualization of Latvia’s national cybersecurity policy coordination
Source: Latvian Ministry of Defence, “Cyber Security Strategy of Latvia,” European Union
Agency for Cybersecurity (website), n.d., https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national
-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map/lv-ncss, 21.

In all these cases of Latvian cyberattack, the Latvian Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT.LV) has been the primary institution responsible
for analyzing and preventing these attacks, racing to incidents and coordinating
incident prevention.10 Headquartered in the Institute of Mathematics and
Computer Science at the University of Latvia, CERT.LV is one of many
components of the Latvian cybersecurity arsenal. While the National
9. “Latvia Repulsed Election Day Cyber-attack,” Latvian Public Broadcasting (website), October 18, 2018,
https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/election/latvia-repulsed-election-day-cyber-attack.a296457/.
10. “Improving Cyber Security Capacities in Latvia,” CERT.LV, accessed May 18, 2021.
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Information Technology Security Council develops cybersecurity policy
at a national level, the implementation of this cyber policy is left to
specific institutions in the public and private sector, including CERT.LV.
Figure 12-1 describes the entire Latvian cybersecurity organization, from the
National Information Technology Security Council (that functions as a strategy
organization) to functional units like Netsafe, SRDA, DSI, and more.11

Cyber Challenges Generalized
As a small countr y, Lat via has always strategically relied on
partnerships to thrive. Even after 1991 when Latvia regained independence
from the USSR through the Latvian independence and democracy poll,
much of Latvia’s infrastructure was still tied to Russia. Their former country
was still a partner. Demographically, even in 2000, ethnic Russians still made
up nearly 30 percent of the country’s population of 2.4 million, according
to Latvia’s census.12 A core component of the Latvian cybersecurity
strategy, however, has been to unwind these relationships with Russia and
lean into more global NATO partnerships. While a logically sound goal,
its implementation has been far more difficult.
The current Latvian cybersecurity strategy has three major components:
building relationships (public, private, and international partnerships),
educating the public, and institutionalizing knowledge.

Building Relationships through Partnership
To date, Latvia has relied on public, private, and international partnerships
to build and supplement its cybersecurity capabilities. As described
by Elina Viksne (a senior expert of the National Cybersecurity Policy
Coordination Section at the Latvian Ministry of Defence), cybersecurity
is a horizontal issue: the sheer number of actors involved means they all must
cooperate in making cyberspace safe.13 The typical Latvian citizen may interact
with government health care, private financial institutions, public Internet
networks, websites around the world, and private WiFi routers—all from
11. Latvian Ministry of Defence, Cyber Security Strategy of Latvia: 2014–2018 (Riga, LV: European Union
Agency for Cybersecurity, 2018), https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies
/ncss-map/lv-ncss.
12. Timothy Heleniak, “Latvia Looks West, But Legacy of Soviets Remain,” Migration Policy Institute
(website), February 1, 2006, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/latvia-looks-west-legacy-soviets-remains.
13. Data Security Solutions, “Securing Cyber Space in Latvia through the Public-private Partnership,”
November 3, 2016, MP4, 21:10. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=acM5sfpgHSY.

203

Bervell

the same device within the same day. Even though the private sector may
have various views on how, when, or why to secure a system, there is no
escaping how interconnected cyberspace is, especially for a small country
like Latvia. Every citizen’s IoT device (cell phones, computers, and more)
uses a combination of technologies managed by governments, businesses, and
international suppliers.
Unfortunately, one challenge is that in isolation, no single institution
has all the human and f inancial resources to attack every threat or risk
globally. By pooling resources, conducting joint cybersecurity exercises, and
practicing the coordinated prevention of cyberattacks and issues, Viksne makes
an argument for a public-private-international approach. Private companies
and governments need to share knowledge with one another to create a system
of “security by cooperation.”
Latvia has deep investments in this cooperative cybersecurity strategy
and fulf ills the collectively agreed upon NATO commitment to invest
2 percent of its GDP in defense.14 Moreover, Latvia helped to establish the
NATO Cooperative Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn in
2008. In partnership with Estonia, Lithuania, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, and
Spain, the CCDCOE is designed “to support our member nations and NATO
with unique interdisciplinary expertise in the f ield of cyber defense
research” and with training and exercises in technology, strategy, and law.15
This allows Latvia to f ight the military and nonmilitary cyberthreats
(hybrid threats) with similar hybrid strategies. Often, these strategies
are practiced through red teaming exercises that bring together the public
sector, private sector, and international partners to ensure the effectiveness
of defenses and counter hybrid responses.

Educating and Training the Public
Even with a public-private-international partnership, the root
of cybersecurity is related to individual nodes of people. Thus, a core pillar
of Latvian cybersecurity involves educating the public regardless of age.
In particular, some of the specific education initiatives include:

14. “Latvia’s Security Policy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, June 19, 2020.
15. Franklin Holcomb, “Countering Russian and Chinese Cyber-Aggression,” Center for European
Policy Analysis (CEPA) (website), December 4, 2020, https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/countering
-russian-and-chinese-cyber-aggression/.
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Cyber defense unit (18+). Volunteers from academia, the
military, and the general public who have specific skills
that can be used to defend the country.16 While it started
with just 13 members, Latvia plans to expand the group
to more than 100 soldiers. The pipeline for this unit could
come directly from the Baltic University study program that
combines regional education resources to develop strong and
qualified experts.17



Youth cyber guards (13–18). In 2014, Janis Sarts, the state
secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Latvia, argued
for the need to educate and train teenagers on cyber defense.
“We have to understand that children are very active users
of the cyber world. We even know of cases when a 14-yearold teenager has created an app which has turned him
into a millionaire,” Sarts said. In theory, this same type
of success could be applied to the security of Latvia
generally.18 The Youth Cyber Guard is an initiative to excite
young Latvians to use their technology talents to defend their
country in cyberspace.



Preschool starting education programs (under 13). Every
phone in Latvia is an IoT device with troves of personal
and private information that can be hacked and used
maliciously. During a 2012 conference with LATO (the
Latvian Transatlantic Organisation), panelists described
how Latvia had plans to begin educating students from
preschool about Internet safety.19 Such learning could also
trickle up to parents and grandparents, eventually spreading
cyber hygiene to the Latvian population.

For all age groups, Latvia recognizes its 3 million citizens must
be vigilant. A core pillar of their strategy for vigilance is to develop
home-grown talent and tap into existing networks of individuals to turn cyber
sleepers into cyber soldiers.
16. Data Security Solutions, “Securing Cyber Space.”
17.

Cyber Security Strategy of Latvia: 2014–2018.

18. Gederts Gelzis, “Cyber Defence Unit Launch,” DW (website), 2014, https://www.dw.com/en/latvia-launches
-cyber-defence-unit-to-beef-up-online-security/a-17471936.
19. LATO Latvian Transatlantic Organisation, “Estonian Attacks Were Wake-up Call for Us,”
March 12, 2012, YouTube video, 6:14, https://w w w.youtube.com/watch?v=Jg8IA DVeN
is&list=PL194DD043B0884979.
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Institutionalizing Knowledge
Latvia has instituted the National Information Technology Security
Council to institutionalize its cyber strategy by developing cybersecurity
policy at a national level. While discussed earlier in a description of
CERT.LV, Latvia’s policy, while written nationally, is implemented
by specific institutions in the public and private sectors.
This implementation strategy of institutionalizing knowledge has
four layers. First, to develop and motivate cyberspace security knowledge,
researchers, innovators, and opinion leaders to collaborate in academic
environments to develop reports, white papers, and educational content
at research conferences. These works are then spread to higher education and
professional education professors to create specializations and develop deeper
expertise at an educator level. Third, students and educational institutions
communicate this research into general knowledge that finally can be used
to inform all users in society of basic cyber skills. In moving from academics
to professors to students to society, Latvia’s strategy is focused on targeting
relevant and actionable knowledge at each level of the public.

Figure 12-2. Level of cyberspace security knowledge according
to the target audience

Ultimately, Latvia’s cybersecurity is inherently tied to its neighbors
and allies. These three investment areas of partnership, public education, and
knowledge creation are particularly Latvian and built into its strategy that is
designed to protect Latvia’s 5G/IoT infrastructure and electrical grid.
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Latvian Electrical Grid
Latvia and Estonia have long been considered the “stars” of the transition
from socialism to the market economy. Both countries quickly reached
development levels comparable to Central European countries just decades
after cutting ties with the USSR. Despite these changes, there are still
remnants of the old system. Much of the Latvian electricity grid and rail
system is connected to Russian infrastructure. Through legal and technical
changes, however, Latvia is on pace to reach independence from Russia by 2025
with systems estimated to offer 700 megawatts of capacity. 20 The process
requires completion of a second interconnection between Poland and Lithuania,
which is still under construction. 21
Until 2017, the prevailing technology for the Latvian electrical grid was
the BRELL Network, an agreement between Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania for parallel energy systems in those countries. 22 While a reliable
technology, the risk was that all of the Baltic states still had much of their
electricity grid connected to Russia. Gazprom (the Russian state-owned
energy group) was one of the major players in providing and managing this
energy. 23 Intrinsically, it was linked to the Russian government, and there
was little confidence from the global markets that Gazprom could maintain a
healthy market economy devoid of favoritism or politics. This reexamination
revealed a core weakness in the Latvian system—what could the Baltic states
do to shift dependence away from Russia to themselves or Western Europe?
Starting as early as 2013, Latvia was moving to leave BRELL and integrate
with the EU energy networks to ensure broader energy security. The goal
now is to create infrastructure projects with Sweden, Poland, and Lithuania
to reduce Russian dependence through investment in and the operation
of the ENTSO-E (the Western European counterpart to the BRELL
20. Alissa de Carbonnel and Andrius Sytas, “Baltic States to Decouple Power Grids from Russia, Link
to EU by 2025,” Reuters (website), June 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltics-energy-eu
-russia/baltic-states-to-decouple-power-grids-from-russia-link-to-eu-by-2025-idUSKBN1JO15Q.
21. LETA/TBT Staff, “Latvia Would Be Ready to Withdraw from Russian-Belarusian Power Grid
Already Today, but There Are Physical Limitations – Karins,” Baltic Times (website), April 13, 2022,
https://www.baltictimes.com/latvia_would_be_ready_to_withdraw_from_russian-belarusian_power_grid
_already_today__but_there_are_physical_limitations_-_karins/.
22. Leonid Karabeshkin, “The Baltic Withdrawal from BRELL: An Economic Necessity or a Political
Decision?,” Energy Collective Group (website), August 21, 2017, https://energycentral.com/c/ec/baltic
-withdrawal-brell-economic-necessity-or-political-decision.
23. Rafael Leal-Arcas, Filipa Santos, and Danai Papadea, “Energy, Electricity and Smart Grids
in Latvia and Portugal – Developments and Concerns,” Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture, & Natural
Resources Law 12, no. 3 (February 2020), https://uknowledge.uky.edu/kjeanrl/vol12/iss3/2/.
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Network). The market at the wholesale level would then be integrated
“directly with the markets of Estonia and Lithuania (the Baltic states) as well
as with those of Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (the Scandinavian
or Nordic countries).” 24 Another initiative Latvia has invested in is the Baltic
Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP), “an initiative between the
European Commission, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Finland, and Sweden (with Norway as an observer) to synchronize
the Baltics’ grid with the continental European Network by 2025.” 25
With this model comes strength, as Latvia and the rest of the Baltic
states integrate further with NATO. Latvia has already seen the benefits.
In October 2019, the country signed an agreement with the United States
involving the Baltic energy grid’s protection from cyberattacks through
strategic and technical support. The weakness comes from the same token.
In being an international system, Lat via is always (and for the
foreseeable future will be) reliant on other countries. Since Latvia
struggles to educate its population on cybersecurity, this dependence
on the EU may be detrimental in the long-term.
For Latvia, the modernization and digitization of the electrical grid
has been a broader part of Latvia’s strategy to become a more renewable
energy economy. Moreover, in becoming this electrical economy of the future,
the country has invested significant resources in developing IoT and connected
smart-city solutions.

Latvian 5G and IoT
With the rise of an independent electrical grid comes the use of more
sophisticated electrical technologies like smart metering, utility network
monitoring, remotely controlled streetlights, smart waste management,
and other cit y-level ser vices. As described by Kerli Gabrilovica,
chief development and marketing officer of Latvia Lattelecom, “The new
infrastructure will allow smart devices to be connected to a single network
. . . Latvia’s capital has many advantages for introducing new technologies.”
These innovations and others will be protected by Latvia’s smart-grid task
force that was established in 2017. 26

24.

Leal-Arcas, Santos, and Papadea, “Energy, Electricity, and Smart Grids.”

25.

Leal-Arcas, Santos, and Papadea, “Energy, Electricity, and Smart Grids.”

26.

Leal-Arcas, Santos, and Papadea, “Energy, Electricity, and Smart Grids.”
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The hope is this technology and the proliferation of IoT smart devices
generally will open the possibility for consumers to use interconnected devices
seamlessly in their daily lives. For consumers concerned about privacy, Latvia
has been a leader in data-privacy adoption. In July 2018, Latvia became the first
Baltic nation to adopt legislation regarding the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) by enacting the Law on Personal Data Processing.
Thus, Latvians have confidence knowing that while using IoT devices their
data will be gathered, processed, and stored in an ethical manner. If not,
the Data State Inspectorate of Latvia (DSI) is the authority responsible for
enforcement.
In spite of this well-thought-out system of check, protections, and
balances, Latvia still faces weaknesses in the cybersecurity due to the IoT and
5G systems they hope to employ. As described by Rafael Leal-Arcas, Filipa
Santos, and Danai Papadea of the University of London: “The proliferation of
IoT smart devices has opened many possible routes through which the function
of a grid can be compromised: electric vehicles, smart meters, thermostats,
and home appliances all could potentially be vulnerable access points
of targeted smart grid.” 27 In seeing every node as a potential point of
entry to the grid, Latvia is exposing itself to an infinite number of attacks
as it promotes more connected cities by establishing technology innovations
like the LoRaWAN network. 28

Recommended Systems, Tools, Procedures,
and Mitigation Plans
In the last decade, Latvia has recognized the growing importance
of anticipating cyber challenges, educating the Latvian public, and anticipating
the future development of 5G, IoT, and the electrical grid. Moving forward,
however, Latvia’s security system will also need to begin developing mitigation
plans and strategies for the future.
In the theory of applied deterrence, countries must rely on more than
just reactive military power or force. Through a combination of social
dimensions, prioritizations, and joint initiatives, countries can develop
mitigation strategies to prevent or avoid issues before they arise. In the
context of cybersecurity, examples of these mitigation and early warning
systems include public-warning systems (for example, tsunami warning
27.

Leal-Arcas, Santos, and Papadea, “Energy, Electricity, and Smart Grids.”

28. Zenobia Hegde, “Activity Delivers Two New Nationwide LoRaWAN IoT Networks, Partnering
Levikom in Estonia and Lattelecon in Latvia,” IoTnow, February 16, 2017.
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systems), community warning systems (for example, through smart city
developments), canary honeypots (for example, digital canaries in the coal
mine), and most recently machine-learning systems. 29
As described by Lukas Milevski, a Baltic Sea fellow at the Eurasia
Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Latvia’s mitigation plans
revolve around “four pillars of national defense: its armed forces, total defense
(which comprises the societal dimension of defense), NATO collective defense,
international cooperation (including alliance cooperation within NATO
or the EU), bilateral military cooperation (especially with the United States),
and working with non-NATO partners (such as Georgia and Ukraine).” 30
Generally, this strategy ref lects the public-private-international partnership
referenced earlier.
As Milevski continues, the aim of these systems is to “prioritize early
warning systems to strengthen Latvia’s capabilities to detect and resist surprise
attack; command and control systems that are resilient against electronic
warfare; and overall military readiness, including for the Zemessardze,
Latvia’s National Guard.” 31 As a supplement to this existing infrastructure,
I propose three additional formulations:
1. Investment in proactive cybersecurity. Latvia should
invest more deeply in education and joint-presence priorities
with other NATO allies. As described in a September 2019
report for the 100-person Latvian parliament, “Permanent
presence of the allied forces strengthens deterrence, closer
integration with NATO defence structures and armed forces,
facilitates reception of the allied forces and their response
if necessary, as well as strengthens NATO defence positions
in the Baltic Region at large.”32 Both in and out of cyberspace,
it is in the best interest of Latvia to increase the presence and
interoperability of more resourced and experienced partners
given its underdeveloped mitigation plans. The aims of these
programs would be to create a proactive rather than reactive
cybersecurity position.

29. Harsha Kalutarage et al., “Early Warning Systems for Cyber Defence,” Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(New York: Springer, May 2016), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39028-4_3.
30. Lukas Milevski, “Latvia’s New State Defense Concept,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (website),
June 25, 2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/06/latvias-new-state-defense-concept/.
31.

“Valsts Aizsardzibas Koncepcija,” Ministru Kabineta, Riga, 2020.

32. “Par Nacionālās drošības koncepcijas apstiprināšanu,” Saeima, September 26, 2019.
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2. Training the next generation of cyber experts. While
Latvia has well-established plans for educating its public
from preschool to later life about cyber hygiene, there
is no international pipeline to train industry experts.
Through partnerships with CERT.EE and CERT.LT
(the Estonian and Lithuanian versions of CERT.LV ),
Latvia can create a regional education ecosystem to train the
next generation of cybersecurity thought leaders. Since its
establishment, CERT.LV ’s ability to identify cyberattacks
performed by foreign intelligence and security services has
improved significantly in isolation. Through collective effort
in the Baltic region to “develop the ability to monitor the
content created on the Internet by users with the purpose
of identifying the targeted activities directed against national
security of Latvia and preventing them, as well as actively work
on reduction of response time and improvement of proactive
ability to prevent threats.”33
3. Investment in critical infrastructure. Latvia should
accelerate its development and independent investment
into critical infrastructure. While Latvia contributes 2 percent
of its GDP to defense (as recommended by NATO) and has
developed partnerships with the regional BRELL network,
these steps alone are not sufficient for a mitigation strategy.
One core precondition for the resilience of the national
information space is the ability of the society and state to be
aware of risks and threats to the public space in house and
to respond to them in real time.34 In the context of energy
security, Latvia can also begin to build up energy reserves
(the Latvian government has already begun exploring the
potential of the Inčukalns’s underground gas storage facility),
promote the use of renewable energy resources (primarily in
the agriculture and transport sectors), and develop energymonitoring systems to flag large deviations from the average.

33.

“Par Nacionālās drošības.”

34.

“Par Nacionālās drošības.”
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Conclusion: Beyond the D’yavol
As Latvia nears the second quarter of the twenty-f irst century,
it is able to lean in to the West despite historical ties to the east.
As institutions like CERT.LV, the Latvian parliament, and BRELL continue
to develop skills and technologies, Latvia is evolving its ability to expel
the devil in the pulpit. Latvia’s population will continue to be prepared
for cyber intrusions if the Latvian government continues to focus
on public-private-international partnerships, state-wide education, and
institutionalized knowledge sharing.
In addition to its armed forces, total defense, NATO collective defense,
international cooperation, bilateral military cooperation, and working
with non-NATO partners, Latvia must continue to strengthen its
5G, IoT, and electrical grid to address challenges posed by more
sophisticated cyber actors. As proposed, such strengthening could come
through joint-presence priorities with NATO allies, international education
pipelines, and deeper investment into upgrading critical infrastructure.
Latvia’s cyber defense is unique, but it offers opportunities for growth
beyond the D’yavol.
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Figure 12-3. Map of Latvia’s threat timeline estimate (6 months indicates likely attack
vector in 2022, 1 year by 2023, 2+years by 2024 or later)
Credit: Ryan Fisk and Lucas Cox

Location

Reason for Threat Priority and Timeline

Baltic Synchronization
Transmission Lines

The transmission lines that are transitioning from BRELL
to coupling with the EU are a direct effort to reduce reliance
on Russia. It is very likely significant attempts to interfere
with the transition will take place over the next two years.

Valmiera Substation

The Valmiera substation is connected to two Baltic
Synchronization transmission lines from Estonia. A single
attack here, especially in the current transition period, would
severely degrade electricity import capabilities.

Estonia-Latvia Interconnection
Pipeline

As the Baltics seek to diversify away from Russian gas
supplies, the Estonia-Latvia Interconnection Pipeline will
be of increasing importance to Latvia’s energy security and
a likely target for intervention.

Vilnius-Panevežys-Riga Pipeline

The pipeline’s importance for Latvia’s energy independence
from Russia will make it a likely target for the next two years.
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ABSTR ACT: Lithuania was one of the few European countries that
exported energy instead of importing it from foreign sources while
it was part of the Soviet Union. Once it applied for membership in
NATO following the fall of the Soviet Union, it was forced to shut
down the nuclear power plant supplying most of the nation’s energy
and import energ y from Russia. Lithuania has taken signif icant
steps to reduce Russia’s monopoly on energy by forming alignments
with other neighboring nations (such as Poland) and announced intentions
to withdraw from the BRELL network. Russia has launched cyberattacks
on Lithuanian infrastructure regularly to keep the country in the sphere of
Russian inf luence. Lithuania has constructed a comprehensive, coordinated
cyber defense strategy to safeguard against predatory Russian interference,
though there has been an increase in cyber threats since the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. As a country bordering the Russian Kalingrad exclave which
houses Russian nuclear weapons, Lithuania is in an especially vulnerable
position during the Ukraine conf lict.
Key words: LitPol, NordBalt, BRELL, Russian cyberattacks, energy
independence, Baltic Cyber Shield, Kaunas institute of technology,
coordinated cybersecurity, Klaipėda

Introduction
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Lithuania has aligned with
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU)
to improve its security and economy, while reducing dependence on Russia
for the same. Energy security during this transition remains a concern
for Lithuania’s government. The International Energy Agency (IEA)
defines energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources
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at an affordable price.”1 Lithuania currently struggles to achieve both conditions
set by the IEA for energy security.
A condition for Lithuanian entry into the EU was the decommissioning
of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant that provided 77 percent of the country’s
electricity requirements. The decommissioning of the plant transitioned
Lithuania from a net exporter of energy to a net importer. 2 To offset this
shortfall, Lithuania had to increase the import of energy from Russia. 3
In 2012, 63 percent of energy imports came from Russia.4 This dependence
was not ideal for Lithuania as they sought to decouple their energy grid
from Russia and connect with the EU market. 5 As the country continues
this transition, it faces threats from malign cyber actors, most likely from
Russia, to the industrial control systems of the electrical grid and renewable
energy generation infrastructure as well as disinformation attacks to decrease
confidence in these systems and the government. Cyberattacks on either
system would require Lithuania to increase, not decrease, dependence
on Russian energy supplies.
To lessen Russian inf luence on the availability of energy, Lithuania
undertook two projects. In 2015, Sweden and Lithuania jointly commissioned
the NordBalt transmission line from Nybro, Sweden, to Klaipėda,
Lithuania. At its peak, this asynchronous line will provide 700 megawatts
of electricity. 6 That same year, Poland and Lithuania launched the LitPol
Link that can provide up to 500 megawatts of electricity.7 These two projects
reduced dependence on Russian energy imports but failed to provide the
1,830 megawatts needed daily by Lithuania. While significantly reducing
the ability of Russia to manipulate the supply of energy for political gain,

1. International Energy Agency (IEA), “Energy Security: Ensuring the Uninterrupted Availability
of Energy Sources at an Affordable Price,” updated December 2, 2019, https://www.iea.org/areas-of-work
/ensuring-energy-security.
2. US Energy Information Administration, “Lithuania,” updated March 2013, accessed April 27, 2021,
https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/LTU.
3. Rokas Masiulis, “Lithuania’s Energy Sector Development Trends” (presentation, Baltic Utilities
Forum, Riga, April 9, 2015), 2, http://www.lsta.lt/files/seminarai/2015-04-09_Ryga/03.-ey-bus-2015-rokas
-masiulis.pdf.
4. “Lithuania,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (website), n.d., accessed
April 29, 2021, https://www.oecd.org/countries/lithuania/.
5. Simon Hoellerbauer, “Lithuania Moves to Bolster Electricity Security,” Foreign Policy Research Institute
(website), March 23, 2016, https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/03/lithuania-moves-bolster-electricity-security/.
6. “NordBalt: Interconnecting Grids,” ABB Group (website), n.d., accessed April 28, 2021,
https://library.e.abb.com/public/e97556106e37e7aec1257dcf004f589a/POW0073%20Rev%201.pdf.
7. “LitPol Link,” Litgrid (website), n.d., accessed April 21, 2021, https://www.litgrid.eu/index.php?lang=2.
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these transmission lines are a security concern. 8 Losing either input
significantly exacerbates the energy shortfall Lithuania faces daily.
Another energ y sector Russia previously manipulated was the
natural-gas market. The monopoly held by state-owned Gazprom over the
Russian natural-gas market had been a key bargaining tool used previously
between Russia and Europe.9 To disrupt this monopoly, Lithuania constructed
the Klaipėda LNG terminal. This terminal reduces Lithuanian dependence
on Russian natural gas by approximately 33 percent. Unfortunately, similar
to the NordBalt and LitPol Link transmission lines, this single point of failure
presents a great risk to Lithuania’s goal of energy security.10
Initiatives like NordBalt, LitPol Link, and the Klaipėda LNG terminal
decreased dependence on Russia energy sources. In 2016, Lithuania only
imported 33 percent of its energy requirements from Russia. Lithuania is
still dependent on other nations, however, to meet its energy demands.
Current estimates show Lithuania must import approximately 70 percent
of its energy requirements.11
In 2019, Lithuania energy supplies depended heavily on oil, natural gas,
and coal. These nonrenewable sources accounted for 75.8 percent of energy
supply. Renewable energy sources like biofuels and waste, hydro, and wind
generated the remaining 24.2 percent.12 The average price for electricity rose
by 14.3 percent, second only to the Netherlands in the European Union.13
Recognizing how the combined dynamics of reliance on external sources
and rising prices are problematic to long-term energy security, Lithuania
set a goal to produce 70 percent of its electrical demand by 2030 and
100 percent by 2050.14 Since the nation has relatively few natural resources,
Lithuania’s focus is on the development of renewable resources.

8. Hollerbauer, “Lithuania Moves.”
9. Members of the Ukrainian Parliament, “Putin’s Pipeline Is a Strategic Weapon. It Must Be Stopped,”
Atlantic Council (blog), October 13, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins
-pipeline-is-a-strategic-weapon-it-must-be-stopped/.
10. Hollerbauer, “Lithuania Moves.”
11. “Lithuania 2021: Energy Policy Review,” IEA (website), n.d., https://www.iea.org/reports/lithuania-2021.
12. “Lithuania Energy Supply by Total Energy Supply by Sector Chart, 2020,” IEA (website), n.d.,
accessed April 9, 2021, https://www.iea.org/countries/lithuania.
13. Eurostat, “Household Energy Prices in the EU Increased Compared with 2018” (news release),
May 7, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/portlet_file_entry/2995521/8-07052020-AP-EN
.pdf/2c418ef5-7307-5217-43a6-4bd063bf7f44.
14. “Lithuania 2021,” 115.
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Lithuania invested in renewable resource production, rising
from 3.1 percent of total energy consumption in 1990 to 33.6 percent
in 2017. While all subsets of renewable energy sources saw growth
over this time, wind-energy generation increased the most. When it began
in 2004, it created only 1 gigawatt hour of energy. Most recent f igures
from 2019 show wind power created 1,499 gigawatt hours of energy.15
The deals to export 3.8 terawatts of energy over a 10-year period
to Estonia from Lithuanian wind farms, and with Siemens to construct
a proof-of-concept storage plant for energy generated by renewable assets,
demonstrate Lithuania’s commitment to energy security.16 With its development
and expansion of renewable energy sources coupled with other initiatives,
Lithuania seeks to establish itself as the new energy hub in the Baltic states
and surrounding region.

Consumption by Sector
Since 2000, demand for electricity has consistently risen in the industrial,
residential, commercial, and public-service sectors while remaining f lat
in the agricultural, forestry, and transportation sectors. The industrial sector
requires 35.4 percent of Lithuania’s electricity, followed by the commercial
and public sector at 33 percent and the residential sector at 28.7 percent.
The agriculture and transportation sectors make up less than 3 percent
of Lithuania’s electricity demand. Lithuania uses approximately 60 percent
of its natural gas for non-energy-related requirements with the industrial,
residential, and commercial sectors accounting for the remaining 40 percent.17
These f igures outline the impact malicious cyber intrusions would have
on Lithuania.

Threats
The Baltic nations f ind themselves on the frontline of a battle
for control between Russia and NATO and have done so long before Russia’s
2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russia desires to retain control over the region
and to prevent increased NATO and EU control. In April 2015, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania announced their intent to disconnect from the Belarus,
15. IEA, “Lithuania Energy Supply.”
16. Sten Hankewitz, “Estonian Energy Company to Purchase Electricity from a Danish Energy Developer,”
Estonian World (website), April 14, 2021, https://estonianworld.com/business/estonian-energy-company
-to-purchase-electricity-from-a-danish-energy-developer/.
17.

IEA, “Lithuania Energy Supply.”
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Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (BRELL) network and connect
to EU energy networks.18 Russia has three primary concerns with the separation
of Lithuania and other nations from the BRELL network.
First, the Baltic states would no longer have to pay Russia to maintain
the network, resulting in less revenue for Russia. Second, Russia would
lose a tremendous leverage over neighboring states from this loss of control
over energy supplies. Russia would have less direct access to alter energy
supply to support its end state in the region. Third, a transfer of networks
by the Baltic nations would force Russia to either construct a new network
to support Kaliningrad where their Baltic f leet is based or make the region
energy self-sufficient. Both options are costly, and Russia previously indicated
it would attempt to force the EU and Baltic states to fund either.19
As a signif icant importer of energy, Lithuania faces a tremendous
amount of risk as it disconnects from BRELL. Russian naval ships
harassed construction of the NordBalt undersea transmission line. 20 In addition
to physical engagements, Lithuania faces threats from malicious cyber actors
to attack in the electrical, natural-gas, and renewable resources sectors.
The loss of any component would negatively impact Lithuania’s energy
security. The tremendous cost required to transition from the BRELL
network to synchronous EU networks creates several opportunities
for exploitation. Russia understands these vulnerabilities and in 2015,
following the announcement of Lithuania’s intent to separate from the BRELL
network, launched distributed denial-of-service attacks at Baltic electricity
grids in an attempt to find vulnerabilities for future exploitation. 21
Intrusions into Lithuania’s infrastructure occurred in 2020 when
cybercriminals accessed over 20 public-sector websites, spreading
disinformation on the eve of a Lithuanian government transition. 22
Earlier in 2020, NordBalt became inoperable without an explanation,
halting 700 megawatts of power (or almost 40 percent of Lithuania’s daily
18. Barbara Lewis and Gederts Gelzis, “Baltics May Risk More Russia Tension with Europe Power
Grid Plan,” Reuters (website), April 14, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/baltic-russia-energy/baltics
-may-risk-more-russia-tension-with-europe-power-grid-plan-idUSL5N0W75BZ20150414.
19. Hollerbauer, “Lithuania Moves.”
20. Hollerbauer, “Lithuania Moves.”
21. Stephen Jewkes and Oleg Vukmanovic, “Suspected Russia-Backed Hackers Target Baltic Energy
Networks,” Reuters (website), May 11, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltics-cyber-insight/suspected
-russia-backed-hackers-target-baltic-energy-networks-idUSKBN1871W5.
22. Sarah Coble, “Lithuania Suffers ‘Most Complex’ Cyber-attack in Years,” Infosecurity (website),
December 16, 2020, https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/lithuania-cyberattack/.
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requirements). 23 The precarious nature of Lithuania’s energy system can be exploited
through a number of activities by cyber actors. This trend is likely to worsen
as Russia increases its hybrid warfare against the Baltic states as part
of its expansionist policies in what it considers its near abroad. Figure 13-1
highlights the major locations where Lithuania could face disinformation
and attacks on industrial control systems.

Figure 13-1. Energy distribution overlay for Lithuania
Source: Stasys Backaitis, “Are All Lithuanian Energy Problems Now Resolved?,”
October 2015, VilNews (website), n.d., accessed May 10, 2021, http://vilnews.com
/2015-10-are-all-lithuanian-energy-problems-now-resolved.

Russian cyber actors use disinformation attacks to create confusion
and reduce trust in a government. There has been an increase in Russian
disinformation efforts surrounding the 2022 Ukraine invasion. In March
2022, the Lithuanian government tightened its national state of emergency,
strengthening the state’s authority to remove “pro-Russian propaganda” on
social media. 24 Once confidence is decreased, any follow-on attacks will
have significantly more impact. Highlighted in figure 13-1 are the four most
likely targets for disinformation attacks. The first target is the government
of Lithuania, against which Russia has allegedly conducted disinformation
23. Government of Lithuania, “Baltic Power Line Disconnects, Triggering Emergency Operations,”
June 8, 2020, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1186395/baltic-power-line-disconnects-triggering
-emergency-operations.
24. Lisa Abend, “Meet the Lithuanian ‘Elves’ Fighting Russian Disinformation,” TIME (website),
March 6, 2022, https://time.com/6155060/lithuania-russia-fighting-disinformation-ukraine/.
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attacks. In December 2020, following their elections, cybercriminals
conducted a significant disinformation campaign spreading disinformation
on multiple government networks on multiple topics, from excessive troop
drafting to corrupt Polish off icials. In the same attack, cybercriminals
alleged corruption at Siauliai airport, the location for NATO’s Baltic air
policing. Sowing seeds of division between Lithuania and the EU at Klaipėda
where the LNG terminal and terminus for NordBalt are or toward the
LitPol Link would be another avenue for disinformation attacks. 25
Russia could also conduct disinformation attacks centered on the safety
of the closed nuclear power plant at Ignalina. Russian actors already carried
out a similar disinformation campaign in Poland centered on a leaking
nuclear reactor in Lithuania. 26
In addition to disinformation attacks, Russian cyber actors could conduct
attacks on the industrial control systems of key electrical infrastructure.
With minimal redundancy in its system, any successful attack would
signif icantly hinder Lithuania’s ability to meet daily energy demands.
A shutdown of the Klaipėda terminal would impact LNG and electricity
imports. Any shutdown to the LNG terminal leaves only Russia as a potential
backfill. LitPol Link provides roughly 30 percent of daily demand and would
have a similar impact as when NordBalt was inoperative in December 2020.
As Lithuania modernizes the Elektrenai Power Plant to meet EU standards,
an attack would double the effect. First, there would be a loss of power generation.
Second, the costly improvements to meet EU standards could be damaged,
requiring repair or replacement, and increasing the total bill. Last, disabling
the transmission lines into Latvia would hinder Lithuania’s goal to be the
regional energy hub for the Baltic states. Realizing the amount of risk posed
by malicious cyber intrusions in the electrical and renewable energy grids,
along with their LNG terminal, Lithuania has proactively addressed these
risks through multiple avenues.

Lithuanian Cyber Efforts
In 2018, the International Telecommunications Union’s Global Cyber
Index gave Lithuania its highest score in its legal and organizational

25.

Coble, “Lithuania Suffers.”

26. Associated Press (AP), “Polish State Websites Hacked and Used to Spread False Info,” AP News (website),
March 17, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/europe-poland-eastern-europe-lithuania-nuclear-waste-424dd9
7778b3d2046bc1cb61a175f270.
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pillars. 27 Lithuania’s efforts on cybersecurity resulted in GCI ranking
them the fourth-most committed country, behind the United Kingdom,
the United States, and France. 28 This cohesive approach enables Lithuania
to enact multiple mitigation measures.
The 2018 cybersecurity strategy for Lithuania clearly identif ies the
Ministry of National Defence as the lead agency for cybersecurity. The strategy
also reinforced the relationship between the National Cybersecurity Centre
(NCSC) and the Ministry of National Defence. The strategy specified the
roles and functions of each, especially of the National Cybersecurity Centre
and its components. The NCSC supports the Ministry of National Defence,
and this alignment streamlines Lithuania’s cybersecurity enterprise. In addition
to the development of plans and policies, the 2018 strategy also mandates the
Ministry of National Defence organize national cybersecurity exercises. 29
Lithuania does this with the Baltic Cyber Shield and Amber Mist
exercise series.
Baltic Cyber Shield, a proof of concept in 2008 and f irst executed
in 2010, is an annual cyber-defense exercise with the major goal of increasing
international, national, and public- and private-industry cooperation.
The initial scenario had six teams defend critical power-generation information
technology systems against progressively more complicated attacks. 30
The National Cybersecurity Centre and Kaunas University of Technology
cohost the exercise, further increasing public and private-sector cooperation.
In 2020, the exercise focused on execution of the National Cyber Incident
Management Plan and reacting to the myriad different cyber events the
National Cybersecurity Centre handles daily. 31 In coordination with this
national-level exercise, the Lithuanian Armed Forces hosts Amber Mist.
Amber Mist improves interoperability between Lithuania and other
NATO partners in the event of a cyberattack. Amber Mist began in 2014
27. International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Publications, Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) 2018,
(Geneva, ITU, 2019), 31, https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2018-PDF-E.pdf.
28.

ITU Publications, GCI 2018, 16.

29. Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Resolution on the Approval of the National Cyber Security
Strategy, no. 818, August 13, 2018, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Documents/National
_Strategies_Repository/LRV+818+National+Cyber+Security+Strategy+%28Lithuania%29.pdf.
30. Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), Baltic Cyber Shield Cyber Defence
Exercise 2010 After Action Report, (Tallinn, EE: CCDCOE, 2010), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10
/BCS2010AAR.pdf.
31. Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, “Stakeholders of Public and Private Sectors
of Lithuania Train to Manage Cyber-incidents” (press statement), October 21, 2020,
https://kam.lt/en/news_1098/current_issues/stakeholders_of_public_and_private_sectors_of_lithuania_train
_to_manage_cyber-incidents.html.
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and runs simultaneously to Cyber Shield to add another layer of realism
to Lithuania’s exercises by providing real-world scenarios. In 2020,
Amber Mist divided participants into friendly, enemy, or neutral teams.
The friendly teams actively defended their networks from attacks by the
enemy team. The neutral team served as a real-world arbiter of the success
of the friendly or enemy teams. If the enemy team’s attack succeeded,
the neutral team would notice a degradation in operations. If the friendly
team succeeded, the neutral team would notice no significant changes. 32
This commitment to realistic training scenarios demonstrates the emphasis
Lithuania applies to its cybersecurity. The application of the strategy and
lessons learned from these exercises led Lithuania to create a regional cyber
center in Kaunas.
Developed in cooperation with the United States and the Kaunas
Institute of Technology, the regional cyber center in Kaunas would
command the EU Rapid Response Cyber Force, part of the EU’s Permanent
Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Through the State Partnership Program
under the US National Guard, Lithuania has coordinated with the Pennsylvania
National Guard to support the center. Support includes US personnel manning
positions. 33 This partnership was on display during Lithuania’s elections
in 2020 when 10 members of the Pennsylvania National Guard’s cyber defense
team remotely provided support to the Kaunas Center. Because of COVID-19
protocols, the US servicemembers remained in Pennsylvania but integrated
their operations with Kaunas to provide cybersecurity for the election. 34
Another part of this project is the development of an early warning system
to notify personnel at the center in the event of an attack. Lithuania allocated
430,000 euros from 2019–21 on this system to use artificial intelligence to
identify and analyze incoming attacks. Once analyzed, the system would send
reports to the operators for further action. 35 While this is a minor amount
of funding compared to other nations’ expenditures, it is a necessary step.
Lithuania has taken many strides toward cybersecurity and energy security,
and there are opportunities for even more improvement.

32. Giedrius Saulenas, “Amber Mist 2020 Cyber Exercise,” Saulenas (website), September 29, 2020,
https://saulenas.com/Amber-Mist-Cyber-Exercise/.
33. Saulius Jakučionis, “Lithuania to Bolster Cyber Security – Early Warning System, Additional
Cybersecurity Center,” July 3, 2019, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1075107/lithuania-to-bolster
-cybersecurity-early warning-system-additional-cybersecurity-center.
34. Keith Hickox, “Pennsylvania National Guard Cyber Branch Supports 2020 Election,” November 3, 2020,
https://www.dvidshub.net/news/382300/pennsylvania-national-guard-cyber-branch-supports-2020-election.
35.

Jakučionis, “Lithuania to Bolster Cybersecurity.”
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Recommendations
Currently, Lithuania faces numerous threats to its energy security.
Adopting the following recommendations would alleviate some
of these threats.
1. Development of sovereign energy production. Lithuania
must continue to develop internal energy production systems.
The lack of fossil fuels means they must utilize renewable
resources. The growth over the last 10 years in renewable
energy production is a positive first step. Developing internal
energy production reduces its dependence on external sources.
While Lithuania became the first country to eliminate its
dependence on Russian energy imports in April 2022—
mostly by increasing its reliance on its LNG terminal
in Klaipėda—Lithuania still imports more than 75 percent of
its energy, mostly from Norway. 36 This action leaves Lithuania
vulnerable under the IEA’s definition of energy security
concerning uninterrupted access.
2. Improve regional cyber cooperation. Lithuania has made
great strides in cybersecurity through its encompassing strategy,
exercises, and regional cyber center. The country should
continue these improvements through closer coordination
with the other Baltic states. Under a memorandum
of understanding signed in 2015, the Baltic nations agreed
to work together on common cyber threats. All parties to
the MOU agree that “critical infrastructure that forms the
foundation upon which modern society functions is also under
threat from cyberspace.”37 The requirements for coordination
will increase as Belarus looks to complete its nuclear power
plant in the future. Connecting to this energy source brings

36. Samanth Subramanian, “Independence Day: How a Baltic Nation Ended Its Reliance on Russian Gas,”
Quartz (website), April 11, 2022, https://qz.com/2152999/lithuania-became-the-first-eu-nation-to-stop
-russian-gas-imports/.
37. Vytautas Butrimas, “Baltic Cyber Cooperation: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania Sign a Historic
Document to Align Their Cyber Defense Policies,” per Concordiam: Journal of European Security
and Defense Issues (website), July 14, 2016, https://perconcordiam.com/baltic-cyber-cooperation/.
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increased risk as Belarus has previously aligned closely
with Russia.38
3. Decentralization of energy storage. Lastly, similar to energy
production, Lithuania should decentralize its storage of energy
generated by renewable sources to prevent grid disruption.
The pilot program with Siemens calls for a centralized location
to store energy generated. While a pilot program, any
improvement would be a proof of concept for distributed
storage that can provide energy throughout the grid while
also remaining on separate systems. Already facing the
pressure on nonredundant energy generation and importation,
Lithuania should start its renewable energy storage concepts
with a distributed approach.

Conclusion
As Lithuania moves toward its goal of energy security independent
of Russian inf luence, the country faces many vulnerabilities from cyber intrusions
into t he elect r ica l g r ids and renewable energ y generat ion.
Lithuania understands the issues it faces and has taken several appropriate
steps to limit the ability of outside agencies to impact the country negatively.
As a necessary first step, the government has a comprehensive strategy that
aligns the national ends with appropriate means. The country has coordinated
with many external agencies, to include US Cyber Command and the National
Guard Bureau, to augment their personnel with subject-matter experts
in many areas and dedicated funding to develop early warning systems
to detect intrusions from human and artificial intelligence threats. If Lithuania
continues to focus on addressing threats, the transition to a synchronous grid
with the European Union will succeed.

38. Andrius Sytas, “Lithuania Stops Baltics Power Trade with Belarus, Russia over Nuclear Plant,” Reuters
(website), November 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/litgrid-belarus/lithuania-stops-baltics-power
-trade-with-belarus-russia-over-nuclear-plant-idUSKBN27J2CA.
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Figure 13-2. Map of Lithuania’s threat timeline estimate (6 months indicates
likely attack vector in 2022, 1 year by 2023, 2+years by 2024 or later)
Credit: Ryan Fisk and Lucas Cox
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Location

Reason for Threat Priority and Timeline

NordBalt, Klaipėda
LNG Terminal

Russia already showed its intentions to disrupt NordBalt when
its warships harassed NordBalt’s construction. The terminal’s
geographical and geostrategic importance and significance
for Lithuanian energy independence could make it a target
for the next six months.

Baltic Synchronization
Transmission Lines

As the Baltics seek to create an independent power grid
before 2025, the transmission lines transitioning to BRELL
will remain vulnerable to attack until completion.

LitPol Link

The LitPol Link could be a disinformation operations target
as Lithuania reduces electricity dependence on Russia.

Harmony Link

Harmony Link will increase the reliability of the transition
from BRELL to the Continental European Synchronous Area
once completed in 2025. Intervention to completion could
be expected in the year before completion should tensions
with Russia increase.

Elektrenai Power Plant

After the closing of the Ignalina nuclear power facility,
Elektrenai became one of the main sources of domestic
energy production and could remain a target amid tensions
for the next six months.

Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant
(Closed)

Continue to expect disinformation operations discrediting
Lithuania for the next two years following the closure of the
nuclear plant.

Vilnius-Panevežys-Riga
Pipeline

The pipeline, which is important to Lithuania’s energy
independence, could be vulnerable to intervention for the
next two years.

Jauniūna LNG Station and
GIPL Pipeline

An ICS attack on this pipeline within the next two years
is possible as Lithuania has turned away from Russian
gas supplies.
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– Case Studies –
Conclusion: Baltics
The most signif icant threats to the Baltics stem from their reliance
on foreign energy. All three Baltic states have pledged to eliminate
their reliance on Russian energy imports completely by the end of 2022,
Lithuania being the first to have done so at the time of this publication.
All three nations are still connected to Russia and Belarus through the
BRELL electric grid. This grid still presents significant security vulnerabilities
at a time when the Russian Federation is encroaching dangerously close
to NATO’s eastern f lank, threatening the sovereignty of the Baltic republics.
An increase in domestic energy production capabilities and reduction
of reliance on foreign power would put the Baltics in a strategic position
to defend against Russian intrusions. This goal appears possible as there
are already a number of networks in place for the Baltics to receive support
from other surrounding NATO nations, which greatly improve their capacity
and resilience.
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– Case Studies –
Southeastern Europe
Southeastern Europe consists of four nations: Romania, Italy,
Greece, and Türkiye. This region faces a more varied threat forecast,
with many different types of facilities and energy sources in each nation
at risk due to different geographic locations and cyber standards.
Each nation has a strategic geographic location, which includes
high-value ports to NATO and Russia. In addition, China is making headway
in these countries through an increase in foreign direct investment in new
technologies, critical infrastructure, and port areas. NATO nation-state
territories and mission-critical infrastructure, therefore, are increasingly
vulnerable to hybrid attacks.
Italy is unique because Chinese f irms have made large investments
into the infrastructure to build Italian renewable energy and could
be feeding data regarding the use of this infrastructure to the
Chinese government. These data could include information regarding
infrastructure movements and grid activity, vital elements for Italy’s economy,
which relies heavily on several strategic ports in the Mediterranean Sea.
Much like Italy, Greece has also seen a great deal of Chinese investment
in its Ports of Piraeus and Thessaloniki in what appears to be an attempt
by the Chinese to carve out an area of inf luence. This action is seen
as very problematic as Greece houses several major joint NATO and
US military bases.
Romania and Türkiye have different concerns. Romania is mostly
energy independent and has access to the Black Sea via ports on its eastern
coastline and is able to exercise autonomy over its power grid and
economy. This autonomy has made it a target for Russian cyberattacks
as Russia lacks any other method of exercising control over Romania.
Türkiye, though in a similar region adjacent to the Black Sea, also has
access to the Mediterranean Sea and controls the Bosporus and
Dardanelles straits, the only way for ships to move between the Black Sea
to the Mediterranean Sea. These routes have long been of interest
to Russia, which borders the Black Sea to the northeast and has taken
advantage of Türkiye’s neutrality to move submarines and warships
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through this area as it attacks Ukraine. In the southeast, Türkiye borders
war-torn Syria. Due to the number of threats Türkiye faces and its geographic
location, it is home to several major NATO bases.
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ABSTRACT: Romania is unique in that it is one of the least foreign energy
dependent countries in Europe, relying mostly on its massive investment
into renewable energy infrastructure and several nuclear power plants
to power most of the nation. There has been a recent growth in cyberattacks
on Romania’s critical infrastructure by foreign actors seeking to exploit
Romania’s strategic position along the Black Sea through cyberattacks.
For example, a ransomware attack in March 2022 on Romania’s largest
petroleum pipeline was attributed to the Hive group.1 Romania has
partnered with other NATO and EU nations to tackle these threats and
has fostered a robust cyber-defense network.
Key words: Romanian Economic Exclusion Zone, cyberattacks,
cybersecurity, renewable energy, networked energy services, smart grid,
nuclear energy, nuclear power plant

Introduction
Romania exists as an important nerve center of the Black Sea region
with its strategic location along the crossroads of three major pan-European
transport corridors and one of the most significant gateways to the Black Sea. 2
As a prominent gateway to the Black Sea and as a NATO and EU country,
the potential for a destabilization campaign targeting Romania is higher than
usual. Russia’s proximity to Romania after the illegal Russian annexation
1. Emma Vail, “Hive Ransomware Gang Targets Romanian Oil Firm in Its Latest Cyberattack,”
Record (website), March 8, 2022, https://therecord.media/hive-ransomware-gang-targets-romanian-oil-firm
-in-its-latest-cyberattack/.
2. “Competitive Advantages,” InvestRomania (website), n.d., accessed June 1, 2021, http://investromania
.gov.ro/web/doing-business/competitive-advantages/.
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of Crimea heightens that potential, considering the identif ication
of Russian-backed disinformation campaigns against Romania in recent years.
Romania is currently in an energy transition period that has diversified
the energy sector over the last 10 years. Romania has invested in renewables,
with 23.88 percent of Romanian electricity production coming from
renewable sources in 2020. 3 While strengthening renewable infrastructure,
Romania is also pushing for the modernization of energy infrastructure via
numerous smart-grid projects. This push has led to the country ranking
third-lowest in energy dependency rate across EU members as of 2020.4
Much of Romania’s renewable electricity potential is generated by hydropower
“followed by wind power and then solar power.” 5
A signif icant portion of Romanian energ y comes from older
fossil-fuel infrastructure. Romania’s eight power plants currently provide
an “installed gross capacity of 5315 MW,” which should only increase
in capacity once Romania’s ninth coal power plant is operational.
Romania currently operates two nuclear power reactors out of Cernavodă,
which are currently generating about 15–20 percent of Romania’s electricity. 6
Romania is expected to expand its nuclear-power capacity with two more
reactors slated to be constructed in 2021 and 2022 or later. This increase
in nuclear power has the potential to further reduce the amount of energy
produced from fossil fuels, in accordance with Romania’s National Energy and
Climate Plan (NECP).
With the goals set by Romania’s NECP, the state intends to increase the
capacity of hydropower electricity generation and “repower,” or install new
and/or upgraded technologies to improve the potential of aging systems,
across existing solar and wind farms.7 Romania has also taken on the
implementation of smart-grid technology across the existing power grid.

3. Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser, “Romania: Energy Country Profile,” Our World in Data (website),
2021, https://ourworldindata.org/energy/country/romania.
4. “The Energy Sector in Romania,” CEE Bankwatch Network (website), 2020, https://bankwatch.org
/beyond-coal/the-energy-sector-in-romania.
5. Nicolae Marinescu, “Changes in Renewable Energy Policy and Their Implications: The Case of Romanian
Producers,” Energies 13, no. 24 (6493): 24, https://doi.org/10.3390/en13246493.
6. “Energy Sector in Romania”; and “Nuclear Power in Romania,” World Nuclear Association (website),
updated March 2021, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/romania.aspx.
7. Delia Pachiu and Nita Marius, “Electricity Regulation in Romania: Overview,” Thomson Reuters
Practical Law (website), law stated as of October 1, 2020, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/4-566
-2907?contextData= percent28sc.Default percent29.
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Romania’s current path forward to modernizing the existing electrical
grid and renewable infrastructure will introduce several major risks into the
energy sector. Most of Romania’s older renewable technology and facilities
require upgrades and new technology to bring them up to current energy
efficiency and production standards. The installation of emerging technology
introduces potential vulnerabilities into strategic energy production facilities.
Romania also plans to construct new renewable facilities, including the
f irst offshore wind farm in Romania’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
With Russia close by and the isolated nature of offshore facilities, this project
introduces a new dimension of vulnerabilities to the security of Romanian
energy production and transportation.
The introduction of smart-grid technology into aging electrical systems
creates numerous vulnerabilities along the aging electrical grid. Older electrical
grids run the risk of sustaining permanent damage during a cyberattack.
Government facilities attached to newly installed smart grids would
be vulnerable to data breaches. At an extreme level, the possibility exists that
energy production facilities processing or containing hazardous materials
(such as nuclear power reactors) are at risk for a cyberattack that could devastate
the local region surrounding these facilities and create nuclear disasters like
the ones seen at Chernobyl and Fukushima.

Renewable Energy and Smart Grids in Romania
With 13 hydroelectric dams throughout Romania, renewables provide
almost half the energy for the country. Hydropower accounted for almost
28 percent of electricity production in 2020 alone, while in 2019, just
over 24 percent of energy consumption was provided by renewable energy
sources. 8 Renewables account for a large portion of electricity production
within the country. As of April 2020, 49.92 percent of electricity production
was due to green energy.9
Romania is making progress in developing its renewable energy
infrastructure in accordance with the European Commission’s (EU) goals
for the European Green Deal. In 2019, Romania was one of the countries
8. “EY Romania Report: Renewables Can Accelerate the Decarbonisation of the Romanian Energy
Sector, But Public Initiatives Must Be Synchronised with Business Intentions,” Ernst & Young (website),
April 1, 2021, https://www.ey.com/en_ro/news/2021/04/ey-romania-report--renewables-can-accelerate
-the-decarbonisation.
9. Varinia Radu, Ramona Dulamea, and Raluca Diaconeasa, “CMS Expert Guide: Renewable Energy
Law and Regulation in Romania,” CMS (website), n.d., https://cms.law/en/int/expert-guides/cms-expert
-guide-to-renewable-energy/romania.
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to have met the Green Deal goal of “reaching a share of approximately
27 percent of green energy in 2019” in accordance with said goals.10
Romania is making strides in achieving the 2030 goal of contributing
a 30.7 percent share of renewable energy. Considering ongoing plans
of increasing renewable energy capacity, Romania has the potential of meeting
and surpassing the 2030 goal in the next 10 years.

Improving Romania’s Renewable Energy Infrastructure
Romania’s current goal, as mentioned earlier, is to reach a 30.7 percent
overall share of renewable energy in gross f inal energy consumption by
2030.11 In order to meet this goal, while also strengthening the shift to
a larger reliance on internal energy sources, Romania plans to increase
renewable energy capacity by almost 35 percent in 2030, with 2.3 gigawatts
in wind farms and 3.7 gigawatts in solar-power plants. At an estimate
of 1 gigawatt powering 300,000 homes, this increased capacity has the
potential of powering 1,800,000 homes in Romania. With repowering alone,
Romania plans to add 3 gigawatts of installed capacity in wind power and
1.35 gigawatts in solar power by 2027–30.12
Hydroelectric power is the largest contributor to Romania’s renewable
energy generation, with wind power, solar power, and biomass making
the second-, third-, and fourth-largest contributions, respectively.13 By
2030, projections indicate the capacity of wind power specif ically will
increase up to 5,255 megawatts.14 It will also be important for Romania
to add new renewable energy facilities to existing energy production
infrastructure, install new technology, upgrade existing technology,
or “repower” existing renewable facilities.

Doubling Down on Smart Grid
Romania is focusing on implementing smart-grid infrastructure
across its general electrical grid. It is taking strong steps to ensure that
accepted contracts are with companies within NATO ally countries.
With the large-scale introduction of smart meters, Romania looks
to turn its current energy market into a “fit-for-RES” (renewable energy
10. Radu, Dulamea, and Diaconeasa, “Renewable Energy Law.”
11. “The 2021–2030 Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan,” European Commission (website),
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/ro_final_necp_main_en.pdf.
12. “2021–2030 Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan,” 58.
13. “Energy Sector in Romania.”
14. “2021–2030 Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan,” 57.
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source) market.15 With mass smart-grid implementation, it is possible
Romania will see an increase in yearly electricity savings across the board.
In 2020, it was estimated that smart metering saved 58.14 gigawatt hours
in electricity, a 125 percent increase from 2018.16
Romania is also taking strong steps to modernize its electrical grid.
As of 2020, 320,000 smart meters were installed by German energy supplier
E.ON, one of three NATO ally-based contractors installing Romania’s
smart-grid infrastructure.17 This action follows a recent trend of accepting
bids from corporations based in NATO countries, as US-based developer,
Networked Energy Services (NES), has been awarded another smart-grid
project set to introduce approximately 90,000 smart meters into the electrical
grid.18 In 2020, 170,000 meters were also installed by Italy-based Enel Group,
an investment of over 11.5 million euros.19
An additional note regarding Romania’s fossil-fuel landscape: Romania
has accepted a bid from China Huadian Engineering Company (CHEC)
for the construction and operation of a new coal plant in Rovinari,
with the operation of the plant slated to continue until 2063. 20 With electricity
generation expected by 2023, and the push for smart-grid technology,
this facility would more than likely be connected to the rest of the grid
via smart metering. While a Chinese threat of cyberattack on Romania
is unlikely, this site does provide an opportunity for a bad actor to utilize known
vulnerabilities within Chinese software to attack smart-grid infrastructure.
The contact point between Chinese software and technology with Western
smart-grid technology also carries the potential to create unique vulnerabilities
due to conf licts between technologies.
15. “2021–2030 Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan,” 72.
16. Lisa Ann Lamont and Ali Sayigh, eds., Application of Smart Grid Technologies: Case Studies in Saving
Electricity in Different Parts of the World (Cambridge, MA: Academic Press, 2018), 329.
17. Jonathan Spencer Jones, “E.ON – 700,000 Smart Meters in Romania by 2028, 2.5 Million
in Germany by 2030,” Smart Energy International (website), December 10, 2020, https://www.smart-energy
.com/industry-sectors/smart-meters/e-on-700000-smart-meters-in-romania-by-2028-2-5-million-in-germany
-by-2030/.
18. “Networked Energy Services Awarded Another Smart Grid Project in Romania,” Networked
Energy Services (website), 2019, https://www.networkedenergy.com/en/news-events/networked-energy
-services-awarded-another-smart-grid-project-in-romania?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm
_campaign=newsletter-jan-2020.
19. SEE Energy News, “Romania: Enel Installs Smart Meters Reaching 900,000 Customers by the
End of 2020,” Serbia Energy (website), October 28, 2020, https://serbia-energy.eu/romania-enel-installs-smart
-meters-reaching-900000-customers-by-the-end-of-2020/.
20. Ionut Dulămiță and Michael Bird, “Chinese Coal Power in Romania’s Rustbelt,” Echowall (website),
2019, https://www.echo-wall.eu/plus-one/chinese-coal-power-romanias-rustbelt.
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The development of renewable energy production and smart-grid
installation creates a lengthy transitional period for Romania. While Romania
continues to improve its energy infrastructure in these areas by accepting bids
for new facilities and installations, it will be essential to ensure the security
of the technical components being used in these projects. As interconnectivity
between every aspect of Romania’s energy landscape continues to grow and
advance, so do the number of potential vulnerabilities for a cyberattack that
could leave every connected component out of commission.

Cyber Challenges of Renewable Energy
and Smart-grid Technology
Imagine the following scenario. At 2:34 a.m. local time in Cernavodă,
power at the Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant suddenly shuts down. Backup
generators that should activate to shut down the plant in the event of power
loss, do not start. The plant is completely without power, and the water
pumps designed to keep the power cores at nominal temperatures shut down.
The cores begin to heat up, and eventually the nuclear cores melt down,
releasing a dangerous amount of radiation into the surrounding area.
In what could be hours, days, or even weeks, new backup generators are
installed, and the cores are brought back down to safe operating levels.
The damage is done, however, as radiation leaks into the surrounding city
of Cernavodă and begins to disperse across the landscape on the wind.
Elevated radiation levels are detected 43 kilometers away on the coast
of Constanța, Romania’s major Black Sea port. The meltdown renders the
intervening area unsafe, and a mass evacuation is ordered. Several engineers
are injured in the chaos, and many more suffer from radiation poisoning as the
plant meltdown releases radiation into the air for several days. The exclusion
zone around the plant remains unsafe for years after, displacing millions
of Romanians and rendering one of Romania’s key Black Sea ports inoperable.
In the months afterward, it is discovered the initial power loss at the
plant was due to a cyberattack on the power station that supplied electricity
to the plant. The backup diesel generators, which could have prevented the
meltdown, were physically sabotaged before the power-loss event, rendering
the plant inoperative.
While this specific scenario may not occur, the reality is that as Romania
introduces new and upgraded smart-grid technology into the existing
electrical grid, the potential for a hybrid attack of this nature increases.
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The threats of such an attack have become increasingly real with the Russian
invasion of Ukraine.
Romania’s current infrastructure is in the midst of a large-scale transition
that operates at a persistent level of risk out to 2030. With plans for new
renewable energy facilities and large-scale expansions of coal and nuclear
capabilities, this transition period carries a heightened risk of cyberattack due
to vulnerabilities introduced with the installation of emerging technology.
As Romania upgrades and strengthens existing energy infrastructure,
windows of opportunity for bad actors to access and weaken this
infrastructure could multiply.
The number of vulnerabilities will grow exponentially as Romania
modernizes older electrical grids and adapts them to smart grids. Romania’s
Internet-connected smart grids could be subject to phishing operations,
denial-of-service attacks, malware propagation, and eavesdropping and
traffic analysis efforts. 21 These cyberattacks could expose private data stored
on energy facility servers (such as payment records, contractor records, and
even government data) if a bad actor attacks the contact point between the
smart grid and a government facility.
The aging electrical grid that serves as the foundation for energy
transportation throughout Romania will be at a heightened risk
of sustaining permanent damage from a cyberattack on integrated smart
grids. If a cyberattack were to focus on exploiting and overloading vulnerable
systems to cause physical destruction, the attack could cause permanent
infrastructural damage that would cost millions to repair and leave millions
of citizens without power for an extended period. While Romania is sourcing
smart-grid development projects from NATO countries, it is equally important
those companies vet the hardware and software being used in the construction
of Romania’s smart-grid net work. If one component or one piece
of installed software carries a backdoor or vulnerability for a bad actor to use,
the whole network could be compromised.
“Repowering” older renewable facilities and plants features several of the
same risks as installing smart grids. If hardware and software components are
not properly vetted, systems within solar or wind farms could be compromised,
leading to delays in energy production, destruction of valuable renewable
technology, or further compromise connected smart-grid networks.

21. Dharmesh Faquir et al., “Cybersecurity in Smart Grids, Challenges and Solutions,” AIMS Electronics
and Electrical Engineering 5, no. 1 (2021): 24–37.

239

Castilleja

Development in Romania’s EEZ
There are several considerations to keep in mind in regard to Romania’s
plans for the construction of offshore wind farms in the Romanian EEZ. As
the sites of these farms will be relatively remote in the Black Sea, there is the
potential for a hybrid attack that targets the physical construction elements
(for example, undersea cabling and construction equipment) and the digital
systems used by contractors to plan, schedule, and store valuable structural data
of the projects. The undersea cables that will run generated power from the
planned wind farms will take time to lay, and any physical sabotage to them
may increase the cost of the project, costing Romania valuable resources. The
exact distance of these wind farms is dependent on the type of turbines used
in the project, but the further out these turbines are constructed, the greater
the possible response time grows. The point of contact between Romania’s
grid and new offshore wind-farm technology also becomes a sensitive pressure
point, at a heightened risk if it is Romania’s major port, Constanța. Disruption
at this point of contact may affect Romanian operations in the Black Sea and
significantly hinder energy transportation from Romania’s EEZ.
Furthermore, the risk of hybrid attack on any of Romania’s planned
offshore wind farms should be considered elevated due to the nature of the
current EEZ landscape of the Black Sea. Romania’s EEZ shares a boundary
with the Bulgarian and Ukrainian EEZs. Ukraine’s EEZ surrounding the
Crimean Peninsula, however, is currently under Russian control after Russia’s
illegal annexation of Crimea. This puts Russia within uncomfortable proximity
to any development efforts in Romania’s EEZ, which presents another avenue
for a possible destabilization campaign in the region.

Romania’s Cybersecurity Landscape
In 2020, 70 percent of Romanian households had access to data
communications networks. 22 This statistic is likely to grow in the next
10 years, as more homes are connected to smart-grid infrastructure.
Access to data communications among Romanian households should increase
sharply as the Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, and Communication’s
(MTIC) RoNET project, aimed at covering areas lacking broadband

22. “Human Development Insights: Romania,” United Nations Development Project (website),
https://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ROU.
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infrastructure, continues to connect areas to data communication technology
simultaneously with ongoing smart-grid projects. 23
In 2013, the Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT)
approved the National Cybersecurity Strategy of Romania, which set
a necessary organizational and conceptual framework for ensuring
cybersecurity and addressed cyber-infrastructure protection in accordance
with policies regarding cyber defense illustrated by the EU and NATO. 24
Since its approval, Romania’s Cybersecurity Strategy has remained unchanged.
Romania’s cyber defense will be key in the next 10 years as it transitions
from a traditional energy infrastructure to production facilities and
technology susceptible to cyberattack.
Romania has prioritized developing its cybersecurity infrastructure
and organization to ensure the cybersecurity of the country and the
EU. As of 2019, Romania has fully transposed the NIS Directive. 25
In accordance with this directive, Romania has demonstrated its national
cybersecurity capabilities to the appropriate level in the EU, prioritized
cross-border collaboration with EU allies, and created and implemented
supervision of critical sectors, such as energy and transport sectors. 26
The National Cybersecurity Strategy of Romania created several entities
tasked with different aspects of ensuring its cybersecurity across critical
sectors. Romania’s National Cybersecurity System (SNSC) is the general
cooperation framework connecting and tasking both public authorities and
institutions with the “responsibilities and capabilities to ensure coordination
of actions at the national level for cyberspace.” 27 In 2018, the Cyber
Defense Command (CApC) of Romania was established, with a mission
to “plan, organise, direct and conduct operations in the cyberspace to protect
military networks, provide information technology services and support the
joint military operations with cyber effects.” 28 Currently, the CApC provides
day-to-day cyberspace defense as it works toward being fully operational
23. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), National Cybersecurity
Organisation: ROMANIA, National Cybersecurity Governance Series (Tallinn: EE: NATO CCDCOE, 2020),
6, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/11/NCS_organisation_ROM-2020_FINAL.pdf.
24.

NATO CCDCOE, National Cybersecurity Organisation: ROMANIA, 8.

25. “Implementation of the NIS Directive in Romania,” European Commission (website), updated
November 7, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/implementation-nis-directive-romania.
26. “NIS Directive,” European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) (website), n.d., accessed
May 24, 2021, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/nis-directive.
27.

NATO CCDCOE, National Cybersecurity Organisation: ROMANIA, 9.

28.

NATO CCDCOE, National Cybersecurity Organisation: ROMANIA, 10.
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by 2024, and has entered several partnerships with US-based entities
to accelerate cyberspace defense excellence. 29
Romania has also developed several CERT-type (Computer Emergency
Response Team) entities to oversee its cyber-defense framework.
The Romanian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-RO), the main
CERT entity of Romania, is the national authority in securing national
networks and information technology and communications (IT&C) systems. 30
CERT-RO is tasked with “preventing, analysing, identifying and responding
to cyber incidents,” and developing and disseminating public policies
for preventing and counteracting incidents involving cyber infrastructure. 31
Additionally, Romania has created CERT-MIL that focuses on “cyber risks,
specialized assistance, forensics, and the management of cyber incident”
for members of the Ministry of Defense, and the National Cyberint
Center and serves as the cyber intelligence center of Romania tasked
with “counter-espionage, economic security, transnational threats and the
protection of classified information.” 32
At present, there is little public information available on the shape
of Romania’s early warning system in regard to cyber defense.
While there is not a clear label or shape to the system, it is safe to assume
Romania’s early warning system is near completion and should be implemented
in 2024 when the CApC is expected to be fully operational. If energy
production were to be halted due to a cyberattack, the operational effectiveness
of the Romanian Armed Forces (R AF) would be severely impacted.
With military preparedness in the Black Sea region growing more and
more necessary with Russia’s presence on the Crimean Peninsula,
ensuring the security of Romania’s energy infrastructure on all fronts will
be of vital importance to the Ministry of Defense in ensuring the readiness
of the RAF.

Recommendations
Whether through direct interference with the installation process of new
or upgraded renewable technology or the sabotage of aging electrical systems
that will serve as the structure for the smart grid, there is currently a high
29. NATO CCDCOE, National Cybersecurity Organisation: ROMANIA, 11.
30. NATO CCDCOE, National Cybersecurity Organisation: ROMANIA, 9.
31. “Romania (RO),” Cyberwiser (website), n.d., accessed May 2021, https://www.cyberwiser.eu
/romania-ro; and NATO CCDCOE, National Cybersecurity Organisation: ROMANIA,” 10.
32. “Romania (RO).”
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threat of hybrid attack. It is important for Romania to address these security
risks in step with developing this rapidly expanding energy infrastructure.
Based on the research presented, the recommendations for addressing
these challenges to the cybersecurity of Romania’s energy infrastructure are
as follows:
1. Rapid finalization and implementation of cyber-defense
early warning systems. It is of the utmost importance that
Romania implement clear cyber early warning systems
across its energy landscape as soon as possible. The absence
of an early warning system leaves critical facilities and
locations at risk of cyberattacks that could have devastating
repercussions if the attacks are not detected early enough.
The creation of dedicated CERT entities on-site at the
Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant or at any of the 13 hydroelectric
dams may be the best short-term solution until the full early
warning system is implemented. In this fashion, there can
at least be an active defense on standby at these hazardous sites
that can respond within seconds of a cyberattack. Constanța
will continue to be a major port in the Black Sea that will
serve as a transportation hub for energy produced via offshore
wind farms in the future. It will be critical to strengthen the
cyber defense of the port, as there are numerous systems
in operation that may eventually share a network with energy
transportation technology. The formation of a CERT tasked
with the cybersecurity of the ports would be an excellent way
to provide a focused approach at the possible cyberattack vectors
present in Constanța.
2. Introduction of an oversight group tasked with vetting
sourced components for repowering and smart-grid projects.
As both renewable-energy projects and smart-grid projects
in Romania will rely on the installation of new technology,
ensuring the safety and security of this technology should
be a major priority. While Romania has focused on working
with ally countries, the components sourced by the entities
tasked with repowering old renewable-energy facilities
or integrating smart meters into the electrical grid are still
at high risk of introducing manufactured vulnerabilities and
backdoors into the system if they are not properly vetted.
To ensure every component involved with these projects
243

Castilleja

does not create new vulnerabilities, a government group
or organization should be created and specifically tasked
with both providing oversight to international contractors
awarded energy-infrastructure bids and vetting the components
used in these projects to ensure they are manufactured at a reliable,
trusted facility. The vulnerabilities associated with constructing
a new wind farm do not exist primarily at the construction
site. While this approach may seem overzealous, it would
further shore up the security of these projects while setting an
example for other allied countries developing renewable energy
or smart-grid infrastructure, which will improve the overall
security of the energy landscape across NATO.
3. Installation of upgraded physical components into
aging electrical grids targeted for smart-grid integration.
Romania’s modernization of the existing electrical grid
by introducing smart-grid technology is a major step
toward increasing energy efficiency. The aging infrastructure,
however, should not be overlooked. In regard to addressing
the possible permanent damage that could be done to the
older electrical grid underneath, it is the recommendation
of this paper that as smart-grid networks are installed
and integrated with existing electrical grids, the physical
grids themselves should also be upgraded, with aging parts
replaced completely. This process would potentially further
protect the energy-transportation network of the country
from any permanent damage in the event of a cyberattack.
Upgrading and replacing older electrical grid components
in step with smart-grid integration efforts would raise the
financial burden immensely. Therefore, this would be a good
opportunity for the EU to form a stronger bond with Romania
and offer financial support as this modernization could
only benefit Romania’s goals in supporting the European
Green Deal.
4. Increased awareness of EEZ security surrounding offshore
facility construction sites. Romania’s plan for the first offshore
wind farm is a great step in advancing its green-energy
goal. As mentioned previously, the proximity of Romania’s
EEZ to Russia is of concern for the security of any offshore
development plans. With the Russian Navy attempting
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to take Odesa from Ukraine’s EEZ, close to Romania’s,
it is critical Romania is ready. Echoing Romanian President
Klaus Iohannis’s sentiment, NATO is developing contingencies
to support Romania in the event of a Russian-backed hybrid
attack on facilities in Romania’s EEZ. Increased vigilance
of the offshore sites will ensure a rapid response in the event
of an attack.33

Conclusion
Romania’s proximity to Russia and the Russia-Ukraine war creates several
concerns for infrastructure security. It is critical now that Romania continue
to further its energy independence goals and secure and update its existing
energy infrastructure to remain free of foreign interference and exploitation.
There is also room for NATO to aid Romania in this mission by assisting
in the development of renewable-energy systems and cybersecurity tools
to help defend Romanian infrastructure, which is especially critical now
that conf lict with Russia is raging so close to its borders.

Figure 13-1. Map of Romania’s threat timeline estimate (6 months indicates likely
attack vector in 2022, 1 year by 2023, 2+ years by 2024 or later)
Credit: Ryan Fisk and Lucas Cox

33. Reuters Staff, “Romanian President Says More NATO Presence Needed in Eastern Europe,”
Reuters (website), May 10, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/biden-join-eastern-european
-nato-states-summit-focus-seen-ukraine-2021-05-10/.
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Location

Reason for Threat Priority and Timeline

Bucharest

Bucharest’s smart grid makes it an attractive cyber target
for the next two years, particularly considering the impact
it could have on port activities, NATO allies, and military
operations in Ukraine.

Port of Constanța

Disrupting the Constanța’s port logistics, distribution, and
tracking within the next six months would have an impact
on NATO capabilities and its posture in the Black Sea.

2026 Offshore Wind Farm

The wind farm’s location and connection with strategic
assets could make it a target upon completion
if cybersecurity is not implemented into the design.

Oil Infrastructure

Oil infrastructure, especially within proximity of the
Corbu refinery and Black Sea critical infrastructure,
remains a possible target in the wake of the cyberattack
on Romania’s leading petroleum company in 2021.

Seini Substation and
Transmission Line to Mukacheve

Expect an ICS or DDoS attack within six months because
this is an important node of Ukraine’s power supply and
is likely to be targeted by cyber or kinetic attack in the next
six months of Russia’s offensive operations in Ukraine.

Iasi Smart Grid

The Iasi smart grids could become a target if there is an
escalation near or with Moldova.

Corbu Gas Treatment Plant
and Pipeline to Midia Gas
Development Plant

A DDoS attack on the plant’s ICS or other cyberattack
within the next six months is likely due to the rising
importance of offshore gas and impact on NATO allies.

Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant

This plant produces 20 percent of Romania’s electricity
and will be of increasing importance in an energy
transition away from Russian imports over the next
year. Disinformation or cyberattacks are possible in that
time frame.
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ABSTR ACT: Although Italy is becoming more energy independent,
it should prioritize a sustainable strategy in the development of renewable
energy sources to minimize risks incurred through the cooperation and
sourcing processes. The inf lux of foreign direct investments in Italy’s
oil, natural-gas, and electric-grid sectors could introduce cooperationinduced risks if proper vetting processes are not undertaken. A survey of the
risks and opportunities provided by cooperation with foreign countries on
energy transformation is necessary for effective risk management. Advances
in 5G interconnectivity further present vendor-related considerations at the
infrastructure level as well as macro-level governance compatibility issues
that may pose concerns for Italy’s long-term strategic priorities.
Keywords: renewable energy, Italy national energy strategy, Italy renewable
energy directive, Huawei, China cyber policy, COPASIR

Introduction
Italy’s Energy Landscape
Italy’s energy consumption is evolving parallel to its commitment
to diversifying its energy landscape and combating the negative effects
of climate change. Its investment in sustainable energy sources is driven
by its dedication to restructuring the energy program for long-term
optimization and moving the country toward a definitive future in energy
efficiency. In the 2030 National Energy and Climate Plan, Italy defines
its strategy toward achieving the goals set forth by the Energy Union,
identifying that energ y securit y and reducing emissions are both
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necessary in achieving long-term NECP objectives.1 The country’s
primary energy consumption is driven by petroleum and natural gas,
which account for 70 percent of its total average annual consumption. 2
Supplementary energy shares emerge from coal, hydroelectricity, and other
renewable energy sources.
Total energy consumption has been declining since 2017, with Italy’s
per capita energy consumption at a 20 percent lower average than the
EU. 3 While most of Italy’s electricity consumption has previously come
from fossil fuels, renewable energy sourcing has since been diversif ied.
Italy’s current energy mix ref lects its energy efficiency directives to have
renewables surpass natural gas as the primary fuel for electric power.
Currently, renewables account for 21 percent of energy consumption,
natural gas for 35 percent, oil for 34.2 percent, and coal for 3.9 percent.
Renewable energy sources have seen a considerable increase in Italy’s energy
consumption mix by more than 1,000 percent since 2005, supporting
less than 2 percent of production in 2005 to nearly 10 percent in 2016.4
Natural gas is predicted to remain the primary source of energy for Italy
until 2030, as the consumption of petroleum products falls and that
of renewable sources increases. 5
The evolution of Italy’s energy mix is a product of the government’s
National Energy Strategy and concerted efforts to induce change in industry
consumption through policy implementation. The recasting of the Renewable
Energy Directive 2018/2001/EU, which moved the legal framework to 2030,
set a renewable-energy target of 32 percent and an increased 14 percent target
for renewable fuel-share in transport. Italy’s final National Integrated Plan
for Energy and Climate 2030, released in January 2020, presents core objectives
of a target for 30 percent renewable-energy share in gross final consumption of
energy, a 22 percent renewable-energy share in the global final consumption
of energy in transport, and a reduction in primary energy consumption
by 43 percent (compared to Primes 2007 scenario). 6 In September 2020,
1. “Italy’s Integrated National and Energy Climate Plan,” Grantham Research Institute on Climate
Change and the Environment (website), 2019, https://www.climate-laws.org/geographies/italy/policies
/italy-s-integrated-national-and-energy-climate-plan.
2. Valentina Canalini, Sofia Silveri, and Antonella Guetta, “International Legal Business Solutions –
Global Legal Insights,” Global Legal Insights (website), 2021, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice
-areas/energy-laws-and-regulations/italy#chaptercontent1.
3. US Energy Information Administration (EIA).
4.

Canalini, Silveri, and Guetta, “International Legal Business Solutions.”

5.

Canalini, Silveri, and Guetta, “International Legal Business Solutions.”

6.

Canalini, Silveri, and Guetta, “International Legal Business Solutions.”
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the European Commission introduced an amendment to the European Climate
Law to adjust the target of a 40 percent emission reduction by 2030 from 1990
levels to a 55 percent target, setting forth the Green Deal Communication
to prioritize member states’ objectives in energy, industry, mobility, and
agriculture.7 Italy has agreed with the larger EU approach and is promoting
the Green New Deal objectives by implementing the Clean Energy Package
through appropriate domestic legislation. 8
The prioritization of a sustainable energy transition brings both strategic
opportunities and liabilities which can be identified partly in the current
incentive policies. The Rilancio Decree in May 2020, for instance, introduced
“super bonuses” or a deduction of 110 percent of expenses incurred between
mid-2020 and the end of 2021 for interventions in energy eff iciency.
The Simplif ication Decree of 2020 is set to accelerate investments and
construction of infrastructure by simplifying photovoltaic plant installation
and is set to strengthen the public-private alliance for investments by allowing
energy performance contracts to be qualified as public partnership contracts.
The COV ID-19 pandemic has brought about challenges and
changes in Italy’s policy approach to its renewable-energy transition.
The Italian government is responding to the emergency by identifying
important macro areas of intervention, including digitization and innovation,
green revolution and ecological transition, and infrastructure for sustainable
mobility. Digitization has materialized as an increased emphasis on 5G
infrastructure, IoT technology, and smart grids for energy management.
Italy’s commitment to translating EU environmental policy directives
is strong and clearly exemplified in practice. The rapid pace at which the
transition toward energy efficiency is occurring, the layered legal landscape
on which it is taking place, and its involvement of cyber-connectivity raise
cyber vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malign actors. The following
case study will consider Italy’s future ambitions in renewables and connective
technology as they relate to the threats posed by the transition process—
namely its supply-chain sourcing for renewable-energy technologies and
the risks posed by the connectivity of 5G technology’s operational and
software infrastructure.

7. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European
Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:
The European Green Deal (Brussels: European Commission, December 11, 2019), 640, https://ec.europa.eu
/info/sites/default/files/european-green-deal-communication_en.pdf.
8. Canalini, Silveri, and Guetta, “International Legal Business Solutions.”
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Vulnerability: Chinese Foreign Direct Investment
in Renewable Energy Technologies
Italy’s transition to renewable energy involves extensive international
cooperation in supply-chain management that poses cybersecurit y
challenges. Italy’s cooperation with China, for instance, poses substantial
risks as China sources a large percentage of Italian photovoltaics, silicon
wafers, and other renewable-energy materials.9 According to Luca Iacoboni,
climate and energy campaigner with Greenpeace Italy, China has always
played a substantial role in Italy’s green-energy market.10 This assertion
is further backed by data, as Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) increased
by 850 percent from 573 million euros in 2015 to 4.9 billion in 2018,
per the Italian Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic.11
Moreover, Chinese multinational company StateGrid has a nearly 35 percent
stake in the f inancing of Italian electricity grids, and companies such
as ChemChina hold great inf luence in energy networks companies.12
While cooperation with China on the achievement of energy transformation
is not a risk itself, the nature and extent of this supply-chain cooperation is not
fully known, increasing the potential for liabilities and security vulnerabilities.
Chinese investment in Italian energy and gas infrastructure is characterized
by a considerable supply-chain and investment-bound relationship.
The Chinese government’s motivation is to divest from its previous
minjian xianxing “non-government (private f irst)” export-driven growth
model and invest efforts in expanding China’s international presence
and promoting Chinese investments abroad.13 This aim can be clearly
seen in China’s current conduct with Italy. Empirical transactions and
investments from China in Italy’s energy sector substantiate China’s
increasing inf luence in sensitive areas. The State Grid Corp. of China’s
purchase of the Italian state lender company Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP)
Reti S.p.A., a holding company with substantial inf luence and control
9. Rudi Bressa, “Italy Welcomes Chinese Investments, but Competition Fears Linger,” Clean Energy
Wire (blog), January 6, 2021, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/blog/italy-welcomes-chinese-investments
-competition-fears-linger.
10. Bressa, “Italy Welcomes Chinese Investments.”
11.

Bressa, “Italy Welcomes Chinese Investments.”

12. Parliamentary Committee for Security of the Republic, “RELAZIONE: sulla tutela degli asset strategici
nazionali nei settori bancario e assicurativo,” XXXIV RELAZIONE: sulla tutela degli asset strategici nazionali
nei settori bancario e assicurativo § (2020), 1–40.
13. Pablo Pareja-Alcaraz, “Chinese Investments in Southern Europe’s Energy Sectors: Similarities and
Divergences in China’s Strategies in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain,” Energy Policy 101 (February 2017):
700–10, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301421516305006.
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over Italy’s electricity grid and gas distribution operations, is a confirmation
of China’s success in asserting its inf luence in the Italian energy sector.14
Gas and electricity distribution are sensitive to foreign investments, allowing
China State Grid greater access to Italy’s energy technology and networks.
Moreover, in 2014, Shanghai Electric agreed to buy a 40 percent stake
in Ansaldo Energia, the Italian power equipment maker, from CDP’s Fondo
Strategico Italiano, while the People’s Bank of China bought stakes topping
2 percent in Italian oil and gas giant ENI (controlled by CDP) and
the electricity and natural-gas distributor ENEL (controlled by the
Italian Treasury).
The pace of Chinese FDI investment in Italy’s energy markets presents
security and economic concerns. First, a substantial proportion of Chinese FDI
in Italy comes from state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Due to the dependence
of SOEs on the state’s decisions, financial vehicles, and investment behaviors,
it is diff icult to reliably differentiate between the investment behaviors
of state-owned enterprises and China’s state capitalist system. For instance,
research has shown that Chinese SOEs’ industrial investment aims align
with those of the state which aims to control the “most profitable components
and nodes of global supply chains.” 15 This goal especially pertains to
Chinese investments in tech-innovation areas such as renewable-energy
generation. The risks emerging from the nature of this partnership present
themselves as being driven by the lack of reciprocity between Italy to China’s
energy engagements, with China placing high restrictions and regulations
on non-energy-related FDI despite Italy’s high engagement.16
First, Chinese investments in Italy present security considerations—
the advanced digitization of renewable-energy systems increases vulnerabilities
to attacks.17 China has empirically had a record high number of cyberattacks
and, thus, extensive supply-chain and sourcing partnerships between Italy
and China can leave Italy’s renewable energy technologies vulnerable.18
14. Francesca Landini and Luca Trogni, “Italy to Sell Energy Grid Stake to China for 2 Billion Euros,”
Reuters (website), July 24, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-china/italy-to-sell-energy-grid
-stake-to-china-for-2-billion-euros-idUSKBN0FT1H020140724.
15. Björn Conrad and Genia Kostka, “Chinese Investments in Europe’s Energy Sector: Risks and
Opportunities?,” Energy Policy 101 (February 2017): 644–48, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii
/S0301421516306711.
16. Conrad and Kostka, “Chinese Investments.”
17.

Conrad and Kostka, “Chinese Investments.”

18. Richard Q. Turcsanyi, “Central European Attitudes towards Chinese Energy Investments:
The Cases of Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic,” Energy Policy 101 (February 2017): 711–22,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030142151630502X.
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Moreover, China’s efforts at market dominance are present in several sectors
of Italy’s renewable energy portfolio, with companies such as China’s Three
Gorges (CTG) expanding its wind portfolio with a 49 percent stake in EDP’s
wind projects in Italy.19
As Chinese private companies increase their share in Italy’s renewable
energy market, they are subject to a complex set of Chinese laws that raise
cybersecurity concerns for Italy. For instance, new regulations being considered
by the Chinese government include those which require companies operating
in and out of China to disclose cybersecurity preparations and the security
of their networks in other countries. 20 This requirement would entail Chinese
distributors having to disclose to the Chinese government their infrastructure
in Italy. While this action would certainly augment China’s cybersecurity
capabilities, it could potentially expose sensitive information about the
Italian operations of these Chinese contractors to the Chinese government’s
scrutiny. Cooperation with Chinese contractors brings about important
security considerations.
Moreover, as both Chinese SOEs and private enterprises work
with state decisionmakers, extensive cooperation on renewable-energy
technology advancements comes with important considerations of security
partnerships. This cooperation is especially pertinent to Italy and other
EU member states, as China falls outside the European security alliance
network. In addition to the security risks, an increase in FDI inf low also
enables greater Chinese inf luence on Italian company boards, with Chinese
state-owned and state-supported entities holding inf luence on Italian
companies’ management, key strategic decisions, and sensitive information. 21
The inf luence of FDI on Italian industry can manifest, for instance,
in increased supply-chain sourcing from Chinese manufacturers. In some
renewable-industry technologies, the Chinese supply of critical raw materials
has indicated long-term risks to Italian wind- and solar-energy industries.
Italy has rapidly increased its reliance on Chinese raw materials for its
development of renewable-energy technology. To this end, its sourcing
of five critical raw materials from China—tellurium, gallium, and indium
(used in making solar cells) and neodymium and dysprosium (used in
19. Simon Nicholas, China Is Investing Heavily in European Wind: Asian Superpower’s Renewable Energy
Ambitions Go Beyond Its Belt and Road Initiative (Lakewood, OH: Institute for Energy Economy and Financial
Analysis, August 2018), http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/China_Research_Brief_August-2018.pdf.
20. Bill Goodwin, “Chinese Law May Require Companies to Disclose Cyber-security Preparations outside
China,” Computer Weekly (website), July 3, 2020, https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252485674
/Chinese-law-may-require-companies-to-disclose-cyber-security-preparations-outside-China.
21.

Conrad and Kostka, “Chinese Investments.”
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manufacturing offshore wind turbines)—is at elevated risk of future supply
bottlenecks and price spikes. 22
As China possesses the only integrated mine-to-magnet value chain
in the world, it is currently one of the largest suppliers for Italy’s energy
transition to solar and wind energy. Italy is the fifth-largest importer of
rare-earth metals from China and is extensively sourcing certain critical
materials (such as dysprosium, for which China supplies nearly 99 percent
of the world supply). 23 The current sourcing relationship with China poses
a risk to Italy’s supply-chain planning, as the Chinese government augments
state control of raw materials and plans to increase prices to factor the
environmental and health externalities incurred in processing and exporting. 24
The rate at which Italy and other countries—the United States, South Korea,
Japan, and the Netherlands—rely on Chinese raw-material exports for the
fulf illment of renewable-energy technologies raises concerns of future
supply shortages and anxieties about Italy’s engagement in wind and solar
energy expansion. As Italy signed the Chinese Belt Initiative in March 2019,
which includes deals in the energy and gas sectors, it should employ
an understanding of the current Italy-China supply-chain relationship
in def ining this partnership. Specif ically, Italy may consider the degree
to which it continues to engage with Chinese suppliers and whether
an active diversification strategy should be taken into account as it progresses
toward 2030.

5G Technology Vulnerabilities
5G networks enable the transition to machine-to-machine communication,
supporting voice and digital conversations, the sharing of data, and a multitude
of vertical markets and technology areas such as the Internet of Things,
telemedicine, smart cities, and autonomous vehicles. Italy has already held
5G multiband spectrum auctions, a key step for the expansion of 5G networks
throughout the country. This is a clear indicator of progress, with 5G carrying
great potential to change the economy and directly boost productivity

22. Wiebke Rabe, Genia Kostka, and Karen Smith Stegen, “China’s Supply of Critical Raw Materials:
Risks for Europe’s Solar and Wind Industries?,” Energy Policy 101 (February 2017): 692–99,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301421516304852#bib37.
23. “Does China Pose a Threat to Global Rare Earth Supply Chains?,” ChinaPower Project (website),
May 12, 2021, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-rare-earths/.
24.

Rabe, Kostka, and Stegen, “China’s Supply.”
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from $3.9 trillion in 2018 to $4.8 trillion in 2023. 25 This rollout should
be conducted with caution, however, as the interconnectivity inherent
to 5G technology also poses cybersecurity risks and presents high vulnerabilities
to compromise. As 5G increases the potential vectors of attack, it raises the
risk of a negative impact on the economy. Conversely, Italy tackling the
5G security issue can ensure a trustworthy and secure ecosystem for
businesses and reduce the costs to industrial espionage. Building a trustworthy
5G environment in Italy would allow for a better business environment and
further encourage international investments.
To this end, cybersecurity risks in the development of the 5G network
are two-fold: supply chains and infrastructure and services. 5G supply-chain
networks involve the sourcing of critical materials, including processors,
memories, chipsets, integrated circuits, capacitors, resistors, and batteries
from a wide range of global suppliers. 26 The expansive nature of supply-chain
networks for 5G technology invites considerable challenges for the maintenance
of cybersecurity in Italy. The physical components of 5G technologies
consist of software integration combined with the hardware components
to compose the final product curated by original equipment manufacturers.
Hardware components are often sourced by international suppliers. Huawei,
one of the primary Chinese contractors in Italy, has nearly 150 global suppliers
and its component networks have several software and hardware providers. 27
To this end, the large network of 5G suppliers significantly increases
cybersecurity concerns. In 2019, the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre
(HCSEC) Oversight Board warned of significant technical issues with Huawei’s
engineering processes in software development and that these issues would
materialize into long-term risks for national security. 28 This acknowledgment
came on top of the December 2019 report by Italy’s Parliamentary Committee
for the Security of the Republic (COPASIR), which expressed similar concerns
about Huawei and ZTE’s potential security threats at the hardware, software,
and installation level of 5G development. The concerns raised by both bodies
invite extensive inquiry into future supply-chain and sub-chain networks
in software and hardware component vetting. It is critical to remember
that the supply chain is the most significant attack surface for a product,
25. European House – Ambrosetti, 5G and Security in Italy: An Overview of Problems and
Possible Remedies (Cernobbio, IT: European House, November 2019), 2, https://www.sipotra.it/wp-content
/uploads/2019/11/5G-and-security-in-Italy.-An-overview-of-problems-and-possible-remedies.pdf.
26.

European House, 5G and Security in Italy, 12.

27.

European House, 5G and Security in Italy, 12.

28.

European House, 5G and Security in Italy, 24.
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especially as primary suppliers such as Huawei, ZTE, Nokia, Ericsson, and
Samsung currently have extensive control over the sourcing process. 29
A second vulnerability in 5G technology involves the maintenance
and configuration of telecom infrastructure. Telecom network equipment
enables devices to be installed and maintained, such that network devices’
firmware and software are able to be updated periodically. The installation
of telecom network equipment is complex and difficult to configure, update,
and troubleshoot, often leaving the vendor representatives best equipped
to complete the task. Previously in Italy, companies such as Huawei
subcontracted their maintenance contracts to ser vice providers.
As telecom providers lose network control skills and updates become more
specific to hardware infrastructure, the process will again largely depend
on subcontracting vendors. Currently, Italian telecom providers use
over 100 subvendors. 30
Firmware updates in telecom may involve patching new releases
into networks, which presents risks and transition period access to attackers
who can install malicious firmware updates. Italy’s contracting of companies
that practice maintenance subcontracting increases security risks due
to the large number of agents, vendors, and contractors with access to
sensitive information on the firmware and network. ASUS, for instance,
a Taiwanese original equipment manufacturer with operations in Italy,
inadvertently sent malware to hundreds of thousands of customers through
an automatic software update tool after the company’s server was compromised
by attackers, who used the vantage to push malware directly to machines. 31
In this manner, threat groups can take “Trojan” software updates designed
for industrial networks and push them onto 5G infrastructure—as Italy’s
5G firmware and software are updated over time to account for security
patches and eff iciency, considerations of vulnerabilities brought by the
subcontracting maintenance process and the potential for malicious software
entering the update stream should inform the monitoring and vetting of
telecom maintenance processes.
A report by Italy’s Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic
(COPASIR) further identified the most pertinent risks to cybersecurity
in Italy, including the use of the TOR network, which allows for illegal
29. European House, 5G and Security in Italy, 7.
30. European House, 5G and Security in Italy, 12–15.
31. Kim Zetter, “Hackers Hijacked ASUS Software Updates to Install Backdoors on Thousands
of Computers,” Vice (website), March 25, 2019, https://www.vice.com/en/article/pan9wn/hackers-hijacked
-asus-software-updates-to-install-backdoors-on-thousands-of-computers.
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activities and intrusions to be carried out anonymously (this is enabled
by mechanisms whereby offensive software is broken down into unidentifiable
pieces that take different paths to reach the f irmware). 32 Examples
of such viruses that could impact Italy include WannaCry, which spread to
countries around the world in 2017 and affected computer stations in public
administration (such as hospitals and universities). WannaCry virus could
have been brought to Italy through the installation of backdoors on Huawei’s
supply of devices to Vodafone Italia—viruses such as WannaCry encrypt
the access keys of the infected system and then follow the request for ransom
to recover its data assets.
Viruses such as WannaCry are especially penetrable during the
updating and reconf iguration stages. The COPASIR report builds
on this v ulnerabilit y in its assertion that international suppliers
(such as Huawei) pose signif icant cybersecurity risks to technological
infrastructure. Moreover, though Huawei Italia later asserted there
is no internal regulation that authorizes the Chinese government
entities to induce manufacturers to install hardware or software, there is
currently conf licting information on this matter—some evidence suggests
the Chinese government and intelligence structures can and have relied
on the collaboration of constituent citizens and businesses. 33 This conf lict
surfaces, again, a recurring concern in partnering with China on the
achievement of technological goals. The Chinese government’s relationship
with private and public enterprises is not fully known, and empirical evidence
suggests considerable cooperation between the agents. The unknown nature
of Chinese government/supplier cooperation could pose a significant conf lict
of interest for Italy’s vendors from the country.
Public-private sector and EU cooperation in vetting vendors,
identifying crime f igures, and collecting and implementing threat
intelligence will be critical in the future development of 5G technologies.
Upon recommendations and findings on Huawei, Telecom Italia (TIM),
one of the largest telecom operators in Italy, has excluded Huawei
from a public procurement call for 5G network development in July 2020. 34
What the action demonstrates is a willingness of Italian telecom providers
32. COPASIR, “Relazione sulle politiche e gli strumenti per la protezione cibernetica e la sicurezza informatica,
a tutela dei cittadini, delle istituzioni, delle infrastrutture critiche e delle imprese di interesse strategico nazionale,”
December 12, 2019, 17, https://parlamento18.camera.it/228.
33.

COPASIR, “Relazione sulle politiche.”

34. Elvira Pollina, “Exclusive: TIM Excludes Huawei from 5G Core Equipment Tender,” Reuters (website),
July 9, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech-5g-italy-brazil-exclusive/exclusive-tim-excludes
-huawei-from-5g-core-equipment-tender-idUSKBN24A2AE.
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to receive and implement security intelligence from the national government
and the EU. This action reinforces the warrant for state investment
in vendor vetting and security intelligence about malicious actors.
As the impact of security breaches would affect public operations, the
Italian government is best positioned to collect and disperse security advice
to 5G developers, providers, and end users of the infrastructure.

Early Warning Systems
The Italian Security Intelligence Department (DIS) has noted
in its annual reports that cyber-espionage activities against government
entities and industry have grown in scale, volume, and sophistication. 35
Italy’s cyber-response system is guided by its administrative and personnel
architecture for early detection and alert dispersal. The Inter-Ministerial
Committee for the Security of the Republic (CISR) advises the Prime Minister
on cybersecurity matters and is supported by the Technical Committee for
the Security of the Republic (T-CSIR). 36 T-CSIR enables the implementation
of the cybersecurity national plan by collecting and analyzing data
from public and private entities, recognizes vulnerabilities in cyber
infrastructure, and targets cyber threats. The Security and Intelligence
Department oversees and coordinates activities of the External Intelligence
and Security Agency (AISE) and the Internal Intelligence and Security
Agency (AISI). The Cyber Security Unit (NSC) is an interagency and
intergovernmental organization responsible for preventing and preparing
for national cyber-crises and coordinating responses in the public and private
sectors. Within the NSC, the early warning and cyber incident response
unit is responsible for detecting and responding to cyber crises. The NSC
collects notifications of cybersecurity concerns internationally and evaluates
the severity of incidents and their likelihood of impacting domestic structures
and private/public organizations. 37
These agencies have worked effectively to monitor technologies and
coordinate responses across sectors. The Italian Computer Security Incident
Response Team (CSIRT- Italia) works in information sharing and coordinating
responses in early detection of large-scale compromises. CSIRT-Italia
35. Melissa Hathaway et al., Italy Cyber Readiness at a Glance (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute
for Policy Studies, November 2016), 4, https://potomacinstitute.org/images/CRI/PIPS_CRI_Italy.pdf.
36.

Hathaway et al., Italy Cyber Readiness.

37. Samuele De Tomas Colatin, National Cybersecurity Organisation: ITALY, National Cybersecurity
Governance Series (Tallinn, EE: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2020), 14,
https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/04/NCS_organisation_ITA_2_0_FINAL.pdf.
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underwent a transition phase in 2018 as what were formerly the National
CERT and Public Administration CERT merged to centralize monitoring,
threat detection, prevention, and response systems in one unit. This new
joint entity is especially critical in centralizing the detection of malicious
intrusion across national and private bodies and information sharing.
In October 2019, for instance, the Public Administration CERT section
launched an information-sharing platform to encourage automated transmission
of indicators of compromise among national public authorities. 38 The National
Anti-crime Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure (CNAIPIC) is
responsible for overseeing and protecting the national critical infrastructure
against cyberattack. CNAIPIC is further effective through its participation
in Interpol and Europol collaboration and information-exchange systems and
is the Italian representative and point of contact to foreign police departments.
By investing in the entities described above, Italy has moved in the
right direction in ensuring a reliable personnel capability and developing
response coordination mechanisms among private and public enterprises.
CNAIPIC, for instance, is investing in expanding protocol and agreement
with private-sector parties to ensure transparency and coordinated response
in protecting critical national infrastructure. CNAIPIC and other government
entities have solidified public-private cooperation in ensuring cybersecurity
of critical national infrastructure and have set a road map for future areas
of cooperation in security.
The early warning personnel architecture discussed above is especially
important in combating threats to national infrastructure (such as pipelines).
In 2016, for instance, the Anonymous hacker collective launched distributed
denial of service and cyberattacks on local authorities who participated in
the Trans Adriatic Pipeline project and corresponding government portals.
The collective specif ically targeted the Apulia and Basilicata regions
of Southern Italy. 39 Thankfully, response systems detected the attacks
at an early stage, allowing the portal’s IT administrators to shut down the
portal temporarily. Although the attack was not conducted on the pipeline
itself, hacktivists (hackers who conduct operations to signal discontent
with an issue), admitted to conducting the attack to express frustration
38.

Colatin, National Cybersecurity Organisation: ITALY.

39. Edward Segal, “7 Crisis Management Lessons from Colonial Pipeline’s Response to Cyber
Attack,” Forbes (website), May 10, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsegal/2021/05/08/colonial
-pipeline-cyberattack-is-providing-crisis-management-lessons-in-real-time/?sh=5032154b3d82; and
Catalin Cimpanu, “Anonymous Attacks Italian Government Portals Because of Gas Pipeline Project,”
Softpedia News (website), February 25, 2016, https://news.softpedia.com/news/anonymous-attacks-italian
-government-site-because-of-gas-pipeline-project-500977.shtml.
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with the negative environmental impact of state pipeline infrastructure,
pointing to a deep-seated sentiment that could resurface as further cybersecurity
threats for Italy’s pipelines and other public infrastructure.40
Energy cybersecurity is especially important for Italy since it is a major
oil refining contributor to Europe with a total of 13 crude-oil refineries.41
Current cybersecurity concerns on pipelines are incredibly pertinent and
relevant to Italy. The recent Colonial Pipeline attack that took place
in May 2021, for instance, could potentially be linked to DarkSide
and Adhubllka ransomware, the former of which has already attacked
Banca di Credito Cooperativo, a large Italian cooperative credit bank.42
Thus, the risks of future attacks are imminent, and with Italy’s pipelines
(TAG, TransMEd, and Transitgas) and extensive public infrastructure,
early warning systems are critical in detecting malicious activity at early stages
and preventing harm to critical public infrastructure.

Recommendations
Renewable Energy Management
1. FDI Vetting: Law Decree No. 23 of April 2020 has already
widened the scope of application in FDI screening to protect
national security and public order. This decree came after Law
Decree No. 105/2019, which had already expanded the scope
of the Golden Power Law to extend the Italian government
the power to assess companies holding strategic partnerships
in sectors in security, defense, energy, transport, communications,
or 5G networks, as well as other areas introduced
by EU Regulation No. 452/2019. This extension was hampered
by shortcomings in identifying “relevant strategic assets
in those newly-introduced sectors.”43 Provisions set forth
under Article 15 of the new Law Decree should be employed
and enforced to monitor investment transactions and impact
40. Cimpanu. “Anonymous Attacks Italian Government.”
41. US Energy Information Administration (EIA), “International: Italy,” EIA (website), August 2017,
https://www.eia.gov/international/overview/country/ITA.
42. Pierluigi Paganini, “An Alleged Ransomware Attack Hit the Italian Banca di Credito Cooperativo
Causing Chaos,” Security Affairs (website), April 29, 2021, https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/117360
/cyber-crime/banca-di-credito-cooperativo-darkside-ransomware.html.
43. “Newsalert – Foreign Direct Investments Screening: Italy Expands Its ‘Golden Powers’
to New Key Sectors,” Chiomenti (website), April 9, 2020, 3, https://www.chiomenti.net/en/publications
/newsalert-foreign-direct-investments-screening-italy-expands-its-golden-powers-to-new-key-sectors.
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on strategic sectors. As the article defines critical infrastructure
in energy, critical technologies including energy storage
(Article 2, No. 1 of Council Regulation), and the security
of supply of critical inputs (fattori produttivi), including energy
and raw materials, must be screened and managed at the
national level. 44 While the provision does ensure that companies
holding investment relationships or assets in the energy sector
are required to disclose the nature and extent of partnerships
to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, it is advisable
the Council gather, process, and assess the security implications
of specific partnerships proactively and enforce guidelines
accordingly. FDI vetting findings and recommendations should
further be published and made accessible to both international
investors and domestic market agents.
2. Diversification of raw-material sourcing. Diversification
in the sourcing of critical raw materials will also aid in the
long-term sustainability and security of renewable energy
technologies in Italy. EU efforts are already promoting the
research consortium “Replacement and Original Magnet
Engineering Options” (ROMEO) that consists of 15 research
centers and manufacturers with the aim to develop rare-earthfree magnets.45 Long-term recycling efforts of critical materials
that seem promising for minerals (such as indium and gallium)
can largely be sourced from CIGS post-industrial scrap.46
Wind industries, too, are developing alternate technologies
that are less reliant on the use of the neodymium and dysprosium
currently extensively sourced from China. Private companies
in other EU member states (such as Germany’s turbine
manufacturer Nordex) have already made strides in reducing
their reliance on China by substituting magnet technologies
to reduce the usage of Chinese mineral exports.47
Similar efforts can be promoted and funded at the national
level for Italy’s renewable energy players as well. In addition to
recycling minerals, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Africa, and
44. Chiomenti, “Newsalert,” 5.
45.
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the United States also have significant deposits of rare-earth
metals, with extraction being the main challenge, as opposed
to supply. 48 Alternate deposits exist and can be pursued in the
future as international processing and extraction capabilities
are augmented.

5G Recommendations
1. Rigorous review process beyond the Golden Power Law.
Cybersecurity risks associated with 5G technology involve
several vectors of attack and a high negative economic and
societal impact potential. A critical item to consider in the
development of 5G networks is the Chinese government’s
relationship with vendors, and the pressures it exerts on
the private entities in the 5G development space. Based
on the previous risks posed by international vendors, Italy
should consider the adoption and enforcement of a rigorous
review process beyond the scope of the Golden Power Law.
Italy should invest in acting on the design phase of the
5G system in vetting potential vendor contracts and history,
auditing vendor processes to reduce the probability of negative
occurrences, and testing and simulating critical application
systems to achieve a sustainable level of redundancy (this step
would involve a joint collaboration between vendors and the
CSIRT-Italia with selected vendors).
2. Assessing vendor governance systems.
Vendors’
governance systems, if they fall outside the EU, should be
assessed so the potential influence of the state on their practices
is known. Vendors should be assessed on ownership structure
and transparency and display the ability to manage state
influence by parties of authorities.
3. Assessing technical aspects of vendor competence.
Finally, technical aspects of vendor competence should
be assessed, including the security of the development life cycle,
sustainability, and security of supply chains (including potential
malicious third-party components), and the authenticity and
integrity of software components. Key recommendations
48. Renee Cho, “Rare Earth Metals: Will We Have Enough?,” Columbia Climate School: Climate,
Earth, and Society State of the Planet (website), September 19, 2012, https://news.climate.columbia
.edu/2012/09/19/rare-earth-metals-will-we-have-enough/.
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by the European House - Ambrosetti, recognized as the best
Italian think tank by the University of Pennsylvania in 2021,
support the above recommendations by ensuring an assessment
of its critical infrastructures for FDI, an audit for the whole
supply chain of vendors, and the establishment of a Centre
of Expertise for Cyber Threat Intelligence, where threats are
detected, contained, and mitigated more quickly.49
As suggested in the 5G and renewable management recommendations,
a thorough vetting process of vendors and foreign direct investments is critical
in ensuring the security of technology development.

Conclusion
Overall, Italy should consider the sustainable development and
diversification of its vendors and investors in both the 5G and renewable
energ y space. In partnerships with countries outside of NATO,
rigorous vetting of suppliers and ensuring the integrity of vendors’ governance
systems and technical capabilities is necessary to avoid falling victim
to cybersecurity threats in the future. Both foreign direct investments
and supply-chain processes present important considerations for Italy’s
policymakers, who should work toward strengthening public-private
partnerships and information sharing in the cybersecurity space.

49.

European House, 5G and Security in Italy, 32.
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Figure 15-1. Map of Italy’s threat timeline estimate (6 months indicates likely attack
vector in 2022, 1 year by 2023, 2+ years by 2024 or later)
Credit: Ryan Fisk and Lucas Cox

Location

Reason for Threat Priority and Timeline

Countrywide

Italy, home to several NATO bases, has high levels
of Chinese FDI in its infrastructure, and its primary
5G supplier is Huawei. Supply-chain, technical, and
communication disruptions over the next two years could
be collateral damage in the broader NATO-Russia conflict.

Melendugno Trans Adriatic
Pipeline Terminal

As one of the only direct-access points for Southern
Europe to gas from Azerbaijan, Russia is likely to intervene
to disrupt the energy transition within the next two years.
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ABSTRACT: With huge volumes of international commerce passing
through its ports and as the host of several United States and NATO military
facilities within its borders, Greece is a strategically significant country
in the hybrid threat environment. Greece has an import-heavy economy and
has seen an increase in foreign direct investment into critical infrastructure
(such as in the case of China’s majority stake in the Port of Piraeus).
In addition, the country has a heavy reliance on external sources of energy,
which could be used against the country and the Alliance. Combined
with low apparent effort to secure its critical infrastructure against hostile
actors, Greece’s energy security, and therefore NATO’s, is at an increased risk.
Keywords: Hellenic Electricity Transmission System, China port investing,
GRNET, Port of Piraeus, Port of Thessaloniki, PIXEL, Internet of
Things, China State Grid Corporation

Introduction and Energy Landscape
Greece is a NATO and an EU member, and the United States and
NATO have a military presence in the country. Also known as the Hellenic
Republic and located in the southern Balkans, it is a country of strategic value
for NATO. It is bordered by Albania, North Macedonia, and Bulgaria to the
north, and Turkey to the east. All bordering countries are NATO member
states. Historically, Greece’s economy has been fragile, and it has had major
financial and debt crises in recent history.
There are several military facilities of note to NATO operations.
The NATO Deployable Corps Greece in Thessaloniki is rapidly deployable
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and supports 1,500 troops. Another signif icant facility is located
in Souda Bay on the island of Crete. The United States Navy has a Naval
Support Activity base at Souda Bay, which supports maritime and air operations
across the region. In addition, a combat wing of the Hellenic Air Force and
the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre are located
at the same facility.1 Direct US-Greek defense cooperation has increased
in recent years: MQ-9 Reapers began f lights out of Larisa Air Force Base
in 2018, and bilateral troop exercises happen with increasing frequency. 2
Currently, Greece relies mostly on natural gas to generate electricity. 3
It also produces electricity from coal and has a significant share of renewable
energy production, approaching 20–30 percent of domestic production.
The renewable sources are diversified into wind, solar, hydropower, and
biofuel. Diversification is an advantageous way to increase redundancy and
ensure that cyberattacks must engage more than a single target.
A large share of energy consumed in Greece is from imported sources.
The majority of oil, for example, is imported from Iraq, Kazakhstan, Russia,
and Iran.4 Some LNG is imported via cargo ship, while pipelines carry the
supply from Azerbaijan and Russia.
The operation of Greek electricity infrastructure (the Hellenic
Electricity Transmission System, HETS) is managed by the Independent
Power Transmission Company (IP TO). IP TO is responsible for
managing the mainland power grid, implementing interconnections to
outlying Greek islands and managing international interconnections. 5
In addition, it is responsible for connecting outlying Greek islands (that
currently independently rely on fossil fuels) to the main power grid to reduce
their emissions and provide better stability.
As part of the international bailout after its f inancial crisis,
Greece was required to privatize ownership of its power grid. To this end,
ADMIE Holdings was created to obtain a 51 percent stake in IPTO.
Another 25 percent stake was sold directly to the state. China’s State
1.

“Greece,” NATO SHAPE (website), n.d., https://shape.nato.int/greece.

2. Nektaria Stamouli, “U.S. Military Finds a Warm Welcome in Once-wary Greece,” Wall Street
Journal (website), February 4, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-military-finds-a-warm-welcome-in
-greece-11549319286.
3. “2020 Fossil Fuel Support Country Notes: Greece,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (website), 2020, https://www.oecd.org/fossil-fuels/data/.
4.

“Fossil Fuel Support Country Notes: Greece.”

5. “About Us,” Independent Power Transmission Operator (website), n.d., https://www.admie.gr/en/company
/about-us.

268

Case Study: Chapter 16

Greece

Grid Corporation, the largest utility company in the world and an SOE,
bought a 24 percent stake in IPTO in 2016. 6 While that is still a minority
stake, China has sought the further acquisition of additional stock at the
Port of Piraeus, and it is possible the same could occur in its shares
of IPTO. IPTO manages multiple grid interconnections with neighboring
countries Italy, Albania, North Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Turkey.
Electricity is imported from Turkey, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia. Exports
go to Albania.

Port Security and Internet of Things Integration
In recent years, China has taken a major interest in increasing shipping
and commerce connections to Greece. In 2016, Cosco, a Chinese shipping
SOE, bought a 51 percent stake in the Port of Piraeus, Greece’s largest port
and one of the largest ports in Europe.7 Cosco has committed to investment
in the port facilities in the years since. In addition, pending delays,
Cosco hopes to purchase another 16 percent share. The acquisition of the
Port of Piraeus, a capstone of the Belt and Road Initiative, shows the effects
of the BRI are not absent from NATO countries.
Internet of Things (IoT) business and integration into infrastructure
in Greece is forthcoming. There is no real integration of IoT into critical
infrastructure yet, but the Greek government has shown it is willing
to fund initiatives that prioritize the integration of digital technologies;
IoT would likely be a part of this effort.
Greece’s ports have begun to adopt IoT into their infrastructure
to improve eff iciency, offer better management of cargo logistics, and
better manage the impacts a port can have on its surrounding areas.
PIXEL, an EU-funded research project intended to study the potential IoT
has in making these improvements, has partnered with the Port of Piraeus
and the Port of Thessaloniki in testing and adopting IoT. 8 PIXEL is intended
to be an upgrade to the existing port community service data exchange
facilitation service. The project will connect stakeholders like the port
authority, cargo ships, the surrounding community, and other infrastructure
6. Angeliki Koutantou and Mark Potter, “China’s State Grid Seals Purchase of Stake in Greek Power Grid,”
Reuters (website), 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-public-power-m-a-state-grid-corp/chinas-state
-grid-seals-purchase-of-stake-in-greek-power-grid-idUSKBN1451SM.
7. Costas Paris, “China’s Cosco Pours More Money Into Greek Port,” Wall Street Journal (website),
November 12, 2019, https://w w w.wsj.com/articles/chinas-cosco-pours-more-money-into-greek
-port-11573581625.
8. “PIXEL – Where IoT Meets the Port of the Future,” PIXEL (website), n.d., https://pixel-ports.eu.

269

Fisk

through IoT sensors. Data collected from the sensors will be used
in a centralized dashboard that allows port operators to control and organize
logistics for maximum efficiency.
The Port of Piraeus and the Port of Thessaloniki, the two Greek ports
involved in PIXEL, are test ports for a PIXEL initiative that focuses
on successfully managing the port’s impact on the surrounding community.9
To achieve this goal, there are several target functions IoT will assist
in creating a traff ic-management software that can predict when a ship
or cargo arrival will create bottlenecks and successfully reduce traff ic,
predicting when emissions will increase due to port activity and successfully
managing operations to mitigate them, and the fusion of data from the port
as a whole with rail and road activities to create a more cohesive real-time
view of holistic management.
While a full deployment of IoT into Greece’s ports is not yet a reality,
it is entirely possible. That reality, combined with the Chinese stake in Greek
commerce, would create the risk that NATO and Greece could lose control
of critical assets at opportune times for adversaries.

Vulnerabilities and Trajectories for Hostile Influence
Greece’s high reliance on imports is an inherent vulnerability to the
security of the energy supply. Energy dependence is an issue that could
be exploited to degrade Greece’s ability to respond in support of NATO action.
Second, the PIXEL program has the potential to open up an entirely new
threat surface that hostile actors could target. Zero-day vulnerabilities in any
of the sensors, management dashboard, or anything connected to that system
could be exploited to disrupt shipping and commerce. Especially considering
the volume of commerce that passes through the Port of Piraeus, a new and
potentially vulnerable system could be an attractive way to carry out an attack
against Greece or even NATO readiness.
Third, the increasing Chinese foreign direct investment in Greek
infrastructure carries risks. The Port of Piraeus and the entire operation
of the Greek electricity grid now have a measure of open Chinese inf luence
attached to them. With the majority stake, Piraeus is now effectively controlled
by China, and the stake in IPTO gives it increased inf luence as well.
9. “Port-City Integration: Use Cases,” PIXEL (website), n.d., https://pixel-ports.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03
/PIXEL_UC_PortCity.pdf.
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Should NATO or Greece enter into any form of dispute with China, Beijing
could use these assets as leverage.
With a location in a volatile region and a large US-NATO military
presence, Greece has the potential to be a target for information operations.
Concerning Russia, a likely target for disinformation could be the relationship
between Greece and the EU. The austerity measures imposed on Greece
as a condition for the EU to bail the country out of its debt crisis were unpopular,
and Russia has already attempted to use the increased Euroscepticism
to gain a better foothold in the country. The previous Greek government,
the Syriza-led coalition, had discussions with the Russian government
about pivoting away from the EU for bailout support.10 Russia, however,
was not in a financial position to follow through at that time. Combined
with an already sympathetic Greek public, information that portrayed the
EU as detrimental to Greek interests could find a foothold. Considering
Greece’s strategic location, vulnerabilities in its infrastructure are vulnerabilities
in NATO readiness and troop mobility and should be addressed as such.

Early Warning and Mitigation
The Greek federal government has several organizations tasked
with handling cyberspace-related incidents and providing mitigation
and recovery services. The first and most prominent organization is the
Hellenic CSIRT. It is the most involved CERT in Greek government
and infrastructure and would be the most involved response organization
in the event of a cyberattack on Greek infrastructure, communications,
or anything else that impacts the federal government or daily life.11
Second is GRNET-CERT, the CERT for the Greek National
Infrastructures for Research and Technology. It focuses on mitigation
for Greek research institutes, universities, and educational organizations.12
In addition to cybersecurity-specif ic mitigation, Greece has begun
coordinating with countries it exchanges electricity with to ensure a continuous
flow. The IPTO recently joined in the creation of a Regional Security Coordinator
10. Paul Stronski, “A Difficult Balancing Act: Russia’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (website), June 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/28/difficult
-balancing-act-russia-s-role-in-eastern-mediterranean-pub-84847.
11. “Large Organizations and Infrastructure,” Hellenic CSIRT (website), n.d., https://csirt.cd.mil.gr/large
-organizations-infrastructure/.
12. “GRNET-CERT Profile,” GRNET CERT (website), 2019, https://cert.grnet.gr/wp-content
/uploads/2019/12/rfc.pdf.
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center headquartered in Thessaloniki. The Regional Security Coordinator
is a joint venture between the TSOs of Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and Romania.13
In addition to managing the successful balancing of electricity exchange
in the region, it is intended to promote operational security between grids.
A center in which TSOs have a real-time view of grid interconnections and
energy production from different sources, the RSC can suggest action to the
domestic grid operators to minimize the risks of interrupting supply.
While Greece has these organizations in place to reduce the impacts
of a cyberattack, it is unclear whether there is a national-level early warning
system in place to anticipate and react to a cyberattack on critical infrastructure
or other important systems. The National Cyber Security Strategy, created
and released as a requirement of the NIS Directive, mentions early warning
systems but only in the context of development or that the responsibility
to operate such a system would fall on the national CERT.14
If there is no national early warning system in place to prevent threats,
critical infrastructure is at increased risk.

Policy Recommendations
1. For NATO, Greece is a location of strategic significance.
For this reason, a high dependence on external sources of energy
increases the chances that dependency could be exploited
in a time of conflict or increased agitation between NATO and
a hostile actor. The most effective way to address this problem
is through accelerating the transition to renewable energy
in order to increase energy independence. Without the risk
of suddenly losing access to necessary natural gas, for example,
Greece would be able to better support NATO operations and
deployments. Until that transition is complete, Greece is at risk.
2. The PIXEL program needs to explore the risks of its
integration into a geopolitically volatile environment. For
example, how could the sensors be exploited to cause a shipping
jam and disrupt global commerce? While the potential
13. “Establishment of the Regional Security Coordinator in Thessaloniki, Greece,” ENTSO-E:
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (website), 2019, https://www.entsoe.eu
/news/2019/12/20/establishment-of-the-regional-security-coordinator-in-thessaloniki-greece/.
14. “ΕΘΝΙΚΗ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΗ ΚΥΒΕΡΝΟΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΣ 2020–2025,” Greek National Cybersecurity Authority,
ENISA: European Union for Cyber Security, 2019.
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for increased efficiency through PIXEL is large, IoT opens new
vulnerabilities. In analyzing the impact that PIXEL will have
on a security landscape (if it progresses past trials and eventually
enters a more ingrained operational status), the unified
interface that brings together IoT sensor data throughout the
ports and the city is a system that needs to take security as a
first priority. Such a large breadth of data collection should be
very closely monitored so large-scale abuse of the system does
not occur. In addition, any Greek early warning system would
do well to consider a full-scale integration of PIXEL technology
a priority.
A similar style of consideration should be adopted for any form
of further IoT development as a whole. Greek critical
infrastructure is not yet at the point of IoT integration in which
a hack could cause a major disruption to daily life or the economy,
but IoT that is being developed to manage those areas needs
to take security considerations into account.
3. Foreign direct investment into Greek infrastructure needs
to be closely monitored to look for signs of exploitation
or the potential for exploitation in a conflict or tense situation.
Especially when considering the volume of commerce passing
through the Port of Piraeus, potential risks should be evaluated.
In a situation in which China would need to apply geopolitical
pressure to Greece or the EU, it could use its ownership of the
port as a stick and a carrot.
4. The development of a cyber early warning system
focused on the defense of energy infrastructure should be
prioritized. As time passes and the capabilities of hostile
actors to interfere with energy security increase, the ability
to prevent at least a portion of attacks is crucial to maintaining
energy security for NATO and the Greek population. This
risk is compounded by the IoT integration into the ports in
the country—as IoT develops, the early warning system needs
to integrate into places (like the Port of Piraeus) where the
risk of a cyberattack has been increased. It is positive an early
warning system is on the Greek government’s radar; however,
concrete action is required soon.
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In the case that an early warning system is present but
not clearly disclosed, there should be an effort to increase
transparency. Increased transparency would increase confidence
in Greek cybersecurity and potentially serve as a deterrent
to hostile actors in cyberspace.
5. NATO can play a major part in assisting Greece in its
development of cybersecurity capability. Lending expertise and
resources to the development of an early warning system or ensuring
the security of a full deployment of IoT into ports are ways that
NATO can support Greece’s security and the Alliance as a whole.

Conclusion
Given the level of international commerce passing through Greece’s
ports and its strategically important geographic position, Greece is at risk
of cyberattacks and other activity that is hostile to NATO, the EU, and the
country itself. While some steps have been taken to prepare, more detailed
and enforceable policies regarding IIoT integration into critical infrastructure
are necessary. In addition, foreign direct investment into the country should
be vetted more thoroughly to ensure it does not create an unacceptable risk
to the country or the Alliance.
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Figure 16-1. Greece threat timeline estimate (six months indicates likely attack vector
in 2022, one year by 2023, two+ years by 2024 or later)
Source: Ryan Fisk

Location

Reason for Threat Priority and Timeline

Port of Piraeus

The Port of Piraeus, largely controlled by China, is a test center
for large-scale IoT integration into shipping, commerce, and the
surrounding community. If a full deployment is implemented
after testing, cyber intrusions could disrupt commerce in two
years or more.

Port of Thessaloniki,
IPTO Substations

Cyber protection of the port’s SCADA subsystems will remain
vital over the next year. Any attack here could affect the entire
port and multiple transmission lines.
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ABSTRACT: A NATO member who has provided Ukraine with drones yet
has allowed its waters to be used by Russian warships, Türkiye is trying to
remain neutral and act as a mediator in the current Ukraine-NATO crisis.
A wrong move could compromise Türkiye’s energy landscape. Türkiye
invested approximately $7 billion into renewable-energy sources, but despite
this sizable investment, Türkiye still must import energy primarily from
Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan to meet its domestic energy needs.1 Türkiye
seeks to mitigate the dangers of dependency on these nations by investing
in extensive AI-powered early warning systems to govern its smart grids and
communications networks. These systems are already bearing the brunt of
hundreds of thousands of cyberattacks annually for the purpose of exploiting
Türkiye’s strategic geographic location. These threats are compounded by
the fact that Türkiye does not have very strong cybersecurity legislation,
relying mostly on private partnerships to set standards and respond
to attacks, leaving significant gaps in security.
Keywords: Turkstream, TANAP, Digital Transformation Office, Turkish
Artificial Intelligence Initiative, HackIstanbul, Cyber Star, Southern
Energy Corridor, Russian cyberattack, artificial intelligence, AI early
warning

Introduction
In the aftermath of World War II, the Republic of Türkiye made the
historic choice of siding with the Western Bloc. This move led to Türkiye
joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on February 18, 1952.
Since that date, NATO has been an integral part of the Republic’s security
1. Nuran Erkul, “Turkey’s Renewable Energy Investments Reach $7B in 2020,” AA Energy (website),
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/renewable/turkeys-renewable-energy-investments-reach-7b-in-2020/31659.

277

Eaton

and defense policy. With the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical landscape
radically changed. In this new world, Türkiye found itself in a strategic
role as the bridge between Europe and Eurasia, including the Middle East.
A key component of this new reality is the mass movement of energy resources
from East to West. More importantly, the twenty-f irst century ushered
in vast developments in energy production, security, and alternative/renewable
energy sources.
The case study presented here investigates and advises on the cybersecurity
situation in Türkiye, with a strong eye toward cybersecurity challenges
in the energy sector. More specifically, this case study investigates Türkiye’s
advancements in artif icial intelligence (AI) and its renewable-energy
prospects. We analyze the current energy landscape, advancements in artificial
intelligence, and renewable energy sources. Next, we investigate vulnerabilities
in Türkiye’s energy security realm, followed by the many mitigation methods
Türkiye employs. Finally, we provide recommendations for improvement.

Current Energy Landscape
Türkiye lacks domestic hydrocarbon reserves and relies very heavily
on energy imports. Close to 72 percent of Türkiye’s primary energy supplies—
oil, natural gas, and coal—are imported. 2 Approximately 29 percent of the
country’s energy supply comes from oil, 28 percent from coal, and 25 percent
from natural gas. Furthermore, the country obtains 17 percent of its total
energy from renewable resources, primarily geothermal, with an increasing
reliance on hydroelectric. 3 Despite a positive trend toward renewables,
the country remains highly reliant on hydrocarbon imports.

2. Riaz Uddin et al., “Energy Storage for Energy Security and Reliability through Renewable
Energy Technologies: A New Paradigm for Energy Policies in Turkey and Pakistan,” Sustainability 13, no. 5
(February 2021): 19, https://doi.org/10.3390/su13052823.
3. Uddin et al., “Energy Storage”; and International Energy Agency (IEA), Turkey 2021: Energy Policy
Review (Paris: IEA, 2020), 17, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/cc499a7b-b72a-466c-88de
-d792a9daff44/Turkey_2021_Energy_Policy_Review.pdf.
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Figure 17-1. Total primary energy supply by source, Türkiye 2000–19
Source: International Energy Agency, “Türkiye 2021: Energy Policy Review,” 2020, 20.

Türkiye’s primary source of natural gas is the Russian Federation;
approximately 63 percent of energy imports come from Russia. Türkiye began
importing from Iran in 2001 and Azerbaijan in 2007.4 Despite diversification,
imports from Russia have steadily increased, especially after the completion and
activation of the TurkStream pipeline in early 2020. Along with the TANAP
pipeline route from Azerbaijan, the two pipelines aid in the diversification of
imports (see figure 2). As for oil, Türkiye imports from Iran, Iraq, Russia, and
Saudi Arabia. Overall, Türkiye imports 93 percent of its oil and 99 percent
of its natural-gas supply. 5
Naturally, this lack of a domestically controllable energy supply
has prompted Türkiye to invest heavily in renewable-energy sources.
Electricity production from renewable sources has tripled in the last decade,
with close to 44 percent of electricity being produced by solar, wind, and
geothermal means. 6 This diversification bodes well for the future in that
Türkiye has already exceeded its 2023 goal of 38.8 percent of electricity
generation from renewable sources.
At present, the greatest threats to Türkiye’s energy security come
from its high reliance on foreign energy and from strategically distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. These attacks can impact local infrastructure,
4.

IEA, Turkey 2021, 12.

5.

IEA, Turkey 2021, 11.

6. IEA, Turkey 2021, 1; and “Turkey’s Cyber Shield: Octopus,” TÜBİTAK ULAKBİM Turkish
Academic Network and Information Center (website), January 1, 2019, https://ulakbim.tubitak.gov.tr/en
/haber/turkeys-cyber-shield-octopus-0.
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as well as critical locations abroad, meaning Türkiye can suffer detrimental
effects from an attack that occurs well outside its jurisdiction.

Figure 17-2. Natural gas and crude oil pipeline map
Source: BOTAS (2020)

Alternate/Renewable Energy Sources
Renewables
The Republic of Türkiye has already initiated massive renewable
energy development projects. Rightly recognizing the security and energy
independence risks associated with relying on energy imports, Türkiye began
implementing changes in the early 2000s. Having already attained its 2023
goal of 38.8 percent of electricity from renewables, Türkiye has set a new
goal of increasing solar and wind energy capacity to 10 gigawatts by 2027.7
To achieve this goal, offshore wind projects are already being developed
with Finland. Moreover, Türkiye is in a global band that receives an ideal
amount of solar radiation for effective photovoltaic generation. The government
has demonstrated a desire to repurpose existing land for renewable energy
through the Renewable Energy Resource Areas (YKEA). This action
7.

IEA, Turkey 2021, 13.
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allows land that is currently earmarked for other uses, namely, agriculture,
to be repurposed—or jointly purposed—for energ y production.
Moreover, the YKEA grants Türkiye the opportunity to continue its
agricultural and industrial production, which is ultimately the cause
of increased energy consumption in the country.

Nuclear Energy

Figure 17-3. Map of potential nuclear energy facilities
Source: World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Turkey,” June 2022, https://worldnuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/Türkiye.aspx.

The most immediate major advancement in energy production within
Türkiye is the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu. 8
Slated to open in 2023, the plant will allow the country to begin producing
electricity at a low cost without continual dependence on foreign actors.
It is being built with f inancial aid from Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear
power firm. Despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Türkiye will continue
to build the plant with Russian assistance, as officially condemning Russia
would cause too great a strain on the supply chain and broader financial
stability. Whether the financial assistance to build the plant will last in light
of current sanctions against Russia remains to be seen.

8. IEA, Turkey 2021; and George Koukoudakis, “EU Energy Security and Turkey’s Contribution
to the Southern Energy Corridor,” Mediterranean Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2017): 106–24,
https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-4164292.
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This attempt at nuclear power is not Türkiye’s f irst. Nuclear
energy ambitions began as early as 1970.9 Beyond the Akkuyu plant,
a Franco-Japanese consortium is pursuing construction of a second facility
in Sinop, while work on a reactor in Igneada, constructed by the Chinese
state nuclear corporation and the American firm Westinghouse, has stalled.10
While Türkiye has few deposits of uranium, it does have very large deposits
of thorium—an alternative nuclear fuel source—estimated at 380,000 tons.11
Thorium reactors are likely one of the main avenues Türkiye will take to move
toward future energy independence.

Artificial Intelligence
Türkiye is in the nascent stages of artificial intelligence (AI) development—
at least publicly. As in many countries, AI research in the security sector
in Türkiye is highly competitive and guarded. This report has already noted
the risks of DDoS attacks and vulnerable local infrastructure on the larger
Turkish network. Artificial intelligence could be a major boon in terms of
rapid response and reaction to cyber intrusions. That said, the government
of Türkiye has engaged extensively in AI research, while also investing in
other early warning systems to combat cyberattacks.
Launched in mid-2018, the Digital Transformation Office of the Presidency
of the Turkish Republic (DTO) was created to coordinate technological and
security projects that have potentially great benefits for the entire country.12
The AI work being monitored by the DTO focuses on energy cybersecurity and
economic cyberattacks. Through the DTO, local industry has been encouraged
to develop domestic AI programs, advocating for an advanced-technology
sector independent of foreign business. Furthermore, the Turkish Artificial
Intelligence Initiative (TRAI) has encouraged university and public research
into this burgeoning technology field. The initiative finds and promotes
AI entrepreneurs, establishes best practices and advisory boards, and provides
adequate public knowledge about AI systems. From a content-development

9. “Nuclear Power in Turkey,” World Nuclear Association (website), updated July 2022, https://www.world
-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/turkey.aspx.
10. “Nuclear Power in Turkey.”
11. Mustafa Balat, “Security of Energy Supply in Turkey: Challenges and Solutions,” Energy Conversion
and Management 51, no. 10 (October 2010): 1998–2011, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enconman.2010.02.033.
12. “Turkish Cyber Security Cluster,” Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Digital Transformation
Office (website), 2021, https://cbddo.gov.tr/en/projects/#4801; and “Turkey’s Cyber Shield: Octopus.”
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side, the TRAI creates webinars, seminars, and training sessions to integrate
AI information across the economy through multiple verticals.13
Lastly, events such as HackInstanbul encourage cybersecurity cooperation
through nongovernmental organizations and public and private institutions.
These operations allow for broader participation in countering cyberattacks
and create opportunities to identify young talent that can aid the government
in future cyber operations. These events work with the AI initiatives as part
of Türkiye’s cybersecurity three-year plan announced in December 2020.
After facing over 325,000 cyberattacks, the country aims to develop robust
means to engage cyber threats.

Weaknesses in the Energy Sector
When looking at Türkiye’s energy security from the perspective
of the North Atlantic Alliance, the clear and present threat is the
reliance on Russian energy sources. Due to its proximity and its
abundance of resources, Russia is the most competitive and costeffective energy source for the Turkish state. This reliance is coupled
with the extensive pipeline system the Russian Federation has cultivated
over the last 30 years. With the completion of TurkStream, Türkiye gained
access to low-cost natural gas and the regional power of being an energy hub.
Because of the strategic geographic position of the country, directing gas
to Türkiye allows it to become the entry point for the Southern Gas Corridor.
Relying so heavily on one country’s natural gas, however, can create a pressure
point that countries can exploit.
The direct threat to Turkish energy security needs to be considered.
Indeed, with Russia maneuvering in Turkish waters during the current Ukraine
conf lict, one wrong move could bring profound consequences for Türkiye.
Türkiye further relies on Russian oil and gas imports, the stability of
which are in question in the context of European attempts to ban Russian
energy. Türkiye is a growing country, and modern economic growth requires
a rapid increase in energy consumption. This need can force the government’s
hand as public and private demand necessitate the quick facilitation of energy.
With pipelines already in place and foreign energy sources readily available—
and encouraged by Turkish economic incentives—increased imports are likely.14
13. “Working Groups,” Turkish Artificial Intelligence Initiative (website), 2021, https://turkiye.ai/en
/working-groups/.
14.

IEA, Turkey 2021.
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Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
Türkiye faces many threats but has established a solid foundation for the
alliance. The government is actively increasing domestic AI initiatives but
lacks the high-tech industrial base other NATO allies have. This problem
creates deficiencies, as there is already a need for advanced cyber defense while
Türkiye is still developing its critical technological capacity.
By 2017, Türkiye accounted for 77 percent of “all targeted malware and
ransomware detections in Europe.” 15 More recently, government sources
state over 325,000 attacks have been detected and stopped within the last
three years.16 While the success rate has been good, a major vulnerability
exists since Türkiye does not have comprehensive cybersecurity laws/policies.
Directives and initiatives have been set up by ministries and security
apparatuses, but formal policy does not yet exist.17 Prior data have shown the
soft underbelly of a nation’s cyber network is the private and local entities.18
National security systems are often well-funded and robust. By not having
national policy enforced by a powerful state entity, however, local business,
small government offices, and private corporations are not required to have
rigorous protections.19 As many of these entities are, in some capacity linked
to the critical infrastructure, a small weakness can lead to a major intrusion.

Mitigation Methods
Energy
Renewable energy sources are at the forefront of Türkiye’s plans,
with strategic initiatives on track to be implemented within the decade.
Construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant—and future ones already
15. Salih Biçakci, F. Doruk Ergun, and Mitat Çelikpala, “The Cyber Security Scene in Turkey,”
in A Primer on Cyber Security in Turkey and the Case of Nuclear Power, ed. Sinan Ülgen (Istanbul:
Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, 2015), 77, https://www.edam.org.tr/document
/CyberNuclear/edam_cyber_security_report.pdf.
16. “Turkey Reveals Its Three-year Cybersecurity Plan,” TRT World (website), December 30, 2020,
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/turkey-reveals-its-three-year-cybersecurity-plan-42820.
17. Efe Düveroğlu, “A Comparative Analysis of Critical Infrastructure Cyber Security Policies:
Best Practices from the US, EU and Turkey” (master’s thesis, Bilkent University, June 2020),
http://repository.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11693/53653/10337584.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
18. Faruk Aydin, “Cyber Security in National Protection of Turkey” (master’s thesis, Çankaya
University, September 2012), 18, http://earsiv.cankaya.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.12416
/1151/Ayd%20n,%20Faruk.pdf?sequence=1.
19. Biçakci, Ergun, and Çelikpala, “Cyber Security Scene in Turkey,” 22–51.
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under consideration—coupled with the large deposits of nuclear fuel
should make Türkiye hopeful for increased energ y independence.
Even with the increased funding for renewable energy sources, Türkiye will
remain a fossil-fuel-oriented country for the near future.
When considering the politics of the Eastern Mediterranean, and Türkiye’s
place in the larger Arab/Muslim world, we must consider the fact that Türkiye
seeks to increase its station as a regional energy hub. 20 Türkiye is seeking
to expand pipelines through/from their territory and domestic production
of natural gas via mining. Natural-gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean
are a major point of contention for Türkiye, which seeks to gain a foothold
in the Levantine. 21 More relevant to Türkiye’s energy needs is the August 2020
natural-gas discovery in the Black Sea, the Sakarya gas field, by the Turkish
petroleum agency. 22 Beyond finding deposits, the Turkish government has
finalized agreements to build an undersea gas pipeline from Turkmenistan
to Azerbaijan, through Türkiye, and into Greece and the rest of Europe. 23
This pipeline, along with TANAP, strengthens Türkiye’s position as an energy
hub for Europe, and reduces reliance on Russian natural gas.

Cybersecurity
As with renewable energy sources, Türkiye has made large investments
in creating and building up its domestic cyber sector. Türkiye has already
made major advancements in domestic early-warning technologies through
the development of four cyber-shield/early-warning software systems: Octopus
(which meets NATO standards), Avci, Azad, and Kasirga. Reports state these
systems were critical in stopping the 325,000 cyberattacks. 24
Türkiye’s Cyber Star competition created opportunities for rising
cybersecurity leaders. Successful entrants in the competition were hired
by TRCERT, Türkiye’s National CERT unit. This unit went on to participate
in NATO’s CMX-2017 Crisis Management Exercise in October 2017 and
the National Cyber Defense Exercise in November 2017. 25 Altogether, the
20. Ali Tekin and Paul A. Williams, “Turkey and EU Energy Security: The Pipeline Connection,”
East European Quarterly 42, no. 4 (January 2009): 419–35.
21. Vedat Yorucu and Özay Mehmet, The Southern Energy Corridor: Turkey’s Role in European Energy
Security, vol. 60, Lecture Notes in Energy Series (Cham, CH: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 47–49.
22.

IEA, Turkey 2021, 25.

23. Yorucu and Mehmet, Southern Energy Corridor, 48.
24.

TRT World, “Turkey Reveals Three-year Cybersecurity Plan”; and “Turkey’s Cyber Shield: Octopus.”

25. ITU Publications, Global Cybersecurity Index – 2018 (Geneva, CH: ITU Publications, 2019),
https://www.itu.int/pub/D-STR-GCI.01-2018.
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advancements made garnered Türkiye a “High Level of Commitment” rating
in the Global Cybersecurity Index, the same level as the United States,
the United Kingdom, France, and many other NATO allies. 26

Recommendations
1. Energy independence. Türkiye should rapidly increase the
production of renewable-energy sources and reduce dependence
on Russia. The more integrated Russia and Türkiye become, the
harder it will be for them to disengage in the future. Naturally,
this reliance embeds foreign interests in Türkiye for years
to come.
Additionally, Türkiye should move away from cooperation
with Russian financiers on secondary projects, specifically the
nuclear power plant. Future nuclear power plants are already
under discussion, and seeking NATO-backed financing would
instill confidence with NATO allies and ensure reliable parties
are participating in critical infrastructure. More importantly,
this action would allow Türkiye to ensure its infrastructure
meets Alliance security standards. Continued partnership with
Russia erodes Türkiye’s sovereignty by creating opportunities
for Russia to exercise further control over the Black Sea region
through cyberattacks on existing oil fields as well as controlling
funding over new nuclear power plants.
2. Develop domestic cybersecurity laws. This development
is most important in the private sector. As Türkiye is a
growing regional and global economic force, its private sector
will be increasingly integrated with European and American
businesses. If the Turkish private sector has significant lapses
in security or inadequate protocols for responding
to cyberattacks, vulnerabilities will be created for their
business partners, posing a grave threat to their European and
American counterparts and the economic growth and security
of Türkiye.

26.

ITU Publications, Global Cybersecurity Index – 2018.
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3. Prioritize NATO objectives in the Middle East. Türkiye
is seeking to increase its power and independence within its
geopolitical sphere of influence. Its advantageous position
in the Southern Energy Corridor gives Türkiye many new
opportunities. Türkiye should use its position to aid greater
NATO objectives in the Middle East and Asia. Rapidly
expanding its cybersecurity infrastructure and integrating it with
NATO allies and industries would bolster Türkiye’s position
as a frontline nation in a volatile region. This integration,
however, is not just the responsibility of Türkiye. Europe and
the United States must make overtures to Turkish industry and
Turkish geopolitical goals. Sharing technology and integrating
Turkish security policy into the grander NATO objective would
fortify against threats to the alliance.

Conclusion
Türkiye is maintaining a delicate balancing act between NATO investment
and business in the region, Russian interests, and its rapidly expanding
domestic infrastructure. Foreign investments have generated a great deal of
domestic wealth. Without a strong domestic policy focus on security, these new
developments will be difficult to maintain in the future as they may become
points of exploitation. Due to NATO exposure through business interests and
investment, foreign investments could create an opening to exercise political
inf luence over Türkiye and NATO nations operating in Türkiye.
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Figure 17-4. Map of Türkiye’s threat timeline estimate (6 months indicates likely
attack vector in 2022, 1 year by 2023, 2+ years by 2024 or later)
Credit: Ryan Fisk and Lucas Cox

Location

Reason for Threat Priority and Timeline

Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline

Expect a kinetic or ICS attack within two years as the
pipeline has been previously kinetically attacked several
times by the PKK. It could also serve as target for Russia
if tensions escalate.

Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant

Expect the Rosatom-funded nuclear plant to serve
as target within two years if Türkiye changes its posture
toward Russian energy.

Kemer Dam and Power Plant

Expect an ICS attack within six months if tensions escalate
with Russia due to the plant’s strategic importance
to Turkish energy independence, which Moscow seeks
to disrupt.

Strait of Bosporus

Expect disinformation or ICS attacks in the infrastructure
surrounding the Bosporus due to its strategic location
for Russia’s war in Ukraine and military needs in the
Mediterranean.
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– Case Studies –
Conclusion: Southeastern Europe
The nations of Southeastern Europe face a wide variety of threats
to their critical energy infrastructure. Romania faces cyberattacks and potential
hybrid warfare in the wake of the Ukraine crises in its EEZ, while Greece
and Italy face vulnerabilities due to Chinese and Russian financing of critical
infrastructure and potentially dangerous hardware. Türkiye is reliant on
Russia for its energy needs, making it captive to Russia’s geopolitical interests.
The current energy landscape leaves Southeastern Europe rich for exploitation
by state and non-state actors with the number of cyberattacks in the region
rising as Russia, China, and Iran exert their inf luence. The current Ukraine
conf lict provides the opportunity for the region to wean itself off its
dependencies. While Russia will not be able to continue to support some
of the energy critical infrastructure development projects due to its economic
isolation, China will try to continue to play a subtle role. Southeastern Europe
will need to choose to partner consciously with NATO member states for its
renewable, oil and gas, and energy infrastructure needs if the cycle of energy
insecurity is to be broken.
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“Just as there is a hybrid war, there will be hybrid peace.”
—Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky1
As of this writing, Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine and its allies
in NATO continues. Any lessons Ukraine has taught NATO may
be preliminary, but patterns have already started to emerge.


The emerging technology environment creates additional
vulnerabilities to critical energy infrastructure during
hybrid war. As section one demonstrated, malicious cyber
actors, whether nation-states or cybercriminals, are taking
advantage of the vulnerabilities created by an Internet
of Things environment, where SmartGrids, renewable energy
sources, and the IT and OT environment can be compromised
remotely. This landscape has been tested and attacked in
the early months of the war in both Ukraine and NATO
member states by Russian-backed hacker groups who have
targeted satellites, wind turbines, and the technological
processes of distribution of coal and thermal power plants. 2
In addition, Russian FSB officials have previously carried
out cyberattacks against critical energy infrastructure in the
United States, including oil and gas, energy, nuclear power
plants, and utilities companies, giving Moscow the ability
to cause disruption on a massive scale now. 3



Russia is targeting energy security through cyber means
in tandem with kinetic attacks. As the Microsoft Digital
Security Unit’s report on Russia’s cyberattacks on Ukraine
mentioned in chapter 2 shows, the current hybrid war

1. “Purpose of Meeting with Putin Depends on When Such Talks to Take Place,”
Ukrinform (website), May 21, 2022, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3488659-zelensky
-purpose-of-meeting-with-putin-depends-on-when-such-talks-to-take-place.html.
2 Sean Lyngaas, “Russian Hackers Allegedly Target Ukraine’s Biggest Private Energy Firm,” CNN
(website), July 1, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/01/politics/russia-ukraine-dtek-hack/index.html.
3. Katie Benner and Kate Conger, “U.S. Accuses 4 Russians of Hacking Infrastructure, Including Nuclear
Plant,” New York Times (website), March 24, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/us/politics
/russians-cyberattacks-infrastructure-nuclear-plant.html.
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being waged was planned long in advance. It included cyber
espionage on NATO countries (such as Turkey and Germany).
Physical attacks on cities are timed with major cyberattacks
on critical infrastructure, both in Ukraine and partner NATO
member states.
While stating that Ukraine’s cybersecurity teams are not
afraid of Russian attacks on their power grids and nuclear sites,
Viktor Zhora, Ukraine’s cyber authority of the State Service
of Special Communications, predicted: “This is happening
for the first time in history and I believe that cyber-war can
only be ended with the end of conventional war, and we will
do everything we can to bring this moment closer.”4


Russia has used information operations and malign
inf luence and manipulation to create a global energy crisis
in the lead-up to and throughout the Ukraine war.
These operations in turn affected food security, the supply
chain, transportation, and logistics, with an impact on NATO’s
militaries. Whether holding gas and oil supply hostage
or using disinformation to try to divide Allies or reframe
their war of aggression, Russia has used the West’s reliance
on its energy for its geopolitical purposes. As demonstrated
in the case studies, Russia’s hybrid war is being fought
with the support of China. China has helped materially to soften
the impact of economic sanctions on Russia, assisted Russia
with tracking Chinese-made drones being used on the
battlefield in Ukraine, and exerted its control over the critical
infrastructure and supply chain of NATO member states.

A Look Ahead
It is clear from lessons one and two that today’s hybrid warfare will
continue to target critical energy infrastructure. This study also found the
cybersecurity in place on critical energy infrastructure is not suff icient
to protect NATO member states from attacks. This finding was true whether
examining traditional infrastructure (such as gas pumps and electric grids)
or renewable infrastructure (such as wind turbines and microgrids).
4. Joe Tidy, “Ukraine Says It Is Fighting First ‘Hybrid War,’ ” BBC News (website), March 4, 2022,
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60622977.
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It is, therefore, highly recommended that NATO member states prioritize
investing in research and development on cyber early warning systems
(CEWS) that include virtual modeling of critical energy infrastructure
for early mitigation of malicious intrusions. As demonstrated in section
two, these new generation CEWS are meeting with success in labs from the
United States to Romania and Germany. There, AI and machine-learning
technologies have been combined with sensing and controls to locate and
neutralize cyberattacks. By using the virtual model of a natural-gas pipeline
and combining it with machine learning, cyberattacks can be identified early
and mitigated. Threat intelligence modeling and identif ication systems,
based on heterogeneous information networks that use cyber entanglement
capabilities, are also helpful in this effort. The modeling helps visualize the
strategic, operational, and tactical effects in cyberspace. While these methods
are just in nascent phases of development, with increased R & D funding and
the implementation of successful prototypes, grids, gas pipelines, and other
energy sources can be protected more adequately from cyberattacks. Any
CEWS development must be in addition to anomaly detection monitoring in
critical energy infrastructure.
Second, NATO and the US military have stated their intentions to
ensure installations are energy independent, and mobile combat units are
not fuel dependent. Strides are being made to improve mobile microgrids.
Field testing and research still need to be done, however, to ensure microgrids
can use renewable and fuel sources reliably. In addition, cybersecurity must
be built in on the front end of the microgrid design, and islanding should
be practiced regularly to ensure military installations can support critical
systems if host nation grids fail.
Finally, NATO member states should free themselves from future malign
inf luence and coercion campaigns—whether from Russia, China, or other
NATO adversaries—by decreasing their energy and supply-chain dependencies.
Tracking and countering information operations through NATO’s Joint
Intelligence and Security Division is a start, but fostering sustainable,
non-hackable energy sources within and across the NATO Alliance will
be equally crucial.

Areas for Further Research
Sourcing cyber secure energy independence for militaries in an era of
hybrid warfare remain an area requiring more research. While NATO has
politically rallied around supporting the expansion of renewable-powered
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microgrids and is interested in improving its cyber early warning capacities,
technologies that may be developed more quickly may be too controversial
at NATO Headquarters to be approved for use any time soon. One example
is the small modular reactor (SMR). Small modular reactors are advanced
nuclear reactors that have a power capacity of up to 300 megawatts of electricity
per unit, which is about one-third of the generating capacity of traditional
nuclear power reactors. While SMRs will be ready for deployment on US bases
by 2026, likely much earlier than renewables-powered microgrids, their use
on military installations in Europe remains an area that requires additional
testing and political will. 5 A study by the NATO Energy Security Centre
of Excellence assessed them not battlefield-ready due to high construction
costs and waste and excessive regulatory restrictions. 6 Given their smaller
footprint, however, SMRs can be used on locations not suitable for larger
nuclear power plants. They offer savings in construction time and can be
deployed by NATO states incrementally to match increasing energy demand.7
In areas lacking sufficient lines of transmission and grid capacity, militaries
can install SMRs into an existing grid or remotely off-grid, as a function
of their smaller electrical output, providing necessary energy for military,
industry, and the population. They also have reduced fuel requirements. Power
plants based on SMRs may require refueling only every three to seven years
in comparison to between one and two years for conventional nuclear plants.
Some SMRs are designed to operate up to 30 years without refueling. These
advantages make them especially useful for the military to ensure independence
of energy supply to their bases or forward operating areas.
One example of the future cooperative use of SMRs between NATO
nations is the intergovernmental agreement between Romania and the
United States signed in December 2020 for the United States to help Romania
develop, license, and construct its own SMR. Similar agreements could also
assist with deployment in other Three Seas Initiative countries, and the
SMRs could also be deployed in the Baltics, Poland, Bulgaria, Turkey, and
Greece. 8 Until there is greater political momentum in Brussels, research and
5. Timothy Renahan, “Realizing Energy Independence on U.S. Military Bases,” Joint Forces Quarterly 103,
no. 4 (2021).
6. Lukas Trakimavicius, “Is Small Really Beautiful? The Future Role of Small Modular Nuclear
Reactors (SMRs) in the Military,” NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (website), November 2, 2020,
https://www.enseccoe.org/data/public/uploads/2020/11/02.-solo-article-lukas-smr-eh-15-web-version-final.pdf.
7. Renahan, “Realizing Energy Independence.”
8. “Teaming Agreement Signed for Romanian SMR Deployment: New Nuclear,” World Nuclear News
(website), November 5, 2021, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Teaming-agreement-signed
-for-Romanian-SMR-deployme.
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construction of this energy independent option for military installations will
likely need to be done on a bilateral or regional level.
Today’s energy is only as secure as the cybersecurity protecting its
critical infrastructure and the will of its state users not to be reliant on adversary
nations for its supply. Ukraine has taught NATO that hybrid wars are worth
fighting to defend freedom. Critical energy infrastructure, cyber resilience,
a fierce sense of independence, and support from democratic alliances can
aid that process. For the sake of Ukraine and its NATO partners, let us hope
hybrid war turns to hybrid peace soon.
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Glossary

Terms as defined by the Department of Defense and NATO
AI: Artificial Intelligence.
BAD: Behavior Anomaly Detection.
Baltic Cyber Shield: An annual cyber defense exercise.
BRELL Network: A network that connects Belarus, Russia, Latvia, and
Lithuania via AC power lines.
CERT: Computer Emergency Response Team.
CEWS: Cyber Early Warning System.
CHEC: China Huadian Engineering Company.
CIA Triad: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability of Data.
CIIP: Critical Information Infrastructure Protection.
CNAIPIC: The National Anti-crime Centre for the Protection of Critical
Infrastructure.
Critical Energy Infrastructure (CEI): Encompasses the processes of energy
generation, transmission, distribution, and consumption.
Critical Infrastructure: Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
vital to the United States.
Cybercriminals: Criminals who use the computer in the commission
of a crime.
DDoS: A Distributed Denial-of-service attacks target websites and servers
by disrupting network connectivity and service.
Digital Certificates: A crucial part of public key infrastructure that binds
an identity (often a user or device) to the encryption keys associated
with them for identification purposes.
Disinformation: Verifiably false or misleading information created, presented,
and disseminated for economic gain or to deceive the public intentionally.
DoS: Denial of service is a malicious attack aiming to render a computer
or network resources unavailable.
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DSO: Distribution System Operator.
Dutch Polder Model: A consensus-based method of economic and social
policy making that draws together 100+ stakeholders.
EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone.
EMER ALD: Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Anomalous
Live Disturbances.
Energy Security: Uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an
affordable price.
EWS: Early Warning System.
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment.
Fit-for-RES: Fit-for-Renewable Energy Source market economy.
Gazprom: Russian state-owned energy group.
Golden Power Law: An Italian law that provided the Italian government
the power to access companies holding strategic partnerships in sectors
in security, defense, energy, transport, communications, or 5G networks; other
areas were introduced by EU Regulation No. 452/2019.
Honeypot: A computer security mechanism set to detect, def lect, or counteract
attempts by unauthorized user.
Hybrid Threats: Threats that combine military and nonmilitary as well
as covert and overt means.
Hybrid Warfare: A theory of military strategy that combines conventional
and irregular methods.
ICA: Internal Certificate Authority. A serval internal to a network responsible
for managing, generating, and issuing digital certificates.
IDS: Intrusion Detection System is a device that monitors a network
for malicious activity. When suspicious activity is detected, it is logged and
sent to an administrator or stored.
IEA: International Energy Agency.
Insider Threat: The potential of an insider to use his/her access knowledge
of an organization’s resources to cause damage or disruption.
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Internet of Things (IoT): A network computing device that interacts
with its environment, sensors, software, and other technologies.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS): A device used to monitor or surveille
a network system.
IRES: Intermittent Renewable Energy Resources.
Locked Shields: An international crisis exercise that tests the skills
of cybersecurity professionals to defend critical infrastructure and IT
against real-time attacks.
Memcached: A temporary information cache system that, if left public online,
could be used to conduct a denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
Microgrids: An alternative source of energy. It is a self-contained power
system network confined to a small geographic area.
Norms: Aspects of international relations that arise from a community
based on certain beliefs and values.
OES: Operations Essential Service.
OVI: Operations Vital of Importance.
Phishing: Using a fraudulent e-mail in order to steal information or gain
unauthorized access to a network. Designed to trick a user into executing
malicious code or responding with information.
Ransomware: A type of malware which holds a device hostage by locking
down key system components, usually at the root level, until the user meets
the demands of the attacker.
Renewable: A natural resource or source of energy that is not depleted
by use, such as water, wind, or solar power.
RES: Renewable Energy Source.
RIA: Estonia’s Information Systems Authority.
ROMEO: Replacement and Original Magnet Engineering Options,
consisting of 15 research centers and manufacturers aiming to develop
rare-earth-free magnets.
RTOS: Real-time Operating System.
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SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition is a system of software
and hardware elements used for controlling, monitoring, and analyzing
industrial devices and processes.
SMR: Small modular reactor.
SOEs: China’s State-owned Enterprises.
Spear phishing: Using a targeted, fraudulent e-mail under the guise
of legitimate personal circumstances in order to steal information or gain
unauthorized access to a network.
TOR Network: A network that allows users to access web browsers
anonymously and conduct their illegal and nefarious activities.
TR AI: Turkish Artificial Intelligence Initiative.
TSO: Transmission System Operator.
Wateringhole: A cyberattack where the attacker infects a website often visited
by the victim.
WOMBAT: Worldwide Observatory of Malicious Behaviors and Attack
Threats.
YKEA: Türkiye’s Renewable Energy Resource Areas.
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